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 Familiar to most anyone with knowledge of U.S. history, antebellum Indian 
removal likely evokes a drama comprised of two roles: on one hand, Indian peoples as 
represented by elite Cherokee activists, and, on the other, their political antagonists in the 
nascent states' rights movement, among whom the infamous Andrew Jackson stands both 
as agent and symbol. What may be surprising, however, is that Americanist scholarship 
on Native removal similarly reduces it to an overarching Indian-Anglo binary. As against 
a two-worlds model that frames removal writ large in terms of a single political dualism, 
I argue that regionally specific forms of Native dispossession around the time of the 
Indian Removal Act (1830) yield different narrative assemblages of Indian identity. 
Further, these assemblages correspond with differences in the historical conditions of 
settler colonialism in different parts of the country, conditions irreducible to a single 
narrative premised on the territorial claims of the United States. Combining work in the 
field of Native studies by scholars such as Gerald Vizenor and Jodi Byrd with post-
structuralist insights into the relationship between narrativity and historicism, this 
dissertation develops a geographic paradigm that emphasizes the ways in which both 
Native and settler actors use linear narratives of history to fashion claims to territory. 
Each chapter situates the work of an Indigenous activist of the period (the Cherokee 
spokesperson Elias Boudinot, the Pequot minister William Apess, and the Sauk warrior 
Black Hawk) in relation to non-Native political and literary texts that lay claim, whether 
implicitly or explicitly, to lands otherwise held by these activists' respective nations. 
Accordingly, the project argues for a change in the conceptualization of Indian identity. 
Rather than a vexed yet essentially referential signifier for Native peoples, Indianness as 
a narrative construct marks the point at which uneven and at times competing territorial 
claims by different settler actors gives way to a portrait of the historical necessity of a 
given claim. What is more, this narrativity becomes available to Native peoples 
themselves as these regional struggles unfold. Insofar as it renders a linear historicity in 
the service of land claims, narrating Indianness gives Native activists a means to 
represent place-based Indigenous sovereignty to audiences not inclined to make sense of 
this concept. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION: FROM A HISTORY OF REMOVAL TO  
THE HISTORICITY OF SETTLER COLONIALISM 
 
 In April 1829, a Cherokee delegation led by John Ross, Principal Chief of the 
Cherokee Nation, met with President Jackson's Secretary of War John Eaton to protest 
the administration's insistence on removal. Though not the first, this meeting gained 
added urgency by the recent discovery of gold on Cherokee lands that were also claimed 
by Georgia. In addition to intensifying already massive settler encroachments, the 
discovery led the state to annex the lucrative territory, thus beginning its infamous 
legislative assault on Native political autonomy. Eaton's response predictably rehashed 
the arguments for Native occupancy laid out in Johnson v. McIntosh (1823), in which 
Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall excavated and normalized a centuries-old 
doctrine of discovery. Yet Eaton did so toward what must have been a stunning assertion. 
In addition to tracing the supposed precedents for state sovereignty, he found the 
immediate cause of intensifying violence and state aggressions alike to be the "course" 
taken by the Cherokee in "establishing an independent, substantive, government" within 
Georgia's borders (qtd. in Prucha 45). The irony was not lost on Cherokee activist Elias 
Boudinot. He would respond in the Cherokee Phoenix the following June that his people 
"have always had a government of their own" and Georgia a pretext for its usurpation; yet 
nothing was said of the impossibility of adapting such governance when his people 
observed "savage laws" (Boudinot 108-9). He hammered the point. In retrospect, it could 
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not but seem that "the illustrious Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe were only 
tantalizing us" by encouraging "the pursuit of agriculture and Government" (Boudinot 
108). 
 Taken together, these claims illustrate the historical and geopolitical dynamics at 
the heart of this project. Positing anachronistic Indianness (here a polity that previously 
either lacked "substance" in its autonomy or existed under the thrall of "savage laws") 
organizes a linear historicity that functions as a claim to Native space. What do I mean 
here? As the following chapters will demonstrate, settler juridical and territorial 
maneuvers against place-based Native sovereignty during the antebellum period involve 
narrating Indian identity as consisting in an ontologically-grounded anachronism, what 
Jean O'Brien has described regarding New England historiography as a process of firsting 
(settlers) and lasting (Natives). Rather than argue that this feature of antebellum 
historiography reflects a deeply embedded process of settlers writing Indians out of time, 
a process that Maureen Konkle contends reveals the fundamental racism behind Indian 
removal, this study proceeds in the opposite direction. In short, I do not take the sense of 
homogenous time supposedly indexed by non-Native historiography for granted as a 
construct from which Indians can be written out, so to speak. Instead, the production of 
this very sense of History, the production of a linear narrative of time that is de facto 
oriented to settler presence, state governance, and the continued colonization of 
Indigenous peoples, constitutes a geopolitical maneuver against place-based Native 
sovereignty, but one that does not register as such precisely insofar as it appears as the 
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given background, the foundation, for any intelligible claim to political sovereignty in the 
first place. 
 The term settler historicity encompasses the notion that the narrativity of linear 
time both sustains and facilitates the dispossession of Native lands by different settler 
actors. As a methodological tool, this concept draws on the work of scholars such as O' 
Brien and Konkle, who address the ways in which non-Native historiography helps to 
produce a historical consciousness that places Native peoples in a position of alterity. 
However, in place of reading this feature of antebellum writing as expressing a more 
fundamental logic of racialization, which I feel obscures rather than clarifies the 
workings of settler colonialism, I transpose it into a geopolitical framework within which 
neither a coherent, one-size-fits-all "Indian" identity nor the settler/U.S. rights to Native 
space are simply given in advance. In making this move, I place the work of Hayden 
White, Michel Foucault, and Gerald Vizenor in conversation with one another.  
 White has spent an entire career exploring what can be conceived as the moral-
ideological roots of historiography. For him, the writing of history, insofar as it relies on 
narrative, presupposes a conception not only of a given social order, but one whose 
givenness depends upon a set of axiomatic ethical relationships embodied in notions like 
"the people," for instance. He refers to the late-Roman Annalists to make this point: 
"What is lacking in the [chronological] list of events" that impedes a sense of "regularity 
and fullness is a notion of a social center by which to locate [these events] with respect to 
one another and to charge them with ethical or moral significance" (11). Such lists do 
indeed give a sense of the expansiveness of time; what they lack is grounding within a set 
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of relationships whose interplay gives the notion of society its life, its basic dynamic. 
Conversely, insofar as historical narrative does come to provide this sense of fullness (of 
both events and the actors engaged in them), its reproduction over time exerts a powerful 
influence on the possibilities entailed in the concept of society moving forward. Put 
another way, the narrativity of history across a range of discourses, including but 
exceeding historiography, reinforces dominant social formations by “making [them] 
desirable” as indices of reality (20).   
 White's insight into the ideological efficacy of history writing clears the space for 
thinking about the narrativity of history as a maneuver against place-based Native 
peoplehood. The problem that arises in shifting the narrativity of History (as it relates to a 
certain view of social normativity/order) beyond the frame of historiography proper and 
into a geopolitical matrix, within which different settler and Native actors vie for 
territorial sovereignty, relates to causality. For White, historians do not intentionally seek 
to foster a specific ideological view of social relations, but they do so nonetheless insofar 
as the objective relationships taken to comprise social "reality" contribute to the 
narrativity of History in the first place. But how does this insight relate to colonization 
and the dispossession of Native lands, which seems like an intentional process, especially 
when considering the political maneuvering that led to the Indian Removal Act of 1830? 
The first step here is to recognize how the historicity of Indian removal already endows 
Native dispossession with a linear coherence: the Removal Act initially evokes Cherokee 
Removal, calling to the fore Andrew Jackson and the Trail of Tears. As such, this 
narrativity lends to a kind of historical amnesia regarding the geopolitical complexity of 
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Indigenous struggles against different forms of settler colonialism during the antebellum 
era.  
 The differences in forms of dispossession of Native groups by a wide range of 
settler, state, and colonial actors are quite drastic. In short, while for the Cherokee people, 
removal policy represents a clear shift away from civilization policy, for Native nations 
of New England there was never anything like a uniform, institutionally-sanctioned drive 
to "civilize" the Indian in the first place. By the antebellum era, the patchwork of 
guardian and reservation systems deriving from late-seventeenth century colonial policy 
had become so embedded in public praxis and consciousness alike that it is no stretch to 
suggest that peoples like the Pequot, Narragansetts, and Wampanoag fell outside of the 
frame of the period's predominant "Indian Question." By contrast, for Indigenous nations 
of the Midwest and beyond, there would be no such concerted effort until well after the 
Civil War, especially after the unilateral termination of treaty-making by the U.S. 
Congress in 1871 (through a rider attached as an afterthought to an appropriation bill) 
made it simpler to deny that place-based Native peoplehood constituted a political 
sovereignty irreducible to the juridical purview of the settler state. And yet, even if 
civilization policy in its own context, around the turn of the nineteenth century, 
represented a somewhat coherent approach to diplomacy with Native nations, it 
nonetheless met with mixed responses among the southeastern peoples that the federal 
government were most interested in civilizing, given their large land bases and potential 
for armed conflict on a broad scale. As is well established (and will be discussed at length 
in chapter one), Boudinot's remarks certainly do not signify the mass acceptance of either 
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the material or ideological contours of Euramerican civilization by the whole of the 
Cherokee people. 
 Accordingly, in bracketing the centrality of Cherokee removal, this study 
emphasizes the role that settler historicity plays in organizing different struggles over 
different Native spaces (different geographic regions of the country) almost 
simultaneously. Michel Foucault's thinking is helpful here in building on the work of 
White. Where White identifies a certain fundamental social/ideological/moral efficacy 
bound up in the reproduction of historical narrative, Foucault's work in the Archaeology 
of Knowledge, a text that acts as retrospective methodology for his earlier books like 
Madness and Civilization and The Order of Things, shifts away from a perspective 
hinging on the writer/historian as the agent of historicism (and the ideology that it relays) 
and toward one that privileges the autonomy of discourse. For Foucault, discourses 
(which I take as including but exceeding historical narrative or historiography proper) are 
more than "groups of signs" in the sense of a set of terms and relationships that merely 
refer to "contents or representations" beyond them; they are rather "practices that 
systematically form the objects of which they speak" (AK 49). Foucault would build on 
this idea going forward as he began to develop the concept of genealogy, but this 
articulation is useful in thinking about the intersection between non-Native portrayals of 
Native space and figurations of Native peoples, on one hand, and the politics of 
dispossession, on the other. Following his work in the Archaeology, settler historicity can 
be thought to comprise a maneuver against place-based Native peoplehood in that it 
sustains representations of sovereignty that foreclose Native claims to land and 
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governance. Furthermore, such a maneuver can be understood as cohering apart from the 
will of any individual settler actor, such as (perhaps especially) Andrew Jackson.  
 Foucault's thinking here further dovetails nicely with that of Gerald Vizenor, 
since the very idea of "the Indian" can be understood as a discursive object, as Foucault 
presents the concept: the "reality" of "the Indian" derives largely from the networks of 
non-Native discourses that render it visible or legible over time. Vizenor's concept of the 
post-Indian gets at a similar notion. As he argues, the “Indian” cannot be separated from 
a teleology, that of American history, that normalizes the concept of "discovery" to the 
point that Indigneous peoples seem unimaginable apart from the colonial/European 
binary that this concept embeds. Vizenor further contends that reality can be conceived of 
as a process of hyperreality corresponding with an embedded demand on the part of 
different social actors that the world present something “real." Insofar as the basis for 
such expectations is a certain representation of the past, however vague, what we might 
label as settler or non-Native hyperreality casts Native peoples either as “simulations of 
the ‘absolute fakes’ in the ruins of representation, or the victims in literary annihilation” 
(Manifest 9). Building from this view, this project asserts that the “Indian” is not a thing 
that exists prior to a discourse that constructs it; rather, Indianness poses itself as doomed, 
lost, tragic and backwards as a function of colonization, which suggests that its 
supposedly essential features demarcate relations of power rather than the excavated 
remnants of a permanently eclipsed authenticity. In a sense, what the following chapters 
seek to do is to take Vizenor's thinking here seriously as a foundation for a different kind 
of historicist inquiry into antebellum dispossession. The networks (involving disciplines 
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like anthropology, sociology, etc.) that inform the "Indian" can be understood as 
inseparable from the continuing project of Native dispossession writ large.  
 Therefore, rather than read Native dispossession through the prism of (Cherokee) 
removal, I examine how Native dispossession entailed producing a historicity organized 
around Indianness so as to license specific and irreducible juridical and territorial 
maneuvers against different Native peoples across the geopolitical map. Each chapter 
focuses on settler colonialism as it manifests within a particular region. Chapter one 
focuses on Cherokee removal in the southeast. The second chapter is grounded in the 
reservation-based Indigenous peoples of New England. The last chapter looks at settler 
expansion into the territory referred to as the Old Northwest and that culminated in the 
highly publicized Black Hawk War of 1832. Limiting the time-frame of the study to 
twenty-five years, I argue that these different geopolitical dynamics make for distinct 
arenas of conflict during the antebellum period, an era often homogenized as one for 
which, as Kevin Bruyneel puts it, "removal was the order of the day" (15). Nonetheless, 
settler historicity plays a role in the unfolding of each arena, as it comprises perhaps the 
most indispensable mechanism for rendering the claims to Native space by settler actors 
as a foregone conclusion, or as a matter of historical necessity.  
 And yet, precisely because this narrativity enters as a maneuver in a more 
fundamental and ongoing struggle over specific lands, the kinds of claims to sovereignty 
that it facilitates also become available to the above-mentioned Native activists, insofar 
as they speak through the frame of Indianness. As each chapter will show, the working of 
settler historicity in each region involves recourse not to a single, generic trope of Indian 
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savagery, but rather to a particular formation of Indian identity as it emerges within the 
struggles over land and sovereignty unique to the region and the Native peoples in 
question. In the southeast, the trope of the backwards, anachronistic savage emerges as a 
means of consolidating settler claims to Cherokee space within the framework laid out by 
civilization policy. In New England, the trope of the noble, virtuous Indian warrior 
modeled on King Philip justifies the continued maintenance of reservation systems in 
ways that exploit Native lands and resources. In the Old Northwest, the trope of the 
exotic, receding or withdrawing Indian consolidates a notion of the region as a "frontier," 
an effectively extra-political domain that forecloses the intelligibility of Native 
territoriality and sovereignty. However, as I will show, each of these frames provides 
Native activists with a means of resisting ongoing settler colonialism precisely insofar as 
they represent maneuvers within multiple struggles over land and sovereignty that were 
ongoing and open-ended. Accordingly, the central claim that I make with regard to 
historicist scholarship dealing with either representations of Indians by non-Native 
authors or Native texts is that these frames of antebellum dispossession are reducible 
neither to a single Indian-Anglo binary nor its corollary, a master narrative of Indian 
removal.  
 Undoubtedly, the passage of the Indian Removal Act of 1830 marks a turning 
point in U.S. Indian policy from an amalgam of ambivalent civilization measures and 
sporadic land cessions via treaty to a formal program of coercive removal that also 
modeled elements of later reservation policy. However, representing that act as a clean 
historical break within a larger narrative of Indian-Anglo conflict diverts attention away 
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from how the "Indian" functions as a signifier within the broader power relations that 
envelop and inform this very shift in policy. Regarding the ways in which generic tropes 
of Indian identity (reflected in such figures as Squanto or Pocahontas) have helped to 
shape non-Native historiography on U.S. westward expansion, Elizabeth Cook-Lynn 
writes that to conceive "history without such ubiquitous colonial and imaginative 
notables would be to recognize that American historians have provided an interpretation 
designed to protect the colonial version of events" (36). As Cook-Lynn's observation 
suggests, the writing of history can be understood as extending the relations of 
knowledge and, consequently, of force that underlie colonization. Insofar as it impedes an 
understanding of colonization as an ongoing project, such historiography can be 
conceived as representing the contemporary condition(s) of Native peoples as, at best, an 
accident, an arbitrary effect of the passage of time, rather than the latest moment in a 
consistent if uneven project of genocide. Working from this insight, I contend that a 
historicity predicated on the textual production of aberrant Indianness traverses not only 
the whole of debates on Native sovereignty, but it also runs the gamut both of literary 
visions of expansion and settlement by non-Native writers and of juridical and extra-
political claims to territory by settler actors.  
 These chapters collectively ask how historicizing Indianness works as a discursive 
maneuver within simultaneous and yet uneven struggles for land and sovereignty. Each 
chapter will situate a well-known work by an Indigenous activist (specifically Elias 
Boudinot; the Pequot activist, writer, and Methodist minister William Apess; and the 
famed Sauk war chief Black Hawk) in relation to non-Native texts that reference the 
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places whose expropriation these activists sought to resist. I argue that narrating an 
imaginary Indian ontology, or "Indianness," as a temporally anterior construct 
retroactively endows settler claims to territory with a narrative cohesion that effaces 
place-based Indigenous peoples' claims to the same, even as it opens the possibility for 
resistance in making such Indianness available for the representation of Indigenous place-
based peoplehood. Put another way, historicizing Indianness generates the condition of 
possibility both for articulating a sovereignty that forecloses Native land claims and, with 
regard to Indigenous activists themselves, for resisting the dispossession of lands—
precisely by appropriating Indianness as a frame for casting territorial or place-based 
belonging in terms of a linear history. Given this geographic/geopolitical focus, then, the 
statements by Eaton and Boudinot are representative of the crux of this study only insofar 
as they are metonymic, not metaphoric, of the ways in which historicizing Native space 
conditions land claims and/or representations of territory.  
 
Knowing Indian Land 
 To insist on viewing the U.S. as a settler state is to recognize that the nation is not 
only predicated on both the dispossession of Indigenous land and the colonization of 
Native forms of governance, but also that it is still engaged in processes of dispossession 
and colonization. Cook-Lynn pointedly summarizes the matter in asking whether the term 
postcolonial accurately describes the contemporary situation of Indigenous peoples. Since 
many of them still have treaty lands held in trust by the federal government and live in 
the context of "tribal governing systems [that] are nonfunctional as tribally focused 
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structures," Native nations, she observes, can legitimately ask when "did we leave the 
colonized state?" (Cook-Lynn 29). From one angle, the answer here would be after 
removal, which gradually becomes the dominant policy framing in the decades leading to 
the Indian Removal Act. However, this approach not only takes the history of the United 
States for granted as an organizing paradigm, but in so doing it casts "removal" as a 
single agenda foisted by the federal government onto place-based Native polities. As the 
following chapters will demonstrate, the pressures on Native groups to assimilate or 
remove, and later simply to remove, were themselves diffuse and polymorphous across 
the early American political field. Foregrounding the role that discourses of Indianness 
play in making the representation of History available as a maneuver against different 
Native peoples in this way intends to push against a historicist methodology that 
presupposes the universality of removal as, if not exactly uniform in terms of its local 
sociopolitical manifestations, nevertheless something like an epistemic modality, a 
common denominator, of the real historical relationships between Indian and Anglo 
actors at the time. In turn, it intends to resist an interpretive framework that casts 
recognition by the state, and rights within it, as the zero degree of Native activism during 
the period. This project's emphasis on the irreducibility of different regional struggles 
against settler colonialism to a single narrative of "removal" is a step, in other words, 
toward rendering the geopolitics of place-based sovereignty as the primary horizon for a 
historicist study. 
 I therefore follow work by Native scholars such as Glen Coulthard in centering 
the study on the complex dynamics of settler colonialism. Coulthard observes that 
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Indigenous anticolonialism "is best understood as a struggle primarily inspired by and 
oriented around the question of land—a struggle not only for land in the material sense" 
but one also informed by "the modalities of Indigenous land-connected practices and 
longstanding experiential knowledge" (13). One strength of this way of thinking about 
dispossession and its resistance is that it locates formations otherwise generically and 
somewhat ambiguously cited as Native belief systems instead as part and parcel of an 
essential struggle over land. In turn, Coulthard's analysis suggests that the political 
dimension of conflicts involving questions of territorial boundaries, pre-existing treaty 
obligations, or settler encroachments and/or government malfeasance already contains 
what we might conceive of as competing epistemological registers.  
 Of course, one might say that any culture simultaneously inhabits and 
(re)produces a worldview as an immanent extension of its shared practices, a sense of the 
world that certainly includes, even presupposes, a unique conception of space and 
relation to collectivity that shapes one's agency on a fundamental level, something like 
Pierre Bourdieu's concept of habitus. However, I take the work of scholars such as 
Coulthard, Jodi Byrd, and Lisa Brooks instead as reinforcing the insight that conflicts 
over territory involve positing land in an abstract, material sense that appears both as the 
obverse of political notions of territory and prerequisite to the very concept of culture. In 
other words, the de facto intelligibility of "land" in its given material sense, to use 
Coulthard's language, effectively enacts, and not only depends upon, a geopolitical claim 
to space. Put another way, representing "land" in either an aesthetic or politico-juridical 
mode already comprises a maneuver in struggles over territory as they unfold. The 
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representation of land in non-Native discourses already comprises a maneuver against 
place-based Native sovereignty, just as contrary to popular belief, the territory covered by 
U.S. settlement never amounted to a vast and empty wilderness awaiting its next stage of 
development in the coming of civilization. 
 Scholarship in Native studies has long stressed that the dispossession of 
Indigenous lands both exceeds and problematizes a political frame oriented toward the 
state that benefits from such dispossession. As Coulthard puts it, foregrounding place-
based Native sovereignty, as rooted in traditional modes of peoplehood and governance, 
emphasizes the fact that "like capital, colonialism, as a structure of domination predicated 
on dispossession, is not 'a thing,' but rather the sum effect of the diversity of interlocking 
oppressive social relations that constitute it," even as capitalism has acted as a motor 
force in the fracturing of place-based Indigenous sovereignty (Coulthard 15). Linda 
Tuhiwai Smith includes among such interlocking relations the proliferation of 
anthropological and historical knowledge of Indigenous peoples, knowledge that 
traditionally presumes the universal validity of the core social and philosophical elements 
of Euramerican culture. Referring to conceptions of human nature that inform 
methodological objectivity in the humanities and social sciences, but that remain indebted 
to Euramerican social norms, Smith observes that what "makes ideas 'real' is the 
system[s] of knowledge, the formations of culture, and the relations of power in which 
[they] are located" (50). Presuppositions like what "an individual is" are so thoroughly 
enmeshed in the organizational principles of society that they quite literally "constitute 
reality" (Smith 51, emphasis added).  
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 Smith's analysis usefully theorizes how knowledge-production works as a 
colonizing process in time. To the degree that ideas such as the political abstraction of the 
individual, the mathematical abstraction of space, and the representation of time premised 
on the apparent perfectibility of society each precondition the processes of inquiry that 
create knowledge, they cease to register their own political and historical contingency in 
providing the means of representing Native peoplehood. For Smith, such ideas come to 
"underpin notions of past and present, of place and relationship to the land," and as they 
do so they not only represent Native peoples to the West in racist and reductive ways, as 
holdovers from an earlier epoch, but they also radically transform "the land and the 
people…in the spatial image of the West," thereby extending the colonization of 
Indigenous lands without necessarily evoking the notion of colonization (53). As noted 
above, Vizenor has made a similar argument. He writes that “social science [and] 
anthropologies are at last causal methodologies...not studies of anthropos, human beings, 
or even natural phenomena," but instead the "remains, reductions of humans and 
imagination to models...social science is institutional power, a tragic monologue in 
isolation” (Vizenor “Trickster Discourse” 187). Rather than leading one to fetishize an 
Indian identity as essentially consisting in a spiritual/magical connection to (another 
abstraction of) land beyond the reach of fallen Old World methodologies, Vizenor's work 
proceeds in the opposite direction. It forges a connection between the geopolitics of 
territory and the knowledge of Indian identity. 
 Vizenor draws heavily on French post-structuralism and especially the later work 
of Jean Baudrillard to argue that the Indian, as an apparently given, axiomatic ethnic 
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identity and therefore a notion prerequisite to any non-Native study of Native peoples, is 
a simulacra, a copy without an original. For him, "the indian" as recognized by both 
academic and mainstream non-Natives alike signifies "the absence of natives"; such 
"simulations of the indian, as the absence of natives, are the documents of discoveries, 
cultural studies, and surveillance" (Fugitive 15-16). Read together with the perspectives 
of Coulthard and Smith, the point to be stressed here is not simply that any such 
representation of Natives amounts to a version of colonization, nor that such knowledge-
production justifies the continued political expropriation of Indigenous land and 
sovereignty. Rather, the point is that the separation between false or biased 
representations of Indigenous peoples, that nonetheless register as objective recognitions 
of Native history or peoplehood, on one hand, and what can be considered the material 
dispossession of Indigenous territory, on the other, is itself a false divide, but one that is 
produced through discourses of Indianness. Narrating "Indianness" generates a crisis of 
authenticity with regard to actual Indigenous peoples. However, this efficacy, I argue, has 
long enabled settler actors to lay claim to Native spaces not simply by discounting the 
claims of particular Native groups, but more fundamentally by rendering a supposedly 
authentic Indian subject whose inevitable temporal anachronism creates the basis for 
settlers to generate an extra-political claim to Native space on the basis of a supposedly 
transcendent History.  
 In a certain sense, the foundation for this argument is nothing new. Vine Deloria, 
Jr.'s 1969 text Custer Died for Your Sins already offers the theoretical insight that this 
dissertation develops into a thesis on the function of historicity in removal-era 
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dispossession. Deloria writes that the mountains of anthropological research designed 
more or less to "capture real Indians in a network of theories has contributed substantially 
to the invisibility of Indian people today" (81). Rather than an allegory, invisibility for 
Deloria indicates a rather precise mechanism. Such work contributes to the mythos of a 
"'real' Indian'" whose proliferation across social space causes actual Indigenous peoples 
"to feel that they are merely shadows of a mythical super-Indian," thereby producing a 
"sense of inadequacy" that non-Natives themselves reinforce "in order to support their 
influence over Indian people" (Deloria 82). Later in the same chapter he lambasts non-
Natives' inability to make the connection between the destructive impact of termination 
policy and the impoverished conditions of reservations. He observes of the Oglala Sioux 
reservation at Pine Ridge that economic hardship and its associated problems partially 
stem from non-Natives who may sincerely believe that they are helping matters, but for 
whom real "problems and real people become invisible before the great Romantic notion 
that the Sioux yearn for the days of Crazy Horse and Red Cloud," adding that Natives are 
inevitably redefined in ways recognizable to non-Natives, "even if that means re-
Indianizing them according to a white man's idea of what they were like in the past and 
should logically become in the future" (92). Even though it paves the way for later work 
in Native studies, Deloria's analysis offers a practical example of how knowledge-
production rooted in Euramerican concepts of space, personhood, and the like interlock 
with the political processes of dispossession.  
 Of course, the recognition of economic underdevelopment, and the charity that 
perhaps follows from it, is not the same as recognizing place-based sovereignty. But the 
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more important insight for this study is that a historicity organized around a caricature of 
Indian identity, as hyper-masculine warrior in this case, enacts such colonizing 
knowledge. The core feature of the portrait of Indianness that Deloria references involves 
(re)presenting Native peoplehood as grounded in, or reducible to, a linear temporality, 
one that, although it depicts Indians as disjointed from the present, nevertheless conforms 
to the broader narrative arc supposedly manifesting in settlement itself. To be clear, the 
trope of the Indian Warrior qua Red Cloud or Crazy Horse does not merely obscure an 
awareness of the federal government's role in the colonization of Native peoples. Rather, 
I read Deloria's examples as implying that a historicity organized around the notion of the 
fallen Indian warrior facilitates the continued dispossession of Native appeals in the name 
of an ostensibly verifiable truth of the past. To draw a comparison to the antebellum era, 
such work accords with Steven Conn's argument that the naturalists and proto-
anthropologists who engaged with Indian history in the early-nineteenth century placed 
Natives writ large into the impossible position of having an ability to "experience decline, 
without ever having experienced a reciprocal rise" (Conn 32).   
 One could suggest that the twentieth-century anthropologists and historians that 
Deloria takes to task suffer from the same cultural biases and misperceptions as their 
early-nineteenth century counterparts when these fields were emerging. However, the 
very notion of misrepresentation here preserves a narrativity within which Native peoples 
are vanishing, receding, etc., which has the corollary effect of repositioning an abstract 
notion of land, in its given material sense, as the a priori backdrop against which such 
vanishing takes place. I would accordingly argue the opposite. Representations of an 
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axiomatic Indian identity that registers in temporal terms as receding, vanishing, etc. 
continue to extend and reinforce conditions of dispossession in keeping with, if not their 
intended purpose, their efficacy at the level of knowledge production. Deloria himself 
gestures to this idea in claiming that pure anthropological research on Native peoples 
boils down to "an abstraction of scholarly suspicions concerning some obscure theory 
originally expounded in pre-Revolutionary days and systematically checked each summer 
since then," despite also implying that the reservation system, and the captive Native 
populations it makes available, is required for anthropology to do this work (81). 
Following the more recent scholarship discussed above, however, what would it mean to 
situate the interplay between knowledge of Indianness and processes of land theft as 
constitutive of colonization in the shift from civilization to removal policy?  
  
Dispossession at the Limits of History  
 Answering this question involves thinking of antebellum Indigenous 
dispossession in terms of multiplicity, but it also involves asking how the signifier 
"Indian" coheres these politics such that local aspects of regional dispossessions register 
either as variations on a theme, or deviations from the norm, of removal. The capacity for 
this signifier to level geopolitical difference seems related to the fact that, as Vizenor 
suggests, Indianness has a history and autonomy apart from the peoples it comes to 
designate. Accordingly, thinking of dispossession in terms of regional (dis)continuity as 
it relates to a broad range of discourses requires separating the Indian from Indigenous 
peoples. As Mark Rifkin has argued, although a scholarly focus on "figurations of 
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Indianness" in non-Native texts intends to refute the mythos of the vanishing Indian, this 
approach nevertheless largely "'stabilizes' settlement as a dynamic that inheres in Native 
bodies, rather than understanding it as a phenomenon that shapes nonnative subjectivities, 
intimacies, articulations, and sensations separate from whether something recognizably 
Indian comes into view" (Settler 4,7). What would it mean, then, to think about textual 
moments that clearly involve a trope like the vanishing Indian apart from its predominant 
acceptance as an axiomatic designation for Native peoples? A first step in this direction 
would be to suggest that moving away from the transparency of the (historical meaning 
of the) Indian toward the conditions of possibility for settler sovereignty, involves 
moving from the "Indian" toward Indianness. Accordingly, these chapters situate 
Indianness less as a racist distortion of actual Native groups, a flawed but essentially 
referential signifier, than a discursive element that more crucially allows for the 
appearance of an axiomatic claim to territory by settler actors exactly when and where 
such claims were far from axiomatic.  
 Suspending the referential meaning of the signifier "Indian" isolates and 
foregrounds the discursive work that otherwise goes missing in its apparent signification. 
Isolating Indianness so as to foreground the intersection between knowledge and land 
theft runs another risk, however. Regarding the tendency in post-structuralist theory to 
position Indianness as a preliminary and constitutive clearing for social critique rather 
than as a topos subject to critical intervention itself, Jodi Byrd observes that the 
“Indian—as a threshold of past and future, regimes of signs, alea, becoming, and death—
combats mechanisms of interpretation through an asignifying disruption that stops, alters, 
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and redirects flow” (17). Insofar as post-structuralist criticism takes off from an already 
overdetermined notion of Indianness, qua polyvocality, multiplicity in the face of the 
Enlightenment legacy of a coherent subject-object, self-Other binary, and the like, it is 
often obliged to evade rather than engage the geopolitics involving Native groups. This 
means that, for my project, Indianness cannot simply register as shorthand either for an 
anti-systemic residue exceeding even the most dispersed forms of antebellum 
colonization, the ghost in the machine of dispossession, or, similarly, a sign of the 
incoherence of settler claims in the abstract. The narrativity of Indianness, I hope to 
show, retroactively conditions specific claims to land and sovereignty in specific regions, 
although one of its effects is to dissimulate this very specificity. This argument, however, 
involves bracketing a mode of analysis that understands colonization as a coherent 
project in time. 
 Approaching the production of History in this way allows for historicity to be 
foregrounded as a tactic in the simultaneous (re)production of different regional forms of 
dispossession. History occupies a central and yet paradoxical position among the 
interlocking relations that Smith and Coulthard identify. To the degree that historical 
reflection presupposes the disciplinary and institutional form of such reflection, history 
appears as one discourse among many others. Its privileged position both in academia 
and mass culture alike is simply not possible without the emergence of modern 
historiographical methodologies during the late Enlightenment. One can acknowledge 
that, following Arif Dirlik, the wide reach of Euramerican historiography has rendered 
the world in its image, fashioning the origin narratives of western societies as a universal 
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teleology, one predicated upon an embedded "rational humanist subject," to the point of 
casting, and thereby subjugating, Indigenous temporalities as stages in the universal 
course of a world-historical progress (65). However, insofar as representations of 
Indianness were integral to the emergence of the methods of such history in the first 
place, the latter would seem to be predicated on settler colonialism rather than vice versa. 
As Steven Conn has observed of the antebellum United States, non-Native writers, artists, 
and historians increasingly represented Indians as beyond "progressive, chronologically-
marked time," which reciprocally helped to create the conceptual and discursive space "to 
conceive of their own history as the unfolding of linear progress" (31).  
 To be fair, a more or less standard postcolonial critique of Eurocentrism does not 
simply grant history an exceptional position among the antecedents of global oppression. 
As Dirlik notes, the "globalization and universalization of Eurocentrism would have been 
inconceivable without the dynamism it acquired through capitalism, imperialism, and 
cultural domination" (73). That said, the critique of postcolonialism over the last 
generation or so in the field of Native studies has provocatively foregrounded its 
compatibility with multi-cultural liberalism and, accordingly, its complicity with the 
settler state and the continued colonization of Indigenous peoples. As Cook-Lynn writes, 
the shift away from "traditional, political, and institutional analysis to cross-cultural 
criticism embeds itself in the colonial paradigm," the proof of which is that many accept 
that both "postcolonial discourse is a done deal" and "postcoloniality is a real thing" for 
Indigenous peoples of North America, despite the fact that Native peoples' efforts to 
reclaim lands and sovereignty have never abated (31). Cook-Lynn's biting remarks lead 
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one to speculate that the Indian-Anglo binary that provides the organizing template for 
much literary and historicist scholarship dealing with Native affairs also enacts this kind 
of foreclosure of Native sovereignty, even as it seeks to demonstrate how colonization 
consists in the writing of Indians out of time. 
 For instance, Susan Scheckel writes that as early-antebellum "debates over the 
status and rights of Indians…unfolded, Indians emerged as nationally liminal figures" 
and that, in turn, "nineteenth-century Americans reified 'the Indian' into an object of 
contemplation," the production of which helped to define U.S. national identity (11). 
Representations of U.S. collective identity in time can never fully break away from tropes 
of Indian pathos because the latter are deeply intertwined with the former from the 
beginning. Though persuasive on the surface, Scheckel implicitly predicates the 
emergence of the Indian on a prior, somewhat disconnected political wrangling over the 
meaning of Native sovereignty as translated within the matrix of normative political 
rights. And insofar as the figure of the Indian enters the discussion already detached from 
the sphere of politics, such an approach not only reduces "the Indian" to the role it plays 
within nascent portraits of US national collective identification, but it also reifies the 
sphere of politics apart from the noted debates over Native sovereignty, despite how the 
intelligibility of the former would seem to be intimately bound up with the latter.  
 To the degree that such representations of Indianness appear to partake of rather 
than to disclose the workings of American exceptionalism, recent critiques of U.S. 
imperialism in American studies offer a useful counterpoint. Analyzing the institutional 
and cultural dynamics of American exceptionalism can indeed help one to grasp how a 
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universal, abstract equality that manifests in the rights of citizens and that, as such, 
provides the basis for collective identification with/through the nation-state, actually 
depends upon the systematic marginalization of specific groups within the body politic. 
As David Kazanjian puts it relative to the early-nineteenth century, although "one nation's 
citizens as a whole were meant to be formally and abstractly equal to another nation's 
citizens, the exceptionalism that characterizes nationalism…constructs hierarchies that 
belie such equality" (4). While the nation-state registers as the guarantor of universal 
freedom(s), and simultaneously fashions itself as the threshold through which abstract 
freedom passes increasingly into the materiality of lived experience, it is also that which 
imposes limits to the scope of formal liberty in the present through its laws. Yet, as Russ 
Castronovo observes, since marginalized subjects on the other side of the law are not 
made wholly invisible, they exert a counter-pressure that renders visible its contingency. 
"The laboring body, licentious body, mesmerized body, emancipated slave body, and 
corpse," he writes "all possess (and are possessed by) senses of historicity" that, apart 
from any will to resist hegemony, nevertheless "add particularistic and hence disruptive 
doses of memory and difference to both the nation-state and the public sphere" (17). This 
basic idea of contingency as opening onto a counter-hegemonic historicity is integral to 
my interpretation of the role of Indianness as, not only consolidating, but resisting settler 
claims to Native space at the level of knowledge-production. 
 Although such work challenges the tendency within literary studies to situate 
tropes like the vanishing Indian as more cultural than political, it still encounters 
problems when confronted with place-based Native peoplehood. For instance, 
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Castronovo's analysis is compelling in that it does not take for granted the identity 
formations (raced and gendered subject positions) that would ostensibly emerge as 
functions of power. His approach situates the political contours of U.S. exceptionalism as 
an immanent feature of antebellum social life, clearly bracketing the "seemingly 
completed constructions of national, state, and public identities" so as to show how "the 
foundations of those identities—notwithstanding…scholarly consensus or liberal 
agreement—are accidental and contingent" (Castronovo 22). However, since the implicit 
axis is the degree to which a concept like citizenship maps onto bodies within the 
juridical bounds of the state, the relationship between the United States and the land itself 
remains exceptional when the focus shifts toward Indigenous peoples. For Castronovo, 
the trope of the stoic, suicidal Indian functions to confirm abstract "freedom as a 
noncultural, eternal value and [to make] the fate of Native Americans a matter of 
individual proclivity, ahistorical and natural" (35). This trope marks the edges of a 
subject-position de facto aligned with the life of the body politic, the material and 
political content of which emerges in harmony with the stratifications already contained 
in the era's emerging concepts of blood and race.  
 Yet the "fate of Native Americans" appears as a historically-given narrative, 
comprising the backdrop against which this delimiting function of the Indian-as-trope 
accrues significance. In this way, situating Indianness, specifically portraits of noble 
Indian suicide, as the liminal yet indispensable edge of liberty nonetheless often 
presumes an arc of history within which all Indigenous peoples suffered a single fate. 
Further, treating this fate as historically given positions the difference of Native peoples 
      26 
as synonymous with the difference that marks any other minority or oppressed subject 
position before the state, thereby reinforcing the primacy of the latter as the condition of 
possibility for the social field writ large. Such an approach paradoxically effaces the 
resistance(s) of these peoples to dispossession as it continues to unfold. Studies in settler 
colonialism are helpful here. Patrick Wolfe's argument that U.S. imperialism amounts to 
a “logic of elimination" that makes it "a structure [rather than] an event" pushes against 
the methodological primacy of the United States; despite shifts in policies and modalities 
of dispossession in history, settler colonialism for Wolfe nonetheless amounts to a 
“complex social formation and a continuity in time” (388, 390). As against work that 
inadvertently normalizes Native dispossession and genocide as a thing of the past, 
Wolfe's position that such dispossession is systemic indicates that there is more to the 
story than the typical narrative admits. Far from a peripheral phantom within American 
history, this systemic excess is directly constitutive of the United States as a settler state. 
 While drawing on such work, this project will nonetheless bracket the view of 
settler colonialism as forming a system, continuity, or logic in time. Certainly, Wolfe's 
point is well taken from one angle. Representations of U.S. history, especially popular 
history, do indeed tend to portray American Indian dispossession as an event, one usually 
symbolized by the Trail of Tears and Cherokee Removal more generally. As argued 
above, American Studies at times similarly frames Indian dispossession as an event in the 
past, even if such framing is neither explicit nor intended and despite that such work 
often challenges commonplace views of U.S. history and the hierarchical presuppositions 
such views entail. However, it strikes me that one problem with a systemic view of U.S.-
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Indian affairs over time, or a view within which history/time itself boils down to a 
systemic, (post-)colonial logic, is that it too quickly yields a binary frame that collapses 
under the weight of all that it obscures, simplifies, or simply excludes. Returning to the 
statements by Boudinot and Eaton opening the present discussion can demonstrate this 
problem. 
 
From History to (Settler) Historicity 
 Boudinot's criticism of Eaton's claim foregrounds a deception that initially 
registers in two ways. If the founding fathers were men of their word, then Jackson's 
pivot toward removal amounts to political sophistry organized around a moralized 
discourse of necessity, itself rooted in the belief that all Natives are inexorably 
determined by "wandering habits…so peculiar to the Indian character" (Eaton 46). The 
implication is that Eaton merely seeks to evade decades of treaties between the Cherokee 
and U.S. that provide manifest evidence of the former's status as a distinct political body. 
Referencing figures associated with an earlier era of diplomacy and treaty-making thus 
serves to indict both Jackson's paternalism and the land grab that it tries to hide. From a 
contemporary perspective, though, the suggestion that the political-economic assimilation 
of U.S. norms and forms was always a tantalizing ruse seems nearer the mark. Boudinot's 
comment inadvertently locates the subversion of Native sovereignty as constitutive of 
any and all Indian policy in the first place. And to the degree that it reveals a foundational 
civilization policy as the lie it always was, the rebuke offers a compelling allegory for the 
actual tenor of U.S.-Native relations borne over time. 
      28 
 Although both views are persuasive, each one strains to accommodate the 
specificities of, in this case, Cherokee removal. As will be discussed in the first chapter, 
the Cherokees had indeed always had a government of their own, but it was traditionally 
comprised of semi-autonomous, matriarchal, and clan-based townships, structures whose 
legitimacy is at best deflected in the phrase "savage laws." The very policy measures that 
Boudinot here implicitly validates were crucial in moving away from these institutions. 
Furthermore, by 1829 there were effectively not one but two Cherokee governments: the 
one that Boudinot represented and the other consisting of Lower Town Cherokees who 
had emigrated west more than a decade earlier. Conversely, treating Eaton's comments as 
an extension of Jackson's racism (and/or of a systemic racism) effaces how the tension 
between South Carolina and the federal government on the issue of nullification inflects 
removal discourse. Cracking down on South Carolina and Georgia would have forfeited 
Jackson's ethos as a states' rights advocate and weakened his shot at reelection in 1832. 
Political motivations aren't the only factor(s) complicating this equation, however. That 
Georgia's actions intensified after the discovery of gold suggests that the market value of 
Cherokee land, as an additional source of state revenue played into the racist rhetoric 
circulating around Native groups in the region as much as any concern over the 
legitimacy of state sovereignty and territorial control. 
 And the interpretative dilemmas do not end there. Patricia Limerick observes that 
scholarship on the American West has tended to iron out the complexity of events until 
"the tales reach compliance with the platitude 'There are two sides to every story,'" 
despite that "in the history of the encounter between Indian peoples and EuroAmericans, 
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'two sides' is an astonishing undercount" (xviii). One can argue that historicizing settler 
colonialism faces the same conundrum, albeit on the other side of the coin. Although 
Eaton and Boudinot's exchange suggests a metaphor for Indians' struggles against 
colonial and U.S. depredations writ large, reflecting a chicanery seemingly fundamental 
to Anglo dealings with Indigenous peoples over time together with its unmasking by the 
latter, the historical facts themselves do not comply. They not only resist being 
marshalled into such a tidy Indian-Anglo binary, but they threaten to disarticulate it from 
the inside.  
 If our understanding of the motivations and mechanics of U.S. Indian policy 
during the early-antebellum era does not easily conform to the period's own political, 
cultural, and juridical dichotomies, though, such that the Indian/Anglo binary proves a 
distorting rather than a revelatory paradigm, then how does one examine the relationship 
between Native dispossession, (settler) sovereignty, and history at this crucial juncture? 
First, this project's focus on a very narrow period intends to control for the drift toward a 
uniform binary that becomes more cumbersome and problematic when stretched over 
long periods of history. But is it enough to supplement dominant historiography with 
more nuanced, local histories focused on specific episodes or events within the larger 
narrative of historical dispossession?  
 Linda Tuhiwai Smith answers this question with a resounding No. "History," she 
writes, "is mostly about power. It is the story of the powerful and how they became 
powerful," further adding that this "relationship with power" contributes to the colonial 
status quo in which Indigenous peoples are "excluded, marginalized, and 'Othered'" 
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(Smith 35). From this view, history is not that important for Natives, since "a thousand 
accounts of the 'truth' will not alter the 'fact' that Indigenous peoples are still marginal and 
do not possess the power to transform history into justice" (ibid.). Put simply, calling for 
more history (or more literary studies, anthropology, etc.) does nothing for Native 
peoples if that call takes settler sovereignty for granted. As Elizabeth Cook-Lynn writes, 
the perpetual failure of "American scholars" to confront "their own history and treatment 
of the indigenes, and how they have allowed their interpretation of that history to shape 
their own cultural identities" has contributed to a "fog of history obscuring the idea that 
tribal nations are extraconstitutional" entities (24).  
 The dominant approach to Indian history, typified for her by a text like Dee 
Brown's Bury my Heart at Wounded Knee, fails to grasp, despite the apparent political 
sympathy, that Native nations "do not exist as a part of the U.S. constitutional structure," 
that they remain, in other words, "separate countries" (Cook-Lynn 24). By contrast, what 
might be termed settler historicity does not initially appear that much different from 
American exceptionalism, except that it underscores the narrativity and contingency of 
formations that the latter presents as having a truth-value or certainty embodied in the 
past itself. Both cohere around some notion of the people, an artificial unity that, like the 
state it is taken to reflect, emerges as rooted in the land itself. Put simply, from one angle 
the form of appearance of both settler historicity and American exceptionalism alike is 
simply History. Again, as Hayden White has argued, “the authority of the historical 
narrative is the authority of reality itself...the historical account endows this reality with 
form” (20).  
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 Accordingly, these chapters should not necessarily be understood as presenting a 
muted dialogue between non-Native writers and political figures and their Native 
counterparts. The focus on representations of Indianness across these chapters does not 
mean to suggest that different settler actors and Indigenous groups were, or are, equal 
participants within in a zero-sum struggle over territory. I agree with Roxanne Dunbar-
Ortiz's assessment that part of the problem with contemporary literary scholarship dealing 
with Native matters lies with "trendy postmodern studies" centered on conceptions of 
Indian-Anglo encounter that presuppose, if not a specific modality of communication or 
cultural connection that traverses the Indian-Anglo divide, a notion of dialogue that 
transcends the factors and forces of dispossession (5). Heavily influenced by Richard 
White's opus The Middle Ground, recent scholarship on varieties of the Indian-Anglo 
encounter, for instance by Joshua David Bellin, Laura Mielke, and Phillip Round and 
exemplified by the recent anthology Native Acts: Indian Performance, 1603-1832, focus 
on issues of "'cultural change' and 'conflict between cultures,'" anthropological updates of 
Mary Louise Pratt's contact zone that paradoxically enable academics to avoid 
"fundamental questions of the formation of the United States and its implications for the 
present and future" (Dunbar-Ortiz 5). As Dunbar-Ortiz suggests, such work is merely the 
latest incarnation of a model of cultural inclusivity that became the vanguard of historical 
revisionism borne of the spirit of the 1960s. Despite its progressive ideals, this 
methodological shift would not extend to the colonization of Native peoples in the U.S., 
since the "fundamental unresolved issues of Indigenous lands, treaties, and sovereignty 
could not but scuttle the premises of multiculturalism" (5). 
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 Therefore, the aim in demonstrating the geographic divergence among 
historicizations of settler presence (and Indian absence) and the responses by Indigenous 
actors (Indian presence and settler contingency) is not to try to reflect the whole story, so 
to speak, of antebellum removal. "Awareness of the settler-colonialist context of US 
history writing," Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz argues, "is essential if one is to avoid the 
laziness of the default position and the trap of a mythological unconscious belief in 
manifest destiny" (6). Rather than interpret this mandate as a call for studies of the 
antebellum period that will supplement and perhaps deconstruct the dominant narrative of 
Indian removal, this project displaces the settler-colonialist context(s) of US history 
writing into a geographic and geopolitical paradigm that does not presume the centrality 
or givenness of the state. Put another way, instead of amounting to another ur-narrative 
organized around an Indian-Anglo binary, the settler-colonialist context of US history 
writing itself is here the object of analysis. Reading two or more non-native texts against 
a familiar Native text is designed to emphasize the manner in which historicity enters as a 
means of retroactively consolidating settler claims to Native space, on one hand, and 
providing a means of resistance for Native actors at the level of knowledge-production, 
on the other. However, this dynamic varies from region to region, and as such it is 
irreducible to a single binary consisting of white settler actors racializing and thereby 
negating the claims of Indians. This study accordingly comprises an effort to demonstrate 
the multivalence of struggles organized around/over the land and the way(s) in which 
historicity works as a maneuver within these struggles, which I contend are as irreducible 
to a single Indian/Anglo binary as their respective spaces. 
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 The first chapter, "Indianizing Cherokee Civilization: Historicizing (Settler) 
Sovereignty in the Native Southeast," focuses on the ways in which positing an 
anachronistic Indian savagery helped to cohere different and, at times, competing claims 
to Cherokee space in the shift from civilization to removal policy. The chapter essentially 
argues that specific portraits of Indian savagery correspond with specific juridical 
dilemmas involving settler actors; these portraits enable otherwise overlapping, partial, 
and contingent (and wholly illegitimate) claims to Cherokee land to appear grounded in a 
transcendent historical necessity, to the exclusion of competing claims. After tracing this 
dynamic in William Gilmore Simms's story "The Two Camps," which I argue attempts to 
supplement state claims to Cherokee space by insisting on the irredeemable savagery of 
the Cherokee, I turn to Elias Boudinot's famous 1826 text "An Address to the Whites." I 
argue here that, in light of the ways in which the discourse of anachronistic savagery 
coheres the shift away from civilization policy, one can read Boudinot as appropriating 
the figure of the Indian savage as a means of legitimizing Cherokee civilization for a non-
Native audience.  
  The second chapter, "Historicizing Indian Character in New England: 
(Dis)placing Native Sovereignty in Child, Sedgwick, and Apess," suggests that the 
mythos of noble Indian character as it surfaces in literary discourses in New England 
helps to consolidate the continued, exploitive supervision of reservation communities. 
The chapter explores Lydia Maria Child's Hobomok and Catherine Maria Sedgewick's 
Hope Leslie, in terms of the reproduction of a hopelessly idealized and virtuous Indian 
character. In short, I argue that this character enables both writers to imagine nascent 
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American republicanism as an inherently egalitarian formation, albeit one within which 
residual forms of Old World tyranny obscure and impede the possibility of realizing its 
true social potential. Both novels imagine Indian character as ethical, self-sacrificing, and 
fated to introject itself into settlement in ways that help to clarify and thereby propel the 
state's own commitment to civil liberty. However, in so doing, they simultaneously 
participate in longstanding notions of an authentic Indian character permanently lost to 
history, notions that were integral to the emergence of the guardian and reservation 
systems. As against this kind of permanently deferred Indian nobility, William Apess's 
Eulogy on King Philip draws on the symbolic currency associated with such character to 
render ongoing struggles against settler oppression visible to a non-Native audience. In so 
doing, Apess reverses the valence of such virtue. His text brackets a historicity that casts 
Indigenous peoples, especially in New England, as having degraded beyond a primordial 
Indian virtue; it thereby represents ongoing settler colonialism for an audience not 
accustomed to such a concept. 
 The third and final chapter in the project is "Realizing Native Dispossession in the 
Old Northwest: Frontier Historicity, Territory, and Indian Withdrawal in Kirkland and 
Black Hawk." In it, I argue that settler expansion into the region known as the Old 
Northwest involves representing the territory in terms of frontier historicity. In essence, 
the figure of the frontier works to deflect place-based Native sovereignty in portraying a 
sense of the landscape as already characterized by Indian withdrawal. However, rather 
than simply justifying expansion after the fact, the trope of Indian withdrawal is prevalent 
in the earliest geopolitical discourse on the region (in a U.S. context). From this angle, 
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this narrativity is integral to the geopolitical sense of the territory in the first place, and it 
primarily works to undermine, in advance, forms of Native political autonomy that pose a 
threat to U.S. claims. In foregrounding the trope of Indian withdrawal as a geopolitical 
maneuver, I discuss how Kirkland's text incorporates this historicity and, as such, helps to 
legitimize settler claims to space, even as the text is critical of the forms of predatory 
banking that destabilize the national economy. The chapter then turns to Black Hawk's 
text, which I situate as intervening in the transiting (in Jodi Byrd's sense) of regional 
Indigenous space to the United States. Black Hawk's biography draws on the trope of 
Indian withdrawal, but in mobilizing the frame of receding Indianness, it effectively re-
historicizes the Black Hawk War, resisting the binary logic of the frontier and, instead, 
portraying settler expansion into the region as comprised by a series of largely fraudulent 
and violent maneuvers against place-based Indigenous alliance networks. 
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CHAPTER II  
 
INDIANIZING CHEROKEE CIVILIZATION: HISTORICIZING (SETTLER) 
SOVEREIGNTY IN THE NATIVE SOUTHEAST  
 
 
 For supporters of the Indian Removal Act (1830), the notion that the Indian was 
inexorably mired in an earlier stage of history supported the view that civilization policy 
failed in presuming that Natives could be assimilated. Just weeks prior to the signing of 
the Treaty of New Echota (1835) legalizing Cherokee removal, President Jackson 
asserted before Congress, “All preceding experiments for the improvement of the Indians 
have failed" and that it seemed "an established fact that they can not live in contact with a 
civilized community and prosper" (Jackson 22). Southern politicians reiterated these 
claims after the Cherokees' forced removal four years later. In an 1840 address to the 
Georgia Historical Society, Judge William Law, who had earlier served on the panel in 
Georgia v. Tassels (1830), affirmed that the "Cherokees of Georgia formed no essential 
exception to the universal failure" of civilization policy: while “[g]lowing descriptions 
[had] indeed been given of their rapid march...notwithstanding individual instances of 
decided improvement and advancement, the great body of the tribe remained, despite of 
all efforts, unchanged and unchangeable" (Law 18).1 Insofar as Law and Jackson 
indirectly refer to the process of westernization spurred by elite Cherokees beginning in 
the early-nineteenth century, the racism underlying these and similar statements appears 
obvious. Nonetheless, reading such assertions as expressions of racism obscures their 
political efficacy in consolidating settler sovereignty. Grounding
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Cherokee removal in an ontological Indian intractability, a construct verified by history, 
gives it a retroactive moral necessity that belies its political contingency. 
 This chapter will argue that such assertions are integral to making historicity 
function as an extra-political claim to Cherokee lands. In positing the irreducible 
limitations of the Indian subject, Law and Crawford render an impression of narrative 
closure, a portrait of historical necessity, that displaces not only the different politico-
juridical crises faced by Georgia and the federal government, but the difference between 
these crises as well. Beyond a symptom of the racialization of Indians, however, I suggest 
that the moral necessity organized around Indianness derives from the narrativity put into 
motion through civilization discourse. Representing the contingency of settler land claims 
as necessities born out of a specific portrait of Native abjection casts the norms and forms 
of settler civilization as constitutive of the political and juridical orders writ large. 
Accordingly, these statements more than justify removal after the fact. For the texts that 
follow, narrating an anachronistic Indian identity as the supposedly real, historical 
grounding of the social body functions as an extra-political claim to Cherokee territory in 
the face of a Cherokee Nation refusing to remove. However, insofar as civilization 
discourse itself retroactively generates this supposed historical relationship between a 
more or less generic Indianness and what constitutes normative belonging or peoplehood, 
I argue that such historicity was not only available but indispensable to elite Cherokees. 
Elias Boudinot's "An Address to the Whites" appropriates this same narrativity toward 
historicizing Cherokee nationhood in terms a settler public would understand as 
demonstrating authentic progress and a legitimate claim to place. 
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 Foregrounding the role of Indianness in consolidating extra-political claims to 
Native land in the southeast builds from the insight that typifying Native peoplehood as a 
residual and stunted formation justifies U.S. expansionism. The dominant framework for 
conceiving this process has been the civilized/savage binary. Kevin Bruyneel argues that 
this binary rationalizes U.S. Indian policy by enabling “the dominant group [to form] the 
boundaries of its own internal identification by...establishing what the group is not via the 
construction of a 'constitutive outside'” (8). Inscribing this outside in forms of Native 
peoplehood reaffirms settler sovereignty by casting the state as entitled to rule and 
accordingly licensed to deflect and negate Native land claims. Similarly, Joanne Barker 
contends that framing Natives as lacking “the full qualities of sovereign nations...because 
they had not evolved into civilization, into an agricultural society in which people owned 
and cultivated the land for God and country” enabled early architects of U.S. Indian 
policy to position the federal government as the "absolute authority to recognize tribes as 
dependent and uncivilized" and then subjugate these peoples "to its power" (33). In 
foregrounding the role that (representations of) indigenous peoples play in U.S. political 
and cultural formations, this work has crucially positioned settler colonialism as central 
rather than peripheral to U.S. political and social intelligibility. 
 I part with the civilized/savage paradigm, however, to the degree that it posits a 
uniform, binary racialization as the catalyst for southeastern removal. Reflecting on the 
role that race played in the move away from "the Enlightenment dream" of Indian 
assimilation central to civilization policy, Reginald Horsman writes that, by the early-
nineteenth century, decades of conflict between Natives and settlers in the southeast 
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“served to confirm the frontiersman and their representatives in their hatred of the 
Indians” (55).2 Albeit inadvertently, this statement shows how the focus on racialization 
tends to subjectivize the turn toward removal, endowing it with a narrative coherence that 
its unfolding never had. Instead of foregrounding a binary racialization as the historical 
cause of this turn, my argument begins from Michel Foucault's methodological insight 
that the unities (the positivities, objects, or concepts) of a discourse must be pulled apart 
from their "virtual self-evidence" in order to determine what questions and relations they 
enable (AK 24). From this view, the shift toward Cherokee removal exceeds the 
framework of a binary project of racialization insofar as civilization discourse never 
offered, nor did it seek to offer, an adequate reflection of southeastern Native peoples qua 
Indians. As Foucault might put it, such Indianness was never “the verbal translation of a 
previously established synthesis,” nor its mistranslation in retrospect, but rather an effect 
of power relations working across multiple fields of knowledge (AK 55). The 
Indianization of the Cherokee as anachronistic savages intensifies from within the frame 
of civilization discourse as a means of historicizing the success or failure of this same 
policy, and as such it is embedded in the growing struggle for sovereignty over Cherokee 
land. 
 Bracketing the binary focus on race enables new questions regarding Cherokee 
removal to come into view. For instance, T. Hartley Crawford, a Jacksonian 
Congressman from Pennsylvania and later Commissioner of Indian Affairs under Martin 
Van Buren, paints a very different picture of Indian anachronism than that of Law's 
unchangeable Cherokees, despite the fact that both men supported removal. In 1838, just 
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months after Cherokee removal had begun, Crawford proposed to Congress his plans for 
Natives both recently removed to Indian Territory and those peoples, like the Osage, who 
were already there. Linking education in manual labor to their capacity future 
socialization, he writes that to "teach a savage man to read, while he continues a savage 
in all else is to throw a seed on a rock” and that saving the Indian from the "idleness of 
his life" requires first improving "his morals…by teaching him how to farm" (420). Both 
Law and Crawford posit Natives as primitive and anachronistic. Yet Crawford implies 
that they might still be assimilated as citizen-subjects through manual labor, despite both 
Law’s 1840 assertion that Cherokees were in fact “unchanged and unchangeable” and the 
earlier Tassels' decision that similarly argues Indians had remained fixed in a state of 
imbecility since discovery.3 How can we have two opposing views on Cherokee 
"civilization" by men otherwise ideologically aligned as advocates of removal and states' 
rights more generally? Were they not prone to the same racist attitudes that invoked 
relatively fixed images of “Indian” difference?   
 The discrepancy between the portraits of Indianness offered by Law and Crawford 
shows not only that the recourse to Indian anachronism for policy justification is 
systemically uneven, dependent upon who needs to justify what with regard to Cherokee 
land. It also demonstrates how historicizing Indianness resolves these very gaps and 
contradictions in the form and/or degree of Indian incapacity narrated. The specific 
features of this incapacity register as the ontological root of Natives' preclusion from 
normative settler society and sovereignty in ways that retroactively legitimize the 
particular needs of the actor in question. Georgia does not have to explain its illegal and 
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genocidal actions in pressuring the Cherokee Nation and forcing removal since Indians 
were immutable after all. By contrast, the federal government still has a moral obligation 
to uplift the Indians recently removed insofar as Indians can indeed be assimilated and 
redeemed. 
 After providing a brief political overview of the transition from civilization to 
removal policy, the chapter will explore the different juridical articulations of Indianness 
in relation either to a civilizing Cherokee Nation or its memory. Juxtaposing Johnson v. 
McIntosh (1823) and Georgia v. Tassels with Crawford's 1838 statement shows how 
Indianness yields a subjectivity with different consequences for state, federal, and Native 
sovereignty rooted in the same concepts mobilized by civilization policy and/or the 
doctrine of discovery. The point developed here is that inquiry into the historicity of 
Native peoplehood yields portraits of Indianness that differ in accordance with the 
juridical and/or political needs of specific settler actors at a particular time, suggesting 
that the discursivity of Indian subjectivity renders historicity available as an extra-
juridical maneuver within a juridical and political frame. The chapter will then turn to 
Law's 1840 oration and William Gilmore Simms' 1843 short story “The Wigwam and the 
Cabin” to examine how, beyond removal, the crisis of sovereignty shifts form: what does 
it mean that political and archival history now includes the forced removal of a civilizing 
Indian people? How does the presence of this memory impact the givenness of Georgia 
history as a claim to place? Here, Indianness provides the basis for imagining a historical 
relation to land organized around the moral necessity of settler peoplehood given the 
historical inertia of Indian savagery. Finally, the chapter will close with a discussion of 
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Boudinot's 1826 “An Address to the Whites.” Scholarship on this essay largely presents it 
as rife with "cultural" contradictions. However, I argue that Boudinot deploys a generic 
Indianness as a frame for his identity in order to represent Cherokee progress as an 
authentic historical movement, a becoming of the Cherokee people. The text accordingly 
appropriates the same narrativity as the settler actors discussed. Mobilizing the historicity 
made available through discourses of inassimilable and residual Indian savagery enables 
Boudinot to register place-based Cherokee sovereignty for a non-Native audience.  
 
Revising State Sovereignty: Historicizing Indianness in the Wake of Cherokee 
Civilization  
 Reading Boudinot's “An Address to the Whites” as legitimizing/historicizing 
Cherokee nationhood by appropriating figurations of Indian savagery requires situating 
the latter in the context of federal efforts to civilize the Cherokee. At the same time, 
providing historical background on these efforts will help to frame this historicity as an 
extra-juridical maneuver, one that emerges to resolve the different juridical dilemmas 
created by a civilizing Cherokee Nation. In the aftermath of the Revolutionary War, 
Washington's Secretary of War Henry Knox argued that promoting missionary societies, 
western-style education, and surplus farming among Native peoples bordering the U.S. 
would make them more open to land cessions. In addition to purchasing lands illegally 
encroached upon by settlers, early treaties between the U.S. and the Cherokee included 
provisions for distributing “livestock, agricultural implements, tools, and instruction,” as 
Theda Perdue and Michael Green observe, “so that Indians could be transformed from 
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hunters to farmers and herders” (Cherokee Nation 27). As Natives morphed into proto-
nuclear family units modeled after idealized patterns of settler home-making and 
agrarianism, they would realize that they did not need so much land. This policy 
approach was rooted in wishful thinking, however. Its implicit function was to deter full-
scale war with the Cherokees (unfeasible given the federal government's depleted 
resources) while deferring the question of the status of Native sovereignty.4 
 Time was on the United States' side insofar as a metaphysics of husbandry 
promised to dismantle sovereign Cherokee peoplehood from the inside out. Yet, things 
changed as the push to assimilate Cherokees led them to adapt westernized forms of 
governance as a means of resisting further land cessions. Removal then emerged as an 
alternative policy option in the early-nineteenth century, fueled both by Georgia's designs 
on Cherokee land and a growing rift between Upper and Lower Town Cherokees 
centered on the latter's mistrust of westernization and frustrations with illegal settler 
emigration.5 Jefferson first proposed voluntary removal as a negotiation tactic to get 
southern states to quit their competing claims to lands later covered by the Louisiana 
purchase, claims that supposedly derived from their respective colonial charters,. As the 
last state to hold out, Georgia agreed in the Compact of 1802 to cede its claims to the 
U.S. in exchange for the termination of all Native claims within its borders. Federal 
efforts to force southeastern natives either to accept allotments or relocate west of the 
Mississippi then ramped up.  
 The U.S. persuaded large groups of Lower Town Cherokees to emigrate in 1809 
and 1819. This pressure only galvanized Cherokee political reorganization, especially in 
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the wake of the Treaty of Fort Jackson (1814) which saw the Creek cede to the U.S. 23 
million acres as compensation for the Red Stick War (Heidler 13).6 Formed in 1809 to 
advise the National Council in its negotiations with the U.S, the Cherokee Standing 
Committee morphed in 1817 into the National Committee, an elite panel that worked to 
prevent land cessions by reinforcing a nationalist ideology in the Council. The Cherokee 
Nation soon passed laws preventing the sale of land by emigrating Cherokees, revoking 
the Chickamauga emigrants' citizenship, and establishing the death penalty for anyone 
who sold land without its consent.7 Finally, in a shift away from governance through 
decentralized, matrilineal clan networks, an 1820 law created a bicameral legislature with 
eight districts, each with a court that answered to one of four circuit judges, and 32 
Council members; the Committee was fixed at 13 members selected by the Council for 
two-year terms (Garrison 55).8  
 This process of political adaptation soon culminated in the 1827 adoption of a 
constitution modeled after that of the United States, a move that Georgia saw as plainly 
violating the Compact of 1802. The mounting tension between already conflicting state 
and federal powers, on one hand, and a Cherokee Nation increasingly recognized as 
"civilizing" on the other, climaxed with the discovery in 1828 of gold in Dahlonega, a 
Cherokee town within the lands claimed by Georgia. Beyond dramatically worsening 
settler incursions and violence, the discovery led the state government to annex a large 
segment of Cherokee territory within its claimed borders. In 1829, the state extended 
jurisdiction over the remaining territory supposedly under its purview, nullifying 
Cherokee governance and authorizing the militia to seize those who violated Georgia 
 45 
law.9 These actions set the stage for two Supreme Court cases, Cherokee Nation v 
Georgia (1831) and Worcester v Georgia (1832), that would establish important 
precedents for future Indian policy but did little at the time to limit Georgia's actions. In 
the former, Justice John Marshall ruled that since Native nations are domestic dependents 
rather than foreign nations proper (the genesis of the ward-guardian paradigm for U.S.-
indigenous relations), the Supreme Court conveniently lacked proper jurisdiction. Since it 
could not hear the case, it could not determine if Georgia's laws violated U.S. treaties 
with the Cherokee or whether they exceeded the powers constitutionally allotted to states.  
 In Worcester v. Georgia, the Supreme Court in an appellate decision argued that 
Georgia both violated the U.S. constitution and infringed upon the Cherokee Nation as a 
“distinct, independent political community, with boundaries accurately described,” 
although Marshall framed these communities in terms of the newly formulated ward-
guardian relationship with the federal government (Worcester v. Georgia 184). Despite 
their ardent resistance, however, Elizur Butler and Samuel Worcester, ABCFM 
missionaries whose arrest for working in Cherokee territory created the case, requested a 
pardon from Georgia governor George Lumpkin.10 Other southern states then proceeded 
with their own territorial agendas, virtually mocking the decision. Taken together, 
Georgia's annexation laws, years of unchecked emigration, and the federal government's 
de facto commitment to removal splintered elite Cherokee leadership into two groups: the 
anti-removal majority associated with Chief John Ross and the treaty party, led by John 
Ridge, Stand Watie, and Elias Boudinot. After Alabama and Tennessee followed 
Georgia's lead in seizing Cherokee territory, the treaty party, or Ridge faction, signed the 
 46 
Treaty of New Echota without the support or approval of the National Council. Despite 
petitions and memorials facilitated by Ross calling for the treaty to be nullified, federal 
troops captured the remaining Cherokees on their lands in Georgia in 1838 and 
imprisoned them in stockades. They would be released a few months later to begin a 
forced march to Indian territory.11 
 Discourses of Indian savagery are integral to the unfolding of these events. To the 
degree that efforts by the Cherokee elite to represent the adaptation of settler cultural and 
political-economic forms as progress reinforced an underlying claim to political 
sovereignty, they provoked questions about the territorial and juridical limits of state and 
federal power. In so doing, Indian claims to civilization problematized settler sovereignty 
as merely an extension of the norms and forms associated with U.S. politics and settler 
sociality more generally. The emergence around this time of concerns over the legality of 
a state within a state (imperium in imperio) reflects this problematization.12 Furthermore, 
that these concerns were coextensive with a turn toward the positively archaic doctrine of 
discovery to determine the scope both of federal and Native sovereignty alike suggests 
that intensified portraits of Indian savagery reinforced the primacy of settler claims to 
place by enabling their historicization where juridical claims stumbled. Although this turn 
initially occurs in Fletcher v. Peck (1810), the Marshall court would offer a more 
nuanced portrait of the powers conferred through discovery in Johnson v. McIntosh 
(1823).  
 While Johnson does not directly involve the Cherokee, the historicity that it 
makes available as a legal precedent for settler sovereignty would provide Georgia with 
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crucial ammunition to defend its claims. In a way, one can view Marshall's arguments in 
both Cherokee Nation and Worcester as mitigating the effects of rendering a 
fantastic(ally overdetermined) narrative of discovery as the real historical basis for a 
notion of Native occupancy. For Marshall, the event of discovery apparently yielded two 
methods for terminating an already limited native title: “discovery gave an exclusive right 
to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or conquest [and] a right to 
such degree of sovereignty as the circumstances of the people would allow them to 
exercise” (Johnson 8).13 Invoking settlers' limited “circumstances” already indicates the 
paradox of this ruling. If the doctrine of discovery magically triggers absolute rights to 
land, why turn to the role that practical contingency played in supposedly creating them? 
Doesn't narrating the historical contingencies involved in the creation of supposedly 
absolute powers over territory already negate any claim to the absoluteness of those 
powers? Marshall perhaps means to suggest that the only real contingency involved 
concerns the mode(s) of implementing these rights from that point forward, which 
extends to considering the character and conditions of Natives' resistance to purchase 
and/or conquest. Yet, the a priori status of the precedent appears already undermined by 
the historicity that throws it into relief in the first place.  
 The reason the ruling moves to the historicity of the rights created at discovery 
seems clear. Turning to such an archaic doctrine obviously begs the question of its 
juridical relevance within a modern U.S. context, but this opening allows Marshall to 
develop what amounts to a genealogy of settler sovereignty, presented as a history of the 
transfer of the rights of discoverers. He argues that the “power possessed by...the United 
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States to grant lands, resided, while we were colonies, in the crown,” that this power has 
been “exercised uniformly” over lands held by natives, and finally that, since its validity 
“has never been questioned, its continued existence...must negative the existence of any 
right which may conflict” with it, namely the idea of “an absolute and complete title in 
the Indians” (Johnson 17, sic). Federal sovereignty derives from discovery insofar as the 
privileges generated by that event have been uniformly enacted over time, with 
consistency and without challenge. The reasoning is clearly tautological, but the pivot 
toward historical narrative within the decision itself generates the backdrop that 
supposedly necessitates the powers that Marshall describes as unfolding logically from 
this imaginary point in the past. This double maneuver comes together in the ruling's 
emphasis on the “uniformity” of the power inaugurated at discovery. Insisting on the 
historical continuity of settler sovereignty tries to shore up a narrative whose very 
necessity precludes the rights that it supposedly confers. The underlying problem with the 
ruling, then, is that as federal juridical sovereignty and Native occupancy come to find 
common ground in the rights and relations among settlers and Natives created at 
discovery, the juridical relevance of this necessity seems further away, only really 
cohering in the narrative of historical continuity, speculative at best, by which Marshall 
links the present with the distant past.  
 The buck only stops at the imagined wildness of Indians themselves, a savagery 
whose historical consistency grounds settler sovereignty as a function of conquest. 
Marshall argues at length that settler “claims [to land] have been maintained and 
established as far west as the river Mississippi, by the sword,” suggesting that U.S. rights 
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to land were sustained over time by one of the two modes allotted by the doctrine of 
discovery (Johnson 18).14 Conquest then describes the real history that followed 
discovery. Yet, this concept's position begins to shift here. Initially one of two seemingly 
abstract modes of enacting the powers of discovery, "conquest" now also names the 
history that retroactively legitimizes the juridical integrity of that event: “However 
extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an inhabited country into 
conquest may appear...if a country has been acquired and held under it,” then it 
necessarily “becomes the law of the land, and cannot be questioned” (Johnson 19). 
Historical and juridical necessity coalesce, however, in a reflection on Indian polities: 
“Although we do not mean to [defend] those principles which Europeans have applied to 
Indian title,” they may nevertheless “find some excuse...in the character and habits of the 
people whose rights have been wrested from them”; “the tribes of Indians...were fierce 
savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn...from the forest” 
(Johnson 18). Representing Indians as irrational and unproductive in both their 
apparently intractable tendencies toward warfare and their reliance on hunting creates and 
sustains a historical narrative that frames the "right to occupancy" as an adequate 
retrospective conceptualization of Natives' supposedly authentic and more or less 
consistent mode of existence. As civilization advanced, Indians gradually left the “soil, to 
which the crown originally claimed title...no longer occupied” (Johnson 19). The shift to 
historicizing intractable Indian savagery lends the ruling a narrative cohesion that covers 
over Marshall's waffling logic. 
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 The civilizing Cherokee Nation appears exempt from this story, however, an 
omission that Georgia duly noted. Johnson v. McIntosh proved integral to the legal 
defense of Georgia's assault on the Cherokee Nation in Georgia v. Tassels. In Elizabeth 
Povinelli's terms, Marshall's historical analysis of the smooth conquest of Indian savagery 
situates territorial sovereignty as a “materiality of inheritance,” a fantasy “of substance 
that posits a material legacy beyond the control of a person or society” (203). Rather than 
simply legitimizing U.S. title over its Indian counterpart, Indian fierceness yields a 
historicity that situates the juridical order writ large as a material consequence of Native 
peoples' irreducible incompatibility with settler governance. Put another way, 
ontologizing Indianness (as unproductive “fierceness” over time) renders a narrative that 
precludes any Native sovereignty beyond occupancy insofar as real, savage “Indians” 
fought settlers and lost, leaving the land to those who followed in the wake of these 
battles. Yet the court likely didn't anticipate that “Indian” incompatibility would provide 
a juridical template for those antagonistic toward federal and Cherokee sovereignty alike, 
giving states' rights advocates a means to limit both at once.  
 Despite not receiving as much attention as the Supreme Court decisions, Georgia 
offers perhaps the most concise and provocative synthesis of Georgia's claims to 
Cherokee territory. It would also prove influential as other southeastern states turned to 
the courts to dismantle Native sovereignty within their borders. The case involved a 
Cherokee man, George “Corn” Tassels, accused of murdering another Cherokee within 
their territory. Drawing on the authority of civil and criminal codes extended illegally 
through annexation, the state militia seized Tassels before he could be tried by the 
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Cherokee government. That this action violated both Article 1, section 10 of the U.S. 
Constitution (which gives Congress the right to regulate commerce with native groups) 
and existing treaties between the U.S. and the Cherokees was no problem, though, as the 
state intended to use this case to legitimize its prior legislative maneuvers. The historicity 
generated in Johnson would allow the Georgia judges to argue that, insofar as the state's 
colonial charter manifested the powers created at discovery regarding the lands in 
question, the state rather than federal government was the true sovereign power over the 
Cherokee in Georgia.  
 However, appropriating Marshall's precedent of discovery as conferring absolute 
powers to conquering nations entails a revision of Johnson's historicity of conquest. This 
revision occurs through a shift in the portrait of Indianness that sustains the narrative and 
juridical validity of reading contemporary state sovereignty as a real extension of those 
powers. The judges first assert that the relationship between the state of Georgia and the 
Cherokee derives from “the principles established by England towards the Indian tribes 
occupying that part of North American which that power colonized” (State 157). The 
ruling appears initially concerned to root settler sovereignty in the colonization of 
particular lands. Framing the rights conferred via discovery as contingent upon the 
colonization of specific lands enables them to build on certain elements from Johnson, 
especially the notion that Europe claimed “'ultimate dominion,'" while departing from 
others, like Native occupancy (ibid.). Presented in this way, settler sovereignty reads as a 
place-based power. While public opinion and conduct toward Indians may change 
dramatically over time, as “strongly marked in the records,” these changes do not impact 
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the “actual relations which ought to exist, and do actually exist between governments 
formed by European descendants and the aboriginal tribes” (State 156). For Georgia, 
discovery quite literally grounds a sovereignty that cannot change over time.  
 From there, the ruling attacks the basis for recognizing Native sovereignty already 
mobilized by Cherokee advocates. They argue for instance that the federal regulation of 
commerce between Native nations and settler citizens proves that the Cherokee do not 
constitute a sovereign state. They also observe that, since “no treaty can be found” in 
which an “Indian tribe” has agreed to allow another government to “alienate and transfer 
its territory,” the inability of the Cherokee Nation to cede its land to anyone but “the State 
of Georgia [and] the United States,” per the notion of occupancy, shows that discovery 
founds an “exclusive legal right” of settlers “to the land within their charter” (State 159). 
These arguments anticipate the panel's key departure from Johnson in the portrait of 
Indian imbecility. Where Marshall specified two modes of terminating Native title 
(purchase and conquest) with the supposed “fierceness” of Indian resistance to settler 
immigrations generating a history of conflict legitimizing federal oversight, Georgia 
offers two different paths, amalgamation and colonization, arguing instead that the “habit, 
manners, and imbecile intellect of the Indians” at discovery made both untenable (State v. 
Tassels 161). Judged incapable of complying either “with the obligations which the laws 
of civilized society imposed, or of being subjected to any [such] code of laws,” Indians 
lived in a territorial and juridical limbo (ibid.). Where Marshall references a potent and 
organized militarized Native resistance (implying some degree of territorial autonomy), 
Georgia posits Indianness as a subjective predisposition toward stuntedness, an 
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atemporal and ontological lack that renders Natives, then and now, incapable of any 
collective agency whatsoever. Neither violent resistance nor treaty agreements, in other 
words, would reflect the minimal, reflexive awareness required even for a limited 
conception of Native title.  
 The shift toward an enduring Indian imbecility accordingly casts Marshall's 
categories of conquest and purchase as misunderstanding the doctrine of discovery. Yet, 
insofar as federal courts held judicial review, such a claim lacked the juridical authority 
to overrule the precedent for federal oversight established via those categories.15 This 
image of imbecility, however, as denoting an intractability effectively unchanged since 
discovery, less justifies Georgia's claims than it retroactively realigns the supposed 
powers created at discovery fully with the “common mass of discoverers,” a phrase 
(awkwardly) gesturing to an originary settler public entitled to Cherokee land (State 161). 
In this way, ontologizing a static Indian imbecility allows the panel to revise the 
geopolitical history of conquest in Johnson and, therefore, to draw on its articulation of 
sovereignty while suiting that concept to its own ends. Unlike in Johnson, the Indians of 
Georgia do not move at all, except to make “secret and bloody attacks upon white 
settlements” (State 162).16 Rather, society developed in their midst as a function of the 
privileges accorded to those original “discoverers,” privileges that implied a certain 
responsibility toward the unfortunately stunted Indians despite their occasional 
aggressions. “Humanity” required, the panel argues, that these peoples “should be 
permitted to live according to their customs and manners; and that they should be 
protected in their existence, under these customs and usages, as long as they chose to 
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adhere to them” (State 161). Confronted with a stunted population and the paradox it 
entailed for the normal modes of enacting sovereign powers, the originary “common 
mass” of settlers tolerated Indians in accordance with the principle, if not the protocols, 
of a sovereignty grounded in discovery.  
 The aim in comparing the different historicizations of Indianness in Johnson and 
Georgia is not simply to show that federal and state powers alike turned to racist 
justifications for settler sovereignty. Rather, the narrativity of Indianness qua savagery 
yields competing settler actors a particular historicity suited to the unique juridical and 
territorial dilemmas posed by a civilizing Cherokee Nation. Jill Norgren argues that the 
Georgia ruling shows that the core principle of the doctrine of discovery, as established 
in Fletcher and Johnson," encouraged state officials to make the claim that their 
extension of state jurisdiction over the Cherokees was legal” (95). Instead of merely 
rationalizing otherwise illegal maneuvers, however, I would argue that the turn to 
imbecility in Georgia sustains a genealogy within which the legislative annexation of 
Cherokee territory and the extension of criminal and civil jurisdiction over it are always-
already legal. Casting Indians' primordial stuntedness as historically ossified renders the 
colonial charter as an expression not only of an originary power dynamic, but of one that 
has never changed. The powers created at discovery through the colonization of Georgia's 
lands remain embodied in the settler public that still exists on the lands specified by the 
charter, and the latter's continued legitimacy, as validated by the federal government in 
the Compact of 1802, attests to this fundamental dynamic. By contrast, Marshall's history 
of conquest reads as a narrative embellishment hiding the fact that federal sovereignty is 
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an unlawful usurpation of states' rights, given that it lacks the necessary grounding in a 
place-based relationship organized at discovery.  
Yet, these portraits of Indianness do not neatly correspond with an intensifying 
states rights' debate. Jackson's administration resuscitates Georgia's portrait of Indian 
imbecility after the Indian Removal Act for opposite ends: as the basis for a discourse of 
moral improvement and labor justifying a new Indian policy, as reflected in his 1835 
insistence to Congress of the need “to protect and if possible preserve and perpetuate the 
scattered remnants of this race" (“Message...1835” 22). This newfound confidence in the 
possibility of Indians' social redemption presupposes a shift in the portrait of imbecility 
as inexorably, ontologically static, a shift corresponding with the multi-faceted problem 
created in removing southeastern native groups, in particular a civilizing Cherokee 
Nation, to Indian territory. First, the obligation to honor newly determined boundaries per 
the Indian Removal Act limited the federal government's access to lands it otherwise 
understood as within its domain. Further, insofar as the Cherokee were removed because 
they supposedly could not live close to a supposedly civilized public and survive, simply 
reviving an older civilization policy would not have enabled access to these lands. 
Finally, although the stunted Indianness of Georgia provides a figure of subjectivity that 
at the very least deflects the political question of Native sovereignty, U.S. legal 
geography after removal nonetheless entitles the Cherokee to some place, and states’ 
rights advocates like Jackson both helped to create and then affirmed this entitlement in 
pushing for removal.  
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 Written only a few months after the forced removal of Cherokees, the 1838 
"Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs" by Indian Commissioner T. Hartley 
Crawford coalesces this shift in imbecility and the new subversions it allows at the level 
of federal Indian policy. The problem with Indians, he argues, is that they never learned 
the value of laboring for private property, which alone can lift them out of the muck of 
unproductive sociality facilitated and symbolized by their tendency toward shared 
landholding. Educating Indians in the value of such property holding is crucial, and 
Crawford suggests that such a program involves vocational training rather than the focus 
on arts, letters, and spiritual salvation ostensibly characteristic of an older civilization 
policy. While the "principle lever by which the Indians are to be lifted out of the mire of 
folly and vice...is education," the "learning of the civilized and cultivated man is not what 
they want now...You must lay the foundations broadly and deeply, but gradually, if you 
would succeed" (Crawford 421). Accordingly, to promote literacy and “liberal” learning 
among Indians, Crawford opines, without first training them in manual labor is to “throw 
a seed on a rock”; “if you would win an Indian from the waywardness and idleness of his 
life, you must improve his morals, as well as his mind...by teaching him how to farm, 
how to work in the mechanic arts, and how to labor profitably” (Crawford 420). For 
Crawford, only by focusing on the vocational aspects of husbandry and agrarianism 
(making civilization policy into a 4-H program) can the federal government save Indians 
from an aimless future. This training will extend the norms and forms of civilization 
insofar as it targets the working body first. Only then will the mass body, the Indian 
polity, show signs of development.  
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 In Georgia, however, there was no Indian polity. There, ontologizing Indianness 
as an ossified incapacity for civilized life framed Native peoplehood as a set of arbitrary 
and static formations, nothing more than habits expressing the irreducible limitations of 
Indian subjectivity in social terms. Whereas in Crawford's report positing a different 
essence of imbecility yields a newfound openness to forms of manual training organized 
around agrarian homemaking, which allows the practice of holding lands in common to 
be problematized in a set of recommendations to the President and Congress. Describing 
the pitfalls of communal ownership of land, Crawford warns that if the lands guaranteed 
to different native groups via treaty continue to be held as "joint property, the ordinary 
motive to industry (and the most powerful one) will be wanting. A bare subsistence is as 
much as they can promise themselves. A few acres of badly cultivated corn about their 
cabins will be seen, instead of extensive fields, rich pastures" (425). Evoking pathetic 
images of failing farms, dilapidated dwellings, and incipient starvation, this 
representation of shared landholding reads as impeding the cultivation of normative 
drives presumed as critical to any and all social development, even as it also poses as 
symptomatic of the lack of such drives and the society they would sustain. Indian 
stuntedness registers as a set of habits reinforced by idleness on a broader, sociological 
scale, and an earlier civilization policy presumably encouraged such idleness insofar as it 
favored the mind over the body.  
The narrativity of Indianness, its capacity to signify at times radically different 
formations of Native subjectivity and/or sociality by way of the same term, accordingly 
serves Crawford in qualifying the political status of the peoples removed west of the 
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Mississippi. However, it does so not only by rendering a supposedly ossified Indian 
subject now redeemable via "imbecility," but also in maintaining this concept's ostensible 
grounding in history, thereby mobilizing the symbolic authority that the latter confers to 
settler actors. Characterizing shared landholding less as a determinate feature of native 
governance and more as an amalgam of stunted drives situates it as the psychosocial basis 
for the Indian's lagging behind in the world-historical march of civilization. Should the 
U.S. fail to seize the opportunity to inculcate an ethic of hard work, along with the 
normative desire it realizes in the subject, "Laziness and unthrift will be so general as to 
not be disgraceful," as the "history of the world proves that distinct and separate 
possessions make those who hold them averse to change" (Crawford 425). Where the 
norms and forms of labor oriented toward the pursuit of private property manifest an 
axiomatic historical progress, presumably evidenced in the endurance and growth of the 
societies they engender, common landholding by contrast suggests less an alternative, 
and protected, governmentality than retrograde historical movement.  
Though one can interpret the text as suggesting that so-called civilization and 
common property index mutually exclusive formations, this view downplays the critical 
temporal dynamic at work. As Crawford puts it, “Unless some system is marked out by 
which there shall be a separate allotment of land to each individual...you will look in vain 
for any general casting off of savagism. Common property and civilization cannot co-
exist” (Crawford 424-5). Common property and the norms and forms of civilization, as 
organized around the pursuit of private property, are less concretely antagonistic social 
formations than different polarities (regressive and progressive, respectively) of a world-
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historical tendency toward progress. No longer anchored in an immutable ontology, 
"savagery" problematizes Indian communalism in terms of the tension between 
imbecility and normative, vocational labor while inflecting this tension with historicity. 
Cast as a form of savagery, communal landholding indexes a failed and fading past, but 
not a fated future. Insofar as the self-perpetuating forms of desire integral to the work one 
does for one's own private property index living history, they index futurity and a way 
perhaps to save Indians from themselves.  
Shifting the narrativity of "imbecility" accordingly introduces a historicity that 
altogether cleaves questions of governance and sovereignty, however limited, from the 
reflection on landholding in Indian territory. Suggesting that Indians' "laziness and 
unthrift" form a vicious cycle of squalor and defeatism recalls Shona Jackson's 
observation that the “state...force[s] a particular resolution of the ego in favor of political-
citizen-subjects" who then reproduce the "forms of capital accumulation or the 
arrangement of capital” that condition their psychosocial existence; such “labor for 
being” revolves around an injunction to work that yields “two senses of right (emotive-
psychic and material)” (94, 55). Building from Jackson's analysis, the discursivity of 
Indianness yields a portrait of native plasticity at the level of the laboring body. The form 
of this usurpation is quite literally a matter of time. Casting the “Indian” as a potential 
citizen-subject, capable of being straightened into a hard-working, surplus-farming 
Christian, resolves the problem of extending imperial oversight by representing federal 
interest in protected native lands as an effort to bring these communities out of the past 
and into the normative present. Instilling in Native populations, not peoples, a desire for 
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normative labor registers as a means to improve Indian “waywardness,” thereby 
transforming native peoplehood from a bunch of lazy communists into a hard-working 
community de facto annexed to the state in the history to come. 
Finally, the trope that coheres this newly discovered urgency, displacing any 
question of juridical and territorial limits against the backdrop of a seemingly axiomatic 
world-historical progress, is the normative home.17 For Crawford, private domesticity 
organized as proto-nuclear homemaking symbolizes both the foundation and the pinnacle 
of the history of world civilizations. His recommendations pivot on the assertion that the 
"foundation of the whole social system lies individuality of property," as the drives 
reinforced in its pursuit alone have "produced the energy, industry, and enterprise that 
distinguish the civilized world and contributes more largely to the good morals of 
men…With it come all the delights that the word home expresses" (425). Internalizing 
the coordinates of a labor-conditioned desire for the home, then, promises to speed the 
“Indian” along the course of history and away from savagery, a notion that here 
maintains the gap between common landholding and legitimate political governance by 
positioning the former as what the latter leaves behind. Without private property and the 
desire that it conditions, via the laboring subject, Natives will “never rise beyond a 
certain point” in world history (Crawford 425). Meaningful social relationships are borne 
out of the desire for an idealized settler domesticity; reciprocally, the home is the site that 
(re)conditions the affective bonds comprising normative, supposedly legitimate kinship. 
Insofar as it also manifests as proto-nuclear homesteading, the desire for the home will 
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remain a crucial trope for Georgia as it attempts to historicize its newfound belonging 
after exiling the Cherokees. 
 
Playing Historian: Familiarizing Settler Belonging After Cherokee Removal 
 To this point, I have been tracing the ways in which positing Indian savagery 
facilitated an extra-juridical historicity by which different settler actors, with different 
territorial and political agendas, could stake a singular claim to Cherokee space. Each 
historicization of settler privilege, however, entails a shift in the essence of Indian 
stuntedness, as this figuration marks the point at which questions of juridical right, 
increasingly intertwined with the visibility, if not the recognition, of Cherokee 
"progress," give way to an extra-political narrative of the necessity of civilized 
intervention. Taken together, these discrepant portraits of Indianness-within-history 
throw into relief the different and irreducible crises of settler sovereignty created by an 
apparently civilizing Cherokee Nation. Although the chapter will shortly explore 
Boudinot's "An Address to the Whites" through this lens, I will first examine William 
Gilmore Simms's text "The Two Camps" (1843) in terms of the same dynamics. The 
intent is to show the interplay between historicity, Indianness, and settler normativity as 
conceptualizing Anglo settlement even beyond Cherokee removal. Doing so will also 
serve to indicate these factors' embeddedness in Boudinot's earlier context as 
conditioning, but not wholly determining, the effort to endow Cherokee nationhood with 
a historicity that would signify a legitimate claim to place. 
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  While the Cherokees' forced march in 1839 gives Georgia territorial and juridical 
control over the former's lands, the problem of legitimacy does not end there, since 
history now records what southern lawmakers worked so hard to foreclose, namely an 
organized Cherokee resistance whose claims manifested an appeal to civilization.18 
Regarding the normative basis of historiography, Hayden White observes that the events 
of history “appear to be real precisely insofar as they belong to an order of moral 
existence, just as they derive their meaning from their placement in this order,” adding 
that such events "find a place in the narrative attesting to their reality" only if they are 
perceived as either lending "to the establishment of social order or fail[ing] to do so” 
(23). For White, the task of the historian is always minimally presupposed. Events are 
only available to historicization if they register some collective morality; at the same 
time, narrating these events reinforces this sense of the social order as an immanent 
unfolding of such morality among a population. Historiography would seem to support 
the retroactive (re)casting of removal in terms of an overlapping ethical and historical 
necessity, as in the advent of the "people" of the south. Yet, since Georgia used state 
apparatuses to pursue a deliberate and vicious campaign against a nation claiming 
civilization, the same events that mandate a return to history also render that return 
fraught with contradiction. History should reflect the moral necessity of Georgia's 
relation to the land within its borders, but the reflection itself requires (re)framing a 
forced removal.  
 Simms's "The Two Camps" does more than merely supplement a fraught history 
by way of its fictionalization, however. In claiming to represent the real "border history 
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of the south," the tale yields a historicity organized around the homesteading settler 
patriarch, whose willingness to treat Indians fairly reflects a moral edifice that also 
forecloses possibility of Cherokee civilization (Simms “To Nash Roach” xxxiv). As an 
effect of a series of uneven political maneuvers and state interventions, however, removal 
was never perpetuated by a coherent, homogenous settler public in the first place. The 
"people" supposedly responsible for removal has no concrete historical referent. Still, 
making this notion appear is indispensable to rendering Cherokee removal meaningful. 
Simms's need to posit a true history, so to speak, implies Georgia's crisis of belonging, 
but it also makes possible the appeal to an idealized settler experience that retroactively 
coheres an imaginary public. Among the “first who settled on the southern borders of 
North Carolina” and still living “so late as 1817,” Daniel Nelson, the text's protagonist, 
represents less “the dead body of the fact [than] its living spirit” (Simms “The Two 
Camps” 33). This spirit, namely that of "old Daniel Boone...a more common one than is 
supposed,” coalesces around the relationships that emerge in the effort to found a home 
among hostile Indians (ibid.). In this way, "The Two Camps" provides for (a retroactive 
fantasy of) a moral relation to the space of Georgia, a relation that eludes historiography 
proper.  
 Although not as celebrated today, Simms was widely popular in his own time, 
making his work an apt vehicle to explore the reconstruction of belonging in the post-
removal south. By 1845, he was already known as a literary talent, with Martin Faber: 
The Story of a Criminal and The Yemassee: A Romance of Carolina, a promising 
historian with The History of South Carolina, and an emerging critic. The Wigwam and 
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the Cabin drew positive reviews on both sides of the Atlantic. Edgar Allan Poe claimed it 
displayed a “genius” that were Simms a “Yankee, would have been rendered immediately 
manifest to his countrymen.”19 Following Annette Kolodny, taking Simms at his word 
that the literary artist is the “'true historian'” involves attending to the “underlying 
symbolic and psychological structures that give meaning to history” (The Lay of the Land 
116).20  Simms presents "experience" as indexing such meaning. He writes briefly in the 
preface of the realistic aspects of his often gothic tales: “I can answer for it, confidently, 
that these legends represent, in large degree, the border history...I have seen the life—
have lived it...my material is the result of a very early personal experience” (Simms “To 
Nash Roach” xxxiv). In fact, The Wigwam and the Cabin was initially planned as one 
book of a two-volume collection, initially titled Tales of the South, comprised of a set of 
southeastern frontier tales and another focusing on plantation and city life.21  
 Suggesting that this work reflects a truth of southern history that escapes the 
archives hinges on the text's portrayal of settler "lived experience" as an authentic 
representation of emigration, and this authenticity presupposes both normativity and 
narrativity. Daniel Nelson both embodies the appeal to an originary settler life and 
provides its framing device, his recollection rendering bits of the history involving the 
Cherokee Nation into a generic template of folk memory. The importance of Nelson's 
masculinity for conceptualizing "border history" in terms of this memory is clear from 
the beginning. The narrative opens with a heterodiegetic narrator that conditions the 
audience to identify with Nelson before shifting the tale to his perspective, suggesting the 
degree to which the embodied settler comprises the crucial fantasy object by which to 
 65 
construct a shared southern history. The text compares the hackneyed quality of most 
contemporary fiction to the stories that might be heard by a “sort of recluse, hale and 
lusty, but white-headed” whose “budget of experience” yields a “rare chronicle” that 
“breathes life into his deeds” (Simms “The Two Camps” 33). Among the “first who 
settled on the southern borders of North Carolina,” Nelson was still living “so late as 
1817,” the year he “removed to Mississippi,” but died only three months later, as “an old 
tree does not bear transplanting easily” (Simms “The Two Camps 33). Nelson registers as 
thoroughly rooted in the soil, which casts the recollection of his earlier days, his 
"chronicle," as almost ontologically coextensive with regional history given its relation to 
place. The phallic imagery of an "old tree" doubles this mapping: his life has so 
penetrated the land that it now signals the land's natural virility or potency on its own.  
As the hyper-masculine essence of place-based belonging, Nelson's labor lays the 
seed for the spirit of settlement to emerge from the otherwise "inert facts" of history. His 
life story covers all of the major events between the Cherokee and the U.S. up to the first 
removal crisis, including the Red Stick War (1813-14) involving Creek, Shawnee, and 
U.S. forces. Set five years after he first emigrated, his narrative could reference either the 
movements of militias from the Carolinas, Virginia, and Georgia into Cherokee territory 
in modern Tennessee during the Revolutionary War in 1782, or a second major outbreak 
of violence when white squatters who had refused to vacate Cherokee territory, per the 
1785 treaty of Hopewell, murdered the Upper Cherokees' principal chief, Old Tassels, 
and provoked nearly a decade of hostilities.22 All we know for sure is that he emigrated 
when the region was still “thickly settled with Indians...the favourite hunting-grounds for 
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several of their tribes” (Simms 33). As measured against Nelson's agency, Native 
peoplehood registers something like a natural pre-history of the space, an undergrowth 
barred from evoking legitimate land tenure in its distance from the enterprising settler. I 
would argue, however, that these vague references to actual Native-settler interactions are 
less sloppy historicism than a determinate effect of framing the narrative through Nelson. 
The aura of masculine agency foregrounds an efficacy that permits historical imprecision 
insofar as that efficacy posits a more fundamental referent, namely the desire to create 
and protect a home. 
Before shifting to Nelson's view, the heterodiegetic narrator further underscores 
this efficacy, linking the idealized laboring body to the impulse to start a family, an 
impulse that provides the form and content of quasi-diplomatic powers. A “stalwart 
youth...tall, with a fiery eye,” he and his companions are described as men for whom 
“danger only seemed to provoke their determination...and mere hardship their frames 
appeared to covet” (Simms 33). The settler's agency provides the frame, both body and 
paradigm, for diplomacy with "Indians." Such men “had no fear...to make a home and 
rear an infant family in regions so remote from...civilization. They had met and made...a 
sort of friendship with the Indians, and in [their] superior vigour…their greater courage, 
and better weapons, they had perhaps come to form a too contemptuous image of the 
savage” (Simms 34). Nelson would seem suited for a job in Crawford's vocational 
training program, but Simms moves quickly from this emphasis on settler agency and the 
false confidence it instills to Nelson's own view. However, the capacity to create "a sort 
of friendship" not only attaches quasi-diplomatic powers to a set of idealized motivations 
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organized around settler homesteading, doing so also deflects any possible questions 
regarding settler depredations through the extra-political connotation of such a 
relationship. "A sort of friendship" then suggests an extension of the ethics organized 
around homemaking into what we would identify as political history, insofar as such 
diplomacy derives from the sexual/ethical dynamics of Nelson's paternal obligation to 
protect his family.  
Put another way, insofar as the settler's embodied agency expresses a desire for 
the normative home, the morality associated with the latter conditions the text's 
geopolitical imaginary; the settler's over-confidence implies a generalized, baseline 
suspicion of Indians. This coupling of (hetero)normative morality and the imagined 
geopolitics of settler expansion recalls Scott Lauria Morgensen's argument that 
“[m]odern sexuality arose in the United States as a method to produce settler colonialism, 
and settler subjects, by facilitating ongoing conquest and naturalizing its effects” (117). 
The desire to create and protect a "home…remote from…civilization" exerts a claim that 
needs no legal articulation insofar as it founds the legitimacy of such claims.23 In turn, 
Natives appear more or less incompatible with formal diplomatic measures to the degree 
that they mark a potential threat to this desire. This suspicion, then, marks the baseline for 
representing geopolitical instability. Nelson's story begins at a time when his “wild 
neighbors” were “becoming discontented” due to other "tribes, more frequently in contact 
with the larger settlements of the whites—wronged by them in trade, or demoralized by 
drink—complain[ing] of their sufferings”; such happenings could not but make these 
“worthy settlers...anxious at signs which warned...of a change in the peaceful relations” 
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that had held to this point (Simms 34-5). Representing the violence, largely due to settler 
encroachments, that characterized Native-settler affairs in the late-eighteenth century as a 
potential threat to settler families both flattens the specificity of Cherokee protests, as 
merely "Indian" discontentment, and casts the settler homestead as a politically neutral 
element in its perceived morality.  
What we might think of as distancing actual history in the idealization of settler 
desire and its positioning as the true motor of history does not register as such, as the shift 
to Nelson's homodiegetic narration totalizes the father's anxiety. As the rumors of 
incipient Indian attacks grows too loud to be ignored, Nelson, like “a good husband,” 
informs his family of the rumors of escalating discontentment. In this passage, he takes 
his daughter "now five years old, upon his knee...and [looks] upon his infant boy," after 
which he feels his "anxieties very much increase," and begins scouting the area (Simms 
35). This scene encapsulates the text's basic representational strategy. Indian unrest 
elsewhere generates an affect, organized around familial concern, that normalizes settler 
incursions into Native space insofar as Indians appear given to irrational, unpredictable, 
and often alcohol-fueled outbreaks. However, I want to underscore the narratological 
aspect of this (dis)placement here. As Nelson interacts with his family, his growing 
anxiety over their safety itself becomes a narrative object, what we might think of as the 
father's gaze. The children, situated as innocent and trusting dependents, take up their 
father's attention and spur him to action. He holds them, looks at them, and worries over 
them. By contrast, as readers, we are preoccupied with the anxiety elicited in the father 
by the children: we see him seeing a potentially horrible fate for his family, which 
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presents him as a man of conscience justified in his actions and, conversely, represents 
geopolitical instability quite literally as an inscrutable thing that exists outside and 
separate from this normative center. To see with Nelson is to see (by way of) his concern.  
Conventional historiography cannot achieve this kind of condensation of the 
supposed meaning of Native-settler affairs. William Law's 1840 history of Georgia, for 
instance, tries to mediate the difficulty in historicizing removal by turning a “glance” to 
the region's indigenous history (16). Cast almost as an aside, this turn occurs after Law 
charts colonial history to the revolution, but before any discussion of state history. In this 
way, it amounts to a formal-chronological displacement of the more recent history of 
Cherokee resistance. Relocating the recent fact(s) of removal to a point just before the 
symbolic advent of modern state- and nationhood, however, suggests that part of the task, 
and the burden, of historical narrative is to explain events in which historical and moral 
necessity diverge in relation to the dominant social order. Law's glance ontologizes 
Indianness to help shore up this crack in the edifice. He describes southeastern Natives as 
“hordes of savages, the Muscogee or Creeks, the Cherokees, the Chickasaws, and the 
Choctaws" alike, different in name only: “They were all characterized by similar habits, 
customs, and pursuits, although in fact distinguished as nations, (if nations they might be 
called)” (Law 16). Building from the groundwork he helped to provide in Georgia v. 
Tassels, Law implies that distinct southeastern nations were nothing more than 
indeterminate masses beneath their merely nominal designations.  
Taken together with the chronological displacement of regional Native history, 
however, implying that southeastern nations are/were ultimately arbitrary variations on 
 70 
the same savage theme obviously ignores what many would have known, certainly Law 
himself since he served on the panel of judges in Georgia. The "glance" at a supposedly 
primordial, irreducibly "Indian" history obscures the fact that the Native peoples 
subsumed under this category had different political relationships with the U.S., different 
treaty histories, different patterns of resistance and removal, and, above all, claims to 
sovereignty that were legitimate at least to the degree that they resulted in the U.S. 
advocating removal. For Law, positing a stubbornly homogenous savagery would seem 
to make any discussion of more recent political history redundant. However, I would 
suggest that the glance conjures more than it can possibly deflect. Rather than pre-
empting any discussion of Cherokee removal, such a "glance" at Native history 
foregrounds only foregrounds its own necessity. Positing a homogenous Indianness 
attempts to homogenize the political histories involving different Native groups, in 
particular that of the civilizing Cherokee, and thereby shift them to a point anterior and 
tangential to what signifies the essential plot structure of Georgia history. Yet, this very 
attempt reads as a departure from that essential narrative, which raises, rather than closes, 
the question of its relation to the latter. 
By comparision, Simms's focus on the settler's supposed lived experience renders 
such geopolitical discord a family affair. After Nelson decides to make a more concerted 
effort to patrol the land, the story turns on a series of gazes that develop his anxiety. The 
first occurs one night as Nelson investigates a campfire and discovers perhaps the motif 
of captivity narratives: a group of Indians surrounding a young woman. Terrified for her 
safety, he hesitates only momentarily before leaping into the mix, hoping to take the 
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warriors by surprise and free the girl. Precisely when he enters, however, the scene 
disappears. Nelson is alone in the woods, no fire and all quiet except for a faint groan. 
Following the sound, he discovers an Indian boy suffering from an apparent tomahawk 
blast to the skull.  
The tension manifests as the paternal reaction that propelled Nelson to leap into 
the fire yields only the unmistakable groan of a wounded Indian, which crucially now 
occupies the affective space just associated with Nelson's child. The scene foregrounds 
the role that familial concern plays in interpreting the meaning of this seemingly random 
act of violence by reflexively inscribing this tension in the father's gaze. Discovering the 
boy, Nelson considers how he would feel if his own son was left in such condition: “I 
thought, if so be I had a son in such a fix, what would I think of the stranger who should 
go home and wait til daylight to give him help!” (Simms 40). The point is not necessarily 
that the singularity of the settler's act here suggests a humanitarianism that exceeds, and 
thereby conceals, the invasion of Cherokee lands by Georgia citizens. Rather, the text 
positions the ethics of settler homemaking as simultaneously the agency and the narrative 
prism, the content and the form, integral to the essential meaning underpinning any 
"border history of the south." 
Put another way, the text less displaces real history than it organizes and 
facilitates a historicity of ethics that marks the legitimacy of settler presence. In keeping 
with the texts discussed earlier, this historicity involves positing a real, fundamental 
confrontation with Indianness predating and requisite to civilized society. This staging 
occurs through Lenatewá, which is the name of the boy/prince Nelson has discovered and 
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saved from certain death. During his six-week stay with Nelson's family, the settler 
intensifies his patrols and soon discovers a band of Indians in the immediate area. After 
apparently realizing Nelson is on to them, and that their plot to capture the Indian boy 
failed, they make “the woods ring with the war-whoop,” suggesting to Nelson they mean 
to give “a regular siege” (Simms 42). This shadowy Indian plot mainly serves to create an 
existential crisis within the home, as Nelson considers how little he knows of the boy. 
However, this sudden uncertainty only makes the quick decision to trust him, despite that 
Nelson fears he could very well wind up cutting "the throats of my wife and children,” all 
the more pronounced as an index of the ideal patriarch's baseline ethics: Nelson can't 
believe “after all we had done for him, that he'd be false...” (Simms 42). The next 
morning the boy had “thrown aside all that I gave him," stolen back his bow and arrows, 
and fired an arrow with a tuft of his hair attached through one of the “loop-holes” (cabin 
windows) into a tree, alerting the outsiders to his presence.  
Read against/through Nelson's suspicion, Lenatewá's sudden assertion of generic 
Indian difference throws into relief normative homemaking as constitutive of the bonds 
of trust that form the matrix of emerging society, not in the least insofar as they have the 
power to impact Indian affairs outside the home. The spatial register of the home here 
comes to double its moral exceptionalism, rendering it that which marks the "border" in 
Simms' history. In the context of Nelson debating whether to trust the boy, the two 
together witness an impromptu Indian council, spurred by the arrow, during which the 
party splits into two factions, a majority led by an “old white-headed chief” and the 
remainder by an intimidating “dark-looking fellow” (Simms 43). The boy explains that 
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the former is his “father or grandfather” and the latter his “uncle,” who we also learn 
attacked his nephew in order to usurp his place as heir to his grandfather/father's 
sovereign power. Lenatewá then asks Nelson if he intends to kill the uncle, to which the 
latter responds with an emphatic “'No…I will shoot none. I am for peace. I would do 
good to the Indians and be their friend. Go to your father and tell him so'” (Simms 44). 
Lenatewá's narrative posits “Indian” difference in terms of failed patriarchy, a botched 
patrilineal transfer of power rooted in the absence of normative homemaking and the 
ethics it facilitates.  
Still, relaying this information to Nelson simultaneously marks the boy's 
newfound loyalty to Nelson, implicitly aligning him on the side of peaceful domesticity. 
The home becomes a barrier marking the space between extra-political morality and the 
pre-political Indianness beyond insofar as it becomes the site from which Indian 
"discontentment" comes into view, quite literally. While Nelson's investment in his home 
organizes the perception of Indian affairs, however, it does not evoke a sense of 
impermeable difference, even as the lack of such homemaking presents Natives' 
dysfunctional social organization as the residual influence of anachronistic kinship 
formations. Just before leaving to engage the Indian party, Lenatewá affectionately pats 
Nelson's daughter, which Nelson interprets as indicating "'you shan't be hurt—not a hair 
of your head!'” (Simms 44). Through this spontaneous gesture, which suggests an 
investment in Nelson's home, the text implies a capacity for Natives' to adapt, but since 
this capacity registers wholly through Lenatewá, it emerges as dependent upon familial 
concern that Nelson manifests. Adaptation presupposes assimilation to settler norms, 
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which in turn suggests that only the ethics organized around settler homemaking can 
produce discernible and legitimate change. 
At this point, the historicity of settler ethics organized around the home begins to 
cohere. The view from the home presents Native alterity less as consisting less in any 
determinate cultural content than in a paradoxical, though amendable, relation to the 
present, one underscored by formal aspects of the brief chapter following Lenatewá's exit. 
Consisting of a single paragraph, this chapter depicts Nelson watching from the window 
as an outbreak of Indian violence rapidly unfolds. The "young prince" Lenatewá engages 
his father/grandfather, the "king," and then points toward his uncle; the king gives a 
“war-whoop," sending a volley of arrows raining down on the uncle; and, finally, this 
outburst ends the conflict as quickly as it began, as “all the arrows had been aimed at the 
one person, and when he sprawled, there was an end to it: the whole affair was over in 
five minutes” (Simms 44). 
 If the idea were simply to cast Indians as inexorably primitive as compared with 
settlement, to simply insist on a one-size-fits-all civilized-savage binary, one could 
imagine Simms allocating more than a paragraph to describing such barbarity and 
refusing to resolve the episode so abruptly. Combined with Nelson's position as onlooker, 
through whom we view the outburst as a potential danger to the family inside the home, 
the passage accordingly foregrounds not simply the difference but the distance, spatial 
and temporal, of Native violence. Though the quick termination corresponds with the 
view of Native peoplehood as inept patriarchy, within which collective peoplehood reads 
as an anti-democratic tendency toward monarchical centralization that cannot but end in 
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self-defeating violence, it also suggests the transience of such forms of peoplehood and 
the governance supposedly underpinning them. By emphasizing the speed of the "whole 
affair," the assassination gives an impression of Indian sociality as fleeting in its 
irrationality, an impression reinforced in the narrative concision. Simms' use of flashback 
doubles this effect: the episode is entirely in past tense and contains no direct speech. 
Read against the mute spectacle of Indian violence (viewing from the window, Nelson 
sees all but hears nothing, which renders the outbreak uncannily silent), the narration of 
the event throws the sense of time out of joint. Nelson paradoxically seems to be 
recollecting the conflict as it unfolds, situated between his readership and a violent 
spectacle of fleeting Indianness.24 From this angle, his doubled position (before the 
window back then, but addressing us now) historicizes settler-Native violence as a brief, 
belated conflict wholly reducible to the Indians themselves and sealed away in the past.  
This doubling, I argue, synthesizes the ideological efficacy of Simms' "true 
historian" par excellence: Anglo settlement's role in border conflict disappears in the 
settler's essential view. And this disappearance, as with the discourses of savagery prior 
to removal, derives from positing, not simply reflecting on, the ontological and/or ethical 
capacity of the Indian Subject, here represented in Lenatewá's emerging loyalty to 
Nelson's home. After returning from the violent outburst, the boy tells Nelson that he had 
convinced his father (the "king" or “Micco Glucco”) to lay down the “red stick” and enter 
into “terms of peace,” since the boy himself survived the initial attempt on his life. This 
diplomatic maneuver poses the desire of the uncle to ascend the Cherokee power 
structure as the true cause of the violence around Nelson's home, thereby correcting the 
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earlier "rumors" that dispossession and fraudulent trade, involving alcohol, were the 
cause of Native unrest. The boy reveals that the “old Micco [Lenatewá's 
father/grandfather]...had only consented to take up the red stick because it was reported 
by...the uncle [who] had good reasons for getting him out of the way—that he [Lenatewá] 
had been murdered by the whites” (Simms 44-5).25 On one hand, these new "inert facts" 
reinforce Indianness as conducive to war. The absence of normative homemaking yields 
large, umbrella formations that tend to implode, the form of which is an explosion of 
jealousy and violence. On the other, this information reaffirms the settler home as the 
(extra-)political agency of territorial stability. Lenatewá here confirms that the earlier 
decision to save the boy, rooted in the transferability of fatherly concern, proves in the 
end the act that restored the region's peace. 
Lenatewá's complex displacement of southeastern Native formations bears further 
unpacking, however. First, “micco” is a Creek term. Second, Cherokees, like Creeks, are 
matrilineal, and the uncle, not the biological father, serves as the primary male figure for 
his sister's children in traditional kinship formations.26 Third, the faction that Simms 
appears to reference in the Red Stick War actually consisted of an alliance between 
Shawnees and Upper Town Creeks (the red stick being associated with Tecumseh and 
Tenskwatawa's pan-Indian collectivism), but here the "red stick" becomes a token of 
generic “Indian” belligerence, not in the least as it serves to indicate Cherokee, not Creek, 
responses to illegal settler emigration in the Carolinas some two decades prior to this 
conflict. 27 Finally, Nelson admits that, although many people will recall that “war” and 
“how the Carolinians humbled them at last,” he didn't then realize that the young man he 
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had saved “was the prince of a tribe only, and not the nation” and was therefore limited in 
his capacity to protect Nelson's family, given that the conflict “was a national warfare, in 
which the whole Cherokee people were in arms” (Simms 45). Neither deriving from a 
westernizing elite nor resembling anything like Cherokees' traditional matrilineal, clan-
based governance, the Cherokee Nation here registers as a vague, arbitrary formation, 
more or less coextensive with the total number of constituent "tribes," which seem to 
refer to separate patrilineal clusters like the one headed by Lenatewá's father/grandfather.  
Considering that Simms limits Nelson's life to 1817, and places the story decades 
before, the various conflations and distortions in Lenatewá's narrative suggest an 
omission of the Cherokee resistance that began in 1817, the year the educated elite 
reorganized the Standing Committee and began aggressively centralizing Cherokee 
governance. In Simms' south, by contrast, Cherokee "nationhood" registers an ambiguous 
formation that passed away long before more modern political events. This representation 
avoids the obvious twists and turns of Law's more formal history, though, insofar as 
privileges Nelson's experience as a narrative device: the text presents Cherokee 
civilization less as a political formation to be denied legitimacy, in retrospect, than as a 
capacity for moral behavior facilitated through contact with the homestead. Put another 
way, the capacity for civilization emerges only through Lenatewá's voluntary actions 
taken on behalf of Nelson's family, and these actions anchor the middle of the narrative. 
After Lenatewá provides the real reasons for the Indian conflict outside of Nelson's 
home, the story jumps forward considerably. After a decade of relative stability, during 
which Lenatewá sheltered Nelson's family from whatever violence threated to break out, 
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widespread conflict once again erupts across the countryside. In a double of the opening 
ghost scene involving the captured girl, Nelson tracks a band of Indians suspected of 
stealing horses to their campfire, only to find Lucy surrounded by warriors.  
Lenatewá's sudden appearance beside Nelson in this passage signals the reversal 
of the opening scene's logic, in which finding the suffering boy confirmed both the 
efficacy and universality of the ethics rooted in a desire to protect the home. Here, an 
actual captivity scene involving Nelson's daughter results in a crisis that will be resolved 
by Lenatewá's loyalty, the ethics he has adapted ostensibly through his familiarity with 
Nelson's family. By intervening, though, Lenatewá also restores a hysterical Nelson to his 
normative, masculine self: “...his soft tones, made me know that the young prince meant 
to be friendly, and I gave him my hand; but the tears gushed out as I did...[crying out] 
'My child, my child' “'Be man!' said he, 'come!'... “'But will you save her, Lenatewá?'” 
(Simms 49). Of course he will. The “young prince” distracts Oloschottee, the son of the 
earlier disgruntled uncle who attacked Lenatewá, as Nelson attacks the lone guard and 
saves his daughter. By helping both to restore the settler family and to return the father to 
himself, Lenatewá crucially reintegrates Nelson's autological status as patriarch, 
rendering him whole again. 
This dialectical exchange, whereby Nelson's fatherly concern creates an alliance 
that proves indispensable to his family's survival as it also reshapes the Indian, reaches its 
normative climax in the last episode, as Lucy and Lenatewá fall in love. Afraid her 
daughter “'has a liking for that redskin,'” however, Nelson's wife (a spectral presence if 
there was one, nearly totally absent) insists he spy on them to determine the extent of 
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their relationship (Simms 54). Nelson admits his reluctance ("'Twarn't a business I was 
overfond of...[but I] did pretty much as she told me…[though it] always gave me a 
sheepish feeling...'”), which in turn casts his wife's sentiments as racist insofar as they 
totally ignore Lenatewá's loyalty and contribution to the family (Simms 54). Nelson gives 
the couple some distance, watching from the cabin window and therein doubling his 
earlier view onto Lenatewá's confrontation. The difference now, however, is the fear that 
he might be seen: his reluctance to spy on the couple suggests a genuine shame. In a 
radical inversion of the earlier window gaze, here the portrait gazes back, which marks 
the real confrontation as taking place within Nelson himself in the form of the 
embarrassment of a loving father.  
The earlier distancing (formally, temporally, narratively) of Indian alterity thus 
draws to an intense point of critical self-reflection in the settler himself, underscoring 
genuine historical progress as the evolution of the settler's ethical orientation. While 
watching the Indian he saved propose to Lucy, Nelson realizes that he already accepts 
Lenatewá for his son : “'...if I had seen the lad running off with the girl...I'd never ha' 
been the man to draw trigger...'”; “'I didn't fear Lenatewá, and I didn't fear my 
daughter...'”; “'...is any picture in this life more...beautiful than two young people jest 
beginning to feel love for one another[?]...'” (Simms 54-5). Nelson's reflection suggests 
the breakdown of his earlier, objective stance while watching the violence unfold among 
Lenatewá's people. However, this breakdown appears to be on the wrong side of the 
ideological divide. The result of Nelson's awakening is that Lenatewá emerges as already 
included in the symbolic matrix organized around settler homemaking: “'...I could see all 
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their motions…what was I to do, if [he was] offering his hand to marry Lucy, and she 
willing…how could I refuse him when I was willing?'” (Simms 55). To the degree that 
the father accepts the Indian youth as a son-in-law, the passage implies that such 
recognition has the capacity to reshape the moral and symbolic edifice that has proven so 
integral to regional peace.   
At the same time, however, this recognition only further entrenches the bonds that 
both comprise the home and organize the father's morality as indices of a supposedly 
legitimate capacity for dealing with Indigenous peoples, a capacity at once extra-political 
and efficacious. In this way, the most dynamic agency within the text remains those 
ethics and, in turn, the homestead that founds them by cultivating desire. In the end, 
normative homemaking itself emerges as the essential, dynamic matrix of any and all 
sociality. Again, conventional historiography tries but fails to portray settlement as this 
kind of catalyst for history proper in its reliance on the "inert facts." Law's 
aforementioned "glance" at Indian history expresses sympathy only insofar as it insists 
that Natives were endowed with "habits immutable as nature" that made them largely 
resistant toward "the influence of civilization and the admission of improvement"; given 
this ontological inertia, Indians "present the spectacle of a 'moral phenomenon,' at which 
we wonder, and for whom we sympathize, but over whose destiny we have no control" 
(Law 17). The actuality of unchecked and illegal settler emigration into Cherokee space, 
the seizure of lands, homes, and infrastructure, a state legislature operating in violation of 
its powers, a superior court intent on delegitimizing both Native sovereignty and federal 
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oversight over Indian affairs—these facts (almost) fall away in pondering the "moral 
phenomenon" that an ontologically fated removal presents in hindsight.  
Yet, since Law is dealing with historiography, the sign that the record of these 
events are still there is this very shift to sympathy in the place where that record should 
be. Cherokee resistance becomes a present-absence: “Where is the posterity of the red 
man who once inhabited this land, now so changed by the meliorating hand of 
civilization, industry, and art?... a melancholy sentiment [pervades] our bosoms…” (Law 
17, sic). The obvious implication is of course that Natives are no longer present because 
they failed to assimilate. However, the condition of possibility for this very implication is 
the prior disavowal of the meaning of Cherokee civilization and, in turn, of removal. The 
shift from the political to the ethical disavows, and thereby names, the historical events 
that structure Law's narrative discourse in their very absence.  
Nelson's paternalism indexes values that are transcendent, however, which is to 
say they aren't bound to a timeline. The corollary of these ahistorical ethics is that 
Indianness amounts to a drag on the normative present, its "wild," irrational social 
formations constantly devolving into outbreaks of violence against which the homestead 
signals movement forward in time. The text's conclusion confirms this truth of history. 
Before Nelson can formally welcome Lenatewá into the family, a “'war-whoop'” sounds 
(Simms 55). The father grabs his rifle and looks back only to see Lucy on the ground and 
Oloschottee bearing down on Lenatewá. Nelson already knows it is blood revenge, as 
“'an Indian never forgets that sort of obligation,'” thereby positing an irreducible savagery 
as the mechanism that prevented the Cherokee from entering into civilized relationships 
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with settlers (Simms 55). Before he can fire, Lenatewá is struck dead; Nelson then kills 
the attacker and gives a “'whoop for all of the world as if I was an Indian myself'” 
(Simms 55). And though Lucy recovers, she never marries, as she never recovers from 
the Indian's loss. Through Lenatewa's death, the text both ejects the possibility of any 
lasting union between settlers and Indias—through no fault of settlers—and privileges 
sympathy, not politics, as the essential frame for conceptualizing the (im)possibility of 
place-based Native sovereignty in history.   
The historicity rendered through the morality organized around settler 
homesteading produces a break, here reflected in the failure of sympathetic identification 
due to another, (un)predictable outbreak of Indian violence, between the normative 
present and the past. Put slightly differently, drawing on this morality winds up 
producing Indianness as a cypher for that which remains recalcitrant beyond even the 
best feelings and intentions. Oloschottee's grievance signals a historical inertia that cuts 
into the authentic display of normative romance from an unseen point on the horizon, 
literally leaping into the frame from the background. His linkage with the Cherokee 
practice of blood revenge casts this leap as the return of an irreducible Indian alterity, one 
that presents Cherokee peoplehood as, beyond what the "inert facts" concerning their 
claims to civilization may suggest, an irrational, violent, and ultimately fleeting 
formation. Finally, that Nelson simultaneously emits a "war whoop" as if he himself were 
an Indian signals that his reflexive and ethical retaliation out of fatherly concern enacts a 
claim to indigeneity, insofar as the page is turned on the violence it could not prevent. 
The "whoop" marks Daniel Nelson's full emergence the "true spirit" of the so-called 
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"border history of the south," the symbol of a moral edifice that renders any memory of 
Georgia history after 1817 a curious footnote.   
 In "The Two Camps," Daniel Nelson's familial concern facilitates the 
representation of history as oriented to an idealized settler experience, that of the sturdy 
yet compassionate patriarch that, for Simms, reflects the moral truth of southern border 
history. As imagined through Nelson's experience, Indianness emerges as an irreducible, 
irrational drag on the present, an inertia that mitigates against whatever influence settler 
ethics may have on (re)shaping the Indian's capacity for civilization, even as this framing 
retroactively coheres settler experience as the moral edifice of southern history. As the 
text's conclusion shows, this edifice neutralizes the role of settler incursions in the actual 
process of state formation: the failure of civilization in relation to the Cherokee emerges 
as a sudden, violent sundering of the otherwise productive feelings organized around 
normative settler homemaking, an explosion of the moral and historical inertia of non-
normative Indian peoplehood into the present. Cast as metonymic of the lived experience 
integral to border history, this last outbreak of Indian discontentment forecloses any need 
to engage with the political history of removal as represented by the Cherokee Nation's 
progress toward civilization. In this way, Simms' story also manifests contemporary 
multicultural liberalism's complicity with settler colonialism more generally.28 Nelson's 
seemingly authentic affection for Lenatewá anticipates the ethic of tolerance whose own 
condition of possibility is the degree to which the tolerated subject is conceivable within 
a discourse of humanity, the disavowed center of which is the ontological givenness of 
liberal (citizen) subjectivity and its normative social formations. 
 84 
Repositioning Savagery in Elias Boudinot's “An Address to the Whites” 
The sense of closure evoked by "The Two Camps" recalls Derrida's notion of 
exorcism. For Derrida, celebrating the specter of one's antagonist after defeat doubles as 
an assurance that “what used to be living is no longer alive, it does not remain effective in 
death itself” (59). Lenatewá's death elicits an affect, a lament, that presupposes a larger 
historical narrative: the Cherokees' successful assimilation to settler society was cut short 
by the irrational and violent nature of Indian peoplehood writ large. Nevertheless, if this 
view was actually believed by anyone, Simms included, the story would be an exercise in 
redundancy. The "Two Camps" therein shares a crucial feature with the texts discussed 
earlier. It posits a supposedly real, fundamental Indianness, predating and requisite to 
modern society, as the basis of a historicity that retroactively legitimizes settler 
belonging. Positing Indian savagery, the specific content of which varies in each of the 
texts discussed, provides the basis for depicting civilization as the temporal extension of 
the norms and forms of settler morality, sociality, and/or political-economy, thereby 
rendering an extra-political claim to the lands of a civilizing Cherokee Nation.  
It is crucial to recognize that "civilization" has no concrete historical referent, 
however. It can be made to register an extra-juridical or –political claim to land, one 
rooted in history, only insofar as agrarianism, euramerican modes of governance, and 
settler cultural forms signify neither political sovereignty nor abstract nationhood in and 
of themselves. Instead, as I've suggested, positing Indianness encodes these elements 
with a historicity that exceeds their otherwise limited capacity to function as political and 
territorial claims. Put another way, narrating savagery as a set of ontological features 
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enables a notion of the "people" to emerge that displaces the need for, and therein the 
lack of, a political or juridical claim to space. From this perspective, this final section 
hopes to reframe the notion of savagery with regard to the well-known Cherokee activist 
Elias Boudinot, who, prior to his turn toward removal in the aftermath of the Indian 
Removal Act of 1830, was perhaps the most visible of those working to combat removal 
pressures on the basis of Cherokee civilization. The traces of Indian savagery in this text, 
I argue, are the means by which Boudinot appropriates a generic Indianness through 
which to narrate the historical becoming of the Cherokee as a coherent people irreducible 
to the United States. Focusing on his 1826 pamphlet "An Address to the Whites," I 
contend that positing savagery allows for a historicity that authenticates Cherokee 
progress while nonetheless differentiating it from the settler governance on which it was 
increasingly modeled.29 
 "An Address to the Whites" was written to secure the funds for what would 
become Boudinot's primary vehicle for influencing the public, The Cherokee Phoenix. 
Launched in 1828, the newspaper quickly gained subscribers all over the United States. 
As Theda Perdue notes, Boudinot's position as editor allowed him to display to whites 
and Cherokees alike all “the remarkable accomplishments of his people” by publishing a 
wide variety of content, such as “official correspondence and documents, legislation 
passed by the National Council...notices of weddings, school examinations, meetings of 
temperance and other societies, and revivals” (“Introduction” 16).30 Put differently, one 
of the paper's key effects was to signify “Indian” modernity to these different 
constituencies by framing Cherokee adaptations of euramerican sociopolitical and 
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cultural norms as progress. However, this strategy entailed not only showcasing the 
Cherokees' rapid appropriation of settler technology, governance, and culture, but also 
framing these adaptations as constituting "progress" by way of the terms and concepts 
made public through an earlier civilization policy.  
 Civilization policy remained a dominant discourse for framing for U.S.-Cherokee 
diplomacy well into the 1820s, shaping the so-called "Indian Question" that emerged in 
the nascent debate over removal. As such, its political appropriation on the side of 
Cherokee sovereignty was by no means unique to Boudinot. Rather, civilization 
discourse generated a historicity that conditioned the political and conceptual field of 
Native affairs writ large. As Maureen Konkle suggests, the Cherokee elite largely sought 
to counter euramericans “removing them from time to time [in order] to deny them 
political autonomy and equality by insisting that they have always been in time and 
[were] rapidly...becoming a modern Indian nation” (Konkle 79). Konkle adds that, as a 
consequence of this strategy, these same elites forged a vexed relationship to traditional 
Cherokee culture. Despite that, for them, the “object of being understood to be in time” 
was not assimilation but rather “to continue as an autonomous Indian nation,” 
nonetheless “claiming Eurocentric time” yielded “political and intellectual impasses [on] 
the value of traditional knowledge and history,” as shown by their representation of 
“traditional life” as “an earlier moment in the history of the tribe” that needed to be left 
behind to be “in order to…advance in civilization” (Konkle 79). Although this approach 
to political recognition challenged Natives' fatedness to vanish by demonstrating that they 
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already lived in time, it nonetheless had the ironic effect of distancing the Cherokees 
from their own cultural past. 
 While Konkle rightly reads the publicizing of changes in political-economy as 
attempting to validate Cherokee nationhood in terms of shared modernity, the social and 
political-economic norms of civilization signal neither modernity nor legitimate 
governance as if intrinsically. Rather, as I've argued, narrating Indian savagery, in some 
form, is integral to this equation. Indianness anchors the historicity that registers settler 
sovereignty as an extension of modes of habitation that signal productivity and/or 
morality, and these modes service an extra-political claim to southeastern territory among 
settler actors with divergent sets of territorial and jurisdictional agendas. Rather than a 
tragic but unintended effect of Cherokee progressivism, then, the distancing of tradition 
that Konkle highlights can instead be read as the condition of possibility for claiming 
sovereignty on the basis of a modernity organized by a latent or residual civilization 
discourse in the first place.  
 Reading Boudinot in this way involves first examining how he foregrounds the 
difference of contemporary Cherokee peoplehood as compared with its traditional 
formations. The text poses the Cherokee towns as the benchmark for assessing true 
progress: the “rise of these people in their movement toward civilization, may be traced 
as far back as the relinquishment of their towns” (Boudinot “An Address” 71). On its 
face, this statement somewhat obviously suggests the colonization of traditional 
Cherokee governance. The norms and forms of settler belonging gain purchase as 
symbols of legitimate governance as Cherokee lands come under further duress, which 
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can be interpreted as suggesting that turning away from certain Native formations is the 
price to be paid for territorial sovereignty. However, referring to the towns also throws 
into relief a sense of historical movement without necessarily turning to the norms of 
forms of civilization. The towns anchor an objective portrait of progress toward a 
supposedly more organized and recognizable state while nevertheless grounding that state 
as an extension of the governance they formerly embodied. The "rise of the people," not 
the origin of Cherokee autonomy, traces its emergence from the Cherokee towns. In this 
way, the content of what is "relinquished" matters less than both the represented notion of 
relinquishing itself and, especially, the impression of autonomous political agency that it 
presupposes. The reference to the towns' position, both rhetorically and as generic 
markers of a geopolitical space irreducible to settler claims, suggests that the specificity 
of the represented content, i.e. what makes the towns savage, non-normative, etc., serves 
to evoke a sense of linear time by way of juxtaposition. 
 Casting Cherokee townships as residual formations here opens onto the text's 
general strategy. This passage shows an implicit awareness that place-based Cherokee 
sovereignty is tethered to a historicity whose Subject is the becoming of the “people,” a 
process that only gains coherence over against “imbecile” forms of collectivity generally 
and ambiguously cited as “Indian.” It is no coincidence that Boudinot foregrounds this 
generic Indianness early in the essay, before noting the Cherokee towns. He opens by 
claiming that he is “aware of the difficulties which have ever existed to Indian 
civilization,” and denies neither “the almost insurmountable obstacles which we 
ourselves have thrown in the way of this improvement,” nor “that difficulties...remain"; 
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nevertheless, of those remaining challenges “there are none that may not easily be 
overcome, by strong and continued exertions” (Boudinot “An Address” 69-70). The text 
primes the distancing of the Cherokee towns with this reference to the supposed obstacles 
to "Indian civilization," not Cherokee peoplehood, suggesting again that the towns serve 
to index a linear, more or less generic historicity organized and made available through 
Indianness. I would suggest that the operative phrase here, though, is "we ourselves," 
which not only indicates a collective of which Boudinot remains a part, it also renders 
this sense of collectivity by way of his own rhetorical presence. This passage clearly 
mobilizes generic Indianness in a manner that both plays on and problematizes its racist 
associations, retaining its distinctiveness while emptying it of its notions of intractable 
imbecility. However, in so doing, it conveys an impression of political agency. By 
slotting the towns into the position of alterity made available in the reference to a "Indian 
civilization," the text renders the "obstacle" to progress and its overcoming, as a 
condition of the legitimacy of that progress, as indeed reducible to Indianness, albeit 
construed as a social rather than an ontological dynamic. In so doing, Boudinot begins to 
articulate a notion of place-based Cherokee peoplehood that does not depend on settler 
emigration for its apparent movement toward civilization.  
 I should note here that I acknowledge that the westernized forms of governance 
that elites, such as Boudinot himself, were championing did involve a deliberate, radical 
shift away from traditional Cherokee governance, a shift that is difficult not to read in 
terms of colonization. Mark Rifkin persuasively demonstrates that Cherokee political 
centralization entailed the subalternization of non-elite Cherokees and that the discourse 
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on Indian nationhood tends to obscure this dynamic. As he writes, narratives of “Indian 
national identity” “shape the 'storytelling' of native collective identity” in ways that 
“efface the imperial and class genealogies of the discourse of 'nation'-hood,” forcing out 
of the picture forms of peoplehood that contradict sanctioned patterns of belonging 
(Rifkin “Representing” 80). My focus on Boudinot's appropriation of Indian savagery 
toward historicizing Cherokee nationhood complements this analysis. Rather than a 
transparent reflection on the Cherokees' progress toward actual, "authentic" political 
modernity, modeled on the settler state, the process of stratification, the silencing of 
traditional Cherokee culture in the emergence of what can be imagined as a hegemonic 
class, can be read as also requiring a narrative of national becoming in order to signify 
legitimate, place-based statehood for a settler public.31 The appropriation of Indian 
savagery toward creating a historicity that can function as a claim to sovereignty for a 
settler public is also a legacy of this process of subalternization. 
To come at this point from a different angle, while Boudinot's rhetoric certainly 
evokes a process of colonization, one can assume that an industrialized Cherokee Nation, 
modeled on the United States and functioning as a fully independent political entity, was 
not an inspiration for Henry Knox's civilization policy. Boudinot has to persuade a settler 
audience to understand what we read as subalternization, aligning Cherokee governance 
with settler political and social normativity, as nonetheless justifying separation from the 
settler state. The point is neither to blame nor absolve Boudinot, however. Rather, it is to 
suggest that, contrary to the view that the Cherokee needed to write themselves into 
history for a public that understood Indians as anachronistic, persuading this public of the 
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legitimacy of place-based Cherokee nationhood involved adapting the discursivity of 
Indianness, qua savagery, so as to legitimize Cherokee belonging in the extra-political 
terms, the linear historicity, established by decades of civilization discourse. By framing 
town and clan-based governance as residual forms of political functioning, the text casts 
these structures as instances of generic Indian anachronism that condition an equally 
generic and linear sense of historical movement qua progress, thus creating the historicity 
that can then frame the adaptations spurred by Cherokee elites as an authentic process of 
development undertaken by a distinct political entity. Priming the reference to the towns 
with both the comments on "Indian civilization" and Boudinot's reflexive self-narration 
enables Cherokee tradition to evoke the locus of a historical sequence, a "progress," that 
his audience would read as authentic and yet as irreducible to that audience and its 
governance.  
 This strategy involves disarticulating settler emigration from civilization. As long 
as the norms and forms of the latter are yoked to the presence of non-natives, rendering 
these norms and settler-state governance as an artificial unity, one can suggest that, as 
does the panel in Georgia v. Tassels, such adaptation merely signals the Cherokees' 
readiness for political assimilation.32 From this perspective, the memorable question that 
opens the text—"What is an Indian?"—is integral to the sense of diachronic movement, 
the emergence of the Cherokee "people." Narrating this emergence pivots on working 
within the frame of Indianness rather than negating its racist connotations outright. 
Boudinot directly appropriates this term and all of its connotations with the assertion that 
“You behold here an Indian, my kindred are Indians, and my fathers sleeping in the 
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wilderness grave—they too were Indians. But I am not as my fathers were—broader 
means and nobler influences have fallen upon me” ("An Address" 69). Since knowledge 
of how his fathers “were” appears already available to his audience, the opening hinges 
on presuming a given Indianness in order to problematize the body of associations that 
are conjured in this term. Boudinot emphasizes the implicit racialist thinking embedded 
in this term by remarking on the ubiquity of the "stale remark—'Do what you will, an 
Indian will still be an Indian,'” paradoxically situating his own Indianness as proof of its 
fallacy, which then more fully comes into view by juxtaposing what was presumed as the 
"present history of Indians" with "the nation to which I belong" (ibid.).  
 As read within the frame of an emergent bio-logics of race, the capacity for 
change that he embodies does not extend to all Natives.33 While for those “unacquainted 
with the manners, habits, and improvements of the Aborigines...the term Indian is 
pregnant with ideas the most repelling and degrading,” he observes, nonetheless “such 
impressions...although they hold too true when applied to some, do great injustice to 
many of this race” (68, my emphasis). If such tropes unfairly stigmatize Boudinot, 
wouldn't all Indians suffer their gross inaccuracies, since the problem appears to be that 
the “Indian” categorically signifies intractability, an unchanged and unchangeable 
essence as Law would later insist? Why foreground the obvious limits of racialist 
thinking only to reassert them in a historical frame?  
 Scholarship tends to read this contradiction as symptomatic of Boudinot's elitism 
and accordingly vexed relationship to his own culture, and he would certainly seem to 
suggest that only those Natives capable of performing whiteness have a claim to 
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futurity.34 However, considering the context allows us to read the text's ironic affirmation 
of “Indian” savagery as integral to representing a Cherokee nationhood that increasingly 
resisted articulation within extant political discourses. The text and speaking tour aimed 
to solicit donations in order to fund a college and to acquire two sets of types, in 
Sequoyah's syllabary and in English, for the paper that would become the Cherokee 
Phoenix (Perdue “Introduction” 12-13). On authority from the Cherokee National 
Council, Boudinot visited several major cities, including Philadelphia, New York, 
Boston, and Charleston, and raised around $1500, enough only for the printing press. 
Since it occurred on the cusp of the ratification of the Cherokee Constitution of 1827, the 
tour aimed at consolidating and publicizing changes in Cherokee political-economy 
nearly two decades in the making, and as such it marks the beginning of a concerted 
effort to broadcast (and normalize) Cherokee sociopolitical differentiation to a vast non-
Native audience that would carry through Boudinot's early years as editor of the Phoenix. 
However, those who donated to the Cherokee cause during Boudinot's tour likely 
understood their charity more ambiguously, as organized around in Perdue's words a 
“belief in common humanity [that] dominated both religious and secular thought” rather 
than as lending support to a state within a state, an argument (imperium in imperio) pro-
removal advocates in the Georgia legislature were already making (“Introduction” 13).35  
 Yet, if Boudinot intended not only to signify political sovereignty but to persuade 
an audience of the legitimacy of this notion, while avoiding political references to 
statehood that would have polarized the very public whose support he needs, why not 
mention existing treaties between the U.S. and the Cherokee Nation? Gesturing to earlier 
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treaties would at least have indicated a precedent for the U.S.-Cherokee political 
relationship that Boudinot largely evades but seems intent on addressing. Such a 
reference might have made a modern "Indian" nation seem less like an historical 
anomaly, as the public likely would have had at least an awareness of the Cherokees' 
numerous treaties. As Lomawaima and Wilkins observe, the Cherokees were obviously 
skilled in diplomacy, having literally centuries of experience in managing the demands of 
complex political theaters and nearly a century of treaty-making with European states and 
their political descendants. By 1817, they had negotiated “ten colonial treaties with 
southern colonies and the British between 1721 and 1783 and nine treaties with the 
United States, beginning in 1785” (Lomawaima and Wilkins 80). In some ways, 
however, the problem here is with the treaty itself. If the existence of treaties proves not 
only that Cherokees acted as sovereigns but further understood that their “consent was 
required before any actions were taken that might adversely effect their nation” even 
within an emerging ward-guardian paradigm, the treaty-form itself was nevertheless the 
vehicle by which settler-state actors eroded Native sovereignty and territory in the 
southeast (Ibid. 81). To the degree that civilization policy subversively deferred the 
question of Native sovereignty as it simultaneously pillaged indigenous land-holdings 
and promoted illegal settler migration, treaties extended and reinforced pressures on 
southeastern Native groups to assimilate or vacate.36  
 Despite the fact that referencing treaties would seem to develop the portrait of 
Cherokee collectivity he intends to convey, Boudinot never mentions a single one—and 
not because he was either clumsy or unaware of them. Rather, their omission reflects the 
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difficulty at hand: to legitimize an appeal to Cherokee sovereignty by way of a 
civilization policy that had long worked to foreclose Native political autonomy and self-
determination going forward. In the context of this foreclosure, drawing on a generic 
Indian difference mobilizes a historicity that can begin to articulate Cherokee political 
autonomy insofar as it first cleaves civilization from settler emigration. Boudinot's 
opening self-Indianizing is the first step in this process. After summarizing Indian history 
as given to the “ravages of savage warfare, to the yells pronounced over the mangled 
bodies of women and children,” thereby generating a stereotypically Indian brutality, 
Boudinot reflexively appropriates this brutality (“You here behold an Indian”), 
presenting himself evidence that a real “Indian” can indeed improve. In so doing, the text 
provides something of an Indian genealogy: “my kindred are Indians, and my 
fathers...But I am not as [they] were...I was not born as thousands are...in a lonely cabin, 
overspread by the forest oak, I drew my first breath...in a language unknown to learned 
and polished nations” (Boudinot 69). Mobilizing the tension between savagery and 
adaptation, Boudinot's evocation of the predominant stereotypes of Indian (in)capacity 
introduces temporality and sociality into the concept. Although he is not “as his fathers 
were,” the text implies he no less belongs to them or the “thousands” who also 
presumably lack the “language" of settler civilization. By the same token, his apparent 
improvement far from disavows a connection to those thousands. Rather, his personhood 
becomes the prism for (re)conceptualizing that polity. In this way, the appeal to generic 
Indianness, not Cherokee-ness, qua savagery registers a sense of continuity within a 
notion of difference.  
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 This polarity is crucial for the text's representational strategy. Cleaving 
civilization from settler emigration so as to frame (settler) "progress" as reflecting a 
place-based Indian continuity requires some notion of "savagery" to posit a minimal 
temporal and geopolitical distance from settlers. If appropriating savagery in this way 
enables an extra-political claim to space through the historicity it facilitates, thereby 
opening to a portrait of place-based Cherokee nationhood, then would seem to require 
speaking/writing from within the frame of “Indian” difference. Just as Boudinot 
foregrounds a relation to place on the basis of turning away from the towns, here the turn 
away from his "fathers" also suggests that the specificity of the represented content is 
subordinate to the representation of historical "movement" that the reference allows. The 
text also foregrounds this collective movement early on within a world-historical frame. 
Prior to framing his own Indian identity, he writes, “Though it be true that he is ignorant, 
that he is a heathen, that he is a savage; yet he is no more than all others have been under 
similar circumstances. Eighteen centuries ago what were the inhabitants of Great 
Britain?” (“An Address” 69). The answer is obviously not “Indians,” but like them. What 
appears as a proto-anthropological point, that Natives are far from essentially ossified and 
fated to disappear, creates a foundation for narrating Indian self-determination by way of 
a historicity modeled on settler nationhood. At the same time, the passage evokes a claim 
to space, priming the later reference to the towns, insofar as it displaces savagery from an 
ontological condition of Indianness, such as in Georgia or Johnson, into a state 
constitutive of the process of civilization writ large, a state from which any given “race of 
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beings,” settlers included, enters History proper, a notion that appears to consist in a 
supposedly universal teleology of social evolution. 
 These passages may be thought of as (re)occupying the “Indian” so as to uncouple 
civilization from U.S. settlement while casting its norms and forms as transcendent 
historical structures. In fact, conditioning the difference of Indianness as one of separate 
autonomous development, rather than of ontological intractability, enables Boudinot to 
foreground the geopolitics of settler emigration as anything but bringing civilization to 
Indians. Regarding the Cherokees' movement away from their traditional towns, the text 
notes that this process essentially began “when game became incompetent [for] their 
support, by reason of the surrounding white population” (71). This formulation implies 
that changing subsistence patterns from widespread hunting to localized agriculture 
derived not from settlers' influence, but from their negative impact on Cherokee 
communities, in particular the withering of hunting lands via illegal settler emigration 
and fraudulent treaties that had already ceded large chunks of territory to the U.S. The 
shift to farming is thus presented as a concretely historical necessity created by the 
pressure that encroaching settlers placed on the Cherokee people. Relaying the extent of 
this shift, Boudinot adds that “there is not a single family in the nation, that can be said to 
subsist on the slender support which the wilderness would afford," a claim that reverses 
the typical valence of the normative settler homestead toward portraying the damages 
wrought by unchecked settler incursions (71).  
 The text then works on two fronts. On one hand, it defamiliarizes the difference of 
Indianness, shifting it from an index of ontological incapacity to one of peoplehood, from 
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that which temporally delimits the genesis of universal History for a non-Native public to 
that which signifies a historicity both recognizable and irreducible to this public. On the 
other, it separates the norms and forms of civilization from settler presence, working 
through the sense of distance rendered by the appropriation of Indianness to throw into 
relief settler emigration as a problem. However, that this distancing of settler normativity 
from U.S. territorial and juridical control in the southeast follows from the earlier move, 
that of shifting the valence of Indianness in more general terms, suggests, as does the 
text's omission of treaties, that mobilizing a historicity using the terms of civilization 
discourse involves more than merely appropriating a generic Indian anachronism or 
simply showing its mutability after all, as does Crawford after Cherokee removal. 
Conversely, just proving that the Cherokees have adapted the forms and norms of settler 
modernity fails to justify their separation from the settler public to which these norms 
tend to adhere. In this way, Boudinot's self-framing is more than just a provocative 
opening. Rather, it holds together the basic strategy, bringing together these two fronts as 
two sides of the same coin. By adapting a generic savagery as a frame for his own 
identity, Boudinot changes the difference associated with Indianness from radical alterity 
to collective, alien(ated) mutability, thereby retaining it as a category through which to 
gesture to territorial sovereignty by foregrounding Cherokee adaptations.37  
Still, one could suggest that, insofar as civilization discourse conditions his 
rhetoric, Boudinot might have begun his essay by detailing Cherokee progress, rather 
than deferring this more relevant and probably more compelling material for his 
audience. Were the aim to simply reverse the racist implications of Indianness, he might 
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have done so. An imagined incapacity for meaningful labor was certainly a recurrent 
feature of narrations of Indianness, one that often served to negate Native forms of 
peoplehood as constituting legitimate governance. A particularly striking example from 
Law's 1840 text indicates both the embeddedness and the utility of this link between 
Indian labor and sociopolitical organization. What begins as a glance in his text 
transforms over a few pages into a strong gloss of Natives' abject relation to normative 
sociality as supposedly evidenced in history: 
 
As it regards their civil and political condition...nothing among these tribes...bore 
the semblance of an established government. They lived gregariously, as 
wandering hunters, without unity or compact as a people...with no other ideas of 
laws than...a few immemorial customs. Each distinct community was again 
[divided] into tribes or families; many inhabit[ing] the same town. Each tribe 
[was] distinguished by some appellative usually derived from the brute creation or 
vegetable world[.] (Law 16) 
 
 
In place of “any semblance of an established government” was a generally diffused 
condition of strict necessity, a general incapacity for any “unity or compact as a people” 
except as “wandering hunters.”  Law narrates an absolute division within history proper 
between the normative track of settlement and that occupied by Natives, a vicious, 
'natural' cycle of overbearing necessity, arbitrary social formations and governance, and 
indeterminate social organization—a state devoid of any capacity for productive 
relationships. Law's discourse accordingly gives an example of what Steven Conn has 
identified as the emerging tendency, at the time, to view natives “as part of natural, rather 
than human, history” (30).  
 100 
However, representing Indian governance and sociality as lacking any meaningful 
structure hinges on linking them with supposedly unproductive modes of labor, namely 
hunting. The reliance on hunting, for Law, explains Indians' apolitical state as driven by a 
necessity that resulted in their constant migration and therein prevented the emergence of 
any discernible organization. Yet, the difference of hunting presupposes settler 
agrarianism in order to explain, in supposedly objective terms, the deficiency and, now, 
non-existence of Indian governance and social organization in Georgia. The reference to 
hunting as a collective form of labor, then, anchors the specific ideological aim here, 
which appears to be to register the necessity of removal without naming it as such. Native 
peoples' reliance on hunting provides the supposedly material basis for representing the 
real contingency of removal in terms of an ontological and historical givenness to 
wandering. And insofar as the Cherokees just wandered west of the Mississippi, the 
people of Georgia are vindicated for a crime not only that they didn't commit, but that 
was never committed. 
But, again, if the coupling of hunting and (the lack of) governance is so strong, 
why does Boudinot not begin by laying out the ways in which the Cherokees have not 
only adapted settler modes of political-economy, but have developed them so 
successfully as to outperform many, if not all, of the surrounding Anglo communities? To 
this point, I would observe that Law's passage not only shows a persistent equation 
between Indian hunting, wandering, and lack of "unity…as a people." It also 
demonstrates, as I've argued, that settler modes of agrarianism and associated tropes of 
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civilization only signify a moral and hence extra-political relation to place insofar as they 
are measured against, both conceptually and historically distanced from, Indianness.  
 By orienting the audience to the generic difference of Indianness early in the text, 
Boudinot articulates Cherokee adaptations as reinforcing the unity of a people, to use 
Law's phrase, without having to justify their continued separation from the settler state. 
The difference of Indianness provides the conceptual, diachronic basis for a 
representation of movement organized as a shift among the Cherokee population. The 
text observes that although “there are many who have commenced a life of agricultural 
labour from mere necessity [and] would gladly resume their former course of living” 
such biases “are individual failings and ought to be passed over"; leaving these failings 
aside, “it cannot be doubted that the nation is improving...in all those particulars which 
must finally constitute the inhabitants an industrious and intelligent people” (Boudinot 
72). The point appears to be that whatever desire Cherokees might have for traditional 
ways of living, like the towns associated with them, such desire constitutes merely a 
bump in the road toward legitimate nationhood. The unification or reconstitution of a 
people is not the same as its creation ex nihilo, however. The individuals mentioned do 
not confirm the narratives of vanishing Indianness that were already beginning to 
circulate in New England, narratives that denied the historical continuity of Native 
peoplehood. Boudinot dispels this possibility early on by insisting that his aim is not to 
give a "detailed account of the various aboriginal tribes…known to you only on the pages 
of history, and there but obscurely," provided "all the colouring of prejudice and bigotry" 
(Boudinot 70). He adds that neither is it his purpose to consider "the remnants, of those 
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who have fled with time and are no more…[only] monuments of the Indian's sad fate"; 
instead it is to offer "a few disconnected facts" concerning the "present improved state 
and future prospects of that particular tribe called the Cherokees to which I belong" 
(ibid.).  
 The tension between these passages suggests two different views of the Indian, as 
ossified and archaic as opposed to having the capacity for adaptation, that map onto two 
different views of the Indian in history, or of the Indian's relation to history. I would 
suggest that this tension less reflects the need to write Indians into a history from which 
they have been exiled, however, than that the imaginary qualities of Indianness (as rooted 
in primordial and ambiguous savagery that impedes normative social development) are 
themselves paradoxically integral to conceptualizing and then (re)producing a linear 
historicity organized around Cherokee peoplehood. The exceptions to the rule of progress 
in Cherokee country that Boudinot notes are a matter of "individual failings" rather than 
the "Indian's sad fate," a trope that he suggests mostly registers the biases of earlier 
generations of settlers. Yet, Cherokee progress still remains within the constellation of 
Indian civilization, as the text makes clear throughout ("When before did a nation of 
Indians step forward and ask for the means of civilization?" he asks toward the end), a 
constellation whose actuality and possibility Boudinot portrays himself as symbolizing 
("An Address" 77). From this view, then, any reluctance to embrace the norms and forms 
of civilization is not symptomatic of the Indian's tragic destiny insofar as it is reducible to 
individuals rather than Indianness. 
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 Changing the difference of Indianness thus provides the conceptual clearing for a 
narrative premised on the historical movement of a particular Native people in relation to 
specific lands in the southeast. As Boudinot observes, “It cannot be doubted that the 
nation is improving...in all those particulars which must finally constitute the inhabitants 
an industrious and intelligent people” (72). The difference of that industrious and 
intelligent people comprising the present and future Cherokee Nation presupposes the 
semantic, ideological clearing generated by the appeal to Indianness. Only by first 
establishing a primordial Indianness in terms of generic savagery does the frame of 
anachronistic “Indian” identity become available to render a narrative of political-
economic adaptation with coherence as development. Working within the terms provided 
by civilization discourse, Boudinot posits an Indianness that conforms to settler 
narrations of civilization but that in so doing crucially differentiates Cherokee from 
settler belonging, remaining consistent with the normative and temporal trajectories 
embedded in such discourse while bracketing their capacity to function as de facto 
territorial and juridical mappings of settler authority.  
 The condensed allusions to Cherokee tradition qua "savagery" throughout the text 
serve the larger purpose of keeping the diachronic and geopolitical difference provided 
by Indianness in view, even as they are metonymic of the term's conceptual phasing 
across the text, so as to signify both the autonomy and differentiation of Cherokee 
progress. For instance, Boudinot observes that in “many places the word of God is 
regularly preached and explained, both by missionaries and natives,” adding that “in no 
ignorant country have the missionaries undergone less trouble and difficulty in spreading 
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knowledge of the Bible” than in Cherokee territory (Boudinot 73). He himself would 
have known that this claim was misleading, as was the notion that the “Cherokees have 
had no established religion of their own” (Boudinot 73).38 In a similar vein, he specifies 
three developments of “late occurrence” that “must certainly place the Cherokee Nation 
in a fair light”: the “invention of letters,” the “translation of the New Testament into 
Cherokee,” and finally, not the adaptation of supposedly superior forms of civil 
government, but simply the “organization of Government” (Boudinot 74). Neither the 
bias reflected by these statements, attributable to Boudinot's own elite status, nor their 
accuracy as indices of actual Cherokee demographics are at issue here, however. 
 Rather, the point is that the text's references to Indianness generate a baseline 
notion for historical Cherokee peoplehood that enables each instance of adaptation to 
evoke the deliberate movement, not the formation, of a people. While the Cherokee 
alphabet “may be greatly simplified” it nonetheless serves “all the purpose of writing”; 
the translation of the New Testament ensures that the “shrill sound of the Savage yell 
shall die away”; and political centralization, “though defective in many respects, is well 
suited to the condition of the inhabitants. As they rise in information and refinement, 
changes in it must follow” until they “arrive” at the point they may be “admitted into all 
the privileges of the American family” (Boudinot 74-5). In contrast to interpreting this 
passage as Boudinot writing the Cherokee Nation into history, where the obstacle to 
recognizing Cherokee political autonomy as symbolized by treaties, western forms of 
governance, and the like derives from Anglo culture's having so consistently written 
Indians out of modernity, I would instead suggest here that Boudinot himself is the one 
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writing the Indian out of time. He cannot appropriate a historicity conditioned by 
civilization discourse without doing so. By deploying "savagery" as an anachronistic 
frame for conceptualizing improvement, and clearly foregrounding the locus of that 
movement in these instances as, if not wholly originating with the Cherokee, at least 
coextensive with an agency embodied in the broader population writ large, qua Indians, 
Boudinot generates a sense of historicity that by charting a shift in the population 
presupposes the coherence of the Cherokee people, as a distinct political body, doing the 
shifting. The narration of progress, in other words, retroactively coheres the polity that 
progresses. 
 In this way, appropriating Indianness enables the text's sociological appeal to 
"progress" to reflect the "movement" of a people and, in turn, a relation to place. The 
relation between Cherokee capacity for civilization and their existence as an independent 
polity appears perhaps most directly in the tabulations Boudinot offers as evidence of 
their industrialization. He indicates, “In 1810 there were 19,500 cattle; 6,100 horses; 
19,600 swine; 1,037 sheep; 467 looms; 1,600 spinning wheels; 30 waggons; 500 ploughs; 
3 saw-mills; 13 grist-mills, & etc. At this time there are 22,000 cattle; 7,600 horses; 
46,000 swine; 2,500 sheep; 762 loom; 2,488 spinning wheels; 172 waggons (sic.)” and 
the list extends to infrastructure, including schools, ferries and “a number of public 
roads” (“An Address” 72). Insofar as the geopolitical integrity of the borders containing 
this progress was a matter for debate, the impression of productivity and growth here 
depend on Boudinot's mobilization of Indianness, in particular the sense of linear 
historicity this term enables. At the same time, insofar as these moments presuppose 
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Boudinot's identification as Indian, a term for some "pregnant with ideas the most 
repelling and degrading," they reinforce its capacity to signify the movement of a people, 
as opposed to merely a stunted and anachronistic ontology ("An Address" 68).  
 Considering that for a settler public the meaning of Cherokee territoriality and its 
borders—legal, political, social—was anything but axiomatic, Boudinot's foregrounding 
of Indianness enables a notion of peoplehood to come into view only insofar as it renders 
difference as distance. "An Address to the Whites" seeks to persuade a settler public of 
the legitimacy of Cherokee progress and to disprove that the “Indian” is irredeemably 
savage and historically ossified. In so doing, the text revises the alterity of Indianness 
from that which frames the rights of different settler actors to Cherokee lands, grounded 
in history, to that which marks the exception, both in the normative sense of progress and 
of political distinction, of the people adapting the norms and forms of settler civilization. 
In terms of his own self-Indianization, Boudinot remains metonymic both of this capacity 
and the process of becoming it implies for the duration of the text. Signaling the future, 
however, would seem more difficult insofar as it threatens to close the gap between 
settler and Indian historicities, thereby potentially raising the incongruity of a nation 
within a nation. Affirming the difference of Indianness in the frame of linear, normative 
historicity substitutes a temporal boundary grounded in “improvement” for a geopolitics 
of settler jurisdiction. But where, to what, does that historicity point in the end? 
In short, it points to heteronormative couplehood. In closing his text, Boudinot 
consistently refers to the Cherokee Nation as a feminine agency. As he writes, “She is at 
this instant, risen like the first morning sun, which grows brighter and brighter, until it 
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reaches its full glory,” gesturing to a futurity that promises to reward the audience's 
investment at that point when “[s]he will become not a great, but a faithful ally of the 
United States” ("An Address" 77). The progress of which Boudinot himself is metonymic 
is that of a masculine throwing off of the shackles of historical determinism, but leaving 
these shackles behind births a jurisdictionally distinct nation characterized as an 
essentially feminine companion to the United States. Boudinot extends the metaphor: “In 
times of peace she will plead the common liberties of America. In times of war her...sons 
will sacrifice in your defence...She asks not for greatness; she seeks not wealth; she 
pleads only...to become respectable as a nation”; the Cherokee Nation asks not for 
territorial sovereignty but only the chance “to enlighten and ennoble her sons, and to 
ornament her daughters with modesty and virtue” ("An Address" 77-8). The geopolitical 
and juridical difference entailed in the Cherokees' becoming a national people, and what 
this difference means for territorial and politico-juridical between the nations going 
forward, is recast as the naturalized difference of heteronormative couplehood and its 
associated notion of normative domesticity.  
Drawing on normative gender dynamics at the end of the text registers the future 
geopolitical agency of Cherokee nationhood through the morality associated with settler 
homemaking. Boudinot casts autonomous, territorial Cherokee governance as woman's 
work, framing the future relationship between the Cherokee Nation and U.S. as a 
domestic partnership.  Mobilizing the gendered dynamics of homemaking registers the 
continued difference of Indian civilization while deflecting the crucial juridico-political 
parallax of territory, sovereignty, and authority. While one could suggest that this trope 
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avoids a more overtly political representation of Cherokee nationhood going forward, it 
would not make much sense to suggest that Boudinot seeks to evade what civilization 
discourse works to foreclose. Rather, as the texts by Crawford and Simms in particular 
suggest, and as the basic strategy of civilization policy shows, rendering the norms and 
forms of settler civilization, here normative homemaking, as the moral locus of the desire 
that grounds a normative and therein justified relation to place involves positing 
Indianness as that which exceeds this edifice, whether through ontological or historical 
inertia, or both. Insofar as the relationship between normative homemaking and 
Indianness derives from a discourse that seeks to civilize, so as to subvert, Cherokee 
landholding, these elements already form an artificial unity, which makes them available 
to Boudinot. However, at the same time, there is no necessary, fixed relationship between 
the two, as both the various configurations of Indianness across the texts in this chapter 
and the necessity of linking such norms and forms to Indian identity in the first place 
bears out. I would suggest, then, that Boudinot here transmutes the normative framework 
that would seemingly disqualify the territorial claims of the Cherokee Nation into that 
which marks its exceptional horizon in terms of the same linear historicity.   
Finally, one could suggest that Boudinot merely anticipates an emergent 
ward/guardian paradigm, normalizing the binary formulation and formation of a two-state 
system. Besides the fact this paradigm had not yet received its formal-legal articulation, 
however, I would suggest that the text's foregrounding of the agency of motherhood at 
the end is in keeping with the adaptability of generic Indianness in its relation to settler 
norms and forms. Furthermore, this trope enables Boudinot to present Cherokee futurity, 
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its path toward "equal standing with other nations of the earth,” as a bildungsroman ("An 
Address" 69). Where the text begins by declaring its purpose to "labour for her 
respectability," by the end that national subject/people is seen "rising from the ashes of 
her degradation, wearing her purified and beautiful garments, and taking her seat" among 
those nations (69, 77). Feminizing the movement of the people serves to  retain a 
conceptual distinction between Cherokee nationhood and the U.S. by transposing that 
relationship into one of a "faithful ally" to its domestic partner. Again, though, this 
framing does not simply deflect the threat implied by its political distinction for a public 
that saw its own belonging as an extension of supposedly transcendent norms. Rather, 
appropriating these norms as the shape of a future union conveys the continued 
"movement" of the Cherokee Nation as a moral necessity in terms Boudinot likely 
perceived as already available to his audience.  
 
     • 
As an elite Cherokee groomed to serve a public role as spokesperson, Boudinot 
worked to represent his people in terms of a discourse that had, by 1826, long provided 
the rhetorical and ideological framing for political relations. After two major waves of 
Cherokee emigration west, the Red Stick War, constant incursions by settlers into 
southeastern Native territory, and nearly four decades of U.S. malfeasance within the 
treaty system, Cherokee leadership increasingly banked on the symbolic efficacy of the 
rhetoric of progress to publicize and politicize place-based belonging. Given the dilemma 
of how to represent Cherokee nationhood by way of the very discourse that had worked 
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to foreclose the legitimacy and real possibility of such a formation, Boudinot's text shows 
that appropriating and affirming a generic Indian savagery provided a throughway to 
historicizing the Cherokees' political centralization and political-economic changes as 
legitimate structures of civilization. Appropriating "savagery" as the alterity from which 
normative, authentic—yet de facto—claims to place emerge enables Boudinot to register 
the legitimacy of Cherokee sovereignty by inhabiting the generic difference of 
Indianness.  
 Put another way, the specificity of Cherokee claims gain coherence as a legitimate 
process of place-based state formation only insofar as settler-state actors articulate their 
own claims to space in relation to anachronistic Indianness. From this view, this latter 
term emerges as a means of articulating a claim to Cherokee land where its political 
mechanisms falter. In this way, the difference of Indianness is inhabitable not because 
Natives are the natural referent for such discourse. Gerald Vizenor has long argued that 
the “indian has no referent but a simulation” (Fugitive 36). Building from this insight, 
this chapter argues that settler historicity, as an extra-juridical maneuver working within a 
political and juridical frame, less brackets actual Native peoples than it retroactively 
constitutes temporal narratives of belonging for non-natives. Following Foucault's 
thinking on the artificial unities that comprise discourse as discussed earlier, Indianness 
qua "savagery" becomes a tool for Cherokee elites in the context of nascent debates over 
the removal of southeastern Native groups precisely insofar as it is widely deployed by 
different settler actors toward their own appeals to territorial sovereignty. As the 
discussion of Georgia v. Tassels, Johnson v. McIntosh, and Commissioner Crawford's 
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report to Congress demonstrate, the discursivity of Indianness, its narrativity, makes it 
subject to appropriation and recombination in politically opposite ways depending upon 
who is claiming what, and when, with regard to Cherokee land.  
After removal shows this will to land and sovereignty persists. Georgia loses its 
axiomatic moral legitimacy insofar as history now documents the illegal and genocidal 
intervention into Cherokee sovereignty that constituted removal. The memory of 
stockades and the forced march west trace political events that simply could not have 
happened if Georgia's position was axiomatically legitimate in the first place. In Simms' 
text, Georgia's recent geopolitical aggressions go missing in the spirit of Daniel Boone, 
which retroactively orients the reader to a moral edifice for the "border history of the 
south" organized around the ethics of an idealized settler-father. Like Law's primordial 
Native imbeciles, Lenatewa's love for Lucy, his devotion to Nelson, and his demise 
changes the referent of Cherokee civilization from a radical effort (even toward its own 
people) to adapt settler political structures in the fight against settler colonialism to a 
capacity to be integrated within a normative matrix of settler sociality, a capacity 
tragically overdetermined by the stubbornness of genealogical savagery. As in each of the 
texts discussed, narrating southeastern space and geopolitics by way of a tailored 
“Indian” identity here represents the archival memory of removal in terms of the Indian's 
intractably perverse relation to normative habitation, thereby historicizing a generic 
Indianness in the space, discursive and territorial, where the Cherokee Nation should be. 
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1     Georgia v. Tassels, discussed below, was a provocative challenge not only to Cherokee claims to lands 
otherwise located within the boundaries of the state of Georgia, but also to the view that the federal 
government had a greater claim to sovereignty than the states. It involved a Cherokee man, George 
'Corn' Tassels, convicted and found guilty of murdering another Cherokee within the boundaries of 
Cherokee territory in northwest Georgia. The crime occurred on lands the state had recently seized 
through a series of legislative acts designed more or less to destroy the Cherokee Nation and acquire its 
lands, known as the Georgia codes. As the question of jurisdiction had to be resolved before the trial, 
John Ross, Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation, saw the case as a possible way of getting the 
question of Cherokee sovereignty before the Supreme Court through the appeal process. However, the 
Georgia appellate court used the interlocutory appeal to articulate the state's claims to sovereignty, 
attacking the legal foundations and precedents for Cherokee landholding. Relying heavily on U.S. 
Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall's legitimation of the doctrine of discovery in  Johnson v. 
McIntosh (1823), the panel viewed Natives as, in Marshall's words, “'rightful occupants of the soil'” 
who lacked “'rights to complete sovereignty as independent nations” since the discovering “'nations of 
Europe...asserted and claimed the ultimate dominion in themselves [and] power to grant the soil, while 
yet in possession of the natives'” (The State v. Tassels 157). In its view, annexing Cherokee land and 
nullifying Cherokees' laws merely enacted a privilege the state had inherited from Great Britain and 
never relinquished. The case was then returned to trial court, where Tassels was quickly found guilty 
and then ordered to an expedited execution by Governor Gilmer, with approval by the state legislature, 
so as to quickly terminate the grounds for Marshall's impending review, of which Gilmer had been 
informed. As Tim Alan Garrison writes, in “hanging Tassel, Georgia...demonstrated the contempt it 
held for the Supreme Court and the notion of federal supremacy. The state rejected the federal 
government's authority over Indian affairs, ignored the strictures of U.S.-Indian treaties, and threatened 
to instigate a war with the Cherokees” (123). See Norgren, The Cherokee Cases, 95-9 and Garrison, 
The Legal Ideology of Removal, 111-124. For more on the doctrine of discovery, see Lomawaima and 
Wilkins, Uneven Ground: American Indian Sovereignty and Federal Law, 19-63. 
 
2      Horsman adds that Jackson's opponents adapting the same contrastive rhetoric of Indian inferiority and 
Anglo-Saxonism shows belief in Natives' capacity to assimilate was “beginning to give way to the 
racialism of the mid-nineteenth century” across the board (Horsman 59). In a similar vein, Jill Norgren 
observes that while the Cherokees seemed to have “committed themselves to a multiracial continent 
populated by different nations,” the general public “who had been uncomfortable with the idea of 
Indian separateness” by the 1820s “began to criticize the possibility of Indian acculturation” (39). And 
Tim Alan Garrison points out that ideas of racial determination and “Anglo-Saxon exceptionalism” had 
become so “deeply embedded in white minds,” saturating politics, philosophy, and the culture at large, 
that even William Wirt, the Cherokee Nation's hired lawyer, employed them in Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia (29). Wirt argued that “theories of Anglo-Saxon superiority [were] flawed,” as the “purported 
successes of Anglo-American culture” over that of the Cherokees could not “be attributed to racial 
purity,” inadvertently highlighting the deep purchase of a race-based epistemology (Garrison 29). At 
the very least, it appears that it was easier for advocates of the Cherokee Nation to question whether 
blood determines the arrangement of social space than to present the Cherokees' obvious appropriation 







3     As a side note, Crawford's emphasis on the necessity of teaching Natives the value of manual labor 
appears especially cynical given that the results of the Cherokees' own hard work, namely the 
development of farm land and a number of mills, contributed to the perceived value of their land in the 
first place, prior to the discovery of gold. As Green and Perdue put it, in the buildup to the Indian 
Removal Act, as Georgia passed legislation annexing Cherokee territory and parceled out land for state 
lottery, “the chance to get a free farm kept the attention of individual Georgians focused on the 
Indians” (71). Consider also that the terms of the Treaty of New Echota (1835) in addition to obligating 
the U.S. “to pay $5 million, cover the cost of various claims levied by and against the Cherokees...and 
set aside money for schools, orphans, and a national fund, and pay the cost of removal to and 
subsistence in the West during the first year” also stipulated that the U.S. “appraise and compensate for 
the value of all improvements left behind” by the Cherokees (ibid. 112). 
 
4     To be clear, from the beginning the U.S. focused on circumscribing Cherokee political autonomy. Like 
their southeastern counterparts, the Cherokees had signed a treaty with the federal government under 
the Articles of Confederation. Article III of the Treaty of Hopewell (1785) states that the Cherokee 
acknowledge themselves “to be under the protection of the United States of America, and no other 
sovereign whosoever,” while Article IX gives Congress “the sole and exclusive right of regulating the 
trade with the Indians, and managing all their affairs in such a manner as they think proper,” a principle 
more fully worked out in the series of Trade and Intercourse Acts that (in theory) limited white 
encroachment and fraudulent land cessions by requiring licenses for trading and entering into Native 
territory. 
 
5 After the boundary fixed by the 1785 treaty and its accompanying provision that the Cherokee could 
punish transgressors “as they please[d]” failed to stem emigration from the Carolinas and Georgia into 
Cherokee territory, the federal government negotiated a new treaty at Holston (present-day Knoxville, 
Tennessee) that sought to deflate escalating hostilities by reaffirming much of the previous treaty. 
However, the latter treaty effectively rewarded illegal white settlements by purchasing the land for the 
squatters in question. A number of land-ceding treaties followed. The resentment toward white 
settlements on Cherokee land in present-day Kentucky and Tennessee helped to propel a more 
centralized political resistance to land cessions. This centralization only amplified the existing tensions 
between Upper and Lower Town Cherokees, however, tensions that manifested in the 1807 execution 
of Cherokee chief Doublehead, a famed Chickamauga warrior made speaker of the nation in 1796, 
mainly for ceding away a large portion of Cherokee hunting grounds. In addition to frustration with the 
United States' unwillingness to curb illegal emigration, the Lower Towns were equally disconcerted 
with the course westernization was taking with regard to traditional political structures. Rather than 
unproblematically registering social progress and national unity, the centralization of Cherokee 
peoplehood undertaken toward regulating and diminishing land cessions via treaty itself gradually 
diminished the political importance of the traditional towns. At a macro-level, the result was the 
stratification of the Cherokees into a representative elite attuned to the demands of capitalist political-
economy, as a means to stave off U.S. inroads into national autonomy, and the broader masses who 
were increasingly estranged from decision-making processes. See Wilkins “Young Chief” in Cherokee 
Tragedy, especially 37-45; Rifkin “Representing the Cherokee Nation” boundary 2, Fall 2005; Green 
and Perdue The Cherokee Nation and the Trail of Tears, 23-41; Heidler and Heidler, Indian Removal 
3-9; Garrison The Legal Ideology of Removal, 14-41. 
 
6 Although the Cherokees had sided with the United States against the British and the Shawnee 
Confederacy in the War of 1812, a conflict that soon catalyzed the Creek civil war and the Red Stick 
war, frontier settlers in the southeast still doubled down on their desire for supposedly free land, 





7 The Chickamaugas refer to a group of Lower Town Cherokees who persistently resisted settler 
hostilities and movements into their territory with force. Led by Dragging Canoe in the late-eighteenth 
century, the group sided with the British during the Revolutionary war but gradually broke away from 
the main body of Cherokees in the early nineteenth century and emigrated as a result of constant 
violent incursions. See Wilkins, 11-20 and Justice, 36-42. 
 
8 For more on the development of the National Council, the National Committee, and the impact of land 
cessions on broader Cherokee political reorganization, see Garrison The Legal Ideology of Indian 
Removal, esp. 45-58; Norgren The Cherokee Cases, esp. 41-6; Green and Perdue “Civilizing the 
Cherokees” in The Cherokee Nation and the Trail of Tears. For a perspective on the impact of political 
reorganization on Cherokee sociality, in particular the ways in which the formation of a centralized 
Cherokee national government with jurisdiction over its territory displaced kinship networks, both 
marginalized women through new criteria for citizenship and rendered resistance to Christianization 
and/or the laws passed by the Council as an archaic radicalism, see Rifkin “Representing the Cherokee 
Nation,” esp. 67-72. 
 
9 Cherokees were integrated into the state as individuals without recourse to legal protection from theft 
or violence to property as they could not testify in court and Georgia judges could not accept Cherokee 
laws as defense (although a later act enabled Cherokees who owned improvements on their land to 
testify in court after the land lottery). Those citizens who opposed removal faced criminal charges if 
they were found to encourage the Cherokee to remain, and they faced up to six years of hard labor if 
found guilty. People who argued that they were acting in accordance with Cherokee laws in defending 
their land faced additional penalties. Creeks had to provide documentation from the Creek federal 
agent if they wished to enter Georgia and could only remain for ten days, as the legislature feared the 
development of alliances that could strengthen the Cherokees' resolve. White people who were living 
in the annexed territory after 1831 had to take an oath of allegiance to the state for which they would 
receive documentation, although white men married to Cherokee women and federal agents were 
exempted. This component was primarily directed toward missionaries like Samuel Worcester and 
Elizur Butler, who along with nine additional missionaries were arrested in 1831 for operating on 
Cherokee grounds without a permit. In 1832, Georgia began to survey Cherokee lands after the 
legislature authorized the governor to do so in the absence of a removal treaty, so as to facilitate the 
lottery of Cherokee lands. The governor was also authorized to seize gold deposits and station militia 
in order to prevent trespassing. See Garrison 103-112 and 169-75, and Green and Perdue 78-85. 
 
10 The missionaries were advised to accept the pardon by their sponsoring body, the American Board of 
Commissioners for Foreign Missions.  Butler and Worcester were specifically arrested and jailed for 
working in the area without the necessary state permit and refusing to sign an oath of allegiance to the 
state, offenses which both derived from the Georgia codes passed in a flurry in the late 1820s as the 
state sought to destroy place-based Cherokee sovereignty. Since the two accepted the pardon, the 
ruling's precedent was never tested in the conflict between the Cherokees and Georgia, although it 
would become an important touchstone for later efforts to reverse elements of allotment and 
termination policies.  
 
11 See Green and Perdue, The Cherokee Nation and the Trail of Tears, “The Treaty of New Echota,” “The 
Trail of Tears” and “Rebuilding in the West”; Konkle, “The Cherokee Resistance” in Writing Indian 
Nations; Perdue “Introduction” in The Cherokee Editor: The Writings of Elias Boudinot, 25-33; Peyer 
The Tutor'd Mind, 206-216; Smith, An American Betrayal, “New Echota,” “Roundup,” and “The Trail 





12    For more on imperium in imperio, see Garrison, 131-2. The argument that Indian nationhood violated 
this principle would contribute to the arguments by pro-removal advocates in the Georgia legislature 
for the primacy of state over native sovereignty. Garrison also points out that contesting this argument 
formed a key component of William Wirt's argument in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia. As Georgia 
aggressively moved to annex Cherokee lands, the debate over removal increasingly turned on whether 
the Cherokee Nation was to be considered a foreign nation or whether it existed in another, more 
ambiguous relation to the federal government, the latter which John Marshall would codify with his 
notion of domestic dependent status in Cherokee Nation. For John Marshall's discussion in this 
decision of why the Cherokees did not constitute a foreign nation, which included combining an a 
priori assertion of settler title to land with the notion that Natives lived in a state of pupilage with 
regard to the U.S., see Prucha 58-9. For President Jackson's slightly earlier discussion of the same point 
from a different, more explicitly geopolitical angle organized around states' rights, see Prucha 47-8. For 
an overview of the emergence of domestic-dependent status for Native nations, in particular the 
Supreme Court's role via Marshall's decisions, see Barker 29-35. For more on how domestic-dependent 
status emerges out of competing views on the doctrine of discovery, see Lomawaima and Wilkins 22-
62. For a detailed discussion of the Supreme Court's trajectory from Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and 
Worcester v. Georgia with regard to the legal limits of native occupancy, states' claims to sovereignty, 
and the scope of the rights attached to the Cherokee people construed as a nation, see Norgren 98-122. 
 
13 Johnson and Graham's Lessee v. William McIntosh involved a dispute over the proper claim to two 
large sections of land in Illinois. The plaintiffs inherited lands that were purchased from the 
Piankashaws prior to the Revolutionary War. As Garrison points out, the lands in question were 
deemed Indian country in the Proclamation of 1763, which made the Appalachian mountain range a 
political boundary between the colonies and Native territory, although they also partially overlapped 
with Virginia's original charter of 1609 (87). The defendants had received a grant to the same lands by 
the United States in 1818. The U.S. acquired Virginia's claim to the lands in 1784 and after the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787 began surveying and selling lands collectively referred to as the Old 
Northwest, despite that several Native groups living in the region still claimed the space. Marshall 
ruled in favor of McIntosh, arguing that Native groups had a right to occupancy only, could sell or cede 
lands to the United States only, and that the latter held political sovereignty over all territory on the 
basis of the doctrine of discovery. See Garrison 87-97 and Konkle 17-19. 
 
14 Here we see the tenuousness of discovery as a basis for sovereignty. According to Marshall's 
reasoning, in the absence of a proper proof of purchase, so to speak, Native peoples' acknowledged 
right to occupancy of these lands had to have been extinguished by conquest; otherwise, either the 
powers of sovereignty created by doctrine of discovery and as laid out here are not absolute (i.e. this 
precedent itself, rather than native 'title,' is the limited construct), or U.S. title to these lands is not valid 
in terms of these powers. Conquest in this passage moves from a means of implementing the powers of 
sovereignty that took effect at discovery to paradoxically the locus of this sovereignty itself, as the end 
of the ruling seems to indicate. 
 
15 In fact, the state legislature expedited the death of George Tassels before a writ of error from Marshall 
arrived informing the panel of judges that its decision in Georgia would be reviewed. Insofar as it 
effectively terminated the basis for the review, killing Tassels prevented the panel's precedent for state 
sovereignty from being overturned and protected the legalization of the state legislature's annexation of 
Cherokee space. See Garrison, 120-4. 
 
16    The panel makes the latter reference in the context of discussing the aforementioned Treaty of 
Hopewell, specifically an article that mandated the Cherokee give notice of their intention to go to war. 
Rather than indicating a nation-to-nation relationship, a bit of diplomacy that could validate a legal 
notion of Cherokee sovereignty, the panel argues that this particular article was rather a necessary and 
“salutary restriction which was the origin of, at least, one approach towards the habits and usages of 





17 This biopolitical use of the trope of the home draws on Mark Rifkin's argument that the settler state 
exerts and naturalizes its power through a compulsory heterosexuality comprising "an ensemble of 
imperatives that includes family formation, homemaking, private property-holding, and the allocation 
of citizenship, a series of 'detachable parts' fused to each other through discourses of sexuality,” which 
indigenous peoples perpetually threaten to disarticulate and thereby disclose as an imaginary basis for 
sovereignty (Rifkin When Did Indians Become Straight 37).  
 
18 For instance, Elias Boudinot, in a letter from August 1832 addressing his forced resignation as editor of 
the Cherokee Phoenix, writes the following: “Has not our oppressor...overlooking the sacred 
obligations of right, not only infringed upon our political rights, but has actually...taken possession of 
one-half of our country...think for a moment, my countrymen, the danger to be apprehended from an 
overwhelming white population...overcharged with high notions of color, dignity, and greatness...They 
should have...our sons and daughters...be slaves indeed” (168). The point is not only that both 
Boudinot's turn to removal and Ross's resistance, along with the Cherokee memorials, exist as archival 
materials in a material sense and therefore, along with the collective memory of removal, cannot be 
denied. Boudinot's turn toward removal itself develops pointed critique of the supposed civility of the 
white establishment in Georgia. The archival record of Cherokee resistance in all its complexity 
radically deconstructs settler claims to Cherokee lands on the basis of a historical or moral necessity 
rhetorically cast as the march of civilization. 
 
19 Edgar Allan Poe, Essays and Reviews 904, originally printed in Godey's Lady's Book, January 1846. 
Poe wrote this review and another in the Broadway Journal to stand by the claims made in his initial 
1845 review of the volume in the latter. In addition, Poe had already expressed a similar opinion of 
Simms in the Democratic Review of December 1844, prior to the publication of The Wigwam and the 
Cabin though likely in response to some of its stories already in circulation, like the widely popular 
“Grayling; Or, 'Murder will Out.” There he insisted that “leaving out of the question Brockden Brown 
and Hawthorne...[Simms] is immeasurably the best writer of fiction in America. He has more vigor, 
more imagination, more movement and more general capacity than all our novelists (save Cooper), 
combined” (Poe ER 1342). See also John Caldwell, “Introduction” xvii to xxii. 
 
20 Kolodny references a talk Simms delivered, coincidentally enough, to the Historical Society of the 
State of Georgia in 1842, the same group to whom Law delivered his lectures on Georgia history in 
1840. In the talk, later reprinted as “History for the Purposes of Art” in his 1846 volume Views and 
Reviews in American Literature, History and Fiction, Simms observes that by giving “'shape to the 
unhewn fact...relation to the scattered fragments'” and uniting “'the parts in coherent dependency” the 
artist “endows, with life and action, the otherwise motionless automata of history” (qtd. in Kolodny, 
The Lay of the Land 116). This is a view of the writer of fiction that Simms would repeat over his 
career and that as we can see nearly perfectly mirrors Hayden White's definition of the historian as one 
who endows facts and events with the kind of meaning found in a culture's fictions. 
 
21 See Guilds “Introduction” page xviii and xxvii n. 4. 
 
22 See Wilkins Cherokee Tragedy, 10-27. Simms' reference seems to be the outbreak of violence between 
the 1785 treaty of Hopewell and the 1794 peace terms negotiated between President Washington and a 
Cherokee delegation at Philadelphia that involved ceding a large section of land illegally occupied by 
white squatters. This was a chaotic phase in the Cherokee history, as settler emigrations spurred 
numerous attacks and counterattacks on both sides. Consequences of illegal settler encroachments onto 
Cherokee space during this time were the secession of the Chickamaugas, the increasing division 
between Upper and Lower Town Cherokees, and, as Wilkins narrates in detail, the execution of Lower 
Town chief Doublehead for ceding away the Cherokees remaining hunting grounds in modern day 





23  Put another way, over against Nelson's extra-political masculinity, the land itself implicitly registers as 
an empty space awaiting annexation to such men by way of a Lockean ethic of labor-based ownership. 
For more on the relationship between labor and the right to land in Locke's thinking and its 
implications for representations of native landedness, see Rifkin "Romancing the State of Nature" in 
Settler Common Sense. 
 
24 In narratological terms, Nelson is at once the homodiegetic focalizor (the actant within the scene 
looking out from the window back then) and the scene's heterodiegetic narrator (addressing the reader 
now), suggesting the degree to which Simms' narrative framing overdetermines the conflict as not only 
a wholly indigenous conflict "out there" but also as (always) already over.  
 
25 It should be noted that this plot vaguely recalls the assassination of Lower Cherokee leader Doublehead 
by The Ridge and a few Cherokee allies who no longer trusted him on the basis of Doublehead's 
unsanctioned selling of tribal hunting grounds. The crucial difference is the role of federal government 
agents played in bribing Cherokee leaders for land so as to bypass both Cherokee governance and the 
stipulations of earlier treaties is posed instead as a tragic and wholly intra-native contest for power.  
 
26 Justice Our Fire Survives the Storm, 32.  
 
27 Perhaps the most blatant oversight on Simms' part is that the Red Stick War and the Creek civil war out 
of which it grew developed in 1813, just a few years before Nelson's death in 1817. For more on 
Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa's resistance, see Colin G. Calloway, The Shawnees and the War for 
America, esp. 138-54. 
 
28   For an analysis of this complicity, see both Byrd, xvii-xxvi and Konkle, 28-36.  
 
29 Much of what follows in this section resists the tendency to see Boudinot as a traitor and then to project 
his break with Ross as the horizon against which all of his prior work is interpreted. This horizon is 
well established. Boudinot would become a key member of what come to be known as the Treaty 
Party, the pro-removal faction of the Cherokee elite also referred to as the Ridge faction, the group that 
signed the Treaty of New Echota on December, 29 1835. Unauthorized by the Cherokee National 
Council, the treaty party obligated the Cherokee to surrender all of their lands east of the Mississippi 
for territory in Indian Country along with funds to remove ($5 million), compensation for lost 
improvements, subsistence for the first year after removal, and future monies for the development of 
infrastructure. The party negotiated over a two-day period with John Schermerhorn, who was 
authorized and pressured by Jackson to get a document signed in Cherokee territory. Twenty members 
of the Ridge faction, including Boudinot and Major Ridge, worked on the treaty and then turned it over 
to a vote by 86 male Cherokees, most of whom lived in the area under intense pressure by settlers and 
the Georgia legislature. The treaty passed 79-6 and was later signed by Stand Watie and John Ridge in 
Washington. It passed by a one-vote majority in the Senate the following May. Jackson ignored 
protests that it was illegitimate and signed it, setting May 23rd 1838 as the date for removal. The Ross 
party attempted to have it nullified to no avail. The treaty's illegitimacy has rightfully received much of 
the scholarly attention on this period, along with the political fallout within the Cherokee Nation that 
led to a civil war and the assassination of members of the Treaty Party, including Boudinot. Receiving 
less attention, however, is that the Georgia legislature passed legislation just prior to the treaty council 
at New Echota authorizing all winners of the previous state lottery of Cherokee lands to take their 
possessions on November 25, 1836. Given the federal government's unwillingness to change course 
after the decision in Worcester v. Georgia and the re-election of Jackson in 1832, this piece of 
legislation perhaps signified to the Ridge faction the utter futility of Ross's insistence on holding out 
for better terms, emboldening them to sign the treaty despite the obvious risk to their lives. See Ehle, 
Trail of Tears: The Rise and Fall of the Cherokee Nation; McLoughlin, After the Trail of Tears; Peyer, 
The Tutor'd Mind, esp. 166-223; Perdue, “Introduction,” in Cherokee Editor; Perdue and Green, The 





30 Perdue notes that there is at least one documented instance of the paper reaching Germany. For more 
on the Cherokee Phoenix's development, content, and political context, as well as its role in shaping the 
'question' of removal and conveying an image of the Cherokees as a civilized peoples, see Wilkins, 
Cherokee Tragedy, 194-213 and Peyer The Tutor'd Mind 183-206. 
 
31   Although this stratification extended to diminishing women's roles in governance, Cherokee women 
were not silent on political matters, instead drawing on their traditional roles as horticulturalists and 
providers for the broader people to persuade the Cherokee National Council against removal and 
allotment in the tense period around the second removal crisis. See Kilcup, Fallen Forests 21-41. 
 
32   The Superior Court of Georgia would argue just four years later that if “the Cherokees now say, they 
have advanced in civilization, and have formed for themselves a regular government” then this only 
shows that “they are there in a situation to be brought under the influence of the laws of a civilized 
state—the state of Georgia”; Cherokee civilization only demonstrates that “the obstacle which 
induced...Georgia to forbear the exercise of the rights [derived from] Great Britain, as the discovering 
nation...no longer exists, if the Cherokees or their counsel are to be believed” (The State v. George 
Tassels 161-2).  
 
33    For more on the bio-logics of blood in their relation to Indian affairs in the nineteenth century, see 
Cheyfitz, "The (Post)Colonial Construction of Indian Country," esp. 15-40. 
 
34 Perhaps largely as a consequence of Boudinot's involvement in the Treaty of New Echota, much of the 
criticism around his life and work tends to focus on the degree of ambivalence or conflict he might 
have felt based on his position between two cultures, and to what extent this psycho-cultural division 
explains his 'turn' from one of the most passionate representatives of the Cherokee Nation to an 
architect of its removal west. If not “so thoroughly Christianized that he did not understand the religion 
of his own people,” as Theda Perdue puts it, referring to his representation of Cherokee religion in this 
particular text, Boudinot has been nonetheless posed as a tragic in his intercultural positioning 
(Cherokee Editor, 81, n. 14). Perdue accordingly reads his acculturation as conditioning an elitism that 
led him to misrepresent his people. Bernd Peyer modifies this stance a bit, though culture is still the 
critical axis. He sees in Boudinot's writing “little evidence...of a problem of self-understanding either as 
a Christian or as a member of the Cherokee Nation," arguing that he seems to have reconciled these 
tensions by considering himself "to be a very privileged sort of Cherokee” (222). As with Perdue, 
Peyer understands Boudinot's elitism as alienating, such that the question of his involvement in the 
Cherokee resistance opens onto a question of his relation to traditional Cherokee culture. Peyer 
suggests that Boudinot “was not really much farther away from or closer to Cherokee tradition than 
John Ross the 'patriot'” after Worcester v. Georgia proved to be a toothless precedent with which to 
combat Georgia's encroachments onto Cherokee lands (223). However, reading the “Address” as an 
ironic prelude to his signing of the Treaty of New Echota presumes not two discrete, otherwise 
hermetically sealed cultural spheres as its most relevant signifying environment but, in so doing, 
presumes removal as fated despite its political context, thus priming the move to psychodynamic and 
cultural heuristics precisely because we already know the history. As Bethany Schneider argues, this 
perspective paradoxically locates Boudinot's agency beyond the purview of each culture thought to 
have influenced his actions. Cultural conflict here “deeply affects and molds [Boudinot] but it is in 
essential opposition to him...the individual fails to do the right thing and that failure is reserved for the 
individual; it defines him. It is blamed on culture but in the end it belongs to the individual who, 
however much he may be corrupted or conflicted by culture, is in the final instance not of culture” 
(157). Reading Boudinot as torn between two roughly hermetic spheres of influence ironically enough 
yields a portrait of an individual who somehow transcends his determinist shackles just enough to 
make a defining mistake, reifying a psychologizing framework in the ostensible shift to a sociopolitical 





35 For more on imperium in imperio, see Garrison, 131-2. As he points out, contesting this argument 
formed a key component of William Wirt's argument in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia. As Georgia 
aggressively moved to annex Cherokee lands, the debate over removal increasingly turned on whether 
the Cherokee Nation was to be considered a foreign nation or whether it existed in another, more 
ambiguous relation to the federal government, the latter which John Marshall would codify with his 
notion of domestic dependent status in Cherokee Nation. For John Marshall's discussion in this 
decision of why the Cherokees did not constitute a foreign nation, which included combining an a 
priori assertion of settler title to land with the notion that Natives lived in a state of pupilage with 
regard to the U.S., see Prucha 58-9. For President Jackson's slightly earlier discussion of the same point 
from a different, more explicitly geopolitical angle organized around states' rights, see Prucha 47-8. For 
an overview of the emergence of domestic-dependent status for Native nations, in particular the 
Supreme Court's role via Marshall's decisions, see Barker 29-35. For more on how domestic-dependent 
status emerges out of competing views on the doctrine of discovery, see Lomawaima and Wilkins 22-
62. For a detailed discussion of the Supreme Court's trajectory from Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and 
Worcester v. Georgia with regard to the legal limits of Native occupancy, states' claims to sovereignty, 
and the scope of the rights attached to the Cherokee people construed as a nation, see Norgren 98-122. 
 
36    For more on the ways in which treaties worked to manufacture an impression of consent on behalf of 
Native peoples to land expropriation, see Rifkin Manifesting America, 39-49. From this angle, Konkle's 
claim that “No one can ever deny the fact of treaties or of their necessity” is therefore deeply 
ambivalent with regard to the debate over Cherokee removal (Konkle 63). 
 
37 I take this notion of changing difference, where the actual concept of difference itself can be shown as 
having a capacity for plasticity and self-differentiation, from the work of Catherine Malabou, in 
particular Changing Difference: The Feminine and the Question of Philosophy and What Should We 
Do With Our Brain? 
 
38   As Joel Martin observes, Christianity was mostly confined to elite Cherokees, which made up a 
relatively small portion of the total population. Among the roughly fifteen thousand Cherokees in 1830, 
"only thirteen hundred" Cherokees practiced Presbyterian, Baptist, Methodist, or Moravian faiths, 
which were the four Christian denominations practiced in the area at the time (Martin 234). Martin 
adds that most of the norms and forms of settler civilization were actually practiced by a relatively 
small portion of the total population; the vast majority of Cherokees continued their traditional 
religious practices well into the antebellum period. See his "Cultural Contact and Crises in the Early 




HISTORICIZING INDIAN CHARACTER IN NEW ENGLAND: 
(DIS)PLACING NATIVE SOVEREIGNTY IN CHILD, SEDGWICK, AND APESS 
 
 The previous chapter argued that the discursivity of Indianness in the context of 
southeastern Native removal served to cast Cherokee land claims as collective progress 
toward normative nationhood, even as it enabled pro-removal actors to historicize 
territorial sovereignty in ways that concealed the contingency and unevenness of their 
individual positions. However, the sheer incongruity of the removal argument was not 
lost on Cherokee advocates at the time. Jeremiah Evarts, author of the William Penn 
essays, insisted that if Georgia needed the U.S. to acquire lands supposedly already under 
its own jurisdiction, then it, rather than the Cherokee Nation, was the domestic 
dependent.1 Nonetheless, such fantasies of entitlement were not limited to the south. 
Evarts also asserted that “[f]rom the settlement of the English colonies in North America 
to the present day, the right of Indians to lands in their actual and peaceable possession, 
and to such form of government as they choose, has been admitted by the whites,” as 
attested by the fact that for “one hundred and fifty years, innumerable treaties were made 
between the English colonists and the Indians, upon the basis of the Indians being 
independent nations” (106). If this were the case, however, what then happened to New 
England Native peoples, who by this time had endured fraudulent land cessions and 
encroachments, broken treaties, and the structural poverty that accompanies capitalism 
for nearly the entire period he offers as proof of the unprecedented nature of Georgia's   
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actions? 2 Presuming his sincerity, how do we account for an activism on behalf of 
“Indian” rights (not Cherokee) that nearly rewrote history, but required a disavowal of 
colonization no less egregious than the removal agenda it opposed?3  
 The short answer would be that Evarts, like most everyone else, believed that 
New England Natives had vanished. Scholarship has demonstrated that the northern 
opposition to removal accepted this mythos if only insofar as Native groups seemed 
unable to withstand the conflicts, diseases (including alcoholism), and reduced means of 
subsistence that came with accumulated land cessions. Brian Dippie has shown that, for 
anti-removal Whigs, the Cherokee Nation was the exception proving that “Indians could 
coexist with white men” and that “the rule of decay need not be universal” (Dippie 65-
6).4 To this point, Daniel R. Mandell observes that northern Democrats and Whigs alike 
embraced the narrative of Native degeneracy, suggesting that it had indeed “become the 
dominant paradigm in the region” for historicizing US-Indian affairs (Tribe, Race, Nation 
184).5 Beyond their status as political allegories, then, the portraits of colonial history 
offered in reformist novels such as Hobomok and Hope Leslie likely appeared as accurate 
revisions of the collective past to the degree that they challenged the biases of earlier 
Puritan historiography, thereby casting this earlier narrative modality as a distortion of 
real events in colonial history that were integral to the nation's founding.  
 However, rather than situate vanishing Indianness as false consciousness (by 
holding the Cherokee to be the exception that disproves the rule, Indian rights activists 
nonetheless misrepresent actual colonial history), this chapter will argue that the portraits 
of bygone “Indian” character, typically associated with the Wampanoag leader King 
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Philip, are metonymic of ongoing settler colonialism in New England, in particular the 
use of historicity to justify guardian systems. These works sustain and extend a 
narrativity of Indian decline and degeneration that allows settler actors to imagine 
themselves at the waxing cusp of linear historicity over against residual New England 
Native groups, namely through positing an idealized, decidedly non-tribal Indianness as 
the prelapsarian point at which Natives were oriented to the aims of settlement. In turn, 
William Apess's Eulogy on King Philip can accordingly be read as reverse discourse, 
disrupting this historicity by foregrounding the continuity of settler depredations within 
the frame already generated by Indian virtue. 
 By depicting regional Native peoples as declining, early-nineteenth century 
historians in New England portrayed Anglo settlement as a historical break over against 
prior indigenous peoplehood, as Jean O' Brien's work makes evident. Repeating this ur 
narrative, namely that “Indians had vanished from their vicinities,” had the cumulative 
effect of purifying “the landscape of Indians [through] a degeneracy narrative that 
foreclosed Indian futures” (O' Brien 143). Such notions gained further empirical validity 
as concepts of “racial mixture and culture 'loss'” developed coherence, which portrayed 
“the Indianness of New England Indians” as having “diluted...to the vanishing point” 
(O'Brien 202). And yet, historicizing Natives as declining was nothing new by the 1820s. 
Amy Den Ouden shows that narratives of Indian decline were part and parcel of efforts to 
undermine Native communities from the very beginning of English settlement.6 This 
chapter will take this historicity into account by reading for the ways in which the 
discourse of vanishing Indianness fosters a prelapsarian notion of Indian character that 
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reinforces settler sociality as not simply progressive (vis-à-vis savage Indians) but, rather, 
gives portraits of settler domesticity and normativity coherence as marking forward 
movement in history on the basis of their ethical universality, thereby sublimating the 
geopolitics of land claims as a struggle over tyranny in time.7  
 In contrast to the trope of familialism as it emerges in the discourse on Cherokee 
removal, however, here romanticized and idealized notions of Indian character, as 
indexing a kind of altruism emerging organically from Nature, provide settlers with a 
means to narrate colonial history apart from the cycles of oppression and tyranny 
characteristic of Puritan patriarchy. Identification with an idealized, noble Indian virtue 
(rather than distance from Indian savagery) helps to cohere a sense of the possibility for 
emergent republican principles to traverse oppressive formations within the settler 
political sphere. Put another way, identification with such Indian virtue casts 
contemporary obstacles to the expansion/expression of egalitarianism as residual forms of 
tyranny, associated with the Old World rather than the New. The problem, however, is 
that the very trope of an impossibly ethical or virtuous Indian character itself derives 
from the discourses used to implement and justify guardian and reservations systems in 
New England over time, systems that exploited Native peoples, land, and resources, and 
that William Apess dedicated much of his life and work to exposing. From this view, 
given that this narrativity was already deeply embedded in negating Native land claims, 
the early-antebellum discourse of noble, vanishing savagery, mostly associated with the 
Wampanoag leader King Philip, less indexes New England ambivalence on the national 
“Indian question” than it extends the narrative undermining of Native claims to place. 
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This approach entails reading for the ways in which the ethics associated with Indian 
character retroactively cohere Anglo settlement (and the U.S.) as an axiomatic, even 
inevitable historical project, one that does not so much claim as subsume the land to the 
temporality that it manifests.  
 This reading further involves parting with the more recent tendency to treat such 
novels in allegorical terms, a break that in turn calls for rethinking the possible referent(s) 
for such representations of sympathetic Indian character. Scholarship on antebellum 
Native vanishing, however, tends to presuppose this relationship, linking Indian character 
both to the national removal debate and an interest in mythologizing the moment of 
founding in the midst of the nation's bicentennial. This view holds that America's 
newness on the world stage tasked post-revolutionary generations with cobbling together 
a coherent national identity, and reflecting on Indian history was an obvious place to 
start, although such reflections were just as obviously vexed. As Susan Scheckel writes, 
on one hand, the romantic notion that Natives were a “dying race” from the “distant past” 
made them perfect subjects to signify the “prehistory of the nation” (8). On the other, 
however, if Natives enabled writers to reflect on national identity, the history they called 
to the fore “also represented that which had to be denied” so as to sustain “a coherent 
image of the nation” (Scheckel 12).8 Although historicizing Native peoples grounded the 
U.S. nation-state, it also threatened to undermine the young nation's claims to 
exceptionalism. The sympathy expressed for the noble savage, a central element of U.S. 
place-making as early as Jefferson's commentary on Logan's Lament, offers an important 
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bait and switch: emotionally compensating for an ongoing project of nation-building that 
would lose its moral grandeur if it were seen instead as the movement of empire.   
 Yet not everyone reads such affect as assuaging Anglo guilt within the frame of 
national history. Laura Mielke for instance argues that Lydia Maria Child's Hobomok 
(1824) brings “the Euro-American heroine into emotional and physical intimacy with the 
American Indian hero” seemingly only to “destroy or repress that intimacy”; in so doing, 
it encourages readers to reconsider Indians' place in “the national family” at the very 
moment they are being “pushed from the foreground into history” (Moving 17, 19). More 
than nationalist ideology, Child's revision of history from this angle offers an alternative 
to removal by mobilizing forms of sincerity and fellow-feeling associated with 
domesticity, taken as an extra-political domain. The novel's emphasis on “the necessary 
authorship of conscience in society and the rule of the heart in marriage” promotes a 
“sympathetic relationship” between whites and Natives that poses sectarian intolerance as 
a thing of the past and gestures to the possibility of new, cross-cultural bonds going 
forward (Mielke Moving 18). Rather than primarily negotiating the contradictions of 
Indian history within an emergent national narrative, sympathy here performs a new 
paradigm for U.S.-Indian politics modeled on Richard White's notion of the middle 
ground, a space “in between cultures, peoples, and in between empires and the nonstate 
world of villages” in which cultural misunderstanding creates “new meanings and 
through them new practices” conducive to bilateral reciprocity and exchange rather than 
unilateral domination (xxvi). 
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 Two diametrically opposed views then derive from efforts to historicize the 
politics of vanishing Indianness. Either such tropes assuage liberal guilt within an 
emergent frame of national identity, or they profile a third space of U.S.-Native political 
relations based on a shared humanity that emerges out of cultural interactions between 
Natives and whites. Yet this either/or framework presumes that southeastern removal, 
given its spectacular nature and its significance in US history, exhausts the political 
terrain of antebellum Native dispossession. The “Indian” question effectively means the 
“Cherokee” question, and novels such as Hope Leslie and Hobomok are usually taken as 
allegorizing one political position or another with regard to this debate, which could be 
interpreted as ironically implying that Wampanoags, Pequots, and their neighbors had 
indeed vanished, or at the very least reinforcing the notion at the level of methodology. 
However, the point is not merely that such criticism effectively doubles the erasure of 
New England Native peoples. Rather, bracketing this allegorical framework enables one 
to examine how the narrative condition of possibility for such sympathy with the 
Cherokees is a linear historicity anchored in casting reservation communities as given to 
deviance and/or degeneration.  
 This chapter focuses on the ways in which narrating Indian character retroactively 
presents New England settlement as an axiomatic structure in ways that efface historical 
and ongoing conditions of settler colonialism, manifest in guardian and reservation 
systems. Insofar as it helps to articulate the egalitarian potential of a nascent 
Republicanism, an imaginary and utterly archaic Indian nobility allows non-Native 
actors, represented in novels like Hobomok and Hope Leslie, works to foreclose a view of 
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New England reservation communities as struggling to maintain their land and autonomy. 
Noble Indian character facilitates a prelapsarian “Indian” that throws antebellum Native 
peoples into relief as residual and therefore partial entities, as inexorably out of joint with 
time and place. The sign that this discourse is metonymic rather than metaphoric of 
settler colonialism (and material rather than purely ephemeral with regard to the 
geopolitics of New England reservation communities) is that the temporality of Indian 
virtue/authenticity emerges against the genealogical background provided by tropes of 
settler homemaking. The modes of sympathy and sentimentalism crucial to generating 
progressive politics, according to Elizabeth Maddock Dillon, hinged on tropes of 
domesticity, which worked to “produce the freedom of the liberal subject through 
[narrating] affective abundance and nonutilitarianism” (Gender 203). Scenes of 
domesticity clear the space for an excessive subjectivity that, in turn, defamiliarizes and 
thereby resists the political status quo. Yet, in laboring for a social milieu that necessarily 
exceeds them, the Indian siblings, lovers, mothers, and fathers in these texts 
anthropomorphize the roots of political reform as already “freely” existing in nature and 
thus constitutive of the social order writ large. The sympathy for Natives elicited in texts 
such as Hobomok and Hope Leslie in turn casts contemporary Native communities under 
guardianship as more lingering than living, thereby extending the efficacy of narratives 
that long underpinned reservation systems. 
 The chapter will examine Lydia Maria Child's Hobomok and Catherine Maria 
Sedgewick's Hope Leslie, for the ways in which each imagines Indian character as 
essentially ethical, self-sacrificing, and proto-egalitarian in ways that depict the reform 
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and expansion of civil liberty within the state as constitutive of any and all meaningful 
political engagement. By predicating political change on recognizing the historical and 
ethical primacy of Indian exceptionalism, each novel intensifies the efficacy of narratives 
of Native decline and may be seen therefore as synecdochic of regional settler 
colonialism despite their progressive politics. By contrast, William Apess's Eulogy on 
King Philip demonstrates how this discourse on character paradoxically opens a path to 
Native resistance internal to anachronistic Indian virtue itself. To eulogize Philip is to 
foreground an ensemble of relations of dispossession otherwise obscured through 
settlement's narration and introjection of a bygone and authentic Indian character. 
Juxtaposing contemporary Native struggles against the legacy of guardian systems with a 
racially-inflected revision of the dominant portrait of King Philip's magnanimity presents 
Indian character as noble but not vanishing. Apess's text therein breaks with a narrativity 
that otherwise presents the unjust dispossession of Indigenous peoples in New England as 
a tragic, primordial event rather than an ongoing condition of possibility for settler 
belonging. 
 
Hobomok's Surrogate Fatherhood 
 While sympathetic portrayals of Indian character in the mid-to-late 1820s 
galvanized the northern opposition to Cherokee removal, they also contributed to the 
belief that the Wampanoags, Pequots, Narragansetts and their regional neighbors had 
been vanquished in the seventeenth century.9 Rather than merely illustrating how little 
antebellum New Englanders knew about history, citations of Indian extinction are as old 
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as the colonies themselves and, as such, constitutive of the very fabric of New England 
historiography. Depicting Native peoples as given to decline yielded the means for 
undermining their self-determination by making dispossession appear as an extra-
political and inevitable phenomenon, as historical necessity. Moreover, this use of 
narrativity to (dis)qualify or even negate Native land rights appeared as early as the 
aftermath of the Pequot War, which quickly became the touchstone for enmeshing 
“claims of legality (the 'rights of conquest') with the construction of historical events” 
(Den Ouden 13).10 Exploring how the notion of inevitable Indian decline develops in 
colonial New England will provide the background for demonstrating how Hobomok 
extends this colonizing ideology, namely by grounding the ethics of settler egalitarianism 
in a primordial Indian virtue.  
 The notion that the massacre at Fort Mystic in 1636 by English (from Connecticut 
and Massachusetts Bay), Narragansett, and Mohegan forces destroyed the Pequots still 
resonates. Yet from their inception such narratives facilitated a historicity that furthered 
settler territorial interests. For example, Connecticut declared the Pequot tribe extinct in 
the Treaty of Hartford that ended the war and divided Pequot captives between the 
Narragansetts and Mohegans while reserving their lands for the English. Nonetheless, as 
early as 1638, one year later, Pequots began returning to traditional locales along the 
Thames River, forming groups that were recognized as the Pequot communities of 
Mashantucket and Stonington within five years (Mandell King Philip's War 17-18). 
Connecticut later reneged on the assertion of Pequot extinction by acknowledging not 
only their survivance but their entitlement to lands by creating reservations not once, but 
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twice: in 1651 at Noank (which was later fraudulently allocated to the town of Groton, in 
the early-eigthteenth century) and again in 1683 at Stonington (Den Ouden 15). 
Apparently, colonists played fast and loose with the meaning of extinction. 
 Far from merely delusional thinking, however, Connecticut's insistence on Pequot 
destruction represents a deliberate use of narrative to foster English hegemony where 
outright dominance was not possible.11 The rise of guardian systems after King Philip's 
war both embodied and relayed the geopolitical efficacy of this historicity. Guardians 
were tasked with helping to care for the sick, overseeing tribal finances, and protecting 
lands from encroachers. Native peoples' reduced land bases (through land cessions) made 
these tasks difficult to accomplish alone, undermining these groups' capacity to support 
themselves and thus forcing individuals to work off the reservation as day-laborers on 
nearby farms, in commercial fishing, or as indentured servants bound out to white 
households. While Native petitions encouraging governments to abide by their own laws 
helped to create guardianships, and reservation communities often utilized guardians to 
protest further expropriations (despite the fact that these appointees, at times, were 
themselves the ones illegally selling lands), that these peoples “needed” such protection 
simultaneously reinforced the image of the Indian, in the abstract, as rapidly declining 
past the point of autonomy.12 Further, guardians facilitated government investigations 
into competing land claims by assessing the condition of reservation communities in 
terms of settler domestic, political-economic, and religious norms. Such inquiries broadly 
served to deflect “questions concerning the illegitimacy of colonial justice and the 
illegality of dispossession” through portraits of Indian illegitimacy, thereby chaining 
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Native land rights that were often explicitly protected by colonial/state law to the 
genealogical question of whether such communities were going extinct, at what rate, and 
accordingly whether they in fact “needed” the lands in question (Den Ouden 90).13  
 By monitoring and depicting reservation communities in terms of such norms, 
guardian systems framed New England Indigenous polities as largely regressive 
formations, which, in turn, further consolidated these norms as the very form of historical 
progress and, as such, supposedly axiomatic indices of sovereignty. For instance, a 1731 
committee report solicited by “Groton proprietors” (Connecticut) interested in the nearby 
Mashantucket-Pequot reservation began by seeking “'a true understanding of the Exact 
number of Pequit Indians in Groton viz of all males sixteen years and upward'” (qtd. in 
Den Ouden 177, sic). Since reservation communities on the whole did not share settler 
heteronuclear norms, determining the status of the community by counting only males, 
whom authorities probably knew were away for long periods working in various trades, 
likely intended to convey an image of the group as degenerating en masse, thereby 
facilitating the expropriation of their land and resources (Den Ouden 178).14 However, 
and more fundamentally, such “objective” assessments retroactively endowed settler 
norms with not only moral but temporal coherence as marking forward movement in time 
insofar as they frame Native polities as failing to reproduce. In this way, Native self-
determination and resistance both to settler encroachments and sequestration of protected 
lands come to signify both deviance and anachronism in the same stroke.15 Native modes 
of habitation appear as symptomatic of “Indian” degeneration insofar as they depart from 
a normative historicity organized around (the ethics of) settler homemaking. In turn, 
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predicating any assessment of the legitimacy of Native objections to illegal settler 
encroachments on an investigation into the condition of the people in question (where 
proximity to settler norms for labor, homemaking, etc. comprises the methodology) 
already de-politicizes those objections, and Native claims to land more generally, by 
casting them as tokens of a residual and characteristically “Indian” recalcitrance.  
 The impact of widespread narratives of Indian vanishing in New England on 
reservation groups makes for a very different discursive relationship, then, than that 
between Indian anachronism and Indigenous sovereignty in the southeast. As discussed in 
the last chapter, discourses of Indianness in the context of southeastern removal pre-empt 
Cherokee claims to their own vast territory by positing a residual Indian intractability: 
despite what they may say, the Cherokee are still Indian and inexorably so, a linkage that 
drives a wedge between Cherokee nationhood and what passes for a modern, meaningful 
claim to land. In antebellum New England, however, as Jean O' Brien's work has shown 
in particular, longstanding narratives of Indian degeneration and the reservation systems 
they perpetuate cast antebellum Natives as less rather than more “Indian.” From the 
vantage of interested settler actors, the Indianness of southeastern Native groups sticks to 
them no matter what, while that of their New England counterparts tends to decline, even 
to the point of degenerating entirely. This difference has roots in regional variations in 
settler colonialism. In the south, Native groups remained quite powerful up until the early 
1800s, controlling a very large section of territory; casting the so-called Five Civilized 
Tribes as irreducibly Indian presented their autonomy as essentially extra-political and 
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therein as incongruent with the kind of sovereignty typically associated with European 
nationhood.  
 Unlike in the southeast, however, the broader territorial struggle over sovereignty 
in New England is effectively over by the 1820s, and Natives peoples there cannot as 
easily signify “nationhood” in the first place. State governments had long appropriated 
the right to monitor reservation groups, to determine the validity of Native claims, and 
purportedly to defend the integrity of land boundaries. Nonetheless, increased demand for 
Native resources such as timber and access to more farmland led colonial and state 
governments to abide less and less rigorously by their own laws and directives regarding 
reservation groups.16 In addition, Natives groups' steady resistance to settler 
encroachments and depredations, most famously evidenced by the Mashpee “revolt” of 
1833, persistently sought to foreground the fraudulent extraction of reservation resources, 
often as a violation of the principle of guardianship itself since these positions were 
ostensibly meant to prevent such depredations. However, as in the discourse on 
southeastern removal, tropes of normative family formation here also function to 
consolidate settler claims to land. Mandell notes that the basic principle for appointing 
guardians to oversee affairs for reservation groups was grounded in the common-law 
notion that “orphans or mental incompetents with property should have a 'father' to 
manage the estate and supervise his or her future” (Behind 145). Tropes of fatherhood 
fertilize state interventions into Native affairs by simultaneously obfuscating treaty-based 
land rights of Native groups, on one hand, and rendering Native ways of being as 
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declining in terms that, for non-Natives, appear to supersede reservation politics, on the 
other.  
 As a result, such familial tropes retroactively organize history writ large as a 
genealogy of settlement, within which the peoples, places, and modes of belonging that 
fall outside of its normative social, political, and juridical frameworks emerge as 
inevitably past-tense, residual formations. And since this historicity portrays Native 
groups as belated and fading given an apparent inability to adequately attend to their own 
affairs, it also opens the space for future intrusions into Native self-determination given a 
moral necessity, a pseudo responsibility of fatherhood, to work on behalf of peoples that 
history had apparently left behind. The discourse on Indian character, in other words, 
forecloses meaningful Native sovereignty from the present by endowing the state with the 
symbolic position of surrogate father to vulnerable Natives, a discursive relationship that 
basically licenses the continued theft of resources. Hence, the Indian problem in New 
England is not that Indians remain "authentically" savage despite the trappings of settler 
civilization, but instead that nothing seems to prevent (nothing could have prevented) 
Indianness from degenerating further and further from its originally autonomous (and 
noble, virtuous, etc.) character over the years—but the effort to intervene has to be made, 
nevertheless.  
 Understood in this way, one can suggest that New England narratives of Native 
peoples as temporally out of joint with regard to an earlier, self-sufficient and supposedly 
authentic Indianness, increasingly organized around patrilineal norms and the 
sociopolitical gender roles they entail, justify expropriating Native lands and resources 
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through the production of poverty on reservations (land cessions were often made to 
cover debts). Such narratives retroactively cast government oversight as a form of 
surrogate fatherhood that is structurally necessary given the apparently deteriorating 
"condition" of Native peoples on reservations, when, in fact, such oversight itself 
negatively impacts Indigenous self-determination to the degree that it facilitates the 
expropriation of resources, the limitation of Indigenous governance, and the erosion of 
land bases. In this way, the narrativity of authentic Indian character quite literally 
represents the continued expropriation as a moral necessity.  
 By giving shape not only to the idea that Natives had declined, but that they had 
degenerated from a prior state within which they could and ostensibly did act as their 
own “fathers,” with all of the symbolic capital attached to this term in a patrilineal 
society, settler political-economic and domestic norms create a historicity within which 
New England Indianness is always receding, therein distancing actual New England 
Native peoples from their supposed historical identity and, in turn, from their lands.17 In 
this way, the discourse organized around guardian systems conditions Child's own 
surrogate/vanishing Indian father in Hobomok, just as the portrait of this character as a 
thoroughly, naturally altruistic subject provides this discourse with a prelapsarian, idyllic 
Indianness. Authentic Indianness thus becomes available to “naturalize” settler 
subjectivities that challenge the (racist and patriarchal) status quo given its prior 
attachment to the land, and this bygone “Indian” character manifests as an idealized 
father/patriarch. Insofar as his contribution to political modernity hinges, in Dana 
Luciano's terms, on a chronobiopolitics of family formation and character, Hobomok 
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more than illuminates the fault lines within antebellum society.18 His noble character 
signals the difference (a naturally ethical Indian fatherhood) that must be integrated if the 
social matrix is to survive and the nation to live up to the promise implied in its founding. 
As such, his vanishing anchors a historicity that is integral to the novel's egalitarian 
vision yet indebted to narratives organized around settler genealogy that had long served 
to deflect reservation communities' claims to land.19  
 The novel revolves around Mary Conant, daughter of the leader of an early 
Puritan settlement at Naumkeak (Naumkeag, or Salem). Barred from her true love, the 
Episcopalian Charles Brown, she is increasingly estranged from her father and the 
broader community, until Charles's death coupled with that of her mother leads her to 
marry Hobomok, a trusted Wampanoag ally. After Charles returns, however, having not 
drowned at sea after all, Hobomok persuades Charles to take his place and nobly heads 
west, asking only that Charles “'be kind to my boy'” (Child Hobomok 140). Substituting a 
law of affection for that of the absolutist patriarch, Hobomok's sacrifice creates a bi-racial 
and multi-denominational family that symbolically reconciles a fledgling community still 
plagued with the divisions its founders fled. As expected, the text's reception was less 
than enthusiastic. An 1824 review calls its plot “bad...and inartificially managed,” 
making for an “unnatural” or, “if the author pleases, improbable and unsatisfactory” 
narrative. However, that Child skillfully marshals the body of “traditions and historical 
facts” to evoke 1620s Plymouth redeems the work from “the censure and the oblivion” its 
plot would otherwise insure. The review thus deflects Child's political allegory through 
an aesthetic critique: that such “facts” are tethered to natural racial and gender hierarchies 
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compensates for her forgetting that “interest...must be preserved, without [violating] 
probability; for every reader is a competent critic on such a production” (“RED 
WOOD”).  
 Framing Hobomok and Mary's marriage as a literary faux pas in this way 
passively reinforces the forms of inequality that the novel targets by appealing to 
audience expectations. By contrast, Child appears to have grasped that historical fiction 
can short circuit oppressions apparently authorized by the past. Nonetheless, the 
“improbable” aspect crucial to Child's allegory appears less that Hobomok nobly heads 
west than that he marries an Anglo woman and has a mixed-race son before going. 
Vanishing Indianness primes both positions, and the novel invokes this paradigm from 
the start. Contemplating how far civilization has progressed in such a short time in the 
new world, the narrator observes modernity as consisting in a deep interrelatedness of 
society and nature that traces back to the echo of a primordial Indian hunter: 
 
I never view the thriving villages of New England...without feeling a glow of 
national pride, as I say, “this is my own Native land.” A long train of associations 
are connected with her picturesque rivers...and...her busy cities, which seem 
everywhere blushing into a perfect Eden of fruit and flowers. The remembrance 
of what we have been, comes rushing on the heart in powerful and happy contrast. 
In most nations the path of antiquity is shrouded in darkness...with us, the vista of 
time is luminous to its remotest point...Two centuries only have elapsed, since our 
most beautiful villages reposed in the undisturbed grandeur of nature...[where] 




The opening sweep synthesizes tensions between civilization (“busy cities”) and nature 
(“picturesque rivers”) by tracing the present back to the primordial labor of the Indian 
hunter, thereby cohering and grounding settler modernity in the primacy of Native 
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peoplehood. Merging with the “fleet tread of the wild deer,” his labor yields an “echo” 
that both presents a portrait of nature as primordially balanced sociality, on one hand, and 
as grounding a specific attachment to the land that inaugurates and sustains a linear 
history oriented to settlers, on the other: “with us, the vista of time is luminous to its 
remotest point.” Unlike with the doctrine of discovery, then, within which primordial 
Native presence signified terra nullius, the novel depicts an originary state of nature that, 
far from an impediment to meaningful sociality, amounts to an organic condition of 
possibility for a historicity that, while European in origin, nevertheless stands as an 
alternative to the Old World with its "shrouded" origins and, ostensibly, its equally 
convoluted and chaotic political history. That nothing “echoes” but the hunter's call 
suggests a fullness that “naturally” (from nature but also therefore without any social 
obstacle or “disturbance”) traverses both the bounds of settlement and the later society 
(“our beautiful villages”) that retroactively emerges as the modern synthesis of two 
worlds.  
 In addition to differentiating new world possibility from the legacy of old world 
shadows, a nod to the religious sectarianism that propelled Protestant migration, 
Indianness dialectically mediates settler society, forming the essential ontological root of 
a distinct temporality—a shift from wandering pre-history to directional history qua 
progress. The “echo” of the hunter's prior presence anchors and sustains a spontaneous 
“train of associations” that traces to the present, endowing settlement with more than a 
reflection on the past: more crucially, settlement here gains status as indigenous. By 
framing the present as the genealogical outcome of a natural historicity, Indianness 
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ultimately registers as a present-absence that sustains settler collective identification. The 
hunter materializes the non-passage of settler belonging (how can Protestant emigrants 
ever truly belong here?) as the trace of an almost archetypal memory emanating from the 
land itself, and the authenticity of this trace memory lies in its spontaneous, involuntary, 
and embodied character, a sudden, blushing “remembrance of what we have been.”  
 Yet, this universal reverberation emerges not merely from an “Indian,” but the 
“Indian,” a stereotypically masculine one. Indian presence yields the difference 
constitutive of an encompassing sameness, disclosing what appear as tensions endemic to 
modernity instead as an organic progress (“everywhere blushing into a perfect Eden”) by 
registering the symbolic value attached to fatherhood.20 As with the early-eighteenth-
century inquiry into Mashantucket degeneration noted above, Indianness sustains a 
narrativity through overdetermining (romanticizing) the ethico-political significance of 
the labor of men, on one hand, while, on the other, endowing such labor with meaning as 
both gesturing to and overlapping with a universal necessity supposedly traceable in 
history itself. The givenness of patrilineal succession might then be thought as the 
invisible frame, the minimal symbolic sameness, that aligns Indianness with settler land 
claims and thus allows its synthesizing presence to resound in the first place. Positing an 
originary and homogenous Indian masculinity “naturalizes” a critique of antebellum 
stratifications in terms of the givenness of settler reprosexuality.21 From this view, 
authentic Indianness is inevitably past-tense, as the only quantum of Nativeness that 
remains past its introjection is its memory, which the novel will encode as the self-
sacrifice that marks true fatherhood (as opposed to intolerant patriarchy).  
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 The opening primes us to read Hobomok's appearance to Mary as manifesting this 
archetypal Indian “fatherhood” de facto oriented to settlement. The narrator (an ancestor 
whose journal is the source of the narrative) sees Mary engage in what appears to be 
witchcraft, a motif that draws her apparent antinomian tendencies into alignment with 
Salem's later witch trials of 1692-3. She cuts herself, uses her blood to jot down some 
text on a white sheet, and then walks around in a large circle, chanting, presumably out of 
earshot. The blatant occultism presents her refusal to give up on her desire as a 
willingness to transgress the Puritan social order, a transgression to which the forest 
beyond Salem appears receptive. Water gleams “like fitful flashes of reason in a 
disordered mind,” which not only evokes her turmoil but also suggests an uncanny 
lifeblood, a lifeline offering a path away from stultifying orthodoxy. Such agency is 
directly associated with Indianness: the ancestor narrating the scene indicates that the 
“trees stood forth in all the beauty of that month which the Indians call the 'moon of 
flowers'” and “called up the spirit of devotion in me” in order that the “heart might be 
kept from the snares of the world” (Child Hobomok 12). Mary, however, lacks such fear, 
and her intrepidness thus registers as a step beyond the epistemic domination of the 
Puritan community. Therefore, while Native peoplehood provides a cypher for a power-
knowledge grounded in the land, its coherence as such depends on the willingness of 
settlers to act. Agency falls to the Anglo, and Indian “nature” here registers both as a 
place “away” from settlement, a space of potential liberation, on one hand, and the 
subjective (counter-hegemonic) orientation that drives one to such a place, on the other.  
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 Mary is going Indian, cutting loose with the established ways of the world, which 
becomes clearer when Hobomok, not Charles, leaps into the center of her ceremonial 
circle. Far from either the stunted, anachronistic savage of Georgia v. Tassels or the 
declining Indians slowly vanishing under the watchful eyes of government-appointed 
overseers across New England, Indianness here is imagined in its supposedly authentic 
and original state, which entails a capacity to transpose the whole of society structurally 
and temporally away from political hypocrisy and looming ideological conflict, which the 
novel allegorizes in the Puritans. Although Mr. Conant's entrenched resistance to other 
arrivant Protestantisms provides the novel's touchstone for Puritan intractability, the 
pious minister Frances Higginson most poignantly expresses the relationship between 
dogma and hierarchy: “the threshold of hell is paved with toleration. Leave hidden 
matters with God, and difficult texts of scripture with elders of the church” (Child 
Hobomok 65). Child takes a dig at the entrenched Standing Order through Higginson. By 
bracketing scripture as the purview of the elite, men like him create the artificial 
conditions whereby their authority appears divinely mandated.  
 Mr. Conant's deteriorating relationship with his own family encapsulates the 
impact of such dogma on the social body, however. After his wife dies and Mary leaves 
home, Mr. Conant admits that perhaps “Christians were too apt to mistake the voice of 
selfishness for the voice of God”; having witnessed his wife “dying amidst the poverty 
which his religious opinions had brought upon her,” he wonders whether “earthly 
motives had nothing to do with his hatred of Episcopacy” (Child Hobomok 119). Though 
already stripped to its Calvinist core, Mr. Conant's humility is only fully defrocked after 
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it destroys his family. Puritanism appears contingent upon a “worldly” intolerance of 
difference, suggesting that while the scenery has changed, the basic ideological 
constellation of righteousness has not. From this perspective, Mr. Conant's “cold mask of 
austerity” less symbolizes a corrosive influence on society than it represents an internal 
corrosion, an intrinsic failure of Anglo civilization discernible in the patriarchal 
reproduction of tyranny in the New World. His Puritannical mask corrodes both sides of 
public/private axis insofar as both “domains” of normative social order are reducible to a 
metaphysics of patriarchy; fragmenting the broader community and estranging his own 
daughter are twin effects of a hierarchical belief system that cannibalizes the same 
collectivity that it engenders. To fail as a father is then to fail as a leader: the “mask” Mr. 
Conant cannot see that he wears registers as the sign that settler genealogy is not yet 
reborn, that it is still haunted by the shadows of old-world sectarianism in the barely 
discernible trace of “unnatural” patriarchal dogmatism. 
 By contrast, Hobomok's ethics provide the means to rehabilitate the given 
interior/exterior configuration of settler sociality from the “inside” out—through the 
home. Hobomok is capable of intervening however insofar Indianness does not directly 
negate the intolerance symptomatic of Puritanism's negative genealogy. Rather, he 
manifests a pre-social “nature” beyond/anterior to it that exerts a pull on those, like Mary, 
who suffer its impositions, guiding these subjects toward relationships more expressive of 
their genuine desire, unconstrained by dogma and hence productive rather than corrosive 
with regard to the larger Puritan, proto-American social project. Hobomok actually says 
very little in the course of the novel; he is as silent as he is noble. On one hand, without 
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settlers there to initiate forward momentum, the openness of Indianness remains the raw 
materials of a more just community. Hobomok's Indianness consolidates the notion that 
History simply doesn't happen until settlers arrive. On the other, however, positing such 
Indianness as quite literally the ground from which history emerges renders its natural 
virtue in the service of cleaving fatherhood from its patriarchal roots, thereby also 
opening up the space for an alternative historicity organized around proto-egalitarian 
ethics. 
 The vehicle for historicity as the novel imagines it is an open subjectivity, which 
manifests in the narrator's first description of Naumkeak. As viewed from the ship's deck, 
the shore “seemed in a profound slumber,” leading the arrivant to view himself "as a drop 
in the vast ocean of existence” and in turn to shrink “from the contemplation of human 
nothingness” (Child Hobomok 7). Where Puritan intolerance maps onto a corrosive 
disposition, a legacy of old-world politics, the narrator's experience, although it stops 
short of realizing the utter arbitrariness of dogmatism, clinging to what it knows, offers 
the possibility of symbolically reconfiguring the social order writ large through (settler) 
self-actualization. Correlative to this subjectivity, the “natural” capacity for Indianness to 
reorient settler social order congeals through the novel's binary paradigm for Indian 
character, in which Natives fall into one of two categories: “good” ones aligned with 
settlers and the “bad” ones who want to destroy them. Where Hobomok's love for Mary 
orients him to settlement, his counterpart, the Wampanoag sachem Corbitant, is described 
as “a stubborn enemy to the Europeans, and all who favored them” (Child Hobomok 30). 
This set of orientations to settler affairs renders authentic Indianness antecedent to 
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“tribal” affairs, which, as in Hope Leslie, appear as second-order formations at best, 
peripheral to the tyranny/liberty dyad immanent to settlement.  
 The text develops this idealized version of prelapsarian Indian character through 
its use of archival materials, within which an ur narrative of Indian decline surfaces as a 
series of historical distortions, pushing out of the frame Native forms of peoplehood and 
the complex geopolitical and trade networks within which they, along with the British 
settlements, were enmeshed. First Hobomok's summoning plays not only on the 
antinomian heresy and later witchcraft trials but also “Hobbomock” as the name of a 
healing spirit actually worshipped by local Wampanoag groups at the time. Puritan 
chroniclers took the name as referring to the devil himself and evidence that Natives were 
devil worshipers; Child accordingly gives the actual Hobomok a spiritual twist in keeping 
with her unitarianism.22 Like his more famous counterpart Squanto, the historical 
Hobomok was a Wampanoag adviser and diplomatic ally to Plymouth colony in its 
earliest years. In 1621, Hobomok, Squanto, and Tockamahamon, a lesser-known 
diplomatic figure, were captured by another Wampanoag band led by the actual 
Corbitant, a minor sachem who had aligned with the Narragansetts out of suspicion of the 
Wampanoag leader Massasoit's treaty with Plymouth the previous year. Although he was 
hostile to Plymouth's increasing militarism and efforts to subordinate smaller Native 
bands, and did in fact lead a small Narragansett-Wampanoag faction to attack Massasoit's 
village (not Plymouth, as in the novel), Corbitant was far from the Tecumseh-like 
architect of vast pan-Indian conspiracy that Child imagines. Similarly, Hobomok was a 
relatively minor figure whose claim to fame was that he alone escaped this kidnap 
 145 
attempt and informed Plymouth's Governor Bradford, who in turn sent Miles Standish 
and a group of troops to intervene.23 
 These distortions fashion authentic Indianness as oriented to settlement and bad, 
“tribal” Indianness (given to forms of peoplehood irreducible to the settler domesticity 
integral to colonial space) as pitted against it. In turn, they further throw into relief a 
parallel between bad Indians, namely Corbitant and his forces, and bad Anglos, namely 
most Puritans. Each threatens to obstruct the genealogical (reprosexual) dialectic central 
to settler history and political modernity more generally. The latter corrodes the dominant 
social order from within. Mr. Conant's drive to keep Naumkeak a community of true 
believers by exiling other Protestant groups keeps the Anglican Charles Brown from 
marrying Mary. The former mirrors this corrosiveness “outside” settlement in a 
geopolitical setting, thereby reinforcing settlement's centrality. Corbitant first enters the 
plot having been “among the Pequods of late,” frustrated “that he had in vain offered 
their war-belt (in token of alliance against the English) to Miantonimo,” the Narragansett 
leader (Child Hobomok 30). While, the novel relies on deeply embedded and embellished 
narratives of Pequot hostility to frame Corbitant's malevolence, the malcontent sachem 
aims to destroy settlement primarily out of “an affair of love,” being the “kinsman” of the 
“once betrothed bride” that Hobomok abandoned for Mary (Child Hobomok 31).  
 Although his machinations seem to protest the geopolitics of settler expansion (he 
warns Hobomok among others that, unless the Natives band together, the “red men...will 
soon be as an arrow that is lost in flight”), Corbitant's presence more fundamentally casts 
Pequot deviance as rooted in a resistance to “natural” settler genealogy embodied by 
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Hobomok's attraction to Mary (Child Hobomok 31). Further, Corbitant has a “mind more 
penetrating and a temper more implacable than most of his brethren” and a “prophetic 
eye [that] foresaw the destruction of his countrymen,” a vision that marks him both as 
exceptional relative to a homogenous Native population and as symbolic of Indian 
decline (Child Hobomok 30). Those, like Hobomok and Mary, who follow their hearts 
(extending the narrator's “open” subjectivity beyond the fear that causes it to recoil into 
what it knows) are cast as expressive of “natural” freedom and a cunning of history in the 
shape of settler genealogy. Those who resist, namely the unlikely pair of Mr. Conant and 
Corbitant, stubbornly impede this uncanny progress. These figures are cast as exerting a 
drag on history, their negative, degenerative characterizations signaling forms of 
historical inertia themselves destined to drop away—which Corbitant himself 
accomplishes not even halfway through the novel.  
 Similarly, the only confrontation between Hobomok and Corbitant reinforces the 
centrality of settlement. One day, en route to visit the Conants, the former stumbles upon 
his nemesis in the woods beyond Salem, preparing an attack. He proceeds to inform Mr. 
Conant, disrupting a meeting with Massachusetts Bay's Governor Endicott and Mr. 
Oldham, presumably the trader whose later murder was a real catalyst for the Pequot 
War, to alert them to “a number of Indians in ambush in the woods below” (Child 
Hobomok 40).24 Rather than assist in the roundup, Hobomok stays back to protect Mary 
and her mother “with the quick eye of love, and the ready arm of hatred” as the settlers 
unceremoniously capture the bad Indian (Child Hobomok 41). Where Corbitant's 
vengeful character flattens Native resistance into an excessive and irrational drive rooted 
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in an outmoded allegiance to “the tribe,” already here a thing of the past, Hobomok's 
allegiance to Naumkeak, which is intertwined with his love for Mary, conflates aspects of 
guardianship with heteronuclear homemaking. More specifically, Hobomok's unwavering 
devotion to Mary and Salem more generally portray noble Indianness as originally 
consisting in a spontaneous attachment to settlement that transcends the public/private 
divide, an inversion of the later paternalistic discourse of Indian degeneration 
characterizing state oversight of New England reservations across the eighteenth century. 
Taken together, then, Corbitant and Hobomok render collective Native peoplehood as a 
barely diegetic and generic “groupness,” which might just as easily characterize the 
stubborn Puritans. In turn, the movement of historical time emerges as a process of 
distancing settlement from such comparatively archaic, even dogmatic forms of 
attachment, an equation that hinges on Hobomok's feelings for Mary, which we learn 
trace to her having helped his sick mother before the Conants relocated from Plymouth to 
Salem. The bifurcation of Indian character into good (forward-leaning/normative) and 
bad (regressive/deviant) men then retroactively organizes the historicity of New England 
settlement around feelings of attraction, longing, jealousy, and anger in ways that efface 
Native territoriality and sovereignty, on one hand, and render settler presence fully 
constitutive of political and social modernity, on the other. 
  If Child suggests that “questioning the dogmas of a culture which relegates 
nonwhite, non-Christian peoples to inferior status necessarily entails joining with those 
peoples in throwing off the yoke of the Great White Father,” as Carolyn Karcher argues, 
the ethical and devoted Indian character that facilitates this alliance nonetheless renders 
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actual Native polities and reservation communities peripheral at best (“Introduction” 
Hobomok xxv). Further, the drive for more land for English settlements and the pressures 
on trade networks for wampum, corn, and furs that intensified Native rivalries 
(particularly that between the Pequot and Narragansetts which would lead to the 
Narragansetts and Mohegans siding with the English during the Pequot War) go missing 
in the novel's history.25 However, there is no contradiction here if we consider that the 
historicity of Indian decline—bracketing Native self-determination through the guardian 
systems—conditions the intelligibility of New England history writ large, as this 
historicity would also condition any effort to pressure patriarchy. Elizabeth Dillon writes 
regarding sentimental literature that depictions of “women and children” who “maintain a 
home without making their work visible as labor” exert pressure on the dominant 
contours of the free, liberal subject (as white, male, privileged) by articulating “an 
abundance of affect that bespeaks the essential freedom of all who occupy the home” 
(202-3).  
 Signifying the non-utilititarian aspect of domestic labor (the labor of love) 
becomes paradoxically crucial to representing the free subject's newfound freedom, 
which opens that signifying process to potentially counter-hegemonic permutations of all 
kinds. However, one can suggest that the representational condition of possibility for this 
non-utilitarian dynamic to signify political resistance in term of the novel's historical 
milieu is the simultaneous embedding of Indianness as a residual formation, such that 
reservation communities become implicitly cast as beyond “domestic” space and, in turn, 
unable to generate any meaningful political efficacy in themselves. From this view, 
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Hobomok's relationship with Mary less appropriates a “representative” Indian identity in 
Mielke's terms than it generates a discursive surplus in the form of prelapsarian Indian 
character in keeping with the narrativity that Den Ouden identifies. By doing so, the text 
transmutes the intimate, timeless freedom associated with the sentimental home into a 
natural-metaphysical principle of the world, an association that further substantiates a 
view of antebellum reservation groups as existing out of time. 
 The novel temporally displaces reservation communities and thereby effaces the 
politics of reservations more generally through Hobomok's figuration within an inverted 
paradigm of settler homemaking qua homesteading in the wilderness (an Indianized 
space of nature creates the affective conditions for the home). Child depicts the 
connection between Mary and the noble Indian as deriving from a natural and originary 
“mingling” of pathos. During the hunting episode, Hobomok and Mary's mutual 
attraction moves from a guarded openness into an extended metaphor on the potential for 
Indianness to soften Puritannical intolerance. It opens with Hobomok sharing 
“descriptions of Indian Nations” with Mary, during which we learn that the Native is only 
eloquent around Mary, while she perhaps “listens with too much interest” (Child 
Hobomok 84). Although Hobomok's stories stand in sharp contrast to the dead letter of 
doctrine, in that they are actually interesting and prompt Mary to seek permission to join 
the hunting party led by him and her father, the narrative does not elaborate on the 
content of any such stories. Rather, they merely seem to hold the diegetic space of a 
vague and anthropomorphic outside, a sociality beyond Puritan settlement whose lack of 
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historical specificity underscores its implicit aim to limit such settlement, to cast its 
totalizing worldview as non-All.  
 The hunting passage that follows further develops the earlier theme of a 
disorienting openness (the narrator's view of Naumkeak from the ship) by combining it 
with the motif of synthesis from the opening primordial Indian hunt(er). As the party 
enters the woods, they spot the Native group across the plain, “winding along the 
opposite woods...torches carried upon poles high above their heads, casting their lurid 
glare on the mild, tranquil light of the evening” (Child Hobomok 88). As the two parties 
come together to form a single line, the merged group is described as unifying “heathen 
and christian, social and savage, elegance and strength, fierceness and timidity” into a 
single “light” that bisects the darkness (Child Hobomok 89). Child focuses the allegory 
by having the “merged” party come across a single deer in an open field, evoking the 
opening “echo” of the hunter. Seeming to identify with the animal, Mary asks Hobomok 
not to kill it, but he has already fired: the “deer sprung high into the air...and Hobomok 
stept forward to seize the victim...[as] he brought it up to Mary...its slender sides [were] 
heaving with the last agonies of life, and she turned away from the painful sight” (Child 
Hobomok 89 sic). Mary's discomfort provides a metaphor for the pain of discovering her 
own feelings for Hobomok, especially insofar as they appear fated to separate her from 
Naumkeak and her father. However, that the scene hints at the possibility of a “mixed” 
community, with the two groups gradually falling into line and becoming oriented toward 
the same horizon, suggests that this impossible desire is the painful requisite for broader 
social harmony, a state of coexistence that quite literally exceeds the comparably narrow 
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political and theological bounds of settlement. In this way, normative romance provides a 
link between (imagined) settler and Indian polities by opening onto a temporal horizon in 
generational and reprosexual terms.  
 Mary's shock upon discovering Charles' death at sea begins the final movement of 
this dialectic catalyzed by natural and noble Indian character. This moment can be 
imagined as depicting her symbolic death, the obverse of which is the opportunity for a 
new social matrix (oriented to settler familial norms) to arise. Put another way, insofar as 
her desire organizes the novel's political trajectory, Mary's grief marks the point at which 
the socio-symbolic edifice of Puritanism crumbles. She is described as suffering a 
“partial derangement of...faculties,” a “bewilderment of grief that almost amounted to 
insanity” yet that cannot be expressed precisely due to its excessiveness (her heart 
refused “to overflow”) (Child Hobomok 120). That she returns unconsciously to her 
mother's grave in such a state frames her loss as a sudden, radical ejection from all 
meaningful community. Dana Luciano argues that early-antebellum mourning both 
“appears as the inescapable condition of life in linear time, which inevitably 
severed...foundational bonds [of affection and sympathy], and furnishes the impetus for 
memory to reconnect to the form of truth they represented” (27-8). In suddenly appearing 
out of nowhere (again) to drape a blanket over Mary in her grief, Hobomok embodies 
such a horizontal attachment, at once a lifeline and a re-membering that returns her not 
only to the land of the living but to linear temporality and to historicity.  
 Hobomok's act disrupts Mary's ambiguous, “de-subjectivized” melancholy and 
creates in its place a “sense of sudden bereavement, deep and bitter reproaches against 
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her father” that endows her once more with psychosocial or “ego” coherence (Child 
Hobomok 121). The novel positions the Indian's authentic act, and what appears as a 
reversal of popular captivity motifs, as what finally enables Mary, and the reader, to 
break with patriarchy. Further, read against the background in which stultifying Calvinist 
dogmatism literally erodes the community inside and out, Hobomok's act/agency 
catalyzes historical progress by enacting this break from the stunted, dogmatic past. 
More precisely, the Puritannical past retroactively comes to be read as stunted and therein 
essentially ahistorical only after Hobomok intervenes in Mary's grief. Recalling his 
appearance in the “mystic circle,” Mary experiences a “broken and confused mass” of 
thoughts, upon which she returns home to give her father one last chance. Stoic to the 
bitter end, he answers by nearly destroying the Anglican prayer book she had received 
from Charles, producing the “fatal resolution,” namely to go Indian (Child Hobomok 
121).  
 Hobomok's marriage to Mary, then, registers as not only as an alternate timeline 
but one deriving from and rooted in the New World. Further, that the text emphasizes her 
volition in accepting his hand in marriage (“I will be your wife, Hobomok, if you love 
me”) and portrays it as a radical revising of women's agency. The voluntary decision to 
marry, even if a devastating grief catalyzes its voluntariness, is an act that “naturally” 
transgresses otherwise apparently impermeable racial and theological borders (Child 
Hobomok 121). Such border-crossing is underscored in Mary's somnambulistic state 
during the ceremony itself, which both suggests her passage beyond the matrix of 
normative custom and poses Hobomok's impact on the broader social order as affective 
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and extra-political. Yet the condition of possibility for narrating this notion of mediating, 
progressive agency is that Indianness already appears within the universal symbolic 
frame supposedly comprised by reprosexual heteronormativity.  
 During the wedding ceremony, the “oldest Indian” issues a series of “short 
harangues” on the duties of men and women in marriage that would have appeared 
perfectly ungodly to Mary Wollstonecraft or Mercy Otis Warren decades earlier: “he 
dwelt upon the duty of the husband to hunt plenty of deer for his wife, to love her, and try 
to make her happy; and that the wife should love her husband, and cook his venison well, 
that he might come home to his wigwam with a light heart” (Child Hobomok 125). 
Hobomok's “natural” ethics and devotion orient Mary's desire away from hierarchy, but 
they only signal a new path insofar as they perpetuate the symbolic constellation 
associated with settler homemaking, which, again, retroactively frames settler genealogy 
as fully coextensive, even synonymous with what it means to have history. In this way, 
insofar as authentic Indian virtue performs its potential labor within a settler milieu 
suffering from excessive patriarchal tyranny, it paves the way for its own disappearance 
within that economy through the reprosexual logic of normative homemaking. In this 
way, the novel frames forms of Indian peoplehood that exceed the framework of this 
economy as inauthentic; the peoples living on reservations signal something like partial 
Indians insofar as they have not (yet) fully disappeared into, or been absorbed through, 
settler sociality. 
 The novel represents this process of absorption or introjection in the birth of their 
child. While Hobomok's chivalry opens a path forward for Mary, it does not fully 
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materialize as a shift in the trajectory history, and finally represent Puritannical 
Naumkeak itself as a residual formation, until the birth of their son. Although Mary is not 
coerced into marrying Hobomok, she nonetheless feels shame as she adjusts to married 
life in the wigwam, suggesting the drag that the normative Puritan establishment 
continues to exert; transgressing authority entails an affective self-disciplining. In turn, 
the novel suggests again that authentic Indianness primarily intervenes at the most 
intimate level of individual affect, rather than of “tribal” geopolitics. Mary feels as if her 
“own nation looked upon her as lost and degraded, and, what was worse, her own heart 
echoed back the charge” (Chile Hobomok 135). Her shame thus represents a prolonging 
of her grief, construed as a prolongation of the psychosocial trauma of breaking with 
settlement after Charles' death (and note that Child slips here: Mary's grief retroactively 
casts settlement as a nation, suggesting the contemporary political terrain in which she 
intends to intervene). When Mary looks at the “'bone of her bone, and flesh of her flesh,'” 
however, she feels “more love for the innocent object, than she thought she should ever 
experience” (Child 136). Hobomok's lifeline, and the shift it enacts within a historicity 
predicated on settler genealogy, only fully materializes when he fathers Mary's child, 
which conveys the allegorical point that race is an artificial construct, a product of the 
social as opposed to the natural body. However, Hobomok too is by and large exiled from 
his people for marrying a white woman. The “truth” to which Mary is reconciled is then 
also that of the naturalness of private domesticity. Authentic Indianness is thus 
individuated, reducible to an ethic of character that throws the “tribe” into relief as an 
incoherent and “unnatural” half-formation. Moreover, this authenticity “naturally” 
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materializes as a nuclear home that produces a “mixed-blood” son, suggesting that the 
bio-cultural uniqueness attributed to Indianness, in its orientation to settlement, dissipates 
along the genealogical channels it produces.  
 Introjecting Indianness into the Conant household casts the proto-nuclear unit as 
fundamental to intelligible sociality and reaffirms settler (even patrilineal) genealogy as 
the form in which historicity discloses itself. Reading the novel as allegorizing the 
artificiality of a divided or stratified America—and then seeking to transcend such 
divisions—then misses the point that imagining Hobomok as an instance of ethical Indian 
fatherhood is integral to presenting settler modes of belonging as organic in their 
relation(s) to the land over time.26 Reading the novel as a political allegory only holds 
insofar as we presume that Hobomok's Indianness maps onto a coherent notion of Native 
collectivity, however generic. Accepting this point, however, necessitates accepting that 
such a notion naturally tends toward the proto-nuclear family unit, or at the very least is 
compatible with this unit. The corollary of Hobomok's individuation and introjection into 
an originary homestead, making it the basis of a genealogy of “progress,” is that, in 
contrast to the discursive terrain of the southeast in which intensified Indianness signaled 
an unbridgeable gap between Native ontology and settler familialism, Indianness here 
anchors settler genealogy to the land by providing its “natural” link. Hobomok's paternity 
is transmitted through heteronuclear domesticity, and its transmission not only re-centers 
forms of fellow-feeling presumed as integral to social bonds but endows this site with a 
temporal movement that transcends the stasis of normative homemaking. The paradoxical 
sign of such movement, the form of this sublation, is that idealized Indian ethics become 
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less “Indian” as they are introjected into the home: Hobomok jr. is “less” Indian than his 
father, but after his birth this “lesser” degree of Indianness seems utterly beside the point, 
a crude means of indexing the meaning of Hobomok's act. Put another way, by way of its 
introjection in the settler home, Indianness itself undergoes a permutation, shifting from a 
corporeal, bio-cultural essence attached to Native peoples to a transmissible signifier for 
ethical authenticity. 
 The novel's final turn realizes this introjection and inversion of Indian character. 
While out hunting, as expected, Hobomok encounters a figure he initially believes to be 
Corbitant but who turns out to be the long-lost lover, Charles. The novel then climaxes 
with a non-duel in which two men of feeling take turns offering to disappear forever. 
Despite the fact that he and Mary now share a child, Hobomok knows that her heart lies 
elsewhere, and he cannot but place her desire above his own. Persuading Charles of this 
point, Hobomok wins (or loses) and heads west, asking only that Brown “'be kind to my 
boy'” (Child 140). Before going, however, he takes care to dissolve his marriage with 
Mary “'by Indian laws,'” the last, self-effacing index of Native political autonomy, which 
he communicates by letter, prompting Brown to observe to the Collier household that the 
Indian's “conduct is all of a piece, noble throughout” (Child 146). Adding to this nobility 
is that Hobomok heads west to effectively die alone, now doubly alienated, fated to “'be 
buried among strangers'” none of whom “'shall black their faces for the unknown chief'” 
(Child 140). His decision to leave is thus presented as an ethical act of the highest order. 
In turn, this parting gift causes Charles and Mary to adopt and (re)name his son as 
Charles Hobomok Conant, which sublimates the father's ethical act in the form of 
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commemoration. If the renaming renders the boy as the material legacy of his biological 
father's sacrifice, the boy's adoption becomes the sign that Hobomok's impact on Mary's 
desire permanently alters the genealogical makeup of settler historicity. This bio-cultural 
shift is confirmed as the adoption reconciles Mary to her father, who takes to his 
grandson out of equal parts “consciousness of blame” and a “mixed feeling of 
compassion and affection,” indicating that Hobomok has inadvertently restored the most 
stoic of Puritans to his most fundamental humanity (Child Hobomok 149). 
 For Child, Indian character redeems the nation in time by virtue of its capacity to 
feel a spontaneous love and compassion that transcends the arbitrary divisions endemic to 
settler modernity. Hobomok does not intend to redeem settlement but does so 
nonetheless, which attests to the “natural” efficacy of his act and, by proxy, the 
authenticity of his character. His sacrifice, however, is at the same time a voluntary 
removal, not simply an exit from settlement but a total exile from any meaningful 
community. Although binary opposites, Hobomok and Corbitant consolidate and refract 
Native peoplehood writ large as historically vanished except for reservation communities, 
such as the Penobscot and Abenaki peoples Child knew in her youth and whose different 
modes of living indicated alternatives to racist patriarchy precisely insofar as the people 
themselves registered as relics of a bygone era.27 Further, if Hobomok's voluntary 
removal erases the possibility of an Indian ethics independently deriving from outside of 
settlement, his son's adoption accomplishes the same erasure inside. While Charles 
Hobomok Conant goes on to become a “distinguished graduate at Cambridge,” becoming 
a message from the New World to the Old, the narrator notes that since his “father was 
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seldom spoken of...by degrees his Indian appellation was silently omitted” (Child 
Hobomok 150). The adopted Native son, the introjected, biocultural remainder of Indian 
character, then gradually loses his ability to mark indigenous peoplehood in the name that 
“silently” disappears as the mediating term between doctrinal authority and dissenting 
love within settler sociality. It simply and precisely goes without saying that Indianness 
will become fully integrated and therefore “civilized” once this gap is bridged.  
 While one could suggest that civilization policy presents the frame for thinking 
the very concept of Native rights in the novel, one would have to add that Hobomok 
junior's mixed-blood body renders legible the nation's capacity to overcome its internal 
divisions. I would argue that the subtle invocation of conversion at the end less shows the 
novel's historical limitation than it indicates how temporality and narrativity associated 
with an otherwise effectively ahistorical Indianness provides the means of presenting 
assimilation and conversion as forward-moving social modalities. Put another way, 
referencing conversion in any deliberate way would already be redundant in terms of the 
novel's logic, as Hobomok's lasting gift is that of a blank Indian body by which to index 
the ethics of the very liberal imaginary that the novel offers as the horizon for any Native 
policy. By contrast, Native futurity becomes not so much political nonsense as beyond 
the grid of intelligibility, as there is only one future, that of the nation-state whose 
borders lose their status as such in the sublation of Indian fatherhood and the implicit 
debt his ethics bestow on the Anglo population to labor on behalf of the Indian. The sign 
that historicizing Indianness as such is constitutive of the novel's national imaginary is 
that the text positions the reader as indebted to Indian character and, in turn, that this debt 
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can only be repaid by remembering, which is to say by way of narrativity. But this 
injunction to remember might be thought as the discursive form of a very real foreclosure 
of reservation peoples as signifying anything other than past-tense, partial subjectivities. 
Introjecting Hobomok, the ethical Indian father, sustains a historicity within which the 
(im)possibility of future assimilation is the only path forward for New England Natives.  
 
Sublating Magawisca's Nature 
 For Child, Hobomok fathers a historicity within which the dogmatic, absolutist 
patriarch falls away in the emergence of a bio-culturally “mixed” patrimony. By contrast, 
Sedgwick's Hope Leslie (1827) imagines even a sympathetic father (quite different from 
Mr. Conant, Mr. Fletcher is described as a man of conscience and feeling) as limited in 
his capacity to contribute to an egalitarian social order. Nonetheless, the novel posits a 
linear historicity oriented to settlement by generating an idealized, prelapsarian 
Indianness, the ethics of which serve to cohere US claims to Native space. As Mark 
Rifkin argues, the novel maps the complex arena consisting of unevenly aligned English 
in terms of settler domesticity. The plot, he writes, manifests a “kin-aesthetic [that] 
divorces Native family formation from the questions and concerns of sovereignty, using 
tropes of kinship to signal...Indian openness to bonding with whites rather than the 
autonomous functioning of indigenous polities” (When 141). Much of this effacement 
occurs through Magawisca, for whom the Fletcher household provides the matrix for an 
evolution from mediating Indian-English strife to articulating a one-size-fits-all Indian 
nationalism, albeit one apparently fated to vanish on the horizon. However, although the 
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text may be thought of as going further than Hobomok in its critique of proto-nuclear, 
patrilineal domesticity, the vehicle for this critique is nevertheless a narrativity of bygone 
Indian character, the exceptional ethics of which serve to consolidate settler claims to 
land in time. By uniting Hope and Everell and thereby resolving the novel's concern over 
the reproduction of tyranny, Magawisca's didacticism comes to present normative 
couplehood as aligned with a transcendent Nature and, accordingly, as an index of 
historicity insofar as it marks the introjection of natural virtue into settler society.  
 As with Hobomok, Hope Leslie constellates character through a transatlantic 
family affair, one centered on a refusal to sacrifice nascent egalitarian principles in the 
face of Old-World hegemony. Sir William, a lawyer who has amassed a fortune and 
gained his way to “courtly favour,” selects his nephew, William Fletcher (Hope's 
adoptive father) to marry his daughter out of a desire to bequeath his name along with his 
wealth (Sedgwick 7). His only stipulation is that his brother steer the boy away from “the 
philosophy and rhetoric and history of those liberty-loving Greeks,” lest he come to stray 
from “unquestioning and unqualified loyalty to his sovereign” (Sedgwick 8). Sir William 
defends popish Anglicanism only insofar as it is sanctioned by the monarchy: his only 
allegiance is to the social order that has allowed him to acquire power and prestige. 
However, the desire to transmit his name with his estate also reads as a desire to transmit 
the broader socio-symbolic system within which the accumulation of exorbitant wealth 
and influence materializes a difference between the elite and the masses, a distinction that 
his own climb up the social ladder shows to be illusory. In Elizabeth Povinelli's terms, Sir 
William seeks recourse to whatever means necessary to engineer a “materiality of 
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inheritance” that would endow his symbolic position with a “metaphysics of substance,” 
an impression of necessity “beyond the control of a person or society” (203). Although 
the novel fully develops such parasitism in Sir Gardiner's character, Sir William 
inaugurates this theme in terms of a preoccupation with essence and appearance that runs 
across the text, specifically the notion that the appearance of legitimate authority may 
mask a perverse will to power at odds with the equilibrium that should characterize a 
democratic social order.  
 At the same time, Sir William's desire to pass on his name indicates that the novel 
thinks about political and social discord largely in terms of transatlantic, linear 
genealogy. Concerned only with consolidating and further legitimizing his position 
through fabricating a family line that will retroactively naturalize his standing and path in 
life, Sir William lacks the kind of passionate attachment that characterizes his nephew, 
whose “fidelity to what he deemed his duty could not have been subdued by the fires of 
martyrdom” (Sedgwick 10). Young Fletcher's resistance is problematic not only because 
it jeopardizes the line of inheritance that would finally consolidate the uncle's privileged 
status, but because it more fundamentally threatens the very logic of such a transmission. 
Sir William makes it clear that “'no daughter or guinea of mine shall ever go to 
one...infected with this spreading plague,'” but the threat discloses the real danger 
(Sedgwick 8). If this “plague” spreads, the symbolic matrix within which daughters and 
guineas substantialize one another and thereby naturalize a gendered social hierarchy will 
also dissolve. Fletcher's stubborn idealism threatens to shift the symbolic coordinates of 
the social matrix writ large away from hierarchical social order and toward democratic 
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openness. The solution? Ship all of the Puritans, a bunch of “mad canting fools,” to New 
England so as to “enjoy with the savages that primitive equality, about which they make 
such a pother” (Sedgwick 7-8). The spatiality of geopolitics proper initially registers as a 
means of resolving an Old-World political struggle that plays out on the terrain of 
genealogy: the elite do not so much seek to persecute those responsible for the “plague” 
of liberty so much as to export them to a place where they will not infect the future. 
Natives accordingly enter the text first as a trope through which to figure the ideological 
distance of what is implicitly framed as a “tribal” commitment to community, on one 
hand, and yet (from the inverse, ironic angle) as a kind of generic, zero-level sociality, 
one “naturally” devoid of the artifice and oppression associated with Old-World 
hierarchy, on the other.  
 Sir William's comment would appear to imply that the novel positions Indianness 
as a projection of settler sociopolitical strife. However, if young Fletcher's revolutionary 
ire indicates a passionate attachment to freedom, it is nonetheless a curiously empty one 
in terms of ideological content. The threatening religious zeal that his uncle believes 
more properly belongs among the Indians is devoid of any of the finer points of 
Calvinism, which marks a real difference between Sedgwick's novel and Hobomok. Child 
devotes space aplenty to the theological and political differences among emigrant 
Protestant groups. Here, by contrast, Sir William discovers his nephew to be full of a 
“lofty independence” (he fails to bow) that strikes the former as “an unknown [and] 
mysterious power” (Sedgwick 9). After deciding to leave for the New World, forfeiting 
his cousin's hand so as not to betray his principles, he is depicted as shunning “earthly 
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passions [for] the cause of liberty and religion,” which the narrator adds typified the 
Puritans as a whole (Sedgwick 12). In sharp contrast to actual dissenting and separatist 
Protestantisms, Fletcher's agenda appears to consist in little more than an embodied 
individualism, one that cross-references “liberty” and “religion” but fails to fuse them 
into a single radical program, much less one that can ground a community. This 
paradoxically empty conviction opens onto the novel's critique of the gendered aspect of 
the political sphere. In merging a postrevolutionary discourse of liberty with Protestant 
separatism, Mr. Fletcher's individualism appears potent enough to shift the broader milieu 
away from tyranny, and the novel's dilemma in turn manifests as a problem of enacting or 
realizing this shift. Part of the problem, however, appears to be Fletcher himself.  
 As it emerges through the opening backstory, the novel's dilemma emerges as a 
question of how to found a free society—how to transform “lofty independence” from a 
generic commitment (one cause or ideological content among others) into a constitutive 
component of social space (its fundamental formal principle). Sedgwick implies that the 
real paradox is that the necessary vehicle for such a shift, Mr. Fletcher's own mobility, 
becomes a problematic content in itself as soon as it breaks away: the break then 
retroactively appears less as a drive to recreate society than a need to retreat from it and 
to recoil into whatever enclave is afforded through his status as an elite male. The novel 
underscores this point in the relative impotence of Fletcher's ethics as a patriarch of 
feeling. Upon emigrating to Boston only to discover that even a “religious republic” is 
prone to an “out-break of heresies,” he moves yet again, to a remote area outside of the 
sparse settlement at Springfield (Sedgwick 16). Although Fletcher opposes his uncle's 
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parasitism in the name of “liberty and religion,” his capacity to opt out of any extended 
social conflict by picking up and moving west makes him the ironic double of his uncle. 
The novel seems to suggest that the substance of young Fletcher's “political and religious 
delinquency,” his commitment to “liberty and religion,” cannot materialize given his 
sheer tendency to emigrate. As such, his vision consists in little more than a “mysterious” 
aura of self-governance that characterizes those “men of genius—men of feeling—the 
men that the world calls visionaries...[but who] cannot brook the slow progress to 
perfection” (Sedgwick 10,16). Impatience too, the novel implies, is a luxury, which the 
text underscores by framing Fletcher's recourse to emigration as an ironic form of 
privilege rooted in the patriarchy from which he seeks to escape—not everyone has 
access to such mobility. 
 Insofar as it is coextensive with his gendered mobility, Fletcher's “feeling” then 
emerges as problematically masculine given its tendency to defer (through emigration) 
confronting extant forms of oppression. On one hand, his final to Springfield “removal” 
draws the ire of the increasingly domineering Puritans. Yet, on the other, it places his 
family in danger, an aspect Sedgwick emphasizes by having him absent during the attack 
on his homestead that kills both his wife and infant child. The text accordingly comes 
down quite hard on male privilege, suggesting that the larger, epistemic problem with the 
political sphere has to do with patriarchy and patrilineal succession in general. If then, as 
Patricia Kalayjian suggests, by shifting the “temporal setting of her narratives” Sedgwick 
implies that “patriarchy continuously reinvents itself as a repressive force, claiming all 
rights for itself and forbidding...the rights of others,” the impatience and inefficacy of 
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men of character like Fletcher prove historical catalysts for such reinvention (69). The 
novel casts such men as constituting a hidden hand behind the failure to (re)invent an 
ethical social order. 
 However, Fletcher's character does introduce the importance of intuition in the 
novel, as a means of seeing past external appearances through to the natural character 
they may conceal, and this capacity functions in the text as a dividing line between those 
committed to justice and to the status quo. Hope, Everell, and Magawisca each come to 
register as more attuned than most to the underlying character of those around them, as 
well as more compelled to act on the suffering of others, but they, like Fletcher, run into 
the problem of being alienated within the dominant milieu on the basis of this very 
awareness. Young Fletcher is specifically depicted as having the capacity to “feel” when 
the dominant order is out of sync with a higher universal law, but his mobility winds up 
removing him from the scene where he could effect change. Similarly, despite their 
intuition, the Fletcher family's privileged position in relation to the community (Fletcher 
and his children are not members of the servant class) renders them symptomatic of a 
society that cannot replicate itself in terms of its own supposedly transcendent principles. 
This gap is crucial. Mr. Fletcher and in turn Hope and Everell register as lacking some 
element that would enable them to materialize their intuition within the social edifice 
itself, but each is unaware of their own limitations. The matrix that makes possible the 
intuition and conviction modeled by the members of the Fletcher family is itself limited 
to the givenness of settler sociality, belief systems, and governance. 
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 I am not suggesting that the novel presumes an image of the public sphere and 
political strife as detached from the politics of land claims. Rather, the appeal to an 
idealized Indian character frames the political horizon by supplying the ethical backdrop 
against which political affairs internal to settlement emerge as subject to, or 
overdetermined by, “earthly passions.” Magawisca's enigmatic yet ambivalent display in 
the trial that closes the novel anthropomorphizes this ethical horizon in the form of an 
appeal to liberty. Referring to Gardiner's plot to ruin her character and thereby preempt 
her incriminations, she insists that Winthrop and the broader community “not wait for 
him to prove that I am your enemy...Take my own word, I am,” which she immediately 
follows with conventional rhetoric of vanishing Indianness: “the sun-beam and the 
shadow cannot mingle. The white man cometh—the Indian vanisheth” (Sedgwick 292). 
Rather than argue, as does Maureen Tuthill for instance, that this sentiment indicates the 
novel's problematic investment in removal ideology broadly conceived, I would only 
suggest here that such discourse positions Magawisca's Indianness as the obverse of the 
impulse that Fletcher represents. She is, of course, not the enemy of the Fletcher 
household, which provides the affective scene that nurtures the settler impetus toward 
liberty. Instead, her comment refers to the state/colonial apparatus that presumes 
sovereignty over her, and yet this resistance dovetails with the foreknowledge that Indian 
polities are fated to disappear. If Fletcher is an ideological form (resistance to tyranny) 
without a corresponding content, in the sense of a clear trajectory or program, then 
Magawisca reads as an ideological content (a capacity to engage and resist the tyranny of 
hierarchical oppression directly; her comments occur in the context of the trial that closes 
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the novel) without a corresponding form in the sense of a social matrix both to which she 
belongs and that accordingly stands to benefit from her action. 
 In slightly different terms, Magawisca is the vanishing mediator that synthesizes 
the Old and New Worlds. By refusing the judgments of the state apparatus, she publicly 
aligns Winthrop's own government with the Old-World ethico-political matrix 
symbolized by Sir William in a manner that neither the younger Fletcher, Everell, nor 
Hope can do without facing exile. On one hand, then, she transposes resistance to 
tyranny, already a defining trait of a distinctly “American” commitment to “liberty and 
religion,” from a localized impulse to escape into a project that transcends and thereby 
has the capacity to reshape the dominant social order. On the other, however, as Rifkin 
writes, the “text seems to speak as if Magawisca's mourning for her mother, and the 
feelings of guilt she seeks to prompt in Winthrop for not fulfilling his promise [to her 
mother of kindness toward her children], were capable of encompassing the meaning of 
the attempted destruction and erasure of the Pequot people” (When 139). As a figure of 
difference, Magawisca extends the forms of affect organized around normative settler 
homemaking beyond their moorings in Anglo settlement, presenting them as integral to 
the intelligibility of Pequot genocide and therefore as requisite to its representation. The 
scene of this transposition is key. By challenging the state's pretensions to condemn or 
acquit her, Magawisca's act of rhetorical sovereignty discloses the racism of the majority 
of Anglos. In turn, her allusions to Sir Gardiner's papism and then Rosa's secret gender 
reveal both his duplicity and, by proxy, the court's own fallibility. This chapter ends with 
the narrator noting the “strange contrariety of opinion and feelings” in the courtroom, the 
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people “guided by the best lights they possessed, deciding against her—the voice of 
nature crying out for her” (Sedgwick 294). However, in generating this palpable discord 
Magawisca's narrative actually effaces questions of jurisdiction and territorial claims that 
provided the backdrop for the Pequot War, displacing the historical specificity of Pequot 
displacement itself in favor of a generic resistance borne out of an equally generic 
Indianness. Her performance therefore transforms the scene into one of settler collective 
(self) recognition and thereby represents historical change as the process by which state 
apparatuses become realigned through the influence of a natural ethics that exceeds 
society proper. Indeed, read in this way, the settler courtroom itself comes to manifest 
settlement's structural openness to an evolution beyond the false consciousness that 
blinds its actual polity. 
 Again, though, it is Magawisca's fullness, her overdetermined meaning as a cipher 
of supposedly authentic and noble Indian virtue, that enables her character to harmonize 
settler society and to posit a rhetoric of liberty oriented to settlement as a concept that, as 
it were, exists freely in nature. Her performance during the trial suggests that the 
primitive equality of the savages consists in a recognition of shared humanity that has the 
capacity to redirect the state's tendency toward persecution. The Pequot heroine emerges 
as the novel's true visionary, in a way its anti-Fletcher. She is, like him, both principled 
and passionate, but lacking the kind of privileged mobility that seems only to impede 
social regeneration. This lack registers as a form of agency: sacrificing her arm to save 
Everell from death at her father's hands positions her character as the inverse of Mr. 
Fletcher's impotence. This “Indian” efficacy further shows in her good faith in reuniting 
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Faith and Hope on Nelema's behalf, her refusal to secure her freedom by helping 
Gardiner remove Rosa from the picture, in sparing Rosa's humiliation at the expense of 
providing testimony that could help prove her own innocence, and, also in the trial scene, 
in echoing Patrick Henry's demand for “'death or liberty,'” a claim that can be understood 
as retroactively naturalizing a uniquely (yet no less generic) American discourse on 
political freedom (Sedgwick 293). She appears able to intervene in the dominant order on 
the side of justice insofar as she emerges from outside the socio-symbolic dynamics of 
settlement. However, just as the reference to Winthrop's promise to her mother 
consolidates her ethos in the courtroom, the authenticity of her character initially emerges 
through her willingness to negotiate her father's “tribal” drive toward vengeance. If 
Indian-Anglo violence is cyclical, as Sedgwick implies, normative genealogy provides 
the concept for thinking it as such (especially as Mononotto's “tribal” vendetta hinges on 
the death of his wife and child at Fort Mystic). The outside that she represents, in other 
words, is already an extension of a supposedly universal ontology predicated on settler 
sociality. 
 Magawisca's character, therefore, also crucially mediates between received 
narratives of Anglo-Indian history and normative modes of settler belonging, which 
makes her central to the novel's sociopolitical critique, as scholars have noted. Mary 
Kelley observes that by having Mononotto seek his revenge after Magawisca narrates her 
version of the destruction of Fort Mystic, Sedgwick shows that “committed Christians 
had a capacity for barbarism equal to that which they attributed to the indigenous 
population” and thus resists the tendency to attribute such episodes to Natives' supposed 
 170 
savagery (xxxiii). Kalayjian similarly argues that by situating Magawisca’s  account of 
the war after that of Digby, a veteran of the conflict who is also loyal to the Fletcher 
household, Sedgwick depicts a moment of empathy within which “the savagery of the 
white soldiers resignifies the term 'savage,'” effectively de-racializing and recasting it as 
“a gendered signifier” (67). Jeffrey Insko suggests that Sedgwick's extradiegetic narrator 
demonstrates an awareness of the “mutability of historical truth” by commenting upon 
and at times reframing key passages, such as Hope's reunion with Faith and Magawisca's 
description of horrors of the Pequot War earlier (183). The narrator's frequent 
commentary, he contends, yields a sense of anachronism that indicates Sedgwick's 
awareness of the power of narration to intervene in historical narrative. From this view, 
the novel is “less concerned with an objective...recovery of a remote period...than with 
bringing disparate periods in time into productive relation,” so as to force the reader to 
confront racial otherness, thereby foregrounding “the perils and potentialities of a nascent 
multi-cultural democracy” (Insko 199, 183).  
 Despite her shifting alignments, or rather by way of them, Magawisca amounts to 
the novel's ethical center in forcing even those who see through and oppose tyranny 
(namely Hope) to confront the deeply embedded racial and cultural limits to their 
altruism. Although this scholarship draws attention to Sedgwick's recognition that the 
narrativity central to historical fiction can be used toward counter-hegemonic ends, it 
does not generally link this recognition to the ur narrative of Indian degeneration that 
developed in relation to reservation communities. Insko, for instance, observes that the 
text's “argument for historical relativism—bringing the past into relation with ever-new 
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presents...is duplicated in the text's representation of the racial other”; the text relates its 
“racial politics to its historiographical interests” and argues “not just for historical 
relativism but for a brand of cultural relativism as well” (Insko 199, 197). Insko suggests 
that the text intervenes in the discipline of history by foregrounding the role that religious 
bias plays in structuring its truth claims, and insofar as it does so, it also makes a parallel 
intervention into the emergent racial politics of the public sphere by deconstructing 
notions of stereotypically “Indian” savagery. Through Magawisca, the text represents 
political and historical representation as effectively separate networks.  
 If Indianness is primarily imagined, as in Hobomok, as the vehicle by which an 
ethical Nature beyond Anglo civilization comes to intervene within the latter, a notion 
that indexes the possibility whereby those settlers who practice an ethical intuition come 
to gain a reflexive awareness of such ethics and become able to reflect it into an originary 
social matrix, Indian character comprises the vehicle for this potential reflection. Further, 
the introjection of such ethics into settler sociality comes to signify progressive 
movement in time, away from the destructive historical cycles that characterize Old 
World England and that amounts to the re-inscription of tyranny into the social body over 
time. To be fair, Magawisca's Pequots are also represented as given to such cycles, 
namely through the text's muted portrayal of Mononotto. Yet, the Pequots themselves 
register as aberrations of the generic Indianness typified by Magawisca, and this 
Indianness furthermore amounts to the element that enables Anglo settlement to save 
itself from itself. The repeated sacrifices that Hope and Magawisca make across the text 
draw both figures into alignment with the younger Fletcher's own resistance to his uncle's 
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overtures to give up his religious and political delinquency (Sedgwick 121). Yet 
Indianness does more than articulate the text's preoccupation with an ethics that can cut 
through the stubbornness and irrationalism of both Indian and Anglo hierarchies. If, as 
the novel seems to suggest, patriarchy problematizes Indian and Anglo socialities alike, 
one of the reasons would appear to have to do with the belief in an Indian-American 
binary in the first place. Fletcher, Hope, Everell, and Magawisca, along with Fletcher's 
wife, each recognize to varying degrees how such stock conceptions of identity mask 
one's authentic character. Yet Jennet's overt racism combined with the eagerness of the 
wider community not only to accuse Nelema and Magawisca of witchcraft but to believe 
they are indeed hell-spawn together suggest that such binarism does exist. Insofar as the 
majority of people see through such formations, by way of them, these reductive tropes 
map reality for settlers and, in turn, Native peoples as well. The paradox is that 
Sedgwick's representation of Magawisca relies on a version of the same binarism to make 
this very point. 
 Magawisca's narrative of the Pequot massacre attests to the materiality of such 
stereotypes. Organized around her own family's suffering, and in particular her brother's 
dramatic death, her account as told to Everell implies that the massacre was partially a 
function of settlers' failure to recognize the honor and humanity that characterizes Natives 
and Anglos alike. In turn, such beliefs contribute to a reactionary belligerence on the part 
of Native groups, an effect represented here by Mononotto's drive to avenge his wife and 
son. Sedgwick suggests that this drive radicalizes him into actively working to form a 
pan-Indian alliance organized around the Mohawks. Rather than simple foils for one 
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another, then, Hope and Magawisca represent different degrees of recognition of the true 
state of Nature obscured by such binarism. As the novel progresses, Sedgwick 
dialectically aligns these perspectives. The second volume resolves the tension between 
patriarchal justice and ethical-feminine Nature, which exists on both sides of the Indian-
Anglo divide, through the logic of the debt that brings the women together. Magawisca 
tells Hope in the graveyard that Nelema “blessed you” and that as “the hand of death 
pressed her throat...she made me swear to perform her promise to you” (Sedgwick 187). 
 In keeping her promise, Magawisca transforms the dyad consisting of her 
sacrifice (of her limb, her standing with her father, etc.) and that of Hope's altruism 
(sacrificing her own character for the sake of Nelema, first, and later Rosa) into a linear 
sequence organized around the possibility of family reunification. In so doing, she 
emerges as the prophet of a unifying afterlife, and her ethos gestures to a supposedly real 
space beyond the veils of Indian-Anglo binarism. After noting their mothers' graves, a 
device that gestures to a common humanity by way of the irrational destruction that 
comes with warfare, Magawisca asserts that “the Great Spirit looks down on these sacred 
spots, where the good and the peaceful rest, with an equal eye...their children are His 
children, whether they are gathered in yonder temple...or bow to Him beneath the green 
boughs of the forest” (Sedgwick 189).  
 Sedgwick here reverses the valence of the Indian-as-savage by attributing to the 
Pequot heroine the text's clearest expression of a something like a Unitarian theological 
framework, and nearly a proto-transcendentalist one, as Magawisca is not depicted as 
Christian in a text that goes so far as to reference the influence of French Catholicism on 
 174 
Native groups to the north, such as the Abenaki. The ethico-political consequences of this 
framework become clear as, despite siding with her father, Magawisca chides Hope for 
not being able to get past the shock of her sister being married to Oneco, an “Indian, in 
whose veins runs the blood of the strongest, the fleetest children of the forest...Think ye 
that your blood be corrupted by mingling with this stream?” (Sedgwick 188). Magawisca 
presents the categories of race deriving from emergent bio-cultural, proto-scientific, and 
civilizational discourses as illusory, contingent constructs, positing 
racial/cultural/spiritual hybridity as something like an immanent truth or fundamental 
condition of existence, one from which patriarchal tyranny departs in its intolerance of 
difference and fear of the Other. If her lessons contradict those of settlement, they also 
gesture to a horizon, a truth to come, and in this way her ethics/character reconfigures the 
perspectival distortions that have plagued settlement to this point as what can only be 
imagined as world-historical stages in the course of an all-encompassing progress. 
Magawisca becomes the cypher for a linear historicity, the form of appearance of which 
is Anglo settlement's ethical improvement—a movement not so much toward as through 
Indianness. 
 This movement manifests in Magawisca's didacticism, which can be seen across 
the novel but gains its full expression at the end. Her lessons defamiliarize Indian-Anglo 
binarism by orienting Hope and Everell to what the text situates as an absolute spiritual 
horizon, a deeper unity that transcends the illusions characteristic, even constitutive of the 
socio-political sphere. Magawisca catalyzes settler self-recognition, but in the process of 
inadvertently orienting the youth of settlement toward an ethico-political in keeping with 
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the spirit, if not the politics, of settlement, she gradually becomes symbolic of the same 
horizon to which she refers. The graveyard scene's didactic overtones underscore this 
point. Hope's horror at Faith/Mary's marriage implies she cannot fully share in the truth 
of the ethical nature that Magawisca here brings to the fore, despite the fact that Hope 
intuits it in the world around her. Insofar as the latter serves as the novel's focal point, 
however, the text here renders the Pequot heroine out of joint not only with settlement's 
elite (white male) ruling class but also its radical, individualistic protagonist in Hope. Her 
Indianness gestures to the possibility of a greater social cohesion in time, but this gesture 
itself articulates a temporal disjuncture that retroactively naturalizes settlement as the site 
from which history proper begins. Magawisca not only possesses knowledge of the 
ultimate unity of all beings, but she implicitly realizes its value for settlers, gesturing to a 
state of existence to which Hope and by proxy all of settlement should tend, should 
emulate as closely as possible in this world. In this way, Magawisca's Indianness eclipses 
Native claims to self-determination in New England. Authentic Indian character emerges 
in the text in its opposition to both masculinist hierarchy and emergent true womanhood, 
and insofar as it does so, it serves to signify settler futurity in ways coextensive with the 
continued justification of guardian systems through supposed fallenness of an original 
and noble Indian virtue. 
 In the escape scene, before she gets the locket containing Everell's portrait as a 
consolation prize, Hope makes it clear she cannot stand the thought of parting with her 
Indian friend, blurting out that “your noble mind must not be wasted in those hideous 
solitudes!” (Sedgwick 332). Magawisca scolds Hope for making such a suggestion: 
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“Solitudes!...there is no solitude to me; the Great Spirit, and his ministers, are every 
where present and visible to the eye of the soul that loves him; nature is but his 
interpreter; her forms are but bodies for his spirit...the rushing winds...the summer 
breeze” and of course the stars that shine “alike on your stately homes and our forest 
domes” (Sedgwick 332). Revealing to Hope her biases for the last time transmutes the 
image of coexistence into one of historicity, within which Native forests give way to 
settler progress, as Magawisca takes her leave. This temporal register gains additional 
backing as we learn that Winthrop's government decided to release her so as to prevent a 
martyrdom that would unify the uneven Native groups around settlement into an anti-
English coalition. As an embodiment of liberty, Magawisca's taking leave to the west 
quite literally presents settler expansion as the movement of history. 
 Yet, such a passage also clearly anticipates the image of the Indian as nature's 
wise steward that still characterizes much popular discourse on Native peoples, 
intimating the ambivalence of Sedgwick's views of contemporary Native peoplehood. 
Maureen Tuthill persuasively reads such ambivalence against the background of the 
Sedgwick family's failed missionary endeavors among the Stockbridge Natives 
“combined with their eventual purchase of the last remaining lands of the Stockbridge 
tribe,” suggesting that Magawisca's voluntary exile at the end of the text perhaps 
symbolizes the notion that Native removal was inevitable (105). There is nothing 
ambivalent, however, in the text's positioning of Magawisca as on the side of truth when 
it comes to narratives of Indian-Anglo conflict typified by the Pequot War. The narrator 
observes that her recounting of the attack on Fort Mystic to Everell was beyond “merely 
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changing sculptors to give the advantage to one or the other...but...putting the chisel into 
the hands of truth, and giving it to whom it belonged” (Sedgwick 53). Rather than merely 
one account among many, Magawisca's view of the conflict is positioned as the version. 
Her narrative is depicted as testifying to the fact that Natives were victims of an 
outrageous and unwarranted display of brutality by settlers. This perspective situates her 
at the intersection of the three domains of history, politics, and religion (the natural, 
“pagan” ethics that enable her to save Everell and thus perpetuate the novel's 
reconfiguration of ethics organized around the home).  
 Sedgwick writes in the preface that while she “is aware that it may be thought that 
the character of Magawisca has no prototype...Without citing Pocohontas, or any other 
individual, or authority, it may be sufficient to remark, that...we are confined not to the 
actual, but the possible,” essentially reversing the terms of the review of Child's 
Hobomok (Sedgwick 6). Portrayals of Natives as static savages bely the enlightenment 
wisdom that “elements of virtue and intellect are not withheld from any branch of the 
human family,” a point Sedgwick qualifies by observing that the “difference of character 
among the various races of the earth, arises mainly from the difference of condition” 
(Sedgwick 6). Far from an “unnatural” abuse of historical traditions, Sedgwick's 
Magawisca is possible, even probable, insofar as biased views of Native peoples, 
perspectives embodied by characters as different as Jennet and Governor Winthrop, are 
part and parcel of the archival source materials. If these characters index a racism integral 
to the general orientation of Puritan historiography and colonial archives, which is to say 
integral to antebellum views of Natives as well, then Magawisca by contrast gives 
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narrative form to the notion of a “human family,” and in so doing, she discloses 
Sedgwick's own revisionist impulse. Her character articulates the concept of a shared 
humanity that shows the discourse on savagery to be small-minded precisely insofar as it 
appropriates the historicity charted by the archives.  
 The novel theorizes that Anglo settlement becomes “civilization” by gaining 
insight into the epistemic roots of its seemingly irresolvable tensions, and Magawisca's 
didacticism is the diegetic element that puts the characters on the path to this knowledge. 
Indianness in this vein has less to do with signifying actual Native groups than providing 
the discursive element by which a linear historicity already oriented to settlement shifts 
its ethical valence. Imagining Indianness as reducible to a view onto true nature 
harmonizes the opening rift between “liberty and religion” and rejuvenates social space 
by sublating the dangers of patriarchy (Sir William's will to power, Sir Gardiner's 
duplicity and profligacy, and Winthrop's sheer capacity to be duped) through the “nature” 
of normative love. If we pair together Magawisca's removal (which reinforces the 
antebellum notion that the destruction of Fort Mystic marked the genesis of a more 
general and inevitable Indian decline) with that of Esther, then the text casts such love as 
not only extending the forms of feeling associated with domesticity into broader social 
space (both East and West, insofar as Esther returns to England) but as that which, as 
such, transcends the “earthly” obsessions sustained by the false consciousness of binary 
ideologies. Romantic love emerges as the true motor of historicity, that which Puritan 
historiography truly denies but is essential to nationhood going forward. The obverse of 
this resolution, as with Hobomok, is that in becoming a marker of settler historicity, 
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Indian character forecloses the capacity of Indianness to register the living history of 
New England Native peoples. 
 
Characterizing a History of Violence in William Apess's Eulogy on King Philip 
 The previous discussions of Hobomok and Hope Leslie sought to illustrate how 
narrating a prelapsarian Indian character actively generates, rather than reflects, a linear 
historicity within which New England settlement emerges as an ethical project in its 
relation to Native space. Imagined as “probable” representations of early Anglo-Native 
conflict, the ethics, sacrifice, and suffering of characters like Hobomok and Magawisca 
depict authentic Indianness as perpetually temporally out of joint, which in turn implicitly 
overdetermines the territorial and juridical claims of New England Native peoples in the 
antebellum period. Historicizing a quintessential Indian character as indicating a natural 
repository of virtue open to settlement, insofar as it is construed as something like an 
ontological principle or tendency already embedded the landscape, casts settlement as 
having introjected (and predicated on the capacity to introject) this “natural” and ethical 
element. This framing of Indianness, then, casts reservation systems in New England as 
spaces where the degraded trace of that primordial Indian exceptionalism slowly 
dwindles to nothing. In this way, such narratives endow settler domesticity with a sense 
of temporality, of movement forward that in turn presents the continued maintenance of 
reservation space as, at best, a tangential concern with regard to the "Indian question"; 
such oversight simply appears as the course of history writ large. Narrating Indian 
character, then, does not so much resist as foreclose thinking about New England Native 
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communities in terms of political and juridical sovereignty. Despite the apparent political 
sympathy toward Native peoples evidenced in the turn away from tropes of Indian 
savagery, works like Hobomok and Hope Leslie can be understood not simply as 
perpetuating a generalized notion of Indian vanishing, but more fundamentally as 
extending the longstanding role that a narrativity of Indian decline played in negating 
New England Native peoples' claims to sovereignty. In other words, rather than tokens of 
a generic “Indian question” that takes Indianness for granted as a relatively stable and 
coherent signifier, these works mobilize the discursivity of Indianness to historicize 
sovereign Native peoplehood as not only a thing of the past, but more crucially as a 
natural (extra-political) formation sublated in the ascendancy of political progressivism 
within a settler public sphere, therein deflecting the claims of reservation-based peoples 
in antebellum New England. 
 By the time William Apess would deliver his Eulogy on King Philip (1836), his 
last work, a decade after the publications of Hobomok and Hope Leslie, the mythos of the 
noble savage had been well established in American literature. John Augustus Stone's 
massively popular Metamora; or, The Last of the Wampanoags (1829) featured the 
popular stage actor Edwin Forrest portraying a highly stylized version of Metacom (King 
Philip), further sedimenting the Wampanoag leader as a reminder to settler audiences that 
the U.S. was indeed born out of the destruction of Native peoples.28 Although such 
caricatures of noble savagery helped to galvanize northern support against removal, as 
Apess prepared his Eulogy the Treaty of New Echota had been signed, while the 
Mashpees were still struggling to eject their intractably pious minister Phineas Fish.29 If, 
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in Bernd Peyer's words, such works had “already begun to salvage Metacom's 'character' 
from the malignant stereotypes created by Increase Mather's and William Hubbard's 
biased seventeenth-century accounts,” the Eulogy implies that this salvaging retained a 
fidelity to the modes of knowledge production at the core of the region's settler 
colonialism (160). One can suggest that the Eulogy fervently attempts to name this failure 
that resisted naming, drawing on Philip's characterization as a noble Indian warrior so as 
to historicize settler colonialism in New England and therein break with a linear 
historicity that consigned both Anglo malfeasance and Native sovereignty to the distant 
past.  
 In drafting the Eulogy after working with the Mashpee and developing a 
reputation as a compelling orator, Apess likely recognized that the narrativity of Indian 
character organized around King Philip conditioned political sympathy for Native 
peoples, for better and for worse. Though honoring the fallen Wampanoag leader 
provides the text's rhetorical purpose, Apess's project more precisely aims to “bring 
before you beings made by the God of Nature” (277). However, the intent seems less to 
demonstrate the inaccuracy of the stereotype as it applies to actual Native groups than to 
mobilize the tension between savagery and noble Indian character to throw into relief 
what appears as a genealogy of systemic cruelty and violence toward otherwise peaceful 
Native communities. To promote “Justice and humanity for the remaining few” of 
Philip's “grateful descendants,” Apess emphasizes in opening, is the purpose of one “who 
proudly tells you the blood of a denominated savage runs in his veins” (Apess 277). 
Rather than merely catering to a general interest in Indian affairs and supplementing 
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Indian and/or colonial history, Apess suggests that Philip serves as a means to an end, a 
vehicle for reframing Native politics in the present by drawing on the recent shift away 
from heathen savagery and toward noble Indian character in the early-antebellum era, a 
shift that, as Jean O' Brien and Steven Conn have shown in different ways, can be 
understood as integral to an emergent historical consciousness in New England. 
 However, although noble Indian character and the heathen savage map onto 
different political positions regarding an antebellum "Indian question," one more or less 
organized around the Cherokee Nation's highly publicized struggles, within the frame of 
New England Anglo presence they nevertheless enact the same settler historicity, 
predicated on the narrativity of inevitable and primordial Indian decline, that constituted 
a fundamental component of settler colonialism in the region. Accordingly, making this 
historicity appear less obligates Apess to identify as Indian, construed as a "real" identity-
formation suppressed by a racist discourse, than steers him to emphasize both the 
magnanimity of Philip's character, on the one hand, and its irreducibility to frames of 
history organized around settler domesticity, couplehood, and their ostensibly axiomatic 
relationship to modernity and, in turn, to political sovereignty, on the other. He adds of 
these "beings" that, while their "purer virtues remain untold...[ and the] noble traits that 
marked the wild man's course lie buried in the shades of night," yet for "those few 
remaining descendants" who stand as "the monument of the cruelty of those who came to 
improve our race and correct our errors" the memory of the Wampanoag leader lives on: 
"even such is the immortal Philip...held in memory by the degraded but yet grateful 
descendants who appreciate his character; so will every patriot, especially in this 
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enlightened age, respect the rude...son of the forest...Where, then, shall we place the hero 
of the wilderness?" (Apess 277). What is crucial from the outset is less the Native leader's 
greatness than that this greatness is remembered by his "degraded" descendants. In 
Derrida's terms, raising the specter of Philip gestures to an even more spectral presence in 
the form of a Native audience that occupies two positions: that of reservation peoples 
who stand as witnesses to a history of dispossession and genocide (a spectral double of 
Apess's actual audience) and that of the impossible remainder of a supposedly long 
eclipsed Indigenous peoplehood. By eulogizing Philip, Apess recodes a trace of New 
England Indianness that usually signifies an ever-receding past and, as such, demarcates 
the break of (settler) modernity instead as a diachronic cut across historical epochs, such 
that the destruction typically consigned to a distant past through the discourse of Indian 
character registers instead as alive in the present by way of the genealogical formation 
this figure makes possible. 
 Apess's strategy can therefore be seen as de-centering the symbolic value attached 
to Philip within his own eulogy so as to historicize indigeneity, to give discursive form to 
New England Native dispossession and survivance. While Apess draws on the discourse 
of noble Indian character in opening up the possibility of eulogizing Philip before a 
settler public, he quickly doubles back and questions the implicit spatio-temporal 
structure of such an event, within which a cohesive community remembers and mourns 
one who has passed. Placing Philip, a phrase that suggests both geographic and historical 
placement as much as a reassessment of the perceived limitations of Indian character 
more generally, here involves re-aligning the audience with those "descendants" who 
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already hold the correct estimation but who are not among those gathered. To place 
Philip means to see him with Native peoples, as Natives see him; Apess asks his audience 
to view history from the angle of the still “burning elements of the uncivilized world” 
(277). Eulogizing a Native leader whom he describes as “the greatest man that ever lived 
upon the American shores” provides the occasion to present a genealogy that, while it 
cannot but appear “buried” from the angle of the foreclosure enacted through renditions 
of Philip's historical importance, pathos, etc., nonetheless turns out to be not quite 
eclipsed (Apess 290). Far from manifesting an ontogenetic rule of decay, Natives emerge 
as those in whom the “God of Nature...has planted sympathies that shall live forever in 
the memory of the world” (Apess 277). As Eric Wolfe suggests, Apess positions Philip in 
direct contrast to “Logan's 'apocalyptic history, in which no one remains to mourn”; to 
the contrary, “for Apess the relationship to loss signifies the continuity of communal 
traditions” (16). The paradox, however, is that narrative portraits of the Wampanoag 
leader provided the archetypal example of a prelapsarian and virtuous Indian character 
and, as such, endowed the ur narrative of settlement's break from an Indian past with 
truth-value.  
 Apess aims to foreground the tension that manifests around Philip's 
representativity, I would argue, so as to make visible the gap between Indianness and 
indigeneity. As we have seen with both Hope Leslie and Hobomok, representing Indian 
character in terms of an inevitably past-tense ethics of Nature forecloses indigeneity as a 
viable position from which to resist dispossession. Since Indianness (the Indian) is 
effectively out of joint with the normativity and hence the temporality of settler 
 185 
modernity in New England, precisely because it functions to produce this notion of 
disjunction, actual Native polities lack the rhetorical and epistemic space from which to 
claim self-determination and sovereignty. In a way, Apess repurposes what might be 
taken as the presumed object of the discourse: honoring Philip's character by 
remembering his history creates a frame through which Native "beings," not Indians, 
come into view precisely as paradoxical and opaque figures. Crucially, Native peoples 
here remain unknown to his audience. Apess defamiliarizes the dominant discourse of 
Indian character by suggesting that the ongoing conditions of Native dispossession 
remains yet “buried in the shades of night," which is to say beyond the “light” of settler 
history and modernity, and in turn beyond settler juridical and territorial claims to place 
(277). Liminality here is less a cultural condition to be overcome than a trope that begins 
to render a seemingly totalizing New England historicity as not-All.  
 The key to this shift is his discussion of the motivation for eulogizing Philip. By 
foregrounding the question of why Apess is doing what he is doing, the text extends the 
symbolic value associated with noble Indianness to sustain what Wolfe describes as a 
counter-narrative of indigenous survivance. Philip's popularity provides the occasion to 
render the positive traits associated with his character as a frame to throw into relief the 
violence of settlers toward Natives. Before anything like a historical record of Philip's 
actions emerges, Apess's audience is met with a heretofore invisible “monument of the 
cruelty of those who came to improve our race and correct our errors,” a kind of 
epistemic stain in historiography and nature alike that, read by way of the glory of Philip, 
marks the suffering and betrayal experienced by Native peoples as ongoing conditions of 
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colonialism (277). Insofar as Philip is not only a known historical figure but already 
laden with pathos given his defiance in the name of liberty, his nobility (its symbolic 
currency) creates the rhetorical space to reverse the framing of Indigenous peoples on 
reservations in New England as declining. Apess asks the audience not only to view the 
famed Indian leader, but to do so from the vantage of Natives (as “natural beings”) who 
not only also remember him, but, more importantly, who are there to remember him 
despite centuries of what reads as systemic projects of cruelty toward New England 
Native peoples.  
 In like Hobomok and Hope Leslie, a binary Indian-Anglo narrativity displaces the 
relation between the violence of warfare and territorial claims through the reader's 
implicit identification with a hopelessly idealized Indianness. Indian character is altruistic 
and natural, and as such it is capable of representing an egalitarian impulse away from the 
tyranny of Old World hierarchy and thereby purifying the notion of civilization, as it 
were. By contrast, marking the occasion to eulogize Philip excavates, renders 
immediately present, some sense of this otherwise obscured and/or effaced relationship in 
the form of settlers' failure to live and act by their own supposedly universal principles of 
humility and goodwill, traits that, though stereotypically Christian, nevertheless were 
increasingly associated with "the Indian." Speaking of settlers as Christians, Apess writes 
that if “they were like my people, professing no purity at all, then their crimes would not 
appear to have such magnitude. But while they appear to be...more virtuous, their crimes 
still blacken” (300). Apess undoubtedly would have understood that he was transposing a 
certain enlightened understanding of the applicability of Christian virtue onto the more 
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traditional historiographic representation of Native peoples as savages within the 
Protestant theological constellations characterizing early America. By so doing, however, 
Apess not only extends the modern break with a Puritannical representation of the Indian-
as-heathen-Other, but he also inverts the framing of exceptional Indian character within 
the historical fiction of his day, using Philip's virtue to portray the crimes against Native 
peoples, and therein sovereign Native peoplehood as a concept in itself, as far from 
relegated to the distant past. 
 From a slightly different angle, Apess's path to the main idea, namely to lay bare 
how those “in the wisdom of their civilized legislation, think it no crime to wreak their 
vengeance upon whole nations and communities,” can be conceived as preparing the 
ground for an act of symbolic violence against the linear historicity (framed through 
primordial Indian virtue) that forecloses Native self-determination (278). Backing into 
the continuity of violence toward Native peoples in New England perhaps appeared the 
only course he could take. Simply appealing to the rights of Indian peoples outright 
would seem to fail insofar as Indianness is the very formation whereby New England 
Native peoples appear as residual, waning versions of their former selves. However, by 
orienting the audience to the possibility of a different perspective of Philip taken by his 
“degraded” heirs, Apess theorizes the destruction of Native peoples often dramatized by 
way of hyperbolic figurations of primordial Indian virtue instead as a historical 
continuity. He states that he expects that “every patriot” will similarly come to “respect 
the rude yet all-accomplished son of the forest, that died a martyr to his cause,” and 
further that such respect should “melt the prejudice of those who are in possession of his 
 188 
soil, and only by right of conquest” (277). The text therein presupposes what New 
England historiography precludes at the level of accepted/acceptable historical 
knowledge, namely that Natives remain dispossessed of their lands. Werner Sollors 
writes that the plethora of noble Indian chieftains portrayed in literature and on the stage 
had become “pseudo ancestors” by “sacralizing new forms of postrevolutionary 
citizenship based on the doctrine of consent” as they cursed the rapacious white settlers 
closing in on them (129). Here, that injustice does not dissipate through settlers' adaption 
of natural, supposedly Indian norms over against old-world tyranny. Rather, it extends 
into the present insofar as the sons of the forest, a phrase the Boston audiences likely 
would have associated with Apess given his autobiography a few years earlier, embody 
the dispossession of Philip's “soil,” which in turn, renders precedents like the doctrines of 
discovery and conquest as decidedly unnatural legitimations of settler claims and the 
violence enacted to secure them.  
 In this way, by writing in the frame of noble Indian character, eulogizing Philip 
can be thought of as resignifying notions of “nature,” already bound up with his symbolic 
value as a key figure in revisions of colonial historiography, instead as indices of Native 
landedness (290). Apess draws on his ethos as a Methodist minister to reconfigure a 
conventional encoding of nature as an imaginary zone that exceeds settlement but 
remains nonetheless oriented to it in terms of the counter-hegemonic relations that find 
articulation there. Before launching into the catalog of settler depredations making up the 
bulk of the text, Apess observes how “inhuman it was in those wretches, to come into a 
country where nature shown in beauty, spreading her wings over the vast continent, 
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sheltering beneath her shades those natural sons of an Almighty Being...whose virtues far 
surpassed their more enlightened foes” and “work to enslave a free people”; to enact such 
a project “and call it religion...outstrips the revelation of God's word...thou pretended[,] 
hypocritical Christian, whoever thou art” (Apess 279). Nature here signifies so many 
different things that it nearly unravels. It denotes a quality of the country prior to 
European discovery, a metaphysical extension of the land that amounts to a form of 
agency (“sheltering” Native peoples), a quality of Natives themselves attesting to their 
unique genealogy, and, within the latter, a concept that allows Christian monotheism to 
appear as a transcendent, universal epistemology, even an ontology. Yet the charge of 
false religion at the end retroactively consolidates these competing dynamics as merely 
different facets of a prior presence. Describing settlers as working to “enslave a free 
people” under the banner of Christian civilization represents a violence that otherwise 
appears long eclipsed, reducible to a primordial event like the Pequot war, or King 
Philip's war, etc., instead as constitutive of the historical project of Anglo settlement. 
 Using the term slavery in this passage short-circuits the sense that violence toward 
Natives is a thing of the past, and Apess likely meant to appeal directly to abolitionist 
sentiments in the crowd.30 However, a critique of emergent racialism is prevalent not 
only in the Eulogy but throughout his work, especially in his autobiography and the 
vitriolic essay “An Indian's Looking-Glass for the White Man.” Barry O' Connell argues 
it is possible to read the Eulogy as appropriating the “patriotic language of the dominant 
culture and switching its referents” in these moments so as to disclose the “almost 
seamless ideology of a racist republicanism that cloaked itself in universalistic language” 
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(lxxiv). Cheryl Walker also notes that Apess's “use of mirroring” subverts the “terms of 
national discourse” and thereby exposes “its racist exclusionism” (172). The promise of 
equal rights had not borne out in history, and by foregrounding race Apess would have 
communicated to the perceptive in his audience the limitations in even progressive Whig 
politics. More broadly, Philip Gura suggests that the incendiary revision of history Apess 
offers in the Eulogy, exposing the anti-Indianism of colonial historiography, serves 
mainly to give “the lie to the white attempt to write this warrior” and by proxy all Natives 
“into oblivion” (111).  Apess aimed to show that his people were “no more...'savage' than 
white men [and] King Philip was not a 'beast,'” realizing that as long as “contemporaries 
refused, as the Puritans had..., to acknowledge their common humanity with people of 
color, tragedies like that of King Philip's War, then being replicated in Florida” with US 
attempts to remove the Seminole “would continue” (137-8).  
 While there is no doubt that Apess felt solidarity with the effects of settler 
colonialism everywhere, the so-called Mashpee revolt just three years earlier likely 
shaped this identification. During this episode, Apess helped the Mashpee to hold their 
state-appointed guardian to account for decades of persistent malfeasance; he was 
adopted into the tribe prior to championing them and afterwards published an extensive 
account of these events in his infamous Indian Nullification. Following Maureen Konkle, 
one should be wary of overemphasizing the text's racial dynamics at the expense of 
diminishing the role of historiography in licensing land theft. As she points out, for 
Apess, the “providential 'extinction' of Indians...is not providential at all, but rather the 
result of whites' desire for Indian land,” what they tell themselves to justify taking it, and 
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finally “the dissemination of that knowledge to the point where it becomes...widely 
accepted” (Konkle 142). Regarding the tendency to read the Eulogy through the critical 
lens of race relations, however, I would suggest narratives of “vanishing” less impede a 
recognition of Natives' common humanity than Indianness, as a cypher for primordial and 
bygone virtue, configures antebellum political and cultural discourses (historiography and 
literature) in New England in such a way that undermines extant Native communities' 
capacity to navigate the politics of reservation systems. While one can read the text as 
disclosing a racism rooted in history that still plagues the settler body politic, the Eulogy 
more fundamentally intervenes in the linear historicity whereby settler modernity 
emerges out of (the mythos of) an introjected Indian exceptionalism.  
 As the opening recalibration of Indian “nature” demonstrates, the extra-political 
configuration of Philip's virtue provides the frame through which to present New England 
Native communities as noble, but not vanishing. Asking “Who is Phillip?” problematizes 
his typical framing as a pseudo-ancestor for a progressive settler public. Apess notes that 
Philip was a descendent of Massasoit, the Wampanoag leader who allied with Plymouth 
colony, one known for “peace and benevolence toward all men” (Apess 277). However, 
Massasoit's ethical character shows less in the simple fact of his allegiance than in the 
manner in which he bore settlers' insults to his goodwill. His reputation is validated by 
the historical record, which shows he countenanced with a “patience and resignation” that 
would “do justice to any Christian nation” a litany of “injuries upon injuries...robberies 
and barbarous deeds of death...committed by the American Pilgrims” (Apess 277). While 
the text presents Indian virtue as characteristic of all Native peoples, and in turn implies 
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that settlers consistently fail to live by the ethical principles, the subtle effect here is to 
draw on the genealogical trope made possible through the discourse of Indian character to 
not only to render visible crimes against Indians, but to portray such crimes as indeed 
crimes against committed against sovereign Native peoples. By extending Philip's ethos 
as one who resisted unjust settler incursions onto other Native peoples, Apess 
foregrounds a continuity of settler depredations that otherwise signal the unremarkable 
background of New England history and, by so doing, creates the space to represent 
Native peoplehood as exceeding the juridical purview of Anglo settlement. 
 The text accomplishes this shift by crucially extending the crimes against the 
Wampanoag outward, connecting them to key scenes of atrocities also committed by 
English emigrants against Abenaki, Massachusett, and other peoples as well. This 
differentiation cuts against the narrative tendency to conflate any and all crimes against 
Native peoples as against a single Indian people or tribe, a configuration that enables 
such violence to be consolidated and deflected as a single, spectacular event that 
happened long ago. In this way, Apess's (mis)placement of Philip defamiliarizes the same 
archival knowledge of New England history that Sedgwick, Child, and a host of other 
non-Natives had already drawn on in bringing colonial history to life for settler 
audiences. The audience learns of Edward Harlow’s (though O' Connell notes that Apess 
likely confused Harlow with Thomas Hunt) capturing of 29 Natives likely associated 
with Massasoit and his unsuccessful attempt to sell them in Spain in 1614 (Apess 279). 
He follows the description of this passage by describing a Massachusett woman “nearly 
one hundred years of age” who complained to “the Pilgrims” in 1622 that a Captain Hunt 
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had recently captured three of her children, only to receive “a few brass trinkets” in return 
(Apess 280). The text drives home the cruelty underlying this episode by drawing on 
racial discourse to bring the injustice to the fore. “O white woman!” he writes, “What 
would you think if some foreign nation...should come and carry away from you three 
lovely children” only to be met with what amounts to excusing the perpetrator of such an 
act: “'Sirs, where are my little ones?'...'It was passion, great passion.'...Should you not 
think they were beings made more like rocks than men?'” (Apess 280 sic). Those who 
committed such atrocities register as unfeeling, even inhuman, which in turn sheds light 
on the degree to which biased historiographers have unjustly inflected the historical 
record. However, while the text utilizes racial discourse to establish a comparative frame 
by which simultaneously to approach and to assess a history of injustice toward New 
England Natives, the vehicle for representing Indianness as a “race” in this passage is an 
appeal to normative domesticity, in particular the appeal to the bond between the mother 
and child presumed as an axiomatic and effectively timeless moral structure.  
 Such tropes of normative family formation surface in the Eulogy precisely insofar 
as they were integral to New England historicity, as evidenced by both Hobomok and 
Hope Leslie. However, if these tropes render an Indian authenticity that de facto 
legitimizes settler control of Native space by positing reservation communities as 
illegitimate with regard not necessarily to settler sexual and domestic norms per se, but 
rather to the refraction of such norms through a bygone Indianness that did in fact 
manifest such qualities, then the mediation of Indian character can be thought as 
affording a strategic reversal of such normativity. The discourse of noble, natural Indian 
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character entails an embedded notion of settler normativity, yet the discursivity of this 
character, its essentially generic quality, nonetheless renders settler normativity available 
to Apess to challenge the foreclosure of Native landedness and self-determination. This 
challenge, I would argue, coheres in the multiplication of settler depredations that the text 
reveals after mobilizing such normativity as an overarching framework. In this section, 
the text moves quickly through a catalog of abuses toward New England Natives in the 
first few decades of Anglo settlement (Miles Standish's preemptive strike on 
Wituwament's Massachusett group, Chicataubut's tragic response to the robbing of his 
mother's grave, the slaughter of a group of Wampanoags by Captain Thomas Dermer, 
Plymouth protecting Squanto despite his intention to murder Massasoit). The reference to 
the motherly sentiments of white women is situated as a universal appeal to sympathy, 
and it primes the audience to read this list as indicating settlers' failure to reciprocate the 
hospitable treatment they received from different Native groups, a point he reinforces in 
this section by constantly referring to the relative weakness of settlement as compared 
with far more established Native peoples. The kidnapping occurred around the same time, 
1622, when Plymouth and Weston settlers were in dire straits and Natives responded by 
giving them supplies. “Had it not been for this humane act of the Indians,” he observes, 
“every white man would have been swept from the colonies”; in the face of such 
atrocities, Massasoit and later Philip can only be said to have “exercised more Christian 
forbearance than any of the governors of that age or since. It might be said he was a 
pattern for the Christians themselves” (Apess 280, 283). Evoking the Christ-like qualities 
of King Philip was not necessarily provocative or even uncommon, as Christian typology 
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contributed to the narrative configuration of vanishing Indian nobility.31 What is unusual, 
though, is Apess's allusion to such qualities to throw into relief the failure of settlers to 
abide by their own teachings. 
 In this way, the text utilizes the symbolic value associated with noble Indian 
character to throw into relief “civilization” as a cover for land theft and genocide. Apess 
clearly intends to convey an image of white savagery, suggesting that such behavior is 
mystified by historiographers like that of the “eminent divine” Increase Mather, for 
whom the caricature of Natives as hell-spawn created to test the faith and commitment of 
Christian settlers serves as a methodological principle. However, the text works to 
connect this mystification to the predominant tropes of Native vanishing, showing the 
latter as similarly effacing the conditions of contemporary Natives. Apess notes that if 
New England historiographers observe that Indigenous peoples in the seventeenth 
century were “large and respectable,” then the fact that settler duplicity and violence 
appears as a constitutive feature of New England settlement suggests that they have been 
“destroyed” not by “fair means” but instead by “hypocritical proceedings, by being duped 
and flattered...We might suppose that meek Christians had better gods and weapons than 
cannon” (285). If Natives are not creatures of Satan, they did not simply vanish. And if 
they did not vanish, as Apess attests by framing himself as a “denominated savage,” then 
their “destruction” registers as an ongoing project. As he writes, “although the Gospel is 
said to be glad tidings to all people, yet we poor Indians never have found those who 
brought it as messengers of mercy...therefore...the 22nd of December and the 4th of July 
are days of mourning and not of joy” (Apess 286). Retroactively casting the founding of 
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Plymouth colony in December of 1620 as the beginning of a history of violence and theft 
from the perspective of Native peoples frames the birth of the United States as, far from 
realizing an enlightened commitment to liberty for all, an extension of such violence 
construed as an originary project of settlement.  
 Crucially, though, foregrounding the character of Massassoit, Philip, and all New 
England Natives by proxy as models of “Christian forbearance” does not challenge 
British and later US claims to land outright. Refusing a linear arrangement that begins 
with the Puritans and ends with various forms of colonialism of his own day, Apess 
instead goes for a rapid-fire pace marked by juxtaposing scenes of Puritan misdeeds with 
allusions to contemporary political situations involving Natives, like the Cherokees, and 
direct appeals to his audience to consider such depredations from Native peoples' views. 
Read against the direct reference to the doctrine of conquest, the multiple temporal 
frames comprising Apess's narrative design undermine the primacy of settler claims to 
territory, positing the presupposition of an axiomatic Native land-based sovereignty 
within a discourse otherwise predicated on the narrative foreclosure of such a concept. He 
writes that “I appeal to you, who value your friends and affectionate mothers, if you 
would have [them] robbed...without calling to account those who did it," pointedly 
adding that should another “nation...come to these regions and begin to rob and plunder 
all that came in their way, would not the orators of the day be called to address the people 
and arouse them to war for such insults?” (282). Depicting the abuses suffered by Natives 
across history by supposed Christians as analogous to the destruction of idealized bonds 
comprising settler domesticity generates a sense of moral outrage, one that the temporal 
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discordance characterizing the narrative design moves toward an impression of Native 
nationhood as irreducible to settler historicity precisely insofar as it emerges as rooted in 
the “common property” of the land itself (282).  
 From this view, we can situate one of the crucial functions of Apess's praise for 
Philip. The text repeatedly insists that the Wampanoag leader was not only “the greatest 
man that ever lived upon the American shores,” but more pointedly one whose greatness 
consisted partly in prophecy and partly in something akin to a natural impulse toward 
ethical behavior, an innate drive to do good even by those who he knew would wrong 
him and his people, and both elements here clearly partake of the dominant discourse on 
Indian nobility. In Apess's words, Philip “knew there was great responsibility resting 
upon himself and country, that it was likely to be ruined by those rude intruders around 
him, though he appears friendly and is willing to sell them lands for almost nothing” 
(Apess 290). An authenticating sign of Philip's "natural" ethics is their constancy, but 
what remains constant is his sense of obligation to his people and country, which 
manifests as a resistance to settler encroachments subsumed by a more general 
willingness to negotiate. The text stresses that Benjamin Church could not bring down the 
Wampanoag leader except through “treachery,” by turning his own people against him; 
that “it was not the Pilgrims that conquered him [but] Indians” in the end; and that “no 
one in history can accuse Philip of being cruel to his conquered foes” (306). In these 
moments, Apess inverts the ubiquitous image of Philip as hopelessly surrounded, 
defiantly grieving a destiny he cannot avert, stressing instead the role of land cessions 
and broken treaties in the conflict. By doing so, the text utilizes Philip's last stand, so to 
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speak, to embed the land in question as always-already Native, not fated to become an 
Anglo nation. Foregrounding Philip's character both prior to and during the battle with 
invasive colonists positions Native land-based sovereignty as background, as already 
there at the level of the text's symbolic horizon, a condition of possibility not only for 
Philip's actions but, as such, also for the sympathy that Apess's eulogy elicited in his 
predominantly non-Native audience. 
 These moments cleave the vanishing from the noble, the savagery from the 
natural being. The text underscores the efficacy of this maneuver both by refusing to 
adapt a purely chronological narrative sequence and by presenting such noble Indian 
character as ultimately irreducible to historically significant or “exceptional” figures like 
Philip or Massasoit. The text is peppered with scenes of Native goodwill betrayed by 
prejudiced whites such as the Native man from “Kennebunk...remarkable for his good 
conduct, and who received a grant of land from the state and...did all that lay in his power 
to comfort his white neighbors, in sickness and death,” only to be forced to witness the 
death of his child alone when the tides turn; the man removes himself from the company 
of whites and heads “to join the Canadian Indians” (Apess 289).32 Further, Apess gives 
no date for this particular story. Instead, he positions it as synecdochic of a broader 
history of betrayal and dispossession of Native peoples by settler communities, a history 
whose truth-value he reinforces by describing his own experiences with anti-Indianism, 
such as being treated with suspicion by an inn-keeper who, upon learning that Apess was 
Native, “was unwilling to sleep opposite my room for fear of being murdered before 
morning” (305). Such behavior cannot but be read as diametrically opposed to the 
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hospitality of figures like Massasoit and Philip, and, as such, these scenes also gesture to 
Native peoples’ primordial rights to the “soil.” Philip's heroics thereby open onto a 
history of dispossession (and removal) that is not a function Native degeneracy but rather 
the insincerity and duplicity of Anglo “civilization.”  
 Eulogizing Philip enables a framework through which to convey self-
determination as a socio-ethical constant, a historical “norm” in itself, to a public not 
inclined to make sense of such a concept. The corollary of this move is that Native 
peoplehood emerges as a living rather than an eclipsed or bygone formation, but also one 
that remains irreducible to settler governance and jurisdiction. From this angle, 
reservations and guardians read as proof of the continuation of the foundational settler 
violence that Apess represents by way of the discourse on a primordial Indian ethics, 
rather than as necessary and/or charitable institutions designed to preserve a degraded 
race. By eulogizing King Philip, Apess refashions noble Indian character to underscore 
the sense that violence toward place-based peoplehood in New England is an ongoing, 
constitutive element of settler sociality, and he does so formally by dispensing with a 
straightforward chronological arrangement. The Eulogy moves back and forth across 
multiple historical frames, yielding a fragmented (or rhizomatic) composition that 
registers the deep continuity and cohesion of settler depredations through the consistency 
of “Indian” character in its engagement with Anglos. Native self-determination, and not 
the twinned ascendancy of settler domesticity and governance, provides the organizing 
paradigm for Apess's historiography. The text's complex narrative design corresponds 
with a drive to portray settler violence as, in Lisa Brooks's words, a single “fire 
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[spreading] across the landscape, waging destruction,” with Apess all the while taking 
care to emphasize that neither the “fire nor its creators are indigenous or natural to [this] 
landscape” (214). As Brooks further observes, Apess also discusses Puritan violence 
largely using passive voice, which enables him “to portray colonization as a force that 
seems to have a life of its own,” while reserving agency for those in the present who can 
yet learn to see such violence for what it is and work “to prove Philip's prophecy wrong” 
(214). Apess's eulogy for Philip mobilizes the discourse organized around the tragic 
Native icon to disrupt the linear historicity oriented to settlement that his character 
typically sustains, implicitly revealing this narrativity itself as a maneuver against 
sovereign Native peoples rather than a truth grounded in the seemingly empirical fact of 
Indian degeneration. 
 
      ● 
 Eric Wolfe observes that the “ultimate direction” of Apess's Eulogy for King 
Philip “is toward the future. Apess reopens a dialogue with loss, the past, and history in 
order to imagine a different relationship to and within the present. For Apess...that future 
clearly lies in the direction of a revivified Indian sovereignty” (19). Yet, what does it say 
about the possibility of imagining such a future that it takes the form of a eulogy for a 
figure already embraced by white audiences, if only as a caricature of supposedly 
authentic Indian virtue and pathos? What does it suggest about the possibility of such a 
Native futurity that the very form it takes is a reframing of what happened long ago? 
Albeit in different ways, Catherine Maria Sedgwick's Hope Leslie and Lydia Maria 
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Child's Hobomok both facilitate the ur narrative that Jean O' Brien identifies as a 
constitutive element of New England historiography, namely that settler history takes off 
from, and gains coherence against, deliberate and repeated representations of Native 
peoplehood as a thing of the past. Insofar as this narrativity draws on notions of Indian 
decline that long served to negate and displace Native claims to land, it further entrenches 
Indianness as a co-incidence, in Sara Ahmed's terms, of temporal, sexual-moral, and 
geopolitical disjunction that functions to orient land and sovereignty away from Natives 
and toward settlers and settlement. The supposedly natural ethics of primordial 
Indianness provide an imaginary link that enables settler historicity to emerge as an 
organic, ethical relationship to Native territory, the path those ethics have taken in time.  
 Reading the noble Indian character of 1820s reformist literature as an extension of 
the narrativity underlying policies such as guardianship involves rethinking the view that 
the historicism of such works mainly serves to allegorize a single antebellum “Indian 
question.” Writers such as Catherine Sedgwick and Lydia Maria Child obviously made 
use of historiography and archival materials in putting their works together. However, as 
Ahmed writes, the archives themselves “take 'form' insofar as they are intended for 
action” and if they allow “documents to dwell, then they, too, are orientation devices, 
which in gathering things around are not neutral but directive” (118). From this 
perspective, the issue is not necessarily to determine how, in what ways, such literature 
reflects a more fundamental demonization of Indians at the level of national politics or a 
project of imperialism construed as an overarching binary formation, in which US Anglos 
move against American Indians, with each of these latter groups suggesting effectively 
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real subject positions. These latter methodological orientations rely on narrative 
structures generated at the level of historical knowledge in the context of ongoing and 
essentially uneven acts of settler colonialism. 
  Rather than read the virtues associated with Indian character as problematizing 
the “Indian question” understood in relation to southeastern Native removal, one can read 
such character as extending the colonizing knowledge that, in turn, consolidates settler 
claims in New England on the basis of History. That writers such as Child and Sedgwick 
promote identification with Indianness in terms of a linear historicity oriented to Anglo 
settlement can be read as part and parcel of the very same historicity that, as Den Ouden 
shows, served to deflect the petitions and claims of New England Natives in the first 
place. Put another way, both Hobomok and Hope Leslie, albeit differently, extend an 
archival narrativity organized around Indian degeneration insofar as they presuppose a 
primordial Indian virtue existing in nature but that primarily serves to re-orient settler 
sociality and/or governance before it vanishes. From the angle of Native self-
determination, the consistent function of such narratives is to produce the sense of an 
absolute, extra-juridical break between the colonial past and the post-colonial present that 
precludes understanding New England Native peoples as legally protected polities with 
rights to land. By eulogizing King Philip, however, William Apess destabilizes a 




1 The following material comes from Evarts' 1829 pamphlet “A Brief View of the Present Relations 
between the Government and People of the United States and the Indians within Our National Limits,” 
which summarized the major points of his William Penn essays for The National Intelligencer and 
doubled as petition that supporters could mail in to Congress. After laying out the Constitutional basis 
for Native sovereignty, given the exclusive treaty-making powers of the federal government combined 
with the fact of treaties existing between Natives and the U.S., Evarts argues with respect to the recent 
1826 Creek cession, “If the territory was acquired from the Creek nation, it was manifestly the 
property of the Creek nation before it was thus acquired,” that if it was acquired by the U.S. via treaty 
then “it was because the Creeks, being a nation, could not dispose of it” any other way, and that “If it 
was acquired for the use of Georgia, it follows that Georgia had not the use of it previously” (qtd. in 
Green and Perdue 108). Clearly, it was not difficult to see through the rhetoric that (poorly) justified 
Georgia's arguments in court and its extension of police power over Cherokee territory in its borders. 
 
2 Evarts was likely aware of this history in some form. Yet, this is not his only oversight concerning 
historical recognition of Native sovereignty by the U.S. On one hand, he ignores reservation 
communities that still existed, the coerciveness of treaties like the Treaty of Hartford (1638) that tried 
to write the Pequots out of existence, and 'lapses' in the consistent recognition of Natives' rights to their 
own forms of government, like the near eighty-year period in which Connecticut's position with regard 
to Mohegan sovereignty was left disputed and indeterminate. On the other, he ignores the fact that the 
U.S. deliberately blocked the so-called Five Civilized Tribes who had sided with the British during the 
Revolutionary War from its peace negotiations, thereby effectively writing out their land claims in the 
meeting that determined territorial sovereignty and geopolitical borders that would mark the conflict's 
formal end. The intent of treaties with the Five Tribes from the post-revolutionary and early-national 
periods he frames as evidencing respect and precedent for Native sovereignty can be seen from this 
view as already undermined by a subversive drive to steal Native land. See Hoxie, This Indian 
Country, 13-43. 
 
3 Recall that the Indian Removal Act of 1830 was no landslide victory for the southern Democratic bloc; 
it barely got out of Congress, passing the House of Representatives 101-97 and the Senate 28-19 
(Heidler and Heidler 25).  
 
4 The mythos of the vanishing Indian in New England is well established, in Native studies and literary 
studies alike. See Dippie, O' Brien, Mandell's Tribe, Conn, Den Ouden, and Sollors. For more on how 
the concept of vanishing Indianness came to shape the response to removal policy, as well as a 
discussion of antebellum explanations of this concept in ways that broke with notions of racial 
determination (such as by citing the consequences of warfare for instance and/or the use of alcohol as a 
means of trade), see Dippie 32-78. 
 
5 Mandell points out that alongside racist portrayals of Natives as drunken vagrants, Democrat-leaning 
papers astonishingly also ran articles celebrating King Philip as a foremost historical example of the 
noble, vanishing Indian. One in particular observed that there “'is a kind of grandeur in the character of 
the Indian warrior which fills the mind of the beholder with admiration. We here see the man in his 
Native, untamed, undegenerate supremacy...Such was Philip, the hero of Mt. Hope'” (qtd.in Mandell 
Tribe 183).  
 
6 See Den Ouden Beyond Conquest, esp. “Dilemmas of Conquest” and “Manufacturing Colonial 
Legitimacy.” One of Den Ouden's crucial points is that not only were notions of conquest and 
extinction discursive tools by which to subordinate Native groups from the very beginning of 




survivance as a means of translating and asserting their continued peoplehood and claims to land. With 
regard to the Pequots' constant petitioning of the colonial government across the eighteenth century, 
she writes that “what was troublesome for government officials was that Pequots—impoverished and 
desperate as their circumstances were...had produced and sustained kin and community ties on their 
own terms, and in the face of a history that had demanded their annihilation. In so doing, did they not 
also perpetuate their collective rights to their reservation land?” (Den Ouden 34). 
 
7 For an extended discussion of this theoretical point, that of the gathering of forward momentum under 
the sign of Indianness construed as a bygone presence, see Rifkin Settler Common Sense, 25-31. 
 
8 In addition to Scheckel, see also Renée Bergland and Werner Sollors. Bergland for instance writes that 
although spectral images of Natives “threaten the American national project, they also nationalize 
imagination. Guilt over the dispossession of Indians and fear of their departed spirits sometimes 
function as perverse sources of pleasure and pride...because they signify a successful appropriation of 
the American spirit” (19). 
 
9 Note, for example, that in the aforementioned William Penn petition, Evarts strengthens his argument 
by adding that colonial power had always held “rights of soil and sovereignty [to be] inherent in the 
Indians, till voluntarily surrendered by them” (Evarts 106, my emphasis). An individuated Native 
subjectivity, not the tribe, legitimizes “Indian” rights to land and sovereignty. If situated in terms of the 
administration of the guardian systems and the widespread notion that Natives had been conquered 
early in colonial history, however, such rhetoric implies that contemporary peoples who lived on 
reservations in New England were not truly Indians, since if they had surrendered their land rights at 
conquest there would be no reservations. 
 
10 Den Ouden illustrates this point through a remarkable reading of the history of reservation politics and 
Native petitions in Connecticut from the seventeenth century through to the present. A particularly 
blatant example of how the narrativity of conquest/extinction services settler sovereignty occurs in the 
context of Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut (1705). Mohegan sachem Owaneco, the son of Uncas (yes, 
the Uncas, the one who allied with British colonists and led the Mohegans against the Pequots in the 
conflict of 1636-8) had petitioned Queen Anne in 1704 to force Connecticut to recognize Mohegan 
land claims and return land that had been illegally appropriated. The Queen ordered a commission to 
be formed to investigate and rule on the matter. During the proceedings, “Mohegan leaders reminded 
the Connecticut government that the historical relationship between Mohegans and colonists had been 
one of alliance, since Mohegan men had performed military service on behalf of the colony from the 
time of the Pequot massacre” (Den Ouden 92). Connecticut officials responded by rewriting the 
narrative to argue that Mohegan lands were already 'conquest lands,' arguing that, contrary to already 
established history, Uncas was in fact not a legitimate sachem, nor even a crucial ally. In fact, Uncas 
was subordinate to the Pequot sachem Sassacus all along, and only his “'disgust'” with the latter caused 
him to “'put himself in with som that followed him in service of ye English against the Pequods'”; this 
meant that since the Pequots were conquered, “all their Adherents and Subjects, whereof all the 
Moheags were a part, were [also] conquered,'” and that Uncas was only retained or tolerated beyond 
this point as a manager, having been “'made a sort of Sachem'” by Connecticut (qtd in Den Ouden 96, 
sic). Of course, the point here is that the malleability of New England narratives of history underscores 
the fundamental lack of any legitimate claim to Native space by colonial governments, even by their 
own standards. For more on Pequot and Mohegan efforts to resist further expropriations of their lands 
by foregrounding their continuity on the land, reminding settler governments of the terms of their own 
laws and treaties, and reversing the discourse of conquering and extinction by asserting their friendship 
with colonists more generally, see Den Ouden, 65-180. For more on the Mohegan's petitioning of 
Queen Anne in particular, the imperial commission's decision to uphold Mohegan land rights, and 





11 It is crucial to recognize that the Pequot War far from established settler hegemony, however. The 
Narragansetts quickly morphed from ally to enemy as they began to accuse the Mohegans of harboring 
Pequots in violation of the terms of the Treaty of Hartford, on one hand, and sought to tighten 
diplomatic relations with the powerful Mohawk of the Iroquois confederacy (rather than become 
permanently aligned with the English), on the other. Further, the constant pressure by Anglo settlers for 
more and more land for townships made whatever stability occurred between the Pequot War and King 
Philip's War (1676-8) tenuous at best. In fact, as Salisbury notes, if anything, the Mohawk, not English 
governments (even as the United Colonies), constituted the major stabilizing force in the region in the 
middle years of the seventeenth century. See Salisbury “Indians and Colonists,” 85-92 and Mandell 
King Philip's War 13-30. 
  
12 See Mandell Tribe 10-35; 70-75 and Behind 143-58, Calloway “Introduction” 4-5, Den Ouden 65-74. 
In some cases the guardians appointed by colonial governments were the very ones who kicked Natives 
off of their lands (See Den Ouden 69). Given such malfeasance, it is important to recognize that, as 
Den Ouden also observes, Natives persistently asserted their rights to land and called on governments 
to uphold their end of the bargain. The first law to codify Natives' rights to reservation lands, passed by 
the Connecticut General Assembly in 1680, was in response to complaints from Pequot leaders (along 
with representatives of Mohegan, Paugussett, and Niantic peoples) that the government had failed in its 
various agreements to protect lands previously reserved for these communities. The resulting law made 
it clear that the lands in question had been allocated “'to them and their heirs forever'” (qtd. in Den 
Ouden 24). 
 
13 Similarly, Ed White has shown that givenness to conspiracy also comprises one of the essential 
narrative traits of Indian deviation. The fear of a Pequot-led conspiracy helped to create the conditions 
for the Pequot War of 1636-8 was not fully reducible to a simple notion of Natives “being savages” he 
suggests but rather in the emerging view that the Pequots had “functionalized their purported savagery 
for strategic purposes” (E. White 441). This casting of an essential capacity for conspiracy develops 
“portability...insofar as it transfers mastery from Pequots to their imagiNative and imagined heirs, the 
Narragansetts” after the war and further still to other Native groups going forward (E. White 442). 
Given this discursive portability, wherein a shifting ethnography developed with regard to the Pequots 
yields the constant “stage upon which conspiratorial...actors perform,” the consistent motif in policy 
and historiography alike of pan-Indian conspiracy as a basis for monitoring New England Native 
groups can be thought of as firmly anchored in “this earlier moment when the Pequots, and then 
Narragansetts, are understood as transcendent Indians,” or when the “Indian” first emerges in a New 
England context as signifying a tendency toward conspiracy and sabotage (E. White 464). 
 
14 Den Ouden further notes that in this case allthough the committee ran into a problem in the large 
number of Mohegans and Narragansett men on the reservation, indicating that “kin ties expanded 
access and, potentially, rights to reservation land for a larger Native population,” such networks would 
in the decades to follow register as proof of Indian deviance and degeneration, especially as tribal rolls 
made it easier to determine heads of household and therefore which members of the community had 
legitimate title to land on the basis of pure or “royal” blood (178). For more on the emergence of 
notions of “royal” blood and the increasing use of rolls and histories as racializing tools anchored in 
normative settler genealogical formations, see Den Ouden, 176-201. 
 
15 This argument is indebted to Sara Ahmed's insight that archival materials might be understood as only 
taking “'form' insofar as they are intended for action” and further that if they allow “documents to 
dwell, then they, too, are orientation devices, which in gathering things around are not neutral but 
directive” (118). The “objectivity” of such archival materials is oriented to settlement as a condition of 
possibility, such that in appearing as source materials they lose their status as maneuvers.  
 




17 “De-Indianizing” regional Natives by framing them in terms of patrilineal genealogy can be seen as 
Ruth Herndon and Ella Sekatu observe in the emergence and proliferation of the term “mustee” to refer 
to Native children (Narragansett in particular) bound out to white households. As they write, “where 
clerks record the parentage of these 'Mustee' children, it is always the mother who is identified as 
Indian” while that of the father is not recorded, suggesting that “officials considered the child to have a 
non-Indian father” (126). As they further point out, the proliferation of such categorizations and their 
ambiguity (some individuals being recorded differently as Indian, Negro, or Mulatto over a period of 
years) had serious consequences for Native peoples' capacity to transfer land and rights to subsequent 
generations. Since Native groups were largely matrilineal, framing Native land rights in terms of 
patrilineal inheritance enabled settler governments to deny individuals claims to lands held in common; 
by “denying 'Mustee' children an 'Indian' father, officials prepared the ground to deny these children 
any rights” they might have later claimed as “descendants of Narragansett or other Native fathers 
(ibid.). 
 
18 See Luciano, 5-12. 
 
19 The more common approach is to read Hobomok's vanishing as proof of Child's ambivalence regarding 
Natives. This ambivalence would not have been limited to Child, but rather a staple of antebellum 
thinking on Native rights given the nascent debate over civilization policy. Daniel Mandell writes that 
despite Child's condemnation of Puritan fathers, the novel's “ending reflect[s] a common prescription 
of how to civilize Indians, and the more general Whig willingness to consider racial intermarriage as 
the best means for their survival” (Tribe 179). Karcher also points out that Child's first novel 
synthesizes the roots of many of the political positions that she would develop more fully throughout 
her life: “Hobomok uncannily predicts Child's career as a reformer and anticipates many of the causes 
she would espouse: justice for Indians; protest against antimiscegenation laws and other forms of racial 
discrimination; women's rights; religious toleration” and by casting racial intermarriage in a positive 
light shows “a paradigm for race-relations that differ[s] radically from James Fenimore Cooper's” 
(Ibid.). From this perspective however, supporting Native rights  appears fully compatible with a social 
philosophy predicated on equality under the law and, as such, not exactly incompatible with settler 
governance. Laura Mielke implies that the Native husband's vanishing amounts to an ethically 
questionable conclusion. Despite emphasizing the capacity for Indian-white relations predicated on 
reciprocal feelings, the novel nonetheless fragments such a union and leaves Hobomok as a belated, 
largely “symbolic presence” correlating with the “willed physical absence” of Natives from 
contemporary society (Moving 18-19). Finally, Joshua David Bellin points out that, despite her 
reformist views, Child's belief in the radical inclusivity of Christianity, as articulated in her later 
research on world religions that culminated in her call for an 'Eclectic Church,' leaves no place for 
Native religious views, an absence that more or less indicates that Child failed to see such beliefs as 
indicative of a modern and autonomous culture. He writes that, for Child, although “Christianity 
rebukes its own insularity and intolerance [in] owing its existence and vitality to spiritual diversity,” 
which is in turn measured in its capacity to accrete“'forms of holy aspiration from all ages and 
nations,'” at the very same time her work shows a persistent “failure to see Indians in the tapestry of 
spiritual diversity” (Bellin 88). To corroborate his point, Bellin pointedly observes that she evades 
Indian religions even in her last work, Aspirations of the World (1878), despite that such literature was 
“widely available (if not reliable) by this time” (ibid.). 
 
20 In a broader sense, the opening shows that the novel conforms with the notion that efforts to historicize 
Anglo civilization in the early-nineteenth century both reinforced and reflected a more general anxiety 
over what appeared as the cyclical pattern of the rise and fall of empires. Such an understanding 
implied that the U.S. was not exempt from the cunning of history, and historians compensated for this 
pattern by gradually shifting the “cyclical” aspect of history onto “the people progress was displacing” 
by framing them as genealogically given to regression (Conn 32). Natives were thus increasingly 
narrated as a priori differentiated from “the chronologically marked time [that alone] measured the 
history of Euro-Americans” (ibid.). Both cause and effect, Natives' transformation into “a people with a 
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past, but without a history” disciplined "proper" history as a linear, Anglo-oriented narrative of 
constant progress, a doubly-silencing affair insofar as sealing Natives away in this way also implied 
they could not “function as their own historians” (Conn 21). 
 
21   I borrow the term reprosexual from Dana Luciano. See Sexual 9-12. 
 
22 See Salisbury, Manitou 42-4; 135-8. 
 
23 Salisbury, Manitou 118-20. 
 
24 Child appears to combine elements of two distinct episodes, however: Hobomok's kidnapping and 
escape from the Narragansett-Wampanoag faction led by Corbitant, after which he warned Plymouth, 
in 1621; and his participation in a later attack on Massachusett peoples by Plymouth colonists at the 
request of the failed colony at Weston (Wessagusset) in 1623. The latter is the only armed conflict in 
which Hobomok is known to have participated alongside English settlers. Further, Salisbury points out 
that Plymouth was not initially inclined to assist the settlers at Wessagusset. In addition to adding 
competition for limited corn supplies from the surrounding Native communities, the non-Separatist 
founder Thomas Weston was a London merchant with an eye toward expanding northward; despite the 
fact that he had also helped to finance Plymouth, the latter saw him as competition. Furthermore, the 
Weston settlers disrupted diplomatic relations by stealing corn from the Massachusett, who in turn 
aligned other Native groups against trading with the newcomers (125). With corn supplies diminished 
and Natives no longer open to helping them, the former went to Plymouth and asked for a military 
intervention. Plymouth only agreed  after learning from Massasoit of a potential uprising led by the 
female Massachusett sachem Wituwamet (not the male Wampanoag Corbitant) was in the works, as 
she had been seeking a broader coalition against the English, likely due to the Westoners stealing corn. 
During the attack, Standish's small group killed seven Natives and thus terminated the overblown threat 
of conspiracy while intimidating the smaller Native communities in the surrounding area. Here, 
however, the scene basically serves to write Corbitant out of the novel through his capture. See 
Salisbury Manitou 125-35.  
 
25 See Mandell King Philip's War 5-31, Salisbury, Manitou 110-140, and Vaughan 75-82. Salisbury 
points out that according to Phineas Pratt's 1662 history of the first generation of English settlers, 
Hobomok sought refuge from his own people among the Plymouth colonists (Salisbury Manitou 271 
n.13). 
 
26   See Karcher "Introduction" xv-xvii and Shreve for different representations of this general approach.     
      While my argument builds from Shreve's point that the novel "struggles to produce a vision capable of     
accommodating the entire spectrum of religious diversity in the United States without sacrificing the 
particularity of historical faiths," I contend that a discourse of Indian character that amounts to an 
antebellum extension of longstanding narratives of Indian decline integral to the maintenance of New 
England reservation systems is the narrative condition of possibility both for imagining and articulating 
such a vision (659). Accordingly, I am decidedly at odds with the claim that evidence of Child 
"actively wrestling" with the "complex legacy of the systematic exclusion, massacre, and 
disinheritance of Indians by European settlers" is the novel's positioning of "Indian religion...as a 
distinct and felt presence in the religious landscape, consisting of a pliable polytheism, an intricate 
ritualism, and a primary sense of wonder and awe produced through the observation of nature" (Shreve 
667-8). 
 
27   See Karcher, "Introduction: The Indian Question." 
 





29 Harvard-appointed minister Phineas Fish hung around for 6 years beyond the Mashpee Act of 1834, 
which organized the reservation as a township with the people holding rights to self-governance, 
finally leaving (though involuntarily, by force) in 1840. The Mashpee would remain an 'Indian district' 
until 1870, when the state incorporated the district as a town and divided the land into parcels for sale. 
For more on Apess's efforts in the so-called “Mashpee revolt,” see his Indian Nullification, See also 
Brooks, 186-197, Campisi, 106-117, O' Connell, xxxv-xxxviii, and Konkle, 132-4. 
 
30 Apess had long had connections with important abolitionists in Boston. He first moved to the city in 
1831, shortly after David Walker published his Appeal ...to the Coloured Citizens of the World (1829) 
and found a natural audience for his provocative brand of Methodism. With roots going back to the 
postrevolutionary era, the Methodist and Baptist networks created by working class African American 
communities were well established and had an impact on the nascent Whig platform. Apess's preaching 
in these circles appears to have earned him a reputation very quickly. He was mentioned by Samuel 
Drake in his popular Indian Biography (1832) before being invited to speak in April of the same year 
with Edward Everett and the Cherokee activist Elias Boudinot in opposition to removal at the Federal 
Street Church, a venue made prominent by William Ellery Channing, who in addition to being an 
integral figure in the antislavery community was a highly influential Unitarian minister at the time. 
Apess's appearance here apparently went over well, leading William Lloyd Garrison to mention him 
shortly afterwards in the Liberator. See Gura, 57-67. 
 
31 See Sollors for a reading of the influence of Christian typology on tropes of Indianness in the 
antebellum U.S.  
 
32 However, while recounting these forgotten episodes attests to a history in the margins, the point is of 
course less that white Whigs did not know the full story and more that these scenes of social interaction 
gesture to the possibility of cohabitation and ethical relationality beyond the dominant paradigm of 
Anglo modernity and Native degeneracy/extinction. We see this in the selectiveness of Apess's Eulogy; 
he leaves out quite a bit of historical material that would give a fuller, more accurate account of the 
complexity of colonial dispossession, including the complex economic and political alliances and 
networks that comprised the 'real' of seventeenth century geopolitics and constituted the matrix out of 
which King Philip's War was born. For more on this history see Mandell, King Philip's War 5-59 and 
Salisbury, “Indians."  
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CHAPTER IV  
 
REALIZING NATIVE DISPOSSESSION IN THE OLD NORTHWEST: 
FRONTIER HISTORICITY, TERRITORY, AND INDIAN WITHDRAWAL 
IN KIRKLAND AND BLACK HAWK 
 
 In February of 1803, just months before the hastily-conducted Louisiana Purchase 
gave the U.S.  rights to nearly 828,000 square miles of land across the Mississippi river, 
Thomas Jefferson wrote a letter to then-governor of Indiana territory William Henry 
Harrison concerning Native lands in the vast region known as the Old Northwest. Given 
that the correspondence was "unofficial and private," Jefferson sought to acquaint 
Harrison with "a more extensive view of our [Indian] policy...[so] that you may the better 
comprehend the parts dealt out to you in detail through the official channel" (1118-9). 
The unofficial agenda involved using government-sponsored trading houses, per the 
Trade and Intercourse Acts, to "promote [a] disposition to exchange lands" by running 
the "good and influential among them" into debt, as when debt rises "beyond what the 
individuals can pay, they become willing to lop them off by a cession of lands" (1118). 
Where an earlier civilization policy sought to leverage trade and shift Native norms en 
masse, thereby undermining the attachment to lands over time, Jefferson's vision 
transforms that deception into outright economic coercion. "In this way," he affirms, "our 
settlements will gradually circumscribe...the Indians" and force them either to assimilate 
as U.S. citizens "or [to] remove beyond the Mississippi," adding that "in the whole course 
of this, it is essential to cultivate their love" (ibid.). The president ends by insisting that   
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what has been shared in this communication would "be improper to be understood by the 
Indians," ostensibly since it might have jeopardized the coercive expropriation of lands 
(1120).1   
 Since distributing items of husbandry here provides the means to acquire Native 
territory through predatory lending, the text could be interpreted as merely revealing the 
hidden logic of an Indian policy grounded in ideas of civilization and humanity. Yet, 
ending the criticism at this point would miss how discourses of Indianness prove 
thoroughly integral not only to Jefferson's policy framing, but also to the geopolitical 
space that it references. For instance, the same text later comments on a "favorable 
opening" for implementing this policy. "The Cahokias [being] extinct," Jefferson 
observes, "we are entitled to their country by our paramount sovereignty. The 
Piorias…have all been driven off…and we might claim [their lands] the same way…The 
Kaskaskias being reduced to a few families" might also entertain ceding everything but 
"as much rich land as they could cultivate…in a single fence" (1119). Imminent 
extinction, however, the Indian motif in New England, here registers as only one 
variation of a more generalized westerly disappearance. Indianness also evokes both a 
state of "being reduced," with a chance of rejuvenation on enclosed family farms, and a 
capacity for being "driven off," which presents Native polities as herd-like formations 
incapable of any meaningful collectivity. More importantly, however, Jefferson situates 
these examples differently than one might expect. Insofar as Natives in the region are 
already withdrawing, receding Indianness emerges as a constitutive feature of the 
geopolitical landscape within which his policy of cultivated indigence would take effect. 
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The territorial gestalt that otherwise appears anterior to specific policy maneuvers, then, 
itself relies on ambiguous concepts, like "paramount sovereignty," that presuppose a 
narrative image of Indians heading west, both geographically and existentially. 
 Jefferson's letter to Harrison accordingly manifests what I term frontier historicity. 
As an ur-narrative, this historicity casts overlapping conflicts among a multitude of settler 
and Indigenous actors in the region as the inevitable movement of civilization writ large. 
Literary scholarship on the frontier mythos has well established the relevance of such 
binary thinking to the intelligibility of U.S. expansion. Nonetheless, this scholarship 
tends to frame the discussion in terms either of cultural regeneration or the third space. 
Either the frontier motif primarily consolidates a distinctly American cultural imaginary, 
or it misrecognizes the role of the middle ground in settler-Native conflict(s). The latter 
paradigm supposedly offers a corrective to an older Turnerian framework. However, the 
middle ground is methodologically problematic to the degree that it poses "settler-
Indigenous conflict as an inevitable product of cultural differences and 
misunderstandings," as Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz puts it, a view that can be taken to imply 
that "violence was committed equally by the colonized and colonizer" (8).2 By contrast, 
this chapter approaches the representation of the geopolitical space in which such cultural 
contact or violence would have occurred as a colonizing maneuver through knowledge 
production. Frontier historicity might be said to involve two aspects: first, the 
representation of real and often violent dispossession of Native peoples in the region as 
an extra-political movement of "Indians" beyond settler cartographic space; and second, 
the conflation of this Indian movement beyond such space with movement out of time. 
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Taken together, this historicity renders land available to settlement insofar as it depicts 
Native peoples as fated to "recede" west. However, rather than read this historicity 
primarily as an ideological mystification of dispossession after the fact, a view that 
presupposes the settler arrangement of (and claims to) geopolitical space, I argue that the 
supposedly real and inevitable movement west by "Indians," a movement that traverses 
the spectrum of regional Indigenous polities and thereby collapses their different claims 
and geopolitical situations into a single fatedness to withdraw, is indispensable to framing 
the Old Northwest as a distinct region within which Anglo settlement appears as 
coextensive with an abstracted process of territorial organization..   
 I therefore build on Dunbar-Ortiz's criticism by arguing that, rather than a 
primarily retrospective phenomenon that rationalizes real geopolitical expansion at a 
cultural level, positing Indian withdrawal conditions the destabilization of Native space in 
advance. As Jodi Byrd argues regarding Deleuze and Guattari's theory of de-
territorialization, which she observes poses the "Indian" as a symbol of non-hierarchical 
becoming magically outside of the West's otherwise totalizing claims to truth, what "we 
imagine to be outside of and rupturing to the state…already depends upon a paradigmatic 
Indianness that arises from colonialist discourses justifying expropriation of land through 
removals and genocide" (14). The colonizing maneuver that Byrd identifies, namely 
imagining Indianness as both geographically and metaphysically "beyond" known space, 
I would argue is integral to producing the geopolitical coherence of the Old Northwest in 
the U.S. context in the first place. As Jefferson's letter shows, the reference to regional 
Native groups creates the impression of a geographic space already oriented to settler 
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governance despite lying beyond its juridical purview. In this way, the narrativity of 
Indian withdrawal defers the recognition of place-based Indigenous sovereignty, 
paradoxically, in the very form of recognizing regional Native groups. In other words, 
narrating withdrawing or receding Indianness registers a waning temporal threshold of 
geopolitical intelligibility in the region, a discursive point that implicitly casts Indigenous 
peoples as homo sacer and, in so doing, renders the visibility of their apparently 
ontological and as such inevitable hardship as an index of the region's inevitable 
orientation toward Anglo settlement in time.   
 As will be discussed below, the earliest U.S. discourse on the region, the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, posits Indian withdrawal as an inevitable historical 
outcome. Given the primacy of this document, one can suggest that the frontier space in 
which the U.S. already enjoys "paramount sovereignty" does not exist in any objective 
sense apart from the portraits of Indian withdrawal that emplot a configuration of this 
space. As Dunbar-Ortiz observes, even the academic progenitor of the frontier thesis, 
Frederick Jackson Turner, gestured to this narrativity. Turner long ago pointed out that 
the U.S. has engaged in violence toward Native groups "'from the beginning of the 
Republic,'" but that this work of the "'colonial system'" has been "'hidden under the 
phraseology of 'interstate migration' and 'territorial organization'" (Dunbar-Ortiz 8). 
Following this assertion, I argue that Jefferson's text is notable in that it shows the 
continuity of a foundational narrativity yoked to the articulation of geopolitical space as 
territory. The narrativity of Indian withdrawal produces the geopolitical conditions for 
such violence precisely in offering what appears merely as a description of the landscape 
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(Indians withdrawing either "over here" and/or "over there"). In this way, frontier 
historicity maps the space of the Old Northwest by (re)producing, through the retroactive 
symbolism of such withdrawal, a sense of the territory (and here I mean a sense of the 
very land itself) as de facto oriented to the United States.  
 From this view, popular frontier literature of the early-antebellum era reads as 
actively extending the colonization of the greater Ohio valley and beyond. This is the 
case even with a text like Caroline Kirkland's 1839 booster novel A New Home, Who'll 
Follow. Kirkland sets this work apart from more overtly romanticized frontier novels 
both by pushing in the direction of literary realism and by sharply criticizing a culture of 
speculation, fueled through predatory banking, for creating massive economic crashes 
like that of 1837. However, the text's imagining of agrarian communalism as a more 
sustainable mode of production in frontier Michigan requires narrating Indianness as a 
deteriorating and largely subaltern element. This figuration generates a historicity that 
deflects extant Indigenous claims to the region as failed and fading modes of belonging, 
thereby clearing the space for settler grass-roots collectivism, as embodied in the rise of 
the fictional town of Montacute, to register as authentic indigeneity. Charting the growth 
of Montacute displaces fraudulent, illegal, and usually violent incursions into Native 
space as constitutive of territorial "organization" by casting the Indian as an irrevocably 
alienated figure, one whose incapacity for village life evokes a sense of historical inertia, 
of lingering beyond the expiration date. By contrast, The Life of Black Hawk should be 
read against this repetition of a historicity that forecloses place-based Native sovereignty. 
In offering a scathing account of settlement's role(s) in creating and perpetuating the 
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conflict, the written translation of the Sauk war chief's life story foregrounds the uneven 
forces of dispossession and genocide, forces otherwise deflected through twin notions of 
territorial development and state formation. It does so, however, by appropriating and 
speaking through the rhetorical frame made available by the trope of Indian withdrawal. 
 Developing this thesis involves thinking the narrativity of Indian withdrawal in 
non-Native texts apart from whatever prejudice their authors may have had toward 
Natives, whether personal biases or those that might be said to characterize antebellum 
culture at large. This chapter positions violence toward place-based Native peoplehood 
west of the Mississippi and north of what would be federally designated as "Indian 
country" as structural rather than intentional, and in making this distinction I follow 
Slavoj Žižek's differentiation between subjective and objective violence. Where 
subjective violence can be understood as a willed harm performed by one social actor 
(individual or group) toward another, objective violence by contrast corresponds with the 
otherwise "smooth functioning of our economic and political systems"; objective 
violence pertains to the background that otherwise appears given in advance: it produces 
a "zero-level standard" view of reality that is necessary in order to "perceive something as 
subjectively violent" (Violence 2).3 From this view, the fact that tropes of Indian 
withdrawal misrepresent or misrecognize sovereign Native peoples matters less than the 
ways in which these portraits cast the Old Northwest as already a temporal extension of 
US jurisdiction in its representation as "territory," apart from the political enactment of 
any specific claims or treaty-processes. That said, the aim in making this distinction is 
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neither to excuse nor rationalize the role(s) played by specific actors, like Jefferson, in 
displacing Native peoples.  
 Rather, it is to argue that if, following Ned Blackhawk, violence toward place-
based Native peoplehood comprises an indispensable element of U.S. expansion, 
especially through installing "new social and racial orders" necessary for the proliferation 
of state power, such violence is not limited to the force associated with episodes of 
violent engagement over the land (9). To the contrary, an objective violence toward the 
intelligibility of place-based Native sovereignty can be theorized as thoroughly immanent 
within the region's discursive (re)production as a known space. Insofar as it is organized 
around receding Indianness, frontier historicity casts land otherwise held by sovereign 
Native groups, not as claimed by settlement per se, but as axiomatically aligned with the 
U.S. through the objective notion of territory, a notion inseparable from ongoing 
processes of settler colonialism and within which Indianness becomes a marker of the 
inevitability of processes of state formation. The chapter will therefore begin by 
exploring how this historicity enters geopolitical discourse on the region, and I argue in 
what follows that it enters as a structural deflection of Native sovereignty.  
 The U.S. inherits more than its claims to the territory from Britain. It also inherits 
a recognition of place-based Native sovereignty in the Proclamation of 1763, albeit a 
tentative one, and the forecasting of Indian withdrawal in the 1787 Ordinance can be read 
as responding to this earlier recognition. In short, U.S. plans to annex the broader region 
require addressing Native presence within a geopolitical frame, but at the same time any 
such address threatens to undermine U.S. claims to sovereignty. Reading the deflection 
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involved in the transition between these documents, however, requires foregrounding the 
actual course of U.S. expansion, which will be detailed in the next section. First, I will 
provide background information on both the economic and political realities of expansion 
and the history of conflict between settler and Native groups before moving to discuss the 
Ordinance as inaugurating a colonizing discourse at the level of knowledge-production. 
From there, I will examine how Kirkland's text incorporates the same narrativity and 
thereby normalizes U.S. juridical claims in relation to extant Indigenous sovereignty 
through embedded tropes of Indian withdrawal. Finally, I will explore how Black Hawk's 
text can be understood as intervening in the juridical and geopolitical orientation of 
Native space to the U.S. enacted in frontier historicity. Insofar as it draws on exoticized 
aspects of the war chief's celebrity, this intervention involves turning the supposed 
inevitability of Indian withdrawal back on itself. In mobilizing the frame of receding 
Indianness, Black Hawk fashions the symbolic currency afforded by his fame (and 
conditioned by the frontier motif) into a means to re-historicize the conflict itself, 
reframing Sauk dispossession as a cascade of betrayals and depredations by a host of 
divergent settler actors with no legitimate claims to Native land in the Old Northwest. 
 
Indian Withdrawal and the Future-Anterior Territory 
 Contrary to popular history, the myth of the Anglo frontier farmer as the 
sociological backbone of the Old Northwest's transformation from underdeveloped 
backcountry to a rising network of bustling regional hubs on this side of the frontier was, 
and remains, decidedly mythic. From about 1760 to the Civil War, the region stretching 
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from the upper Great Lakes through Ohio and westward from the Appalachians to the 
Mississippi underwent seismic shifts in both population growth and geopolitical stability. 
According to James Belich, one period from 1811-1819 saw an influx of 403,000 
emigrants, mostly in the Ohio valley and after 1815, that "tripled the population to 
800,000," while a comparably dramatic surge began decade later with the completion of 
the Eerie Canal (91). In themselves, these surges were not synonymous with political-
economic development, however. As Belich shows, the more sustainable growth in local 
economies frequently began after the bubble popped on a boom phase. When panic over 
either economic instability or rumors of Indian violence scattered settlers in nascent 
urban centers, venture capitalists picked up the crumbs, acquiring farmlands, factories, 
and distribution enterprises for cheap and turning them toward exportation back east by 
utilizing equally cheap transportation. Accordingly, the "Anglo explosion was bust-
driven as well as boom-driven," meaning that the political-economic infrastructure 
associated with U.S. expansion "was built like a coral reef on layer after layer of fiscal 
corpses" rather than through a process of trickle-down civilization (Belich 206). Far from 
the stubborn fantasy of hardy Anglo stocks fighting off Britain and then peopling an 
otherwise empty landscape, the real trajectory of rising US influence in the region 
consisted of these sporadic and recursive cycles of capital, goods, and encroaching 
settlers booming and busting, together with a sustained resistance to such incursions by 
different Native coalitions. 
 Illegal emigration into and settlement of Native space, and the often violent 
disruption of existing diplomatic and trade networks that it entailed, comprises the base-
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level factor in this trajectory, as evidenced by the fact such disruptions precede the 
formation of the United States. The same settler incursions that earlier gave Britain fits 
only intensified in the post-revolutionary period, as settler groups poured into Shawnee, 
Miami, and Delaware lands by way of the Ohio river in the early 1780s. These 
emigrations set up years of violent conflict, as the colonies were even less committed as 
states to curbing populations on the perimeter. Some states even incentivized illegal 
encroachment into the lower Ohio Valley at this time, ostensibly as a means of settling 
lands supposedly included under their colonial charters.4 When Native groups responded 
to these encroachments and depredations with force of any kind, settlers would, in Sarah 
Miller's words, resort "to their own brutality, condoning their attacks and killings as 
protection for their settlements regardless of whether Indians were friendly or not. 
Punishment for killing an Indian seldom occurred" (39). Miller adds that news of such 
attacks traveled throughout the eastern US and across Native territories, complicating 
treaty proceedings, such as at Fort McIntosh in 1785. Further, such violent incursions 
often found support in American militia groups operating in the area.5  
 This phenomenon, namely the non-sanctioned support of illegal settler 
encroachment by militia groups, climaxed in the early 1790s. The defeat in 1791 of 
General Arthur St. Clair's militia, comprised both of US soldiers and private citizens 
(largely the encroaching settlers themselves), by Blue Jacket's confederacy of Shawnee, 
Miami, Wyandot, Delaware, Ottawas, among others, demonstrated the continued potency 
of a well-organized Native military resistance. Although this was the worst ever defeat of 
US forces by a Native confederacy, the US countered with General Anthony Wayne's 
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defeat of a smaller, splintered version of the same group at the Battle of Fallen Timbers 
(1794). This latter defeat led to the Treaty of Greenville in 1795, which saw Native 
representatives cede most of Ohio, a southeastern chunk amounting to two-thirds of the 
territory, and parts of Indiana, including present-day Chicago. As Colin Calloway puts it, 
this cession paved the way for a "population tsunami" that transformed the region in a 
very short time (Shawnees 109). It also opened the door for further illegal encroachments 
and depredations, such as the 1804 treaty between the US, represented by William Henry 
Harrison, and four Sauk warriors (unauthorized to cede territory) at St. Louis that 
exchanged all of the Sauk homelands east of the Mississippi for a one-thousand dollar 
annuity; Black Hawk would later refer to this treaty as "the origin of all our difficulties" 
(19). The 1795 treaty also catalyzed the Shawnee leader Tenskwatawa's creation of a pan-
Indian confederacy (his brother, Tecumseh, had in fact refused to sign it, and he probably 
viewed the dispossession of southeastern Ohio as unresolved), which in turn set the stage 
for Black Hawk's resistance two decades later. The Sauk warrior clearly presents his 
resistance as stemming from the confirmation of the original cession of the Sauk village 
of Saukenuk in 1813 and his justified refusal to remove west of the Mississippi per its 
fraudulent terms. 
 Given this trajectory, in which peripheral settler economies were wrecked, 
salvaged, and wrecked again, and treaty boundaries drawn, illegally traversed, and 
redrawn per newer land cessions, the frontier mythos becomes a vexed concept. Do the 
narrative elements of the frontier motif primarily mystify each critical sequence in this 
history after the fact? Or, rather, does the symbolic currency of a frontier historicity, 
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organized around anticipations of Indian withdrawal, derive from its role in offering, in 
advance, a descriptive image of the territory, one within which future settlement appears 
as a foregone conclusion? The latter possibility involves thinking US involvement in the 
region together with the production of a frontier concept that (re)organizes the cyclical, 
sporadic, and violent nature of state formation. To this point, settler emigration enters the 
early political discourse on the region precisely as a geopolitical problem, one that helped 
to articulate an early formulation of Native sovereignty. The area known as the Old 
Northwest is first designated as an Indian reserve by the British in the Proclamation of 
1763, which the crown supported precisely because it did not want an expanding frontier.  
 In the aftermath of the French and Indian War, in which Britain usurped France as 
the dominant transatlantic power, the Ottawa war chief Pontiac formed a coalition of 
regional Native groups (including Ottawa, Ojibwe, Potawatomi, Shawnee, Miami, and 
Delaware peoples) to resist militaristic British governance, speculative economic 
practices that supplanted French networks in the fur trade, and the increasing problem of 
unsanctioned Anglo settlements. Usually called Pontiac's War, this widespread conflict 
led Britain to rush the Proclamation and hopefully stabilize the region by prohibiting 
settlement beyond the Appalachians. Despite that it was ultimately ineffective in curbing 
settler depredations, however, the discursive act of positing an Indian-Anglo boundary 
represented Native peoples in terms other than indolent nomadism, implicitly negating 
the assumption that Indians were antithetical to the kind of political collectivity implied 
by borderlines. Even if Britain never intended to honor the boundary it delineated, the 
delineation itself attested to Native peoples' territorial autonomy. In this way, the 1763 
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document remains an important touchstone, as it marks a clear historical precedent for the 
non-Native acknowledgment of Native rights to land preceding the formation of the 
United States.6  
 As a failed resolution for settler emigration that nevertheless reflects a degree of 
Native territorial autonomy, the Proclamation can be understood as a genealogical 
precursor to the later frontier motif. Positing a fixed geographic boundary that organizes 
Native territory as a space denied to colonial settlement provides the geopolitical baseline 
against which future U.S. claims would be articulated. Given what we know of the 
history of expansion into the Ohio Valley, the production of a new notion of territory in 
the U.S. context could be said to gradually foreclose the implication of Native territorial 
autonomy in the Proclamation's boundary formation. As posited against the boundary 
marked by the Appalachians (both a natural and political border between British subjects 
and "Indians"), the frontier concept less divides geopolitical space(s) than it creates a 
permeable edge beyond which geopolitics of sovereignty lose their grounding in the 
present, thereby drawing territoriality into alignment with settler sovereignty in the US 
context. As it shifts in the wake of the Proclamation's geopolitical mapping, the frontier 
motif would have to entail a retroactive movement enabling it to evacuate the very same 
provisional Native sovereignty that it evokes on its face, but without signifying this 
retroactive movement. This split points toward the production of Indianness as signifying 
withdrawal. The question now becomes: where does this trope of a frontier organized 
around Indian withdrawal emerge in US geopolitical discourse? 
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 The short answer is with the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which was drafted as 
the U.S. faced difficulties on several fronts. The very real threat that Native resistance in 
the Ohio valley and beyond would again yield a powerful pan-Indigenous coalition was 
only one problem. On one hand, architects of the federal government needed to reach a 
compromise between large states that had given up their western charters and their 
smaller counterparts, while also reducing the chances of future insurrections by unpaid 
and disaffected revolutionaries on the perimeter. On the other, Britain had established 
representative assemblies in the newly-created provinces of New Brunswick in 1784 and 
Ontario a few years later, governments that would have been "quite attractive to 'Late 
Loyalist' American settlers in the 1790s and 1800s" (Belich 167). On top of war debts 
accrued by the federal government and Britain's continued presence (in Canada but also 
in key positions, like Detroit, which they never left as mandated by the Treaty of Paris), 
the chance that U.S. citizens might colonize lands still under Britain's yoke conditioned 
the drafting of territorial protocols. As Belich suggests, British presence in Canada can be 
viewed as pressuring the United States to continue to extend the franchise in its plans for 
expansion, so as to shore up what had to be seen as a failing state. Instead of 
incorporating the territory by extending the borders of states with western charters, the 
ordinance initiated a process of cloning autonomous state governments on the periphery. 
By tethering autonomous governance to emigration rather than chaining the territories to 
eastern state governments, which was at least a theoretical possibility in keeping with the 
original charters, the design resolves these various difficulties through the seemingly 
perfunctory act of laying out protocols for integrating territory. Indianness enters as the 
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discursive means of transiting, in Jodi Byrd's terms, the radical contingency of violent 
incursions into Native territory in defiance of boundary lines into an image of the 
necessary and orderly, even autonomous organization of the region over time.  
  The Ordinance veers from the earlier evocation of Native autonomy, even as it 
appears similarly to acknowledge Native claims. After Virginia gave up its extensive 
western charter in 1783, federal actors began a series of negotiations with Native groups 
in the region. Taken together, treaties with the Six Nations at Fort Stanwix in 1784, with 
Ojibwa, Wyandot, Delaware, and Ottawa peoples at Fort McIntosh a year later, and with 
the Shawnee at Fort Finney in 1786 ceded the western portions of Pennsylvania and New 
York along with most of eastern Ohio.7 The Ordinance, drafted by Jefferson the next 
year, then declared that the region in its entirety, beyond lands already ceded, would 
contain from three to five separate states; it also drew territorial borders for three of these 
and laid out a process for transforming the territories into states. Male suffrage would 
depend on prior US citizenship in the east, possessing a freehold of at least fifty acres in 
the territory, and having been a resident in the latter for two years. Men could vote for 
representation in the general assembly from their county/township when its population 
reached five thousand. Reaching a population of sixty thousand "free inhabitants" in the 
territorial district would finally trigger admission to statehood. Clearly these protocols are 
dependent upon, even tethered to, settler emigration. But there was one major problem: 
Native nations still controlled most of the territory. The Ordinance mediates this bind by 
referring to future-anterior land cessions. Regarding the creation and enforcement of laws 
in the territory, Section 8 states that a governor assigned by Congress to each territory 
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would create counties and townships "in parts of the district in which the Indian titles 
shall have been extinguished" ("Transcript").  
 Referring to land cessions in the future-anterior tense seems little more than 
Jefferson's obligatory nod to (at least the generic idea of) Native sovereignty. In fact, the 
point of this section appears to have been to ensure that settler expansion within the 
territory didn't outpace the reproduction of juridical power, as it also dictates that the laws 
of a given territorial district will apply evenly to the whole district. However, if the act 
presumes state formation as an inevitable historical outcome, it does so through 
forecasting the eventual cession of Native lands. Jefferson writes that "Indian titles" will 
have been ceded by the time the protocols go into effect, but this reference, and in 
particular its future-anterior tense, can be conceived as a deflection in the form of an 
acknowledgement. It allows the necessary reference to autonomous Native peoples to 
serve as its own deferral, negating Indigenous territoriality in the discursive act of its very 
acknowledgment. Instead of sovereign entities with uneven and overlapping territories 
wholly irreducible to US claims and juridical power, "Indians" emerge behind their titles 
as a paradoxical, fleeting group(ness), hinging on the very claims they presumably hold. 
"Indian titles" then register as paradoxical objects, only posited as substantial insofar as 
they will fade. In contrast to Britain's geopolitical line, then, the boundary image manifest 
in the Ordinance displays what we might identify as the frontier mythos. However, 
insofar as the notion of Indian withdrawal registers as an objective element of the 
"territory" in question, it also embeds settler emigration as a narrative feature of the land 
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itself, as indexing the possibility of its future organization and, as such, endowing the 
land with a temporality that orients it to the state in extra-political terms. 
 One might ask if the Ordinance forecloses permanent land-based Native 
sovereignty in order to clear the space in which to outline its protocols, why mention such 
cessions at all, since it isn't likely the text was drafted for a Native audience in the first 
place, much less addressed to one? The reason involves a delicate political arena in which 
matters of U.S. statecraft entailed complex geopolitical dynamics. Drafting any plans 
whatsoever for annexing the territory at the very least necessitated referencing Native 
peoples, and not only because the Proclamation establishes a precedent. Rather, any 
territorial plan that failed to address Native "title" would have registered as incomplete, 
especially for framers already divided by competing state interests. However, since 
Native claims were many and uneven, the possibility existed that some groups might not 
cede lands. Although it was likely inconceivable that Native territory could remain off 
limits to expansion for the fledgling government, omitting Native peoples entirely would 
have failed to persuade large and small-state partisans alike of US stability during a 
tumultuous period. It is important to recall that the Northwest Ordinance is passed by the 
Confederation Congress only a year after Shay's Rebellion, and at the same time as the 
process of drafting and ratifying the US Constitution, which would come to replace the 
Articles of Confederation just two years later.8 The inability to raise tax revenue doomed 
the latter, as the federal government had difficulty raising a militia to quell the rebellion. I 
suggest that the Ordinance's content reflects these very real concerns over the stability of 
the United States government moving forward. For instance, it enables surveyed lands 
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(following the creation of townships on lands ceded by Native groups) to be purchased by 
private interests, thereby providing a critical revenue stream for the federal government 
 From this view, the future-anterior negation in the act/form of recognizing Native 
rights to land, positing "Indian titles" as destined to be ceded, does not simply naturalize 
settler emigration. Rather, narrating such land cessions casts both illegal encroachment 
and the processes of state formation it sustains as indices of the region's futurity, 
abstracting their violent and contingent aspects through the narrative and temporal 
extension of the territory itself. Insofar as the future-anterior tense deflects any possibility 
that Natives might reject the terms, so that the necessary cessions appear as foregone 
conclusions, settler emigration emerges in the document as already coextensive with the 
next phase of the life of the territory, as a necessary movement away from the 
ambiguous, quasi-political nothingness comprising its current "Indian" state. 
Rhetorically, the Ordinance leaves no question that actual settler populations in the 
region will reach numbers sufficient to trigger the mechanisms for republican machinery 
laid out in the protocols; it is only a matter of time before the territory "organizes." 
Inverting this equation foregrounds the manner in which frontier historicity organizes the 
acquisition of Native lands at the level of knowledge-production. Positing inevitable 
Indian withdrawal, through the reference to future-anterior land cessions, generates a 
narrative within which state formation in Native space appears as a normative and logical 
sequence of events, as a given historicity against which the violent resistance of various 
Native groups to settler incursions will appear as deviations from the path of progress. In 
this way, a vague fantasy of fated and homogenous Indian withdrawal retroactively 
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coheres a territorial gestalt within which illegal settler emigration appears as a historical 
necessity.  
 This view calls for a different reading of the more famous Section 14 Article 3, 
which promises "good faith...toward the Indians" and affirms that their "lands and 
property" will never be "taken from them without their consent" ("Transcript"). Rather 
than read this passage in terms of truth or falsity, I would note that insofar as the 
reference to Native land cessions in the future-anterior tense comes first, the 
displacement/deferral of Native sovereignty delivered by way of this tense primes the 
significance of "good faith" rather than vice versa. Read as a qualification of the earlier 
assertion of land cessions, good faith registers as a diplomatic addendum to plans already 
made. However, it also formally subsumes (the lack of) seemingly fixed boundary lines 
between the US and Native peoples to the order of US-oriented historicity. By 
legitimizing transactions that will have happened, serving as their extra-legal guarantee, 
"good faith" structurally presupposes that Native land tenure and sovereignty are already 
compatible with Anglo/US models of contractual exchange. Most importantly, however, 
the allusion to diplomatic goodwill retroactively endows the earlier reference to Indian 
land cessions with an assurance that these lands will have been ceded ethically. The 
corollary implication is that any resistance to the terms of exchange offered by the U.S. 
(will) appear as temporary, "savage" anomalies associated with receding Indian abjection, 
as residual symptoms of historical change rather than of legitimate problems with either 
the premises or promises of actual treaties. 
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 In this way, the violence associated with U.S. expansion into the Old Northwest 
should be grasped as encompassing the geopolitical representation of the region itself. 
The Northwest Ordinance references lands that were both claimed by sovereign Native 
groups and already designated as Native territory by the British in the earlier 
Proclamation. However, it deflects the geopolitical limitation to U.S. expansion posed by 
Native sovereignty paradoxically through imagining a smooth and inevitable transfer of 
Indian "title" to the settler state. By establishing that the protocols for territorial 
organization will occur on lands that "will have been ceded" by Native groups, the 
Ordinance casts "Indian title" as something like a temporary geopolitical condition, a 
form of land holding destined to give way to U.S. settlement, which in turn conveys a 
sense of the region as dependent upon future processes of state formation for coherence.  
 This representation, I argue, enacts a form of objective violence: in the matter-of-
fact, seemingly pragmatic vision of expansion, the Ordinance posits a futurity against 
which violent Native resistance to settler encroachments reads as deviating from 
normative course of territorial "development." However, the displacement at work does 
not only target Native resistance, but rather all aspects of the tumultuous situation 
embroiling the U.S. The future-anterior territory created in the Ordinance displaces the 
fact that settler emigration (for some, a mode of capitalist exploitation, and for others, an 
escape from the same) over the Appalachians was largely impossible to constrain in the 
first place, that the region had long been characterized by warfare and remained a site 
likely to create powerful pan-Indigenous alliances, and that the federal government 
established in the aftermath of the revolution was not simply destined to survive its own 
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intensifying factionalism. Read against this background, the trope of Indian withdrawal 
involved here exceeds the frame of an imperial will-to-colonize. The Ordinance 
transmutes the vast and potentially devastating geopolitical uncertainty that the U.S. 
faced on all fronts into the certainty of a smooth, orderly process of national development 
ahead, and the certainty that the "Indian" will cede its lands when the time comes 
provides the essential ideologeme for that fantasy. 
 Accordingly, if frontier historicity names the process whereby settler narratives of 
the Old Northwest displace real geopolitical instability into the certainty that savagery 
will withdraw in time, this process is generative rather than reflective. In the Ordinance, 
"Indian title" casts Native sovereignty as substantial only long enough to be terminated 
through some diplomatic process. Rather than a distortion of the actual sovereignty of the 
Shawnee, Sauk, Fox, or Winnebago, however, the concept of "Indian title" emerges as a 
means of endowing the immediacy of such instability with the predictability and certainty 
of a linear narrative. Moreover, this translation does not register as a deflection of 
potential crises, I would argue, insofar as "Indian title" registers as a little piece of the 
geopolitical real. Although certainly an ambiguous concept within settler discourses, such 
title indexes an ambiguity that is historically constant in itself, a staple of the archives and 
one crucial for maintaining a belief in the legitimacy of settler presence on Native space.  
 From this angle, the reference to "Indian title" stabilizes the sheer contingency 
associated with future land cessions, transposing that contingency into the necessity of 
future exchanges through the historicity evoked through this concept. Put another way, its 
reference should not be read as the trace of a pre-existing, racist stereotype of inevitable 
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Indian withdrawal manifesting and distorting otherwise legitimate Native sovereignty. 
Rather, the concept of a uniformly coherent "Indian title" already in existence "out there" 
comprises the fantasy object whose emergence casts (posits the presupposition of) 
inevitable Indian withdrawal as a foregone conclusion. Further, while this certainty 
consolidates the vision of orderly territorial incorporation and development, it also 
crucially defers this idealized moment of exchange. The Indianness of "Indian title" 
dislocates Native place-based sovereignty from the present, while it renders the sheer 
violence of expansion as a series of aberrations in route to that moment of perfect and 
orderly transfer of land. In this way, the historicity evoked through this narrative both 
sustains and conditions the uneven trajectory of boom/bust economics, illegal settler 
encroachments, and violence between settler and Indigenous actors that comprises the 
destabilization of Native space and sovereignty.  
  
Boosting (the Backwoods) to a New Frontier  
 As discussed above, the Northwest Ordinance's brief reference to Native land 
cessions implicitly portrays settler emigration as an orderly process integral to larger 
territorial aims, an orderliness that, I argue, the text inscribes into the notion of the "Old 
Northwest" as a coherent geopolitical space. Referring to lands that "will have been 
ceded" introduces a temporality that abstracts the violent processes of expansion in what 
appears as an axiomatic unfolding of the potential for organization already latent within 
the region as geopolitical space. In this way, the text renders such emigration as the 
motor for processes of state formation that, insofar as they follow from ethical land 
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cessions, appear as a foregone conclusion, as simply the next phase in the life of the 
territory itself and a historical necessity. The reference to inevitable Indian land cessions, 
then, can be understood as enacting an objective violence toward place-based Native 
peoplehood. The Ordinance endows the Old Northwest with a historicity that forecloses 
place-based Native sovereignty moving forward. In turn, literary portrayals of regional 
life that follow during the antebellum era, I would argue, extend the ongoing 
displacement of Native peoples that the Ordinance both envisions and retroactively 
normalizes. The point is not so much that the colonizing work of such texts is reducible 
to the 1787 document, however. Rather, the latter instantiates, in a U.S. context, the set of 
discursive relations whereby the notion of the space as "territory" enacts a violence on its 
own, namely through the narrativity of regional Indian withdrawal that it presupposes. 
Even a text like Caroline Kirkland's A New Home, Who'll Follow? falls within the frame 
of this objective violence. While the novel presents itself as offering practical knowledge 
of the land as against romanticized and potentially harmful distortions of life on the 
frontier, the condition of possibility for its turn toward a more ethical reality is a portrait 
of the territory sustained through the narrativity of Indian withdrawal. 
 First Published in 1839, the novel fictionalizes Kirkland's years living in the 
fledgling town of Pinkney, Michigan, which she founded along with her husband, 
William Kirkland, in 1837. Both educators from privileged backgrounds, the couple 
moved to Detroit in 1835 to lead the newly created Detroit Female Seminary. The novel 
far from romanticizes these events, however. As Noreen Lape concisely puts it, Kirkland 
writes "the permeability of the American frontier" in such a way that "teases out truth, 
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calling into question its very foundations and revealing its constructedness" (364). This 
truth entails a clear critique of the forms of predatory banking and land acquisition that 
precipitated the economic collapse of 1837. Nevertheless, the condition of possibility for 
this critique is an inverse homogenization of Indianness as place-based counter-
productivity. The novel's critique of speculative banking practices and land exploitation 
extends neither to the received narrativity of regional Native peoplehood nor the 
geopolitics of dispossession that are coextensive with the rise of regional economic 
networks. Accordingly, what fails to register is the role that a systemic undermining of 
Native sovereignty (such as the inundating of Native polities with alcohol via state-
sanctioned trading) plays both in making land available for purchase from the U.S. and in 
propelling the very forms of speculation the novel otherwise targets.  
 Reading the text as extending settler claims to the territory through frontier 
historicity calls for some additional background. William Kirkland purchased at least 800 
acres of land situated roughly 60 miles west of Detroit in the context of a massive surge 
in emigration and capital investment (Zagarell xiii-xiv). Although the site for the town 
was but a tiny portion of the land ceded to the US by Wyandot, Potawatomi, Chippewa, 
and Ottawa peoples in the 1807 Treaty of Detroit, which included almost the entire 
southeast quadrant of present-day Michigan, several factors worked to inhibit emigration 
to this area as compared with that to the south. Its reputation as mostly inhospitable 
marshland, the lack of transportation infrastructure, and the perceived threat of Indian 
violence together stalled speculation and settlement in the years after the War of 1812 
(Dunbar 156-8; 176-9). In fact, the territory did not reach statehood until 1837, two 
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decades after Illinois and Indiana and nearly 34 years after Ohio. However, the 
completion of the Eerie Canal in 1825 ignited an emigration influx that in turn catalyzed 
speculation in both land and minerals, fueling the volatility that led to Black Hawk's 
famed resistance to removing per the terms of fraudulent treaties with the U.S. Since 
most of the conflict occurred in western Michigan territory (present-day Wisconsin), the 
end of Black Hawk's War in 1832 brought a symbolic closure, one that helped create the 
impression of a region now "open" to seismic capital expansion, especially in the context 
of a largely unregulated financial system. Land sales in Michigan skyrocketed from 
147,062 acres in 1830 to a record 4,189,823 acres in 1836, a total that Dunbar notes 
exceeded figures "for the entire country as recently as 1833" (164).9  
 Although Kirkland does reference the purchase of the site for Pinckney (here 
Montacute), the critique of unsustainable land speculation propped up by paper money 
and predatory lending references neither treaty-based land cessions nor Native resistance 
to settler encroachments, such as the recent and highly publicized Black Hawk War 
(1832). Despite the fact that intrusions into Native space helped to create the store of 
"government land," as the novel terms it, were part and parcel of such destructive forces, 
the novel effaces such intrusions entirely, which enables it to separate the forces of 
economic destruction from waves of settler emigration, as reflected in the novel's basic 
mapping of space. The text's critical import instead hinges on an early distinction 
between the village and the city that links the economic crash of 1837 only with the city, 
construed as a failed project of settlement; in this way the text compartmentalizes the 
practices and processes associated with unsustainable speculation, which implicitly 
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frames the lands surrounding cities like "Tinkerville" as effectively beyond state 
processes of acquisition/expansion and, as such, reducible to something like the trope of 
frontier wilderness even as the novel brackets the romanticization of such a framing 
(Kirkland 31).10 Disassociating from economic predation the fraudulent treaties and 
illegal encroachments that Black Hawk spent much of his adult life resisting, Kirkland 
frames the capitalist flows that tanked the economy as the ultimately degenerative 
efficacy of an unbridled acquisitiveness, one both symbolized and propelled by idealized 
visions of future cityscapes. Accordingly, the vision of the city symbolizes such flows, 
standing in contrast to an alternative potential for egalitarianism supposedly inscribed in 
the landscape itself. Where the "'madness of the people' in those days of golden 
dreams...of city-building" implodes communities before they even get started, the 
Clavers' (Kirklands') "plan of a village" resonates as a more authentic locus of forms of 
industry that prove sustainable insofar as they emerge out of the supposedly actual 
conditions of frontier necessity (Kirkland 4).  
 The plot's ethical thrust is therefore in keeping with Maria Sánchez's observation 
that reform novelists sought to restore "truthful meaning and truthful relations" so as to 
counter what was perceived as a loss of reality in the twinned frenzy of land speculation 
and the proliferation of unbacked banks (41). More specifically, the tension between 
village formation and city building doesn't wholly bracket the destructive course of 
unregulated expansion (as a primarily bust-driven phenomenon, with long-term economic 
development moving by way of the disequilibrium of unforeseen and rapid collapses). 
Instead, it displaces the destructive aspect from a systemic element of U.S. expansion to 
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the intention or drive of specific actors to take advantage of an unregulated financial 
system, thereby keeping open the possibility of something like an ethical process of 
expansion. This displacement manifests in Kirkland's plot design. The plot is essentially a 
tale of two cities, Tinkerville and Montacute, situated as simultaneous experiments in 
different logics of expansion: the wild frontier of get-rich (dis)investment schemes versus 
that of slow-paced, egalitarian community formation. In either case, however, movement 
"beyond the confines of civilization," to the "remoter parts" in which such experiments 
occur, reads as effectively given to settler presence in advance to the degree that 
Indianness signals a residual element of the landscape. 
  The text's realist mode initially reflects this givenness. Initially tempted to "set 
forth my little book as being entirely, what it is very nearly—a veritable history, an 
unimpeachable transcript of reality, a rough picture, in detached parts," Kirkland admits 
that there are "glosses, and colourings, and lights," yet the incidents and events 
themselves, even in their "unnatural, or absolutely incredible" character, are "to be 
received as literally true" (1, sic). These scenarios largely revolve around the seemingly 
insurmountable differences between Mary and her new neighbors. However, the narrative 
reporting of this discomfort provides the crucial hinge for the novel's criticism of 
speculation. As the various micro-narratives threaded through the narrative unfold, her 
own difficulty in adapting marks the distance from romanticized portrayals of the 
frontier. Such narratives, which are loosely associated with Mary herself as coming from 
a privileged background back east, emerge as hyperbolic to the degree that they depart 
from real conditions associated with such a life as she encounters them. Measured against 
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this pivot toward literary realism, more popular frontier romances read as out of touch 
with the periphery. In turn, as material tokens of the real hardship of such a life, bog-
holes, roadways built from logs, porous cabins, snakebites, wildfire, and the potency of 
various illnesses, especially malarial fever or "ague," gradually provide the material 
counterpoint to what emerge as the socio-symbolic obstacles to settlement, namely rude 
manners, suspiciousness of new emigrants' intentions, a pronounced sensitivity to class-
based prejudices, occasional theft, and an often tenacious commitment to ignorance.  
 A New Home therefore presents itself as trading generic conventions for accuracy, 
subjectivity for objectivity, and the narrative apparatus proves indispensable to rendering 
a tangible sense of the hard work and the day-to-day actuality usually effaced in 
romanticized texts. The result, as Zagarell puts it, is a departure from the "unobtrusive 
participant/observer" typical of travel literature, such that "her developing capacity to 
accommodate westerners as well as easterners constitutes one dimension of the 
community's development" (xxix). Narrating life on the frontier by way of the immediate 
difficulties it brings to bear on the narrative persona, not the least of which are the class-
based assumptions of what exactly constitutes a need, extends into the novel a tension 
between a desire to render a "transcript of reality," its supposedly real conditions, and the 
fact that cultural-, gendered- and market-based constraints impact one's capacity to create 
such an unimpeachable transcript. Life on the frontier presents obstacles that not only 
force the emigrant to adapt, they also gradually throw into relief character traits that, in 
their disjunction from frontier reality, become obstacles in themselves. Indianness enters 
this dilemma on the side of reality, as marking an objective knowledge embedded in the 
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landscape invisible to those like Mary without experience out on the perimeter. The first 
mention of Natives of any kind realizes this displacement. When the party very early on 
encounters a rattlesnake, one of Mary's early backwoods companions declares in passing 
that "'the Indians call them Massisangas and so folks calls 'em too'" (Kirkland 16). The 
second mention of Natives performs a similar move. At one point, a party of investors are 
"following an Indian trail" when they become disoriented and lost, throwing into relief 
their unfitness for frontier life (Kirkland 16, 26).  
 That Indians "call" rattlesnakes Massiangas implies that Natives are present and 
that they are not a simple cypher for a bygone era, irrevocably lost to history and, as such, 
available for appropriation as a means of representing a national past. But neither do they 
overlap with the population designated by the term "folks," which refers to the 
presumably Anglo settlers who emigrated some time earlier and appear to Mary as 
backwoods rabble. However, as these early examples indicate, Indianness less references 
any particular Indigenous people, such as the Sauk or Winnebago, than it initially 
signifies a knowledge of the landscape that is both framed as temporally anterior and that 
as such, in Rifkin's words, "helps orient and provide momentum for the feeling of 
givenness that marks non-natives' relation to place" (Settler 31). In this way, Indianness 
designates an earlier era, but one not inexorably sealed away from Anglo settlement. It 
enters the frame not as a displaced formation, but rather as the mediated trace of a prior 
presence that still proves useful to arrivants and readers alike: a form of knowledge that, 
being rooted in the land, enables a practical sense of what it takes to live away from 
"civilization." As a mediated form of knowledge, Indianness further underscores certain 
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exploitive interests as wholly out of sync with something like the potential social ecology 
of the frontier. The "Indian" trail, for instance, is an impression of Natives' prior presence 
quite literally embedded in the territory, but it only registers as a means of demarcating 
the strangeness or "wildness" of the land as framed through the bourgeois norms of 
eastern banking culture, suggesting the fundamental ineptitude of those looking to turn a 
quick profit through speculation. By contrast, the backwoods settlers' appropriation of the 
term "Massisanga" establishes them in close relation to a praxis seemingly derived from 
the land itself, as does their implied capacity to follow Indian trails. 
 As indexing a kind of knowledge that throws into relief and thereby differentiates 
settler modes of adaptation in terms of their preparation for life beyond civilization, 
Indian knowledge accordingly helps to organize the pivot from romance toward reality by 
foregrounding the difficulty with two supposedly constituent elements of the backwoods: 
landscape and population. However, this capacity for differentiation is not exclusive to 
Indianness. The narrative enacts the same ordering process through juxtaposing Mary's 
resistance in domestic settings to the lack of customs and manners associated with eastern 
privilege with scenes in the "'timbered land,'" in which the shift in terrain emphasizes a 
corresponding shift in the perception of what constitutes necessity (Kirkland 7). For 
instance, an early passage describes a typical noon meal. After laying out an ostensibly 
rustic spread of apple sauce, mashed potatoes, pork, and "bowls of milk," the equally 
rustic hosts blow a horn, an almost "magical" intervention that draws "enough men and 
boys" from the seemingly "solitary" landscape to pack the room to the gills (Kirkland 
14). Initially resolving "not to touch a mouthful," Mary is "mortified" at being virtually 
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compelled to eat alongside such ruffians (ibid.). The sudden appearance of a whole host 
of settler laborers seemingly out of thin air presents them as belonging to, at one with, the 
terrain in ways that escape Mary and her traveling companions. Their manners in turn 
also emerge not simply as unrefined as compared with the narrator herself, but as forming 
a cultural baseline that, given its linkage with the labor apparently necessary to make the 
wild habitable, shows Mary's worldview to be as much an impediment, in the beginning, 
to something like collective progress as the aims of the bankers who get lost while 
surveying the territory.  
 Accordingly, if Indianness enters as a place-based knowledge that helps to sort the 
useful from the exploitive arrivants, it is not the only path to such a critique; the power of 
the pastoral to reshape the community in fundamental ways exceeds Indianness since it 
also manifests in scenes that reflect the capacity of the settler working poor for survival 
and community formation apart from Native tropes. The rural working poor appear to 
have an efficacy all their own, which in turn implies that the praxis/knowledge 
symbolized by Indianness is not fully coextensive or associated with the landscape as a 
site for social rejuvenation. Prior Indian knowledge marks a distinct praxis organized 
around living off the land, but it is a receding praxis, as attested by the fact that settlers, 
and not Indians themselves, are the ones who relay such knowledge and ostensibly 
determine its usefulness. In fact, Indianness also comes to signify something like an 
embedded incapacity for adaptation. The novel spatially links Indian figures with 
Tinkerville, the city on the rise that winds up collapsing nearly as quickly as it is 
envisioned. After having adapted somewhat, Mary guides a far more reticent friend on a 
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visit to see the neighboring town, which rumors suggest is beginning to take off. The text 
underscores Mary's progress by having her assuage a friend who is shocked to see a real 
Indian: "I was terribly puzzled. It had never occurred to me that the Indians would 
naturally be objects of terror" to someone who "had scarcely ever seen one; and I knew 
we should probably meet dozens of them [on] our short ride" (Kirkland 85). Suggesting 
something of a failed population in their sparse, phantasmatic quality, especially as 
compared with the more industrious if stubborn backwoods Anglos, wandering Indians 
throw into relief both Mary's increasing experience with the landscape and her waxing 
identification as an "old" settler, to whom it falls to offer the very knowledge she earlier 
lacked.  
 When Mary and her friend get lost on this visit, she stops to ask an unnamed, 
random Indian if they are going the right way. While "he could not be made to 
understand," he nevertheless gives them "the usual assenting grunt," prompting Mary to 
continue. However, after failing to reach the city, they backtrack "to the nearest log hut" 
to ask for the road to Tinkerville, only to learn that they had already passed it: "'It a'n't 
long since you came through it. That big stump is the middle of the public square''' 
(Kirkland 85). The miscommunication finds a parallel in the actual state of Tinkerville; 
so far, all of the buzz and predatory lending has produced less than nothing. The moment 
is doubly temporalized, however: the obvious gap between what Tinkerville is/was meant 
to become and its actual lack of progress registers as a failed futurity, while the Indian 
"grunt" that leads nowhere gestures to a gap between the forms of Native peoplehood that 
must have existed at some point in the past and what now appears as the only meaningful, 
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potentially lasting form of settlement around, namely Mary's slowly developing town of 
Montacute. The imminent failure of Tinkerville overlaps with the apparent failure of 
Indian peoplehood to suggest an incapacity to create/sustain meaningful and sustainable 
collectivity.  
 In this linking of speculation and Indianness, however, the latter primes the 
reader's perception of the looming failure of Tinkerville rather than vice versa; the 
apparent givenness of Indian withdrawal sustains the passage's critique. The loitering 
Indians register on the side of a realism rooted in a "unimpeachable transcript" of actual 
life on the frontier, evidenced by the fact that Mary can't understand the grunt calls for no 
additional explanation. To be fair, this episode does indeed indicate that Native peoples 
were very much still around, inhabiting areas that they had supposedly vacated. However, 
by lumping all regional peoples together within the generic category "Indians," the text's 
recognition of these Natives also marks its extension of the narrativity of withdrawal that 
also characterized the Northwest Ordinance. Seeing these peoples as "Indians" amounts 
the discursive means by which Kirkland's realism deflects Native claims to sovereignty, 
the complex political dynamics of Native dispossession(s), and the political history of 
such dispossession and its resistance, like the conditions involving the recent Black Hawk 
War. By representing such Natives as "Indians," the passage generates a sense of the land 
as de facto given to settlers not simply insofar as these wandering subjects signal the 
residual trace of an outmoded way of life, but by overdetermining the failure of 
Tinkerville precisely as localized and not a systemic feature of a predatory capitalist 
network. The fact that Indians loiter around the site that should have been a public square 
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help to throw into relief the city's failure to live up to the vision that founded it, but this 
failed future does not exhaust all potential for a meaningful and sustainable habitation out 
on the perimeter.  
 In other words, the random Indian's grunt articulates the more general sense of 
disorientation that Mary feels upon discovering that Tinkerville is a stump. It helps to 
register the supposed reality of the radical, material dis-investement symbolized by the 
urban boom in Tinkerville. If the spasms of enterprise that create Tinkerville ultimately 
leave less than nothing, then the sociosymbolic gap raised through Indianness manifests 
that nothing: the "grunt" that leads nowhere provides an implied metaphor for a more 
devastating withdrawal embedded in rampant speculation qua "progress." Yet, through 
this very association the passage also suggests that the forms of speculation that generate 
such socioeconomic collapse are themselves fated to disappear. Even as Indianness acts 
as a quick cypher for the ineptitude of rampant, predatory capitalism, and marks the 
distance between such enterprise and the interests of Mary and her company, the sense of 
axiomatic Indian withdrawal also crucially frames the possibility of a utopian and 
egalitarian community free from the pitfalls of speculative capitalism and within which 
people from all backgrounds and social positions contribute to the common good. The 
narrativity of receding Indianness is indispensable to the subtle dialectic that Kirkland 
poses as an authentic and sustainable path of development.  
 This narrativity enables Kirkland to strike a delicate balance between criticizing 
both rampant speculation and frontier romanticism as ultimately destructive forces, on 
one hand, while nevertheless participating in the genre of booster literature, albeit on the 
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side of a communitarian ethics, on the other. Insofar as it keeps investors, rich and poor 
alike, focused on the future-anterior cityscape, the grand vision of a bustling metropolis 
rather than its stark, swampy reality, Kirkland depicts booster literature as concealing its 
own fraudulence in the temporality constitutive of its initial appeal. Crucial to this 
displacement or concealing of an unsustainable profit-motive, the force behind such 
spasmodic enterprise, is, in Zagarell's terms, a "commercial language...of ever-shifting 
and fraudulent signifiers which advance the interests of a few...at the expense of the 
community as a whole," and in particular the role of "image production," the visual and 
narrative representation of a bustling city that provides perhaps the most indispensable 
and constant catalyst for such stasis as Mary observes around the stump at Tinkerville 
(xl-xli). Booster literature involves a kind of double time in which the future promise 
overdetermines present skepticism regarding both the means and the feasibility of such 
rapid growth, and the novel suggests that this totalizing sense of a wholly imaginary 
possibility keeps investor desire quite literally oriented elsewhere, looking for the next 
Tinkerville when the current one turns out a bust.  
 Therefore, to the degree that the booster-driven desire behind the collapses 
allegorized by Tinkerville obscures any awareness of risk (hence leading to over-
investment, then the unsustainable boom, etc.), Indianness for Kirkland resonates as a 
socio-symbolic counterpoint to the actual circulation of such images in the boom that 
precipitated the bust of 1837. As a supposedly organic and residual element of the 
landscape, Indianness helps to foreground a disjunction not simply between the "city" as 
it actually exists and its future-anterior form, but also between the textual circulation of 
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such imaginary future cities as a form of capital extraction (an anti-labor) and the 
possibility of more productive forms of labor rooted in the land, since Indians once lived 
and thrived here, though they don't any longer. If, then, Kirkland's turn away from the 
utterly fantastic Michigan of sentimental novels, romanticized travel literature, and 
booster propaganda amounts to, as Kolodny puts it, carving out for readers an "attractive" 
yet "responsible role on an unformed landscape that might yet bear their especial and 
idealizing imprint," that carving entails (re)producing an Indianness that can signal 
something like the stunted possibility inherent in the territory itself. As a kind of residual 
and objective predicate of the territory, Indianness marks off the "land" from the 
pervasive incitement to invest that otherwise organizes it as space to be settled, while 
nevertheless retaining the coherence of "territory" as that which supersedes failed modes 
of Indigenous peoplehood and, in turn, as an extra-political space within which some 
form of egalitarian and ultimately productive capitalism might yet be possible (The Land 
148).  
 It is no coincidence, then, that Mary's course of adaptation, positioned as 
metonymic of the development of village life, is framed as a shift from being an outsider 
among "Indigenous" settlers to one entitled to "speak for the natives," phrasing that 
locates generic Indian withdrawal as the point of transit for settler indigeneity (Kirkland 
134, 66). Recall that the Northwest Ordinance, in referencing future-anterior land 
cessions, renders Indianness as a temporal predicate of the space, thereby deflecting 
Native autonomy and sovereignty through orienting the "territory" to the U.S. in time, or 
in other words rendering it dependent upon supposedly inevitable and orderly flows of 
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settler emigration and the processes of state formation that they catalyze. Here the sparse 
zombification of Natives in the text similarly suggests that Indian withdrawal establishes 
an indeterminate point at which the spatial bleeds over into the temporal, indexing a 
historicity already integral to the lands in question and within which settler governance 
appears unremarkable precisely insofar as it is a foregone conclusion. Put another way, 
Indianness signifies the possibility of a limit to cutthroat speculation inherent in the 
"territory" itself, not because Natives gesture to alternative lifeways so much as they 
make available an abstract representation of space as simultaneously anterior to and 
destined to pass beyond the destructive flows of capital and rabble. Although claiming 
indigeneity, Mary Clavers never plays Indian, at least in the sense Philip Deloria has 
shown to be an essential component of settler self- and national representation. 
Nevertheless, tropes of Indian withdrawal crucially frame the ethic of reciprocity that 
Kirkland presents as constitutive of sustainable, even egalitarian community formation. 
This ethic is founded on cultivating the environment in the broadest sense, extending to 
the habits and views of the local inhabitants as much as the forms of labor they perform.  
 Mary Clavers's embrace of frontier reality most fully expresses the development 
of this ethic, which calls for unpacking given its importance to Kirkland's communitarian 
vision. The novel's parallel forms of development in Montacute and Tinkerville pivot on 
the emergence of what Karen Kilcup identifies in Kirkland's second major work, Forest 
Life, as a "version of 'simple living,'" which consists of "discarding unnecessary 
belongings, emphasizing spiritual development, and behaving respectfully toward the 
environment" as well as embracing a "democratic perspective on wealth and acquisition" 
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(Fallen 113). Her capacity to help reshape the community derives from her own 
resistance to it. In other words, Montacute is not simply fated to become a model 
community, as village formation is neither a simple integration nor colonization of the 
backwoods by the monied. Generating an alternative trajectory for "that anomalous mass 
called society" proceeds insofar as Mary comes to realize both the hard work and the 
degree of collective engagement that it takes to survive on the frontier (Kirkland 76). 
Again, meal times offer a privileged motif for staging the dialectic of class- and gender-
based discord central to this dialectic. After having begun to acclimate, Mary claims that 
those newly emigrating will find the "social character of the meals, in particular, is quite 
destroyed, by the constant presence of strangers, whose manners, habits of thinking, and 
social connexions are quite different from your own" (Kirkland 52-3). Nonetheless, hope 
is not lost, as "the silent influence of example," she observes, "is daily effecting much 
towards reformation in many particulars"; the way for those accustomed to a refined 
routine to overcome such "evils" is to be patient and "set forth in their own manners and 
habits, all that is kind, forbearing, true, lovely, and of good report" (Kirkland 53). It's 
pretty clear why the novel wasn't such a big hit with her neighbors. Yet moments like 
these transform the discourse of manners, perhaps the token of class difference, into the 
sign that her privilege is outmoded here. For Kirkland, as Aliaga-Buchenal puts it, 
egalitarianism begins as "an occasion for the 'upper' and 'lower' classes to come together, 
forced as the reunions may be," and give prosperous arrivants a chance "to revise 
prejudice" and their counterparts "an opportunity to learn something of the 'refinement' of 
others'" (71). 
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 However, it is crucial to grasp this egalitarianism less as a coherent program or 
idea external to these "forced reunions," as something to which each party turns to make 
the meeting bearable, and instead as their immanent extension, as the very telos of village 
formation that the novel situates as a real possibility inherent in the landscape. As Mary 
gradually cedes her attachments to the forms and norms of privileged life back east, her 
neighbors conversely come to understand the sense of shared responsibility integral to 
survival as a communitarian value. The most enduring form of necessity, which pushes 
her beyond hermetic fright, is that of her neighbors needing her stuff. She observes that 
whoever "comes into Michigan with nothing, will be sure to better his condition; but wo 
to him that brings anything like an appearance of abundance, whether of money or mere 
household conveniences. To have them and not be willing to share them...with the whole 
community, is an unpardonable crime" (Kirkland 67). Such criminality suggests the 
process by which the backwoods inhabitants come to exert a symbolic pressure that has 
the immediate effect of loosening new emigrants' conceptions of the rights and privileges 
ascribed to ownership, what Mary terms "involuntary loans": "...I have lent my broom, 
my thread, my tape, my spoons, my cat, my thimble, my scissors, my shawl, my shoes," 
and, taking the cake, Mary even recalls that a friend once had a neighbor who asked to 
borrow her baby (Kirkland 68, 71). However, the corollary of this near-constant demand 
for various necessities by one's less-mannered neighbors is their knowledge of what 
constitutes usefulness in the "open country" (Kirkland 50). After the Clavers arrive at 
their log cabin, and in the context of trying to "procure a domestic" to help arrange the 
place (which ultimately fails, as no one on the perimeter would "'hire out'" as a "regular 
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calling, or with an acknowledgement of inferior station"), Mary decides that she must "go 
myself to the scene of action" and arrange her house (Kirkland 38-9, 42). She discovers, 
however, that she has no idea what it takes to live in these conditions. As she unpacks her 
things only to find a larger, more "hopeless task of calling order out of chaos," her 
neighbors by contrast gape and gawk: "'What on airth's them gimcracks for?'" (Kirkland 
42).  
  The path of village formation comprises the mutual adaptation of new and 
"Native" emigrants adapting both to each other and to the shift in very concept of 
necessity itself that this doubled adaptation yields. For the latter group, coming to 
understand the circulation of items from the perspective of community development, 
rather than that of the survival of the individual family unit, involves a shift in the notion 
of what exactly makes land valuable. Just as Mary can get past neither her own cultural 
biases nor the muddy, decidedly non-picturesque character of the woods, the people she 
meets along the way are portrayed as subject to the tyranny of their dreams as much as 
that of the landscape. Their ethic of raw necessity and common knowledge are far from 
exempt from the more general tendency to commodify land, a view constitutive of the 
larger tendency toward economic instability. As one Mr. Danforth relates, describing his 
own early experiences in Michigan territory, "We had most awful hard times at first. 
Many's the day I've worked from sunrise till dark in the fields" clearing land, "but that's 
all over now; and we've got four times as much land as we ever should have owned in 
York-state" (Kirkland 22). The inverse of romanticized views of the land as empty 
homogenous Nature, this quantification of the landscape, Mary observes, "forms a 
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prominent and frequent theme of self-gratulation among the settlers...The possession of a 
large number of acres is esteemed a great good," despite the fact that, as she sees it, 
comfort level does not "abound in proportion to landed increase" but rather diminishes: 
"the habit of selling out so frequently makes that home-feeling...so large an ingredient in 
happiness elsewhere, almost a nonentity in Michigan," as these folks "spend all their lives 
in getting ready to begin" (ibid.). For the rustic neighbors, organic knowledge rooted in 
the hard work of daily survival serves a home that is infinitely deferred, if only because 
they do not realize that happiness is contingent on neither the number of acres one claims 
nor their market value. From this angle, forming a lasting community is a costly, even 
counter-productive endeavor.  
 For Kirkland, an ethic of reciprocity gradually developed through local trade 
(dictated by use-value rather than the exchange-value that fuels capital investment) 
provides the key material and socio-symbolic link to (re)align the woods and the people. 
These moments of material and socio-symbolic exchange coalesce into a forward yet 
recursive momentum whereby the distribution of necessity forms something rather than 
nothing. In this way, a backwoods economy predicated on land clearing and speculation 
slowly re-constellates its own socio-economic horizon by integrating newly-arrived 
settlers, those from a class position diametrically opposite that of earlier emigrants. That 
land can be commodified is not the problem. After all, the creation of a surplus of 
"government land" through land cessions with regional Native peoples entails a process 
of commodification. Rather, the problem as the novel stages it is that the drive toward 
more and more land/wealth obviates the development of local networks of exchange that 
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are crucial toward developing the kinds of meaningful social relations (the genesis of the 
"village") necessary to curb cycles of unsustainable growth and collapse. Insofar as old 
settlers are themselves bound up in the larger economy of speculation, they alone cannot 
realize the broader social potential of a ground-up emphasis on trade as informed by raw 
necessity; and insofar as new arrivants like Mary are resentful about moving out to the 
backwoods in the first place, they are not inclined to realize it either. The way out, so to 
speak, of the massively destructive cycles of a boom/bust economy is through the unique 
and immanent dialectic of community formation embodied in the development of 
Montacute. 
 In this way, the novel's egalitarian vision presupposes settler emigration. As we 
will see, Black Hawk himself had already made a point quite close to that of Kirkland, 
but one that drew a firmer distinction between trade and commodification of land ("land 
cannot be sold," as he famously notes). For him, the selling of land distorts, even negates 
the inherent, organic possibilities for collective organization entailed in trade-based 
relationships similar to those Kirkland describes at Montacute. Kirkland's dialectic by 
contrast presents land speculation as deeply problematic, but to the degree that more 
ethical processes of community formation nevertheless also entail the prior and 
supposedly legitimate cession of Native lands, the text cannot integrate the fraudulence 
that produces government land in the first place within the frame of its critique. Of 
course, this blind spot does not register as a blind spot. The text's portrait of a smooth, 
immanent development of sustainable community relations at Montacute, in contrast to 
the panic symbolized by Tinkerville, both derives from and extends a colonizing frontier 
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historicity, one already integral to cutthroat, rampant capitalism precisely insofar as it 
imagines the territory as if fated to become more organized on the path to statehood. To 
this point, despite taking different forms or acquiring different meanings in specific 
narrative moments, the trope of Indian withdrawal generally signifies an embedded, 
residual, and ultimately imperfect body of associations that works across the text to 
illuminate the problems with a settler economy. Receding Indianness both deflects prior 
Native claims to space, on one hand, while rendering the productivity of non-Native 
labor, rather than the ethics of US juridical claims, the fulcrum of legitimate belonging, 
on the other.  
 And as with the Northwest Ordinance, the failure to address actual rampant and 
genocidal dispossession takes the form of (what appears as) a recognition of Native 
autonomy. Kirkland does in fact acknowledge Native trade networks, albeit without the 
geopolitical function Black Hawk describes. In the context of admiring the fertility of the 
soil, Mary describes the "whortle-berry of Michigan," a fruit "despised elsewhere" but 
treasured in the hinterlands due to its improved quality (Kirkland 81). Each summer, 
"The Indians bring in immense quantities slung in panniers or mococks of bark on...their 
wild-looking ponies; a squaw, with any quantity of pappooses...on the ridge between 
them"; "'Schwap? Nappanee?' is the question of the queen of the forest...which means 
'will you exchange, or swap, for flour:' and you take the whortle-berries...returning the 
same measured quantity of flour" (Kirkland 81, sic). Indian trade again manifests a 
knowledge of the land, but its rhetorical relegation in this instance to a supplemental 
digression, one reached by way of a more general focus on agriculture, doubles its 
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ideological displacement as a legitimate mode of production. Opening with a reflection 
on the possibility of gardening in Michigan, this passage seamlessly transitions into a 
celebration of the unlikely diversity and adaptability of the local workforce, but one that 
implicitly centers farming as the truly indispensable socio-economic cog. Just prior to the 
forest queen's arrival, Mary gushes on the sheer potential for husbandry: "Nobody can 
deny that our soil amply repays whatever trouble we may bestow upon it"; "Enrich it 
properly, and you lack nothing that will grow north of Charleston" (Kirkland 81).  
 Bracketing the fact that this passage ignores, for instance, that Sauk women not 
only farmed, but did so well enough to feed the encroaching settler rabble who fenced in 
their fields at Rock Island, Indigenous trading here gestures to forms of labor (namely 
gathering and bartering) that, while basically efficacious, nonetheless fail to signify 
productivity what registers as an axiomatic distance from Anglo modes of husbandry. Put 
another way, while Indian labor/trade evokes a praxis deriving organically from the 
landscape itself, it simultaneously signals a non-productive ethic of reciprocity, one that 
simply cannot sustain anything like the long-term economic growth and diversification 
associated with village life. Prior to the reference to the whortleberry, Mary again notes 
that "there could scarcely be a trade or profession which is not largely represented among 
the farmers of Michigan....Montacute, half-fledged as it is, affords facilities that one 
could scarce expect," including a goldsmith, various carpenters, masons, merchants, and 
even a backwoods dentist (Kirkland 80). The capacity to cultivate the soil begins from 
where the place-based knowledge/praxis of prior Indian trade leaves off. Further, Indians 
less utilize than rely upon hunting, gathering, and rustic forms of trade for either basic 
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necessities, such as flour, or money, which Mary elsewhere describes as "valueless" 
given "how little it will buy in the woods," which positions Indigenous networks both as 
signifying poverty in their simplicity and as aligned with the predatory, paper banking 
that winds up leaving neighboring Tinkerville a ghost town (Kirkland 120). In registering 
a certain untapped potential, Indian trade then registers a fading mode of production, one 
completely cleaved from claims to sovereignty. As such, it works to cast Anglo farming 
and the forms of non-Native industry it promises to support as true extensions of the 
terrain's latent potential for settlement and, accordingly, as legitimate indices of 
indigeneity.  
  If there is one moment of withdrawing Indianness in the text that frames land in 
terms of settler-oriented historicity while also (re)producing regional Native peoples as 
an excessive population, as aberrant with regard to the normative path toward progress 
symbolized in Mary's journey, it is the family of inebriated Indians that Mary describes 
very early in the book.11 In the context of still trying to get out to the village site for the 
first time, and lamenting the marshy, depressing terrain, Mary and her party plan to spend 
the night at the house of a nearby French trader, so as to maximize the time exploring and 
adjusting to the land. As we will see, the reference of course recalls the long history of 
French trade networks with regional Native groups like the Sauk, networks largely rooted 
in the fur trade. However, described as situated in the vicinity of "a few Indian huts," the 
trading house here evokes an impression of Native peoples as dependent on trade for 
survival (Kirkland 28). The trader lives with his "Indian wife," who is largely silent 
except when asked to play "the part of interpreter between the gentlemen [apparently the 
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Frenchman and members of Mary's party] and some wretched looking Indians who were 
hanging about the house" (Kirkland 29). Further, the group of "wretched" Indians 
includes several children, who though possessing "bright, gazelle-like eyes" nonetheless 
show "nothing of the staring curiosity [of] the whiter broods of the same class of settlers" 
(ibid.).  
 Mary then learns that the Indians in question "had come to procure whiskey of the 
trader," gesturing to a geopolitics of displacement effected through the proliferation of 
alcoholism through trade, a historical phenomenon (as Black Hawk forcefully observes) 
that helped to generate conditions of dispossession, both in reference to the 1804 treaty 
and as a feature of trading with whites more generally. In fact, Black Hawk describes 
how his own frustration with the whites' use of alcohol as a means of degrading and 
dispossessing his people prompted him at one point to destroy several containers so as to 
prevent their distribution. The focus in this passage, however, veers from what we would 
identify as the geopolitics or ethics of such trade in favor of victim-blaming. After this 
particular group leaves with the "baleful luxury which performs among their fated race 
the work of fire, famine and pestilence," it isn't long before another is "seen approaching 
the door with that long easy trot which is so habitual with the savage" (Kirkland 29). 
Though alcohol itself is seen as "baleful," Natives' apparent propensity to abuse alcohol 
signals a racialized function of "fate," as much a part of their intrinsic nature as the 
characteristic trot, as opposed to the direct effect of real geopolitical antecedents 
unleashed through the appropriation of trade networks by settler rabble, private interests, 
and the US state over the course of the prior four decades. Later the same night, Mary 
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describes waking to a "hideous yelling, which to city ears could be no less than an Indian 
war-whoop" followed by a violent knocking at the door; everyone quiets down when, 
after answering, the trader assures them it was just the Indians returning for "more 
whiskey," and, therefore, "'noting at all'" (Kirkland 29).  
 The next morning, the trader "unblushingly vindicated himself in the matter" 
while discussing the previous night's events. "He said that they would get whiskey from 
someone—that an Indian could not live without it, and that they would pay honestly for 
what they got," although they would "steal anything...from the farmers" to make the 
payment (Kirkland 30). Mary observes that his wife, however, "listened with no pleased 
aspect to this discussion of the foibles of her countrymen," and seemed anxious for the 
guests to leave (Kirkland 30). The narrative then resumes Mary's path to Montacute. One 
could suggest that the representation of Indian alcoholism as racially unique and therein 
non-political is in keeping with the more general racialism endemic to the American 
public sphere at large. However, such a view would neglect the role that representing a 
characteristically Indian indigence plays in consolidating a vision of the territory as if 
destined for industrious settlement, even as Mary appears to implicitly condemn the 
trader's role in perpetuating such "savagery" for the sake of economic gain. It is not only 
that the effects of dispossession appear instead as their ultimate causality in such portraits 
of Indian squalor. It is also this inversion further consolidates the "Indian" as a structural 
non-presence whose figuration, as failed or non-productive industry, orients the territory 
to the US in time.  
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 As a cypher for failed yet "natural" political-economy, the narrativity of receding 
Indianness in Kirkland's novel displaces the role that settler depredations (by private and 
government actors alike) played in producing the "government land" in the first place. 
Narrating Indians as if fated to recede sustains a broader historicity within which settler 
emigration appears an axiomatic phenomenon. Taken together, the references to Indians 
scattered across the text render such facts quite literally unremarkable. Rather than 
normalizing such emigration, however, this narrativity instead extends a sense of the 
territory as an ultimately extra-political space, as a landscape conducive to developing 
forms of exchange and collective labor that register as drawing forth the true potential for 
social harmony, supposedly embedded in the land, insofar as Indians signify the 
inevitable passing away of failed modes of peoplehood. By narrating Indianness as 
withdrawing, the thriving village at Montacute transmutes the actual conditions of Native 
dispossession into a portrait of frontier life as the unfolding of a seemingly fundamental 
ethic of reciprocity over time, the core element of a grounded egalitarianism that, by 
comparison, presents destructive flows of illegal encroachment, land speculation, and 
unregulated capital investment as aberrations, not catalysts, of U.S. expansion across 
Native space.  
 
Black Hawk's Parallax View 
 As noted above, the booms of settler emigration and land speculation across Ohio, 
Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin territories that Kirkland experienced firsthand in the 
mid-1830s, but that represent only the latest incarnation of a boom/bust trajectory 
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spanning decades, proceeded by way of persistent settler disruptions of Native place-
based sovereignty. Although it sharply criticizes the predatory capitalism that generates 
cycles of economic collapse, A New Home, Who'll Follow?  presupposes the 
dispossession of the Sauk and other regional Native peoples, even as the end of the 1832 
conflict between U.S. militia forces and Black Hawk's band directly paved the way for 
the massive influx of emigrants, speculation, and predatory lending Kirkland describes. 
As Jung observes, despite the fact that rumors of Indian uprisings were prevalent in the 
years following the conflict (mostly involving the Winnnebago, a traditional ally of the 
Sauk), the total population of Wisconsin territory nearly tripled from 11,000 in 1836 to 
30,000 in 1840—and it exploded to over 300,000 by 1850 (204-5). The end of Black 
Hawk's resistance is accordingly integral both to the continued dispossession of Native 
space in the region and to the uneven and often chaotic flows of capital and settlers that 
drove such dispossession. 
 It would then make sense to position Kirkland's text as sealing over the very 
conflict that Black Hawk's narrative seeks to reframe for a non-Native audience, one for 
which the episode likely resonated as the latest, spectacular episode in the Indian's 
gradual but certain decline to the west. The rise of Montacute would seem to reaffirm that 
narrativity of decline. The traces of Indian withdrawal embedded in the proto-egalitarian 
landscape would implicitly cast Black Hawk's scathing critique of the forces of 
dispossession as the biased and limited view of an angry warrior seeking the only victory 
remaining: to validate his character and his people's culture in the court of public opinion. 
This perspective is problematic, however. The presumption that chronological order is 
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essential to any historicist inquiry into conditions of dispossession that extend into the 
present reinforces the centrality of the settler state at the level of narrative form. The 
passage of time here, in the sense of historical causality, gestures to a political necessity 
that forecloses reading Black Hawk's text as engaged in a struggle for land, a struggle 
irreducible both to the duration of his so-called war and more broadly to the implied 
notion that the only meaningful tactics against settler colonialism transpire in military or 
juridical contexts. One can understand Black Hawk's text as a tactical engagement with 
the presumption that the U.S. was fated to develop the Old Northwest. The text can be 
read, in other words, as pushing against U.S. claims to Native space in the Old Northwest 
by disrupting the linear historicity that embeds such claims as a foregone conclusion, a 
historicity that coheres through the trope of inevitable Indian withdrawal. From this view, 
A New Home, Who'll Follow does not have the last word on the visibility of the 
geopolitics of dispossession in which it is embedded simply because it follows Black 
Hawk's text, if only because those geopolitics are/were ongoing.  
 Building from these observations, I would also add that the question of intent is 
largely beside the point if the focus is the symbolic foreclosure of place-based Native 
sovereignty. Put another way, the symbolic and discursive configuration that makes 
something like Black Hawk's biography desirable in the first place, as the account of real 
Indian war chief recorded just before he moves beyond the frontier, so to speak, is not 
reducible to Black Hawk himself. As grounded in a narrativity of Indian withdrawal, 
frontier historicity retroactively organizes a series of uneven, competing actors with 
different claims to Native space in the territory instead as the orderly and fated movement 
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of territorial organization, construed as an extra-political process insofar as it is rendered 
a matter of (settler) time. However, if this historicity not only precedes A New Home but 
further constellates the notion of extra-political space that surfaces in that text's image of 
an effectively empty landscape, if it is integral to the objective notion of territory with 
regard to the Old Northwest from the earliest articulation of U.S. claims to space, then it 
already constitutes a maneuver against Indigenous peoples in the region that works to 
render Native claims to space unintelligible. Accordingly, it makes sense to read Black 
Hawk's text not simply as entering into this framework, into the grid of geopolitical 
intelligibility as it is predicated on the reproduction of frontier historicity, but as 
disrupting this grid and its retroactive consolidation of regional Native space as already 
under the juridical purview of the settler state.  
 I therefore argue in what follows that Black Hawk's autobiography draws on the 
symbolic currency of withdrawing Indianness to narrate the displacement of Native 
peoples in the region as far from a matter of inevitable withdrawal. The text reverses the 
historicity such Indianness entails precisely by throwing into relief the multiple and 
unevenly aligned actors and agendas that culminated in Black Hawk's forced exile and 
the dispossession of Saukenuk. The basis for this critical move is the presupposition of 
place-based alliance networks. The text's intervention hinges on the relation between the 
historical narrative of Black Hawk's life and an ethics of exchange both organized around 
and integral to reproducing place-based Sauk peoplehood. Hence, the narrative less 
supplements a flawed history of the conflict as it unfolded within a given geographic area 
(the Old Northwest) than it enacts a parallax view of the space. Black Hawk's narrative 
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undercuts the axiomatic orientation of this territory to settler governance insofar as it 
articulates, within the symbolic framework generated by tropes of Indian withdrawal, that 
the Sauk far from simply receded/vanished to the west. Before exploring Black Hawk's 
implicit challenge to a historicity that presupposes the givenness of state claims, I will 
show how discourses of Indian withdrawal shape his public image as something like the 
embodiment of such narrativity, as an exoticized, living example of the trope of the 
Indian-heading-toward-sunset. First, however, I should explain the notion of parallax, 
since it is crucial to grasping how I understand his text to work. 
 The idea of the parallax view comes from Žižek, and it amounts to an effort to 
rethink the relationship between a clash of ideologies within a social milieu and the 
socio-symbolic and political space(s) within which competing ideologies play out. As he 
writes apropos Hegel's division between the Universal and the Particular, the "Universal 
is not the encompassing container of particular content, the peaceful medium-background 
of the conflict of particularities," but rather the site of an antagonism, a non-All, that the 
multitude of particularities attempts to "obfuscate/reconcile/master" (PV 35). In other 
words, there is no "'neutral' reality within which [ideological or cultural, etc.] gaps 
occur," such as in the case of an Indian versus a Western or Euramerican representation 
of the same objective territory designated as the Old Northwest (Žižek PV 29). Instead, 
every reality is already "seen through an invisible frame," which means that the parallax 
view is not one view among many possible ones; parallax implies a gap, not in the sense 
of "two incompatible perspectives onto the same X," but between one view "and what 
eludes it, and the other perspective fills in the void of what we could not see from the first 
             
 
262 
perspective" (PV 29). From this angle, it is not enough to suggest that frontier historicity 
merely misrepresents Native rights to the space designated "Old Northwest" (or 
"Michigan Territory," or "Wisconsin Territory," etc.), since this approach misses the fact 
that the narrativity of Indian withdrawal is integral to the geopolitical and cultural 
intelligibility of the space in the first place. Such an approach retains the de facto 
orientation aligning such space with the settler state, as already the future-anterior, 
objective extension of state jurisdiction. As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the 
notion of an objective space in this sense is inseparable from the frontier historicity that 
embeds processes of emigration and state formation in the very notion of "territory," 
namely through foreclosing any meaningful Native sovereignty moving forward. By 
contrast, Black Hawk's text enacts a parallax view: it mobilizes the very trope (that of 
exotic Indian withdrawal) that otherwise coheres the notion of the frontier as a 
supposedly "real" territorial gestalt (premised on the inevitability settler emigration, and 
state formation) to expose the fraudulent and genocidal dispossession of land otherwise 
obscured by the frontier mythos.  
 Non-Native discourses on the Black Hawk War began to represent him as a living 
symbol of exotic, receding Indianness as soon as the conflict had ended. As Cheryl 
Walker observes, his surrender to US forces marked the beginning of his introjection into 
US nationalist identity through an "outpouring of literature" on the Sauk warrior that 
largely cast him as "a personification of (Native) American, not just Indian, virtue" (77). 
The textual material surrounding his infamous surrender tour of the east coast suggests 
that he likely grew accustomed to such personification. As the tour progressed, Black 
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Hawk seems to have ushered the theme of "vanishing" himself, playing into the 
predominant red/white racial binary that framed him for a non-Native audience, even as 
this paradigm would appear largely absent from his actual biography. For instance, while 
at Fort Monroe, he reflected on his surrender in such a way that surely pleased then-
president Andrew Jackson and his secretary of war, Lewis Cass. "'You have treated the 
red men very kindly...the memory of your friendship will remain till...it is time for Black 
Hawk to sing his death song...Your houses are as numerous as the leaves on the trees, and 
your warriors...the red man has but few'" ("Black Hawk"). Similarly, at Jefferson 
Barracks Black Hawk reportedly refused to be painted with a spear in hand by George 
Catlin, claiming that he "'was forever done with spears'" ("The Black Hawk"). A poem 
that circulated in newspapers during the tour addressed him as the "chief of a thousand 
warriors," but only in the context of scorning the "Old forest lion" for having the audacity 
to "dabble in the gore of wives and mothers,/ And kill…thy harmless pale-faced 
brothers," a wholly irrational, murderous impulse that largely explains why the "glowing 
day star" had set and "dull night…closed upon [his] bright career" (Sanford).  
 From a distance, it is easy to grasp these allusions to the futility of further 
resistance, and the framing of such resistance in terms of inhuman savagery, as 
overdetermining the gesture to fellowship ostensibly symbolized by the tour more 
broadly. Yet the relevant point here is not necessarily that the textual material generated 
by the tour unveils the disingenuousness of any political rhetoric of goodwill, but rather 
that such caricatures of receding Indian savagery function instead amount to a sufficient 
explanation of the actual circumstances involving the termination of Sauk claims and the 
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annexation of Sauk space; far from negating any claims to historical accuracy, the 
hyperbole of such scenes posits the presupposition of a general narrativity of inevitable 
Indian dispossession that functions as their implicit baseline. Further, if this discourse 
might be said to deflect both the history of violence and fraudulence characterizing Sauk 
dispossession and, more broadly, the legitimacy of Native sovereignty as a political 
category in the Old Northwest, then this deflection occurs paradoxically through the 
recognition of Black Hawk as a concrete manifestation of a more generalized 
temporality, one characterized by a binary narrative of white/US ascent and Indian 
decline. This narrativity exceeds the immediate context of the Black Hawk War, 
however. By focalizing Black Hawk in this way, this discourse extends the earlier 
framing of Indianness as fated to withdraw in the region. Black Hawk himself provides 
seemingly empirical evidence of a larger historical necessity at work in the region's 
supposed "organization," while his celebrity further extends the efficacy of this 
narrativity by compelling crowds of thousands to witness himself and his fellow Sauk 
travelers firsthand, these "noble specimens of the early race of America" ("ARRIVAL OF 
THE PRESIDENT"). 
 A notable example of non-Native discourse rendering Black Hawk as a cypher for 
bygone Indianness occurs in George Catlin's critique of settler expansion and his 
sympathetic portrayal of the war chief. At the conclusion of his 1841 Manners, Custom, 
and Condition of the North American Indian, Catlin pointedly attributes Native peoples' 
apparently bleak future to U.S. policy and especially to the continued and ruthless 
displacement of Indians by encroaching settlers. He writes that, since the coming "'pale 
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faces'" have already "thrown...their friends and connexions into the grave," Natives 
appear to "have no better prospect" than of "living a few years longer" and finally sinking 
"into the ground...surrendering their lands...to the enjoyment of their enemies" (Catlin 
485). Yet such injustice will not go unpunished. The price of this surrender for 
"American citizens" is the "lingering terror" of one day standing "with guilt's shivering 
conviction" among the "accusing spirits, that are to rise in their own fields, at the final 
day of resurrection" (ibid.). Despite leveling what appears from a contemporary view as a 
charge of genocide, Catlin's eschatological vision nonetheless denies the possibility of 
any meaningful, much less successful Native resistance in the future. This foreclosure 
also surfaces in Catlin's description in the same text of the 1832 treaty council at Rock 
Island. In the larger context of Sauk peoples gathered to transfer their land claims to the 
"insatiable grasp of pale-faced voracity," he notes that Black Hawk appears as an "object 
of pity," a "poor dethroned monarch" left standing alone and "in dumb and dismal 
silence" (Catlin, 440, 447). Despite the obvious sympathy, the Sauk war chief here 
amounts to an already spectral presence, embodying a fallenness that doubles as a 
prognostication, a vision of a Native resistance that can only ever be a voice from the 
grave.  
 Catlin therefore produces an incisive critique of the motivations for expansion. 
Nevertheless, this very criticism presents its imagined audience as de facto heirs to Sauk 
lands. The doubled transiting of shame and even outrage through the image of a muted, 
defeated Black Hawk, taken together with a spectral din of restless and unavenged Native 
voices on the settler day of reckoning, expresses a powerful dissent to both cutthroat land 
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speculation and the politics of dispossession. However, in these passages, the figuration 
of Indian suffering discloses a narrativity that, though deriving from the very recognition 
of injustice towards Indians, casts the lands in question in terms of a settler historicity 
that imagines "western" space as if already under de facto U.S. purview. The lament 
elicited by Catlin's image of Black Hawk together with the other future-anterior Indian 
ghosts transmutes real material consequences of settler emigration and unchecked US 
expansion into a vexed yet inevitable episode in the history of the new "territory." In this 
sense, the figuration parallels the symbolic function of future-anterior land cessions and 
"good faith" in the Northwest Ordinance. Black Hawk's tragic pose consolidates the view 
of Native peoplehood as an effectively outmoded way of living; in this way, the apparent 
facticity of his defeat, as refracted through a layer of pathos, re-inscribes an objective 
sense of the territory as predicated on the foreclosure of Native place-based sovereignty. 
Catlin's embedded narrative of receding Indianness organizes a linear temporality, a 
historicity, within which the geopolitics of dispossession, and the violation of treaties and 
borderlines they entail, give way to the Indian's drifting away before the coming of the 
pale-faced rabble.  
 Catlin's representation of Black Hawk's supposed resignation to fallenness 
coalesces the broader geopolitical function of the discourse on withdrawing Indianness in 
the region. The Sauk warrior's celebrity occupies the space of receding Indianness 
established in the Northwest Ordinance, even as his personhood and the occasion of his 
surrender, taken together, serve to verify or "realize" the experiential truth supposedly 
behind that abstracted narrativity. The discourse on Black Hawk's surrender therein 
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transits well into the antebellum era a foundational frontier historicity that casts regional 
Native displacement as an extra-political and temporal condition of territorial 
organization. As one would expect, this narrative framing surfaces in the rhetorical 
positioning of the warrior that opens the Life of Black Hawk. Attesting to the text's 
authenticity, Antoine LeClaire, the US interpreter for the Sauk, affirms in his note 
beginning the volume that, after completing the tour, Black Hawk called on him rather 
than vice versa, expressing "a great desire to have a History of his Life written...that the 
people of the United States...might know the causes that had compelled him to act...and 
the principles by which he was governed" (Black Hawk 3). In the dedication to General 
Atkinson that follows, Black Hawk describes the man who commanded forces against 
him as his "conqueror" and hopes that he "never experience the humility that the power 
of the American government has reduced me to...[one who] in his Native forests, was 
once as proud and bold as yourself" (ibid. 6). Each moment clearly participates in the 
same body of associations organized around fallen Indianness. Whether he intended to do 
so or not, Black Hawk fits the mold of a Metamora, taking one last opportunity to relate 
to his conquerors the tragic futility of holding out against civilization. 
 However, as the text quickly demonstrates, Black Hawk explodes the view that 
his resistance signifies such futility. As noted above, he makes no bones about locating 
the 1804 treaty as the root of his problems. Some context will help to explain what he 
means. In 1804, four intoxicated Sauk warriors, who were unauthorized to cede territory, 
transferred to the US the bulk of Sauk lands east of the Mississippi for a $1,000 annuity 
(of which Black Hawk claims his people, or at least his band, never saw a dime). 
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Compounding the problem, however, is that Black Hawk himself inadvertently sustained 
these terms by signing the treaty that closed the War of 1812.12 Regarding this second 
treaty, he laments the willingness of U.S. actors to dupe Indigenous peoples into land 
cessions. "What do we know of the manner of the laws and customs of the white people? 
They might buy our bodies for dissection and we would touch the goose quill to confirm 
it, without knowing what we are doing," adding that "We can only judge of what is 
proper and right by our standard of right and wrong, which differs widely from the 
whites" (Black Hawk, 44). Against the background of a narrativity that abstracts the 
violence of dispossession, casting it as anomalous relative to normative territorial 
development, Black Hawk's critique here signals the pivot for thinking his text more 
broadly as directly intervening in the retroactive production of Native space as territory. 
To the degree that conveying a Sauk "standard of right and wrong" proves inseparable 
from place-based peoplehood, the text already undermines the linear historicity that 
otherwise would predicate the Old Northwest on settler governance.  
 In foregrounding the fallenness of Black Hawk's position, LeClaire's opening, 
then, provides the means to problematize the narrativity that such a framing typically 
evokes. The text moves quickly to disrupt implication of inevitable Indian withdrawal 
intimated, for instance, in the discourse of "good faith" supposedly central to U.S. 
territorial claims. Before developing this reading, however, I should note that it breaks 
with the predominant view of Black Hawk's text either as a belated demonstration of 
cultural autonomy in its critique of American hegemony or as offering belated statement 
of cultural sovereignty in the aftermath of the war. For example, Kendall Johnson 
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observes that the autobiography emphasizes "the hospitality of the Sauk and Fox toward 
peaceful strangers" in order to contrast with US depredations, drawing attention to the 
text's mobilization of tokens of diplomacy, such as peace medals, to designate "America's 
projection of 'peace and friendship' as an act of war" (775). Johnson argues that peace 
medals during this era epistemically translate "Indians into the Western discourse of 
property in which they figure alternatively as kings, chiefs, warriors, domestic dependent 
nations, savages" (779). Medals serve a process of incorporating Native peoples into the 
"domestic language of the US," reaching "to the ground of the alien, foreign, or savage in 
order to carry them back" in a manner that predictably fails "to substantiate Indians as 
actually sovereign in their difference," presenting them instead as "savages who only 
think in literal terms" (Johnson 779). By contrast, Black Hawk discloses the true valence 
of the terms peace and friendship, such that they "not only signal dishonesty but outline 
the rhetorical pattern of marking peace with Indians in the act of dispossessing them" 
(Johnson 781).13  
 Johnson usefully foregrounds the ways in which Black Hawk de-familiarizes a 
generic notion of goodwill and thereby discloses the violence and dispossession central to 
settler advances, incursions that otherwise appear as, at best, the tragic price of 
"progress." Reading Black Hawk in this way, as focalizing his own stereotypically 
"Indian" fallenness, can be further elaborated, however, and conceived as intervening in 
the ways in which frontier historicity frames "territory" as already an extension of 
U.S./settler modes of belonging. The origin narrative that opens the text draws on the 
increasing appeal of the exoticized Indian Other while problematizing its status as a 
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cypher of inevitable disappearance. In foregrounding his lineage as war chief, the text de-
familiarizes settler governance and juridical power, rendering an opening that can be 
understood as manifesting a place-based ethic of reciprocity and, consequently, a 
different form of "good faith" than that of the Northwest Ordinance.  
 In the origin narrative, Black Hawk dwells on the moment of contact between his 
great grandfather Na-nà-ma-kee, who lived at Montreal before the Sac moved west to flee 
the Iroquois in the mid-seventeenth century, and a French explorer, possibly Samuel de 
Champlain. In addition to promising to return the next year with goods for trade, the 
explorer gives Na-nà-ma-kee a medal that confers upon him the status of war leader, a 
position that Black Hawk would inherit, and provides his two brothers with additional 
ones that make them into civil leaders. As he notes, this moment of exchange establishes 
what the text describes as "a regular trade" between the Sauk and the French peoples, 
likely referring the network of trade relations that would largely persist until the British 
replaced the French as the major trading force in the region at the end of the French and 
Indian war (9).14 To the degree that it locates European contact as a foundational 
moment, the passage may be seen as corroborating the general view of settler expansion 
as having a devastating historical impact as it spread to Indigenous societies, reshaping 
their lifeways through the advent of mercantilism.  
 However, as Laura Rigal notes, while Indigenous hunting and harvesting in the 
region had followed local ecological patterns for "at least two thousand years," the 
French entered this equilibrium with their fur trade around the mid-seventeenth century 
which persisted for over a century "without changing its basic outline" (208). Black 
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Hawk's origin story reflects this equilibrium by problematizing the European/Indian 
binary central to this kind of critical take on the destructiveness of European/Anglo 
contact, a binary that surfaces in different ways in the texts by Catlin and implicitly 
Kirkland. For example, rather than the French simply stumbling into Na-nà-ma-kee's 
party by chance, the narrative positions the great-grandfather as the primary agent here, 
driven to look for the explorer by a message from the "Great Spirit" indicating that, if his 
instructions were followed, he would meet a "white man" who would become "to him a 
father" (9). The trade networks that derive from this moment are epistemically covered 
by the spiritual narrative Black Hawk relates. It is not simply that the Sauk forefather 
welcomes the European traveler. Rather, what appear as distinct narrative modalities in 
the allusions to kinship, to history and geopolitics, and to Native religion, emerge as 
immanent elements of a social praxis irreducible to settler colonialism. Insofar as these 
modalities emerge out of a nexus of relationships comprise Sauk peoplehood, in other 
words, the autobiography de-familiarizes the artificial unity of Anglo civilization. It 
thereby cuts against the narrativity of Indian withdrawal by problematizing the coherence 
of the very formation that ostensibly comes to fill the space vacated by Indians. 
 Even as the passage positions Black Hawk's ancestors as having a primary 
relation to place, it also conveys a sense of the interdependence of the different actors that 
come to occupy it, as evidenced by the subtle fact that the openness to a kind of divine 
revelation underlying the scene is not depicted as unique to Native peoples. Upon 
discovering the visitor, Na-nà-ma-kee tells him that he had been sent by the Great Spirit 
to find him. The man responds with what seems to be the most ironic moment of white-
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guy-playing-Indian ever. He states not only that "he was the son of the King of France," 
but also, pointedly, "that he had been dreaming for four years [and] that the Great Spirit 
had directed him to come here, where he should meet a nation of people who had never 
yet seen a white man" (9-10, my emphasis). The visitor adds that the Spirit told him these 
people "should be his children, and he should be their father," and admits to Na-nà-ma-
kee in closing that when he told the King of his dream the latter merely reacted with 
laughter, claiming that the territory was nothing but "an uninhabited region of lakes and 
mountains" (Black Hawk 10). The factuality and accuracy of Black Hawk's 
representation of Na-nà-ma-kee's pivotal moment of contact do not really matter. What 
does is that their textual inclusion discloses a historicity within which trade and 
diplomacy, not warfare or acquisition, comprise the baseline paradigm for contact with 
non-Native groups. This narrative anchors the broader representation of longstanding 
trade networks that, as Rifkin puts it, serve to indicate "the possibility of modes of 
interaction between Euramericans and Indigenous peoples not based on the acquisition of 
land or the circumscription of Native space," networks that remained active well into 
Black Hawk's adulthood, even as members came and went over a long span of time 
("Documenting" 688). The origin narrative therefore underscores the primacy of place-
based sovereignty by situating what we would identify as an Indigenous belief system as 
an immanent means of organizing diplomatic relationships.  
 As compared with the discourse on his surrender, Black Hawk's representation of 
place-based Sauk networks through the origin narrative inverts the condescending 
suggestion of a subordination guaranteed in the annals of History. The opening passage 
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shifts the orientation of the geopolitical events and alliances that follow, and with which 
some of the audience would have been familiar, away from a teleological narrative 
centered on U.S. expansion and toward the reproduction of social, economic, and 
political bonds comprising the basic matrix of Sauk peoplehood. By the late-eighteenth 
century, the Sauk had developed trade connections with the Spanish at St. Louis 
(resulting from its transfer from France to Spain after the Seven Years War) and then re-
established ties to the French there when the latter regained the territory in the early-
nineteenth century, until the Louisiana Purchase. Before turning to this later history, 
however, Black Hawk narrates the process by which Na-nà-ma-kee gained formal 
recognition as a chief by the Sauk. After returning from meeting the visitor, Na-nà-ma-
kee tells his father, Muk-a-tà-quet, also referred to as the "principal chief of the nation," 
of his dream and subsequent discovery (Black Hawk 11). The latter then relays these 
events to the people and affirms his son's status by giving him the medicine bundle that 
Black Hawk later inherits, which Muk-a-tà-quet himself describes as "'the soul of our 
nation'"; yet dissension arises on the basis of "so much power being given" to one so 
young (Black Hawk 11). At that moment, a bolt of lightning sets fire to a nearby tree. Na-
nà-ma-kee tells the council that he had indeed caused the strike, thereby demonstrating 
the will of the Great Spirit and convincing the people of his readiness for such 
responsibility. The narrative then leaps forward chronologically some decades to the 
British defeat of the French in the Seven Years War and to the Sauk migration to 
Mackinac (Lake Michigan).15  
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 As some have noted, Black Hawk's emphasis on the origins of his lineage may 
have stemmed from a desire to demonstrate his legitimacy as a leader, especially as 
compared with Ke-o-kuck, the rival Sauk chief whose openness to U.S. overtures would 
play a major role in persuading the people to exchange lands and emigrate across the 
Mississippi. Ke-o-kuck's gradual embrace of removal more or less forced Black Hawk 
into drastic measures to remain at Saukenuk.16 Although Ke-o-kuck attained his position 
without having killed an enemy and was of mixed Fox and French descent, he would 
gradually acquire both leadership over a band consisting of about 4500 Sauk and also the 
backing of most of the civil chiefs, traditional leaders whose authority came from clan 
affiliation. By contrast, Black Hawk's so-called British Band, which resisted removal per 
the terms deriving from the fraudulent treaty of 1804, consisted only of about 800 Sauk at 
the most (Jung 55-6). Against this background, narrating the spectacular confirmation of 
his grandfather's status conveys a lineage that helps to legitimize a course of action taken 
on behalf of only a minority of the nation. Rather than a means of self-validation, 
however, the emphasis on Ke-o-kuck's origins can be read, as Rifkin suggests, as 
foregrounding the ways in which the U.S. "seeks to break up regional networks, isolating 
Native peoples from each other and producing forms of territorial boundedness and 
political centralization that facilitate the extension of U.S. jurisdiction" ("Documenting" 
695).  
 In keeping with this reading, the internal strife that characterizes the origin 
narrative also bears on the dynamics of this latter conflict with Ke-o-kuck. The Na-nà-
ma-kee narrative formally and symbolically primes Black Hawk's break with his later 
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rival. Marking the dissension and its overcoming in the former narrative constitutes the 
frame for thinking the latter break constituted by Black Hawk's actions, a frame that, 
though primarily comprised of Sauk peoples also extends to those acknowledged as 
parties within the kinship-diplomatic bonds that it manifests, bonds designated in the 
recurrence of the term "father." The use of "father" to designate historical allies to the 
Sauk, as well as the many non-Native actors with whom Black Hawk confers in the 
course of the usurpation of Saukenuk, casts Sauk peoplehood as a constitutive 
geopolitical agency rather than as peripheral to U.S. and/or European presence. In this 
way, the narrative subverts representations of the space as occupied by a homogenous 
Indianness fated to recede once supposedly civilized processes of emigration and state 
formation take hold. The diplomatic bonds that Black Hawk foregrounds early in the text 
not only emphasize place-based modes of organization that run counter to a frontier 
historicity within which Indians predictably withdraw in time, but they also implicitly 
cast territorial protocols that fail to acknowledge these Indigenous networks as subverting 
geopolitical processes already embedded in the region.  
 From the grandfather narrative forward, then, the ethic of reciprocity organized 
around Sauk peoplehood grounds a narrative of events that problematize a reading of the 
conflict through the lens of exotic, withdrawing Indianness integral to the imagination of 
frontier space. When the U.S. acquires control of St. Louis and sends a delegation of 
soldiers up the Mississippi and Rock rivers, they meet with Black Hawk's band, offering 
gifts that include an American flag. In exchange, the soldiers request that the band give 
up their British flags and medals, which Black Hawk declines to do, stating that he 
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wishes "to have two Fathers!" (17). First, the possibility of having multiple alliance 
networks challenges a paradigm in which generic representations of "Indian" autonomy 
serve mainly to present settler incursions of various kinds as historically progressive. 
Second, this passage obviously intervenes in the multivalent notion of hierarchy 
associated with "fatherhood," such that adapting the kinship term to reflect Sauk 
geopolitical practice negates its own overtly patriarchal register. Where the term usually 
denotes a sociopolitical power that goes without saying (God the Father, fatherhood as a 
metaphor for the primacy of US political power vis-à-vis Native peoples, the father as the 
master of the home), Black Hawk's usage traverses such divisions, disclosing their 
contingency and partiality in the course of centering place-based Sauk political 
formations. Finally, in forcing the term to register Sauk political agency in this way, the 
comment gestures to a non-normative geopolitical praxis that not only precedes, but 
exceeds both settler modes of territorial expansion and the political geography they 
presuppose.17 In other words, by indicating the possibility for the Sauk to have multiple, 
seemingly incompatible alliances with different non-Native actors, the comment brackets 
a geopolitical orientation toward U.S. (or British) colonization and calls into question a 
narrativity that would facilitate U.S. expansion by depicting Native displacement as both 
an inevitable and an extra-political phenomenon.  
 As Catlin and Kirkland differently show, representing Indianness as subject to an 
extra-political disappearance over time generates an image of the Old Northwest as a 
known space already predicated on the foreclosure of Native sovereignty. This 
foreclosure orients the space toward settler governance in such a manner that the violence 
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of expansion appears as something like the historical movement of the "territory" itself, 
as, at best, a spectacular and wholly irrational exception to the normative course of 
progress in the region. By beginning with an assertion of place-based kinship, Black 
Hawk, by contrast, frames his break with Ke-o-kuck, his refusal to leave Saukenuk in the 
years leading up to the conflict, and his return to the village in 1832 from west of the 
Mississippi (often blamed for beginning the conflict) through the Sauk-centered forms of 
alliance-making first established in the grandfather narrative. This framing clears the 
space for a place-based ethics of alliance-making and reciprocity to emerge as embedded 
in the landscape yet not necessarily receding. These ethics implicitly challenge the 
supposed fatedness of "unsettled" lands to be integrated by the United States not in the 
least by representing the turn toward violence as deriving from both violations of 
diplomatic networks already integral to the space and illegal incursions into Sauk 
territory, more generally. 
 One passage especially challenges not only the legitimacy of U.S. juridical 
powers of recognition, but also the seemingly given, meta-position of territorial 
sovereignty that such powers retroactively legitimize. When Fox warriors avenge the 
murder of kin by Menomonees and Santee Sioux, the settler public in the area panics, 
causing the "Great Father" (the U.S. federal government) to demand that the Fox hand 
over the suspects (Black Hawk 68). However, the U.S. failed to intervene when the Fox 
were attacked in the first place, nor did they apparently make a request of them after the 
Fox retaliated. Black Hawk accordingly recalls that when the Fox came to him for advice, 
he told them that they had "done right" and that "our Great Father acted very unjustly in 
             
 
278 
demanding them [the Fox] without ever having made a similar demand" of the other 
nations, adding that "if he had no right [then] he had none now" and further adding that it 
was "very questionable, if not altogether usurpation...where a difference between exists 
between two nations for him to interfere," suggesting the lack of U.S. juridical purview 
(68). Black Hawk's symbolic currency as a famous Sauk warrior generates the rhetorical 
position from which to criticize the extension of settler sovereignty through treaty 
processes. At the same time, however, he also interrupts the tendency to pose Sauk, Fox, 
and Menominee place-based sovereignty as merely nominal variations of the same 
Indianness already configured as a receding predicate of the space. Just as the origin 
narrative cuts against the artificial unity of Anglo civilization early in the text, Black 
Hawk here intervenes in the transit of regional juridical power from Indigenous groups to 
the settler state by problematizing the tendency to conflate the sovereignties of different 
Indigenous peoples into a homogenous notion of Indian withdrawal. 
 By continually foregrounding these alliance networks, the narrative conditions an 
ethics both inseparable from an image of place-based Sauk autonomy and, as such, out of 
sync with his own symbolic position as a kind of "Last of the Mohicans Sauk." At one 
point, he indicates that he and his band would not leave as ordered because they "had no 
agency in selling our country," and "as provision had been made in the treaty" of 1814 
that ratified the earlier 1804 treaty "for us all to remain as long as it belonged to the 
United States," he and his group "could not be forced away" (Black Hawk 62). This 
comment draws together two additional elements of the text's critique. Black Hawk 
asserts that "land cannot be sold" insofar as the "Great Spirit give it to his children to live 
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upon," adding that "any other people" can claim land only after those living there 
"voluntarily leave it" and, further, that "Nothing can be sold, but such things as can be 
carried away" (56). He makes this comment after describing his return to Saukenuk after 
a winter hunt (1828) to discover not only that backwoods intruders had not left, but that 
they had also made further enclosures of Sauk land. At this point, he remarks that there 
was "no more friendship existing" between Ke-o-kuck and himself, since "only a coward, 
and no brave" would "abandon his village to be occupied by strangers" (Black Hawk 56). 
However, narrating Black Hawk's rift with Ke-o-kuck does not intend portray the former 
as having an irrational attachment to ancestral lands. Rather, the political dissent with the 
main body of the Sauk extends both the narrative continuity and the embedded notion of 
Native sovereignty by way of the trope of alliance-making.   
 As an organizing motif, then, Sauk political processes and alliance networks 
portray the resistance to settler incursions as both grounded in and part and parcel of 
orderly diplomatic processes, thereby challenging the deflection of land cessions in the 
popular discourse on Black Hawk's surrender. During the above-mentioned crisis, Black 
Hawk continually meets with Native and non-Native (British and American) actors alike 
seeking advice on how to proceed. After having learned that some of the land at 
Saukenuk had been privately sold to speculative interests, Black Hawk determines to 
remain on the balance of lands originally claimed by the U.S. per the 1804 treaty. 
However, while coming to this decision, he meets with "the chief of my British Father" 
who advises him to meet with "our American father," and after this he meets with "the 
great chief at Detroit," each of whom give the same advice, namely that if the land has 
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not been sold the Sauk have a right to remain on them (60). The point to be emphasized is 
neither that Black Hawk had a legitimate reason for his actions nor that they were 
validated by those of non-Native military and private actors. Rather, insofar as these 
meetings draw upon existing alliance networks, they signify modern instantiations of the 
same form of geopolitical agency symbolized in the Na-nà-ma-kee narrative. In this way, 
they manifest Native sovereignty in terms of a field of cultural production, depictions of 
frontier life in terms of literary realism and historicizations of the Black Hawk War as 
evidencing the red man's tragic fate, that otherwise reinforces a systemic negation of 
place-based Native peoplehood.  
 Rather than a belated grudge, the tension between Ke-o-kuck and Black Hawk 
therefore registers a complex political dynamic that, in turn, casts "being forced" from 
Saukenuk as a violation on an order of ethics far exceeding the normative political and 
cultural frameworks that structure settler belonging. Prior to detailing the 1831 meetings 
with Gaines and the Sauk council, Black Hawk ruminates on his attachment to Saukenuk. 
He observes that when he remembers "the scenes of my youth, and those of later days—
and reflected that the theatre on which these were acted, had been so long the home of my 
fathers, who now slept on the hills around it, I could not...consent to leave it, without 
being forced therefrom," echoing his representation of Ke-o-kuck's earlier comments to 
the council on the importance of defending Sauk land (Black Hawk 62). The passage 
renders a lucid expression both of Black Hawk's connection to home and of his drive to 
remain and defend it from civilization in the form of backwoods settler vagabonds, armed 
with booze and fences. Read together with both the portrait of Ke-o-kuck's early stance 
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and the detailed history of Black Hawk's lineage, one can suggest that while kinship 
provides the epistemic condition for interfacing with non-Native parties, it does not 
preclude intra-tribal dissension and political dynamics.  
 At the same time, the narrativity of Sauk political processes casts settler 
incursions as themselves composed of multiple actors, an image far from either the 
orderly portrait of emigration reflected in the Northwest Ordinance or Catlin's more 
critical portrait of settler hordes. Settler emigration itself emerges as an alien 
phenomenon, less a civilized process of territorial development than a siege by a host of 
different actors with uneven aims. Upon returning to Saukenuk from the winter hunt just 
prior to the 1831 standoff with General Edmund Gaines, who tried more or less to 
intimidate Black Hawk into leaving, the latter discovers that encroaching settlers had 
plowed up the corn planted by Sauk women the previous season. Black Hawk determines 
to "put a stop to the intruders," giving them one day to leave (Black Hawk 64). 
Nevertheless, when one of the intruders indicates that his family "would be in a starving 
condition, if he went and left his crop" and promises that he would "behave well" if the 
Sauk leader would allow him to remain through the harvest, Black Hawk relates that the 
man "spoke reasonably, and I consented" (64). The obverse of this willingness to 
accommodate the very people encroaching on Sauk lands is an ethical refusal of violence 
that is grounded in a connection to place. A quintessential example is Black Hawk's 
adaptation of what reads as civil disobedience in his refusal to leave Saukenuk. During 
the confrontation with Gaines, whose intimidation tactics can be viewed as escalating the 
crisis, Black Hawk repeatedly insists upon his determination to "make no resistance, in 
             
 
282 
case the military came"; "in the event of the war chief coming to our village to remove 
us...not a gun should be fired, nor any resistance offered" (63, 67).  
 The ethics that Indigenous actors display in such moments immanently and 
retroactively undermine the historicity of the frontier motif as typified by Catlin, within 
which the blurring of socio-spatial and temporal movement creates a gap between 
recognizing the crimes of dispossession and the formal recognition of Native, in this case 
Sauk, sovereignty. Insofar as these ethics constitute a mode of relationality, of forming 
and sustaining connections among disparate groups in the region, they presuppose Sauk 
belonging by way of gesturing to the alliances that comprise regional geopolitical 
dynamics.18 They accordingly subvert representations of the territory as fated to pass into 
U.S. jurisdiction, pivoting away from the retroactive work of a frontier historicity 
oriented to the cloning and integration of supposedly "unsettled" Native lands. One 
political consequence of these ethics is the problematization of a reading of the text in 
which Sauk alliance-networks amount at most to an "Indian" alternative to U.S. 
republicanism. Black Hawk in fact himself offers a striking (and strikingly relevant) 
critique of democracy when he observes that "white people never appear to be satisfied. 
When they get a good father, they hold councils (at the suggestion of some bad, 
ambitious man, who wants the place himself,) and conclude...that this man" or someone 
else equally ambitious "would make a better father...and nine times out of ten they don't 
get as good a one again" (Black Hawk 58). As opposed to the embedded corporatism of 
settler democracy, which, as he indicates, is subject to manipulation by those with no 
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substantial ethical and familial ties to place and people, the dynamics of Sauk peoplehood 
that he charts are premised on an ethics rooted in sustaining the people and the land.  
 Black Hawk's comment presupposes a relational ethics whose various networks 
gesture to Indigenous modes of diplomacy, exchange, and place-making not only into 
which settler actors enter, but that also open up something like a series of counterfactual 
possibilities in the otherwise supposedly fated and hermetic break between residual and 
receding Indianness and the coming of civilized settler modernity. In a way, Black Hawk 
puts a twist on Byrd's observation that even "in its consolidation, the United States is 
haunted by the specters of its origins, and the displaced narratives that have been 
continually rewritten do not altogether disappear" (206). As with Catlin, the spectrality of 
an exotic and receding Indianness often yielded the point at which a grievance over 
Native dispossession simultaneously produced its irrevocable historicity. Here, that 
spectrality "haunts" the discourse from the inside, as Black Hawk extends its aura to 
foreground the dysfunction of the mechanisms of U.S. corporate and political culture 
themselves, aspects of U.S. geopolitics that also go missing in the objective 
representation of the "territory" as if fated to give way to settler governance (206).  
 Put another way, if, as Rifkin convincingly argues, Black Hawk's narrative "offers 
an alternative mapping to that of U.S. policy" largely through "insisting on the coherence 
of shared social processes that predate, and are seriously disrupted by, U.S. presence in 
the region," the corollary of disclosing this disruption is a counter-historicity that 
fractures the notion of the settler "state" to such an extent that the various U.S./Anglo 
elements intruding on Sauk lands cannot be said to add up to any kind of homogenous 
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whole ("Documenting" 686). For instance, Black Hawk's specific critique of the U.S.'s 
failure to follow through on promises to trade with the Sauk on credit (through Fort 
Madison), which he bluntly states forced most of the Sauk from neutrality to the British 
side in the War of 1812, registers as more than a mere failure of diplomacy and an 
oblique reflection of imperialist designs on the region more generally. This failure to 
come through with supplies necessary for the Sauk to proceed with the seasonal hunt 
damages relations with the U.S. and could be read as indexing a monolithic "whiteness," 
as an axiomatic geopolitical category; the text would seem to corroborate this view in 
questioning why the Great Spirit sent whites "to this island, to drive us from our homes, 
and introduce among us poisonous liquors, disease, and death? (23). Nevertheless, the 
wound created at Fort Madison was not enough to galvanize Black Hawk into joining the 
Winnebago uprising over a decade later, suggesting at once that such a transiting did not 
mean a permanent exile and that U.S. efforts to coerce the broader Sauk and Ojibwe 
alliance networks into remaining neutral were at least minimally productive. To Black 
Hawk, such a failure to come through on trade signals a duplicity that puts his people at 
risk. However, the critique of U.S.-sanctioned traders also registers only as a partial 
critique of the military apparatus with which they are but unevenly aligned. 
Foregrounding a geopolitics built on Indigenous networks of reciprocity divides an 
otherwise seemingly homogenous United States qua civilization into its own uneven and 
asymmetrical actors. This division undercuts the notion of a frontier space within which 
receding Indianness sustains a portrait of organization that, in turn, retroactively endows 
settler civilization with an imaginary cohesion and unity.  
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 In this way, criticizing the failure to come through on terms of exchange 
complements that of the juridical reach of settler sovereignty per the U.S. overreaching in 
the Fox murders. Moreover, the setter actors in each of these instances are different from 
the rabble that would form the bulk of the volunteer militia force, a group comprised 
largely of the same settlers who had earlier encroached upon Saukenuk (and the lead 
mines of the Sauk and Winnebago more generally over the previous five years). If we 
recall how the historicity evoked through future-anterior land cessions in the Northwest 
Ordinance renders settler emigration a structural element of the territory, its temporality, 
the ire that Black Hawk directs toward this rabble can be thought both as rendering this 
group structurally visible in their historical role as backwoods encroachers and, as such, 
immanently contravening a historicity within which illegal emigration loses its status as 
such. Black Hawk's description of how his people largely refrained from injuring those 
who had encroached on their lands during their winter hunts, a description that pivots on 
his ethical treatment of these "intruders," rhetorically aims to show to a settler audience 
that "we are a peaceable people" (57). However, reversing the valence of stereotypical 
Indian savagery involves disclosing the real, material shape of emigration and its effects: 
"...having permitted ten men to take possession of our corn-fields; prevent us from 
planting corn; burn and destroy our lodges; ill-treat our women; and beat to death our 
men, without resistance," his band's behavior offers "a lesson worthy for the white man to 
learn; to use forbearance when injured" (ibid.). Although the text situates the list of 
grievances as proof of Black Hawk's conduct and character, it also mobilizes an ethics 
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rooted in Sauk place-based peoplehood to throw into relief depredations that simply did 
not register as depredations within non-Native discourses on expansion into the region. 
 Though the backwoods rabble comprises on only one group within the dispersed 
but largely hostile annexation of Native space, they are shown as among the most vicious, 
in keeping with what historical records have come to disclose. Black Hawk notes that he 
would have remained at Saukenuk during the 1831 standoff and been "taken prisoner by 
the regulars [enlisted federal troops]" except that he was afraid of the violence he might 
elicit from the settler rabble who were apparently "under no restraint of their chiefs" (67). 
The text casts these "pale faces" diametrically opposite the "braves," a term that generally 
refers to Native warriors but that Black Hawk also extends to regular US troops and 
certain government representatives, such as President Jackson and Illinois territorial 
governor John Reynolds (who also commanded forces against Black Hawk). Key is that 
these "braves" are a crucial part of the very invasive juridical apparatus that Black Hawk 
heavily criticizes a few pages earlier. In fact, the text comes down most forcefully against 
"pale faces," whom he also refers to as "these settlers on our frontiers and on our lands" 
and strikingly contrasts them with whites living in the Appalachian mountains who 
appear to live by the principle "'do unto others as you wish them to do unto you,'" a 
reference that hearkens back to the geopolitical boundary line established by the British 
in the Proclamation of 1763 (90). And rightfully so, as those settlers who poured into the 
region by the hundreds of thousands after the War of 1812 and then into Winnebago and 
Sauk lands in particular by the thousands in the mid- to late 1820s were the primary 
encroachers that first drove the Sauk away from Saukenuk, settling on lands that had not 
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been sold and razing crops while the Sauk were away during winter. Further, these "pale 
faces," to whom Catlin, to his credit, obliquely refers in his journals as the insatiable 
hordes, not only formed the volunteer militias that determined the outcome of the war, 
but they also effectively began the war with the attack at Stillman's Run. Still more, they 
were largely responsible for the grotesque violence toward a retreating band of primarily 
starving women, children, and elderly desperately attempting to re-cross the Mississippi 
River at the Battle of Bad Axe that ended the conflict.19 
 Black Hawk's text occupies the imposed frame of exotic, receding Indianness to 
generate a narrative that, in describing the violent conflict, stresses how he tried 
repeatedly to withdraw peacefully and remove from his homelands. However, he was 
denied the opportunity to do so by a bloodthirsty white militia, on one hand, and U.S. 
officials who were eager to make an example of his supposedly stubborn attachment to 
the place of his birth, on the other. The larger point, though, is that despite such a horrific 
outcome, the text nonetheless refuses to view the conflict as a zero-sum game involving 
two sides, whites and Indians. Appropriating the narrativity of Indian withdrawal by way 
of Black Hawk's emergent celebrity provides the condition to destabilize both that 
Indianness and, by proxy, a reading that would situate the atrocity of Sauk dispossession 
as a merely an unfortunate page in the otherwise smooth transit of paradigmatic settler 
civilization. In offering a genealogical portrait of Sauk belonging, organized around Sauk 
alliance-networks and political processes, the narrative's representation of the conflict as 
a horrific, wildly uneven, and unapologetically genocidal affair cuts against a frontier 
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historicity that orients the territory, writ large, to the US through figures of receding 
Indianness.  
 The text can therefore be understood as a tactic at the level of knowledge-
production. Both the geopolitics and larger coherence of US expansion relies upon the 
narrativity of future-anterior Indian withdrawal to cast violent usurpation by multiple, 
differently situated, and structurally uneven settler actors retroactively as the smooth, 
inevitable unfolding of inevitable state formation. In this sense, the text both anticipates 
and corroborates Foucault's observation that the "state is nothing else but the mobile 
effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities" (Birth of Biopolitics 77). Although the 
larger discourse surrounding Black Hawk demonstrates a continuation of an earlier 
frontier historicity by framing Sauk dispossession through the spectacle of exotic and 
belated Indianness, the Life of Black Hawk quickly problematizes that narrativity by 
suspending the binary, future-anterior tense whereby the temporality of residual 
Indianness consolidates uneven intrusions and encroachments into Native space into the 
smooth, linear, and destined unfolding of the territory in accordance with settler 
governance. By showing territorialization as consisting in a multiplicity of violations of 
place-based Sauk sovereignty and peoplehood, Black Hawk negates the retroactive effect 
whereby receding Indianness orients Native lands to the U.S. via the historicity of the Old 
Northwest as a "territory." Conceived as a maneuver in a broader struggle for place-based 
sovereignty that has not ended, the text gives the final impression that one actor, namely 
the encroaching politico-juridical apparatus, may yet be played off of another, the 
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encroaching white rabble, and that, for Black Hawk, the matter was far from settled at the 
council of 1832.  
 
      ● 
 This chapter has sought to foreground the role that frontier historicity played 
facilitating Native dispossesion in the Old Northwest by rendering a notion of the 
territory as historically oriented to the United States through the narratives of receding 
Indianness. By way of narrating Indian withdrawal, the very objective space in which 
certain agendas appear as a means to dispossess and displace Indigenous peoples 
retroactively appears as already predicated on U.S. governance. Kirkland locates a 
"forward" in the possibility of egalitarian village-making, construed as an immanent, 
place-based alternative to the forms of unregulated encroachment and speculation that 
drove expansion. As Linda Tuhiwai Smith observes, however, what "makes ideas 'real' is 
the system[s] of knowledge, the formations of culture, and the relations of power in 
which [they] are located" (51). Accordingly, the figures of receding Indianness that 
Kirkland describes as scattered across the landscape help to construct a sense of reality 
within which the immanent and organic forming of community life at Montacute registers 
as a sustainable and authentic relation to place, especially in relation to rampant land 
speculation and predatory lending. Further, the text's indebtedness to this frontier 
historicity marks it as extending an objective violence toward place-based Native 
peoplehood already envisioned in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.  
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 These tropes of Indian withdrawal do not mis-recognize actual Native groups, 
though they do gesture to actual mechanisms of dispossession that Black Hawk discloses 
in greater detail. Rather, they render Indianness as a non-presence, one that endows the 
territory in its objectivity as destined for settler annexation. The narrative suggestion of 
this withdrawal through these supposedly real figures generates an "Old Northwest" as a 
territory whose objectivity largely consists in its being carved out for settlers in advance. 
In turn, Black Hawk's text can and should be read as a parallax view onto ongoing 
processes of displacement and dispossession in the region. However, I want to end with a 
comment on the narrative impression of necessity that the arc of this chapter may imply, 
and I would like to do so by briefly returning to my argument concerning the emergence 
of this frontier historicity.  
 Considering that the Northwest Ordinance outlines mechanisms for integrating 
territory that would be adapted later by Congress and come to shape Jefferson's Indian 
policy as president, its future-anterior tense might read as inaugurating a policy of 
subversion characteristic of later settler colonialism, as the aforementioned letter to 
Harrison written some fifteen years after the Ordinance would indicate. At the very least, 
predicting a point at which Native land rights will have been ceded anticipates the more 
aggressive and systemic use of treaties during the antebellum era to acquire Native lands 
in exchange for reservations further west, payments, and goods. However, this gap 
between the stated or surface (formal) discourse and its actual, subversive effects can be 
too quickly reduced to a more fundamental drive to dispossess Native peoples. Such a 
reading is symptomatic of methodological approaches to settler colonialism that, in Mark 
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Rifkin's words, risk "shorthand[ing] its workings" by representing it "as a fully integrated 
whole operating in smooth, consistent, and intentional ways across the sociospatial 
terrain it encompasses" (Settler 5). Presupposing such a drive as a historical causality in 
itself ironically minimizes the work that the document performs, which involves not 
simply collapsing and effacing the specificity of Native peoples and their claims from the 
political grid of intelligibility, but, in this case, also the obverse maneuver: positing a 
historicity via future-anterior land cessions that endows the territoriality of the space in 
question with meaning, in the abstract, as a temporal extension of settler belonging.  
 I think that it would therefore be a mistake to read the Ordinance, or Kirkland's 
novel for that matter, as reflecting or expressing a transcendent will-to-colonize. Treating 
the former as "expressing" colonialism in this way paradoxically situates the effacement 
of Native sovereignty. In turn, such a reading presumes both the givenness of settler 
claims over time and the capacity of the nation to enact them at what was undoubtedly a 
tenuous moment in U.S. history, as if such claims only needed to be legitimized rather 
than implemented. As against this presumption, I would reiterate that the effect of the 
production of knowledge on the space of the Old Northwest as transited through receding 
Indianness is to generate this very sense of historical necessity as the will of transcendent 
subject, of a single actor behind the curtain. And, as I think Black Hawk makes clear in 
foregrounding the multiplicity of Native and settler actors, intrusions, and agendas 
constitutive of settler expansion in the region, the supposed necessity of that movement 
remains an imported commodity.   




1 It should be noted that the letter to Harrison, though exceptional, is not the only place Jefferson 
underscores the coercive element of land exchange. In fact, in a letter dated just a week earlier than this 
one, he expressed a similar view to Benjamin Hawkins, former senator from North Carolina and US 
Indian agent in charge of dealing with southeastern Native peoples. There Jefferson observed that 
while Natives "are learning to do better on less land, our increasing numbers will be calling for more 
land, and thus a coincidence of interests will be produced," and pointedly added that "You are in the 
station peculiarly charged with this interchange, and [have] in your power to promote among the 
Indians a sense of the superior value of a little land, well cultivated, over a great deal, unimproved..." 
("To Benjamin Hawkins," 1115). 
 
2    The notion of the third space/middle ground can be thought pushing against an older historicism that 
reads the representations of Indians in non-Native literature as mainly fabricating a symbolic American 
identity and thereby synthesizing a unique national imaginary out of two otherwise discording 
elements: a vexed transatlantic cultural heritage and the New World landscape. Sollors' Beyond 
Ethnicity does the latter kind of work, but perhaps the definitive text in this vein is the incredibly 
researched opus Regeneration Through Violence, in which Richard Slotkin lays out a trans-historical 
archaeology of the different uses of the "Indian" as a myth-figure, crucially showing how narrative 
constructions of Indianness provide a flexible series of archetypes by which to narrate the development 
of American social and historical consciousness. The third space model, by contrast, privileges the 
performativity involved in cultural encounters, for Native and settler actors alike. For more, see the 
collection Native Acts, edited by Bellin and Mielke. Importantly, however, the afterword of this very 
volume, written by Philip Deloria, notes, albeit briefly, the difficulties in taking the idea of the middle 
ground (which Richard White developed with regard to the Ohio Valley region) as a transposable 
concept that can adequately explain Native-settler interactions elsewhere and at different times. 
 
3    For Žižek, however, the concept of objective violence is not simply an abstraction. Its historical and 
existential form is capitalism. The "mad, self-enhancing circulation of capital" as described by Marx 
"reaches its apogee in today's meta-reflexive speculation on futures"; it is therefore too simplistic to 
claim, he argues, "that the spectre of this self-engendering monster that pursues its path disregarding 
any human or environmental concern is an ideological abstraction and that behind this abstraction there 
are real people and natural objects on whose productive capacities and resources capital's circulation is 
based and on which it feeds like a gigantic parasite" (Žižek Violence 12). In contrast to this view, 
which seeks to retain the world molded by capitalism by locating its violence primarily "in our 
financial speculators' misperception of social reality," Žižek insists we read Marx as arguing that "the 
self-propelling metaphysical dance of capital…runs the show"; capitalism is Real in the sense that it 
determines the "structure of material social processes: the fate of whole strata of the population and 
sometimes whole countries can be decided by the 'solipsistic' speculative dance of capital" (Violence 
12).  
 
4    For a detailed analysis of this encroachments and the role they played in establishing a pan-Indian 
confederacy, see Lakomäki, 102-120. 
 
5     For instance, Miller adds that in 1786 Colonel George Rogers Clark, the officer in charge of the 
northwestern frontier during the Revolutionary War, organized and conducted raids on Miami and 
Shawnee villages along the Wabash River supposedly in retaliation for attacks made by Native 
warriors on anglo settlements near Vincennes, Indiana. Clark however acted without explicit approval 








6     See Calloway One Vast Winter Count 352-6, Shannon Iroquois Diplomacy on the Early American 
Frontier 165-9, and Richter Facing East from Indian Country 208-13. Complicating the issue of the 
boundary line was a treaty negotiated between the British and Iroquois at Fort Stanwix in 1768, sixteen 
years before the more familiar one negotiated between the US and the Six Nations at the same location. 
Land speculators and settlers from western New York and Pennsylvania had been angling for access to 
land in the Indian reserve for some time. The treaty carved out a chunk by drawing a new line that 
began in New York and stretched down to the Ohio River, following from there all the way to the 
Mississippi. However, the Iroquois had no claims to the lands ceded below the Ohio river, as these 
belonged primarily to Shawnee and Delaware peoples. Although members of each group were at the 
treaty conference, neither participated in the formal process itself, nor did they authorize the Iroquois to 
make the cession on their behalf. Further, William Johnson, the superintendent of Indian affairs for the 
northern region (a position also created in the aftermath of the Proclamation of 1763), went beyond his 
authority in allowing a group of private land interests, tellingly called the Suffering Traders, to 
negotiate with the Iroquois directly, prior to formal procedures. Finally, Johnson also extended the new 
line to the southwest from the Kanawaha to the Tennessee Rivers, well beyond the original distance 
approved by the British monarchy. The regional colonial authority then ordered Johnson to give the 
fraudulently ceded territory back. Nonetheless, the agreement immediately contributed to the flood of 
unsanctioned anglo emigration in the territory in the latter quarter of the 18th century, and it 
simultaneously galvanized the Shawnee who lived in the southern Ohio valley to resist such 
encroachments with force. 
 
7    Although the broader Iroquois council rejected the terms set at Fort Stanwix for their lands in New 
York and Pennsylvania, the US treated the agreement as legitimate. Similarly, the Treaty of Fort 
Finney polarized the Shawnees, as those who did not participate decried its outcome. These cessions 
accordingly set the stage for decades of not only Iroquois and Shawnee resistance but of broader pan-
Indian confederacies in the region. See Calloway The Shawnees and the War for America 77-84 and 
Richter 223-5. 
 
8    For More on Shay's Rebellion, in particular the role that processes of debt litigation played in 
catalyzing the movement, see Goldscheider. 
 
9     For more on the development of the Eerie Canal and the displacement of Iroquois peoples in western 
New York, see Rifkin Settler, 174-7. For more on the economics of the emigration influx in the 
western part of Michigan territory, including mining development and, in particular, the role that the 
American Fur Company played in extracting resources from what would become Iowa territory and 
thereby forcing the Sauk to cede more of their lands in order to trade for goods, see Rigal. For more on 
the Treaty of Detroit, see Gilpin 43-5 and Dunbar 146. Although what constitutes present-day 
Michigan derives from eleven treaties, from the 1795 Treaty of Greenville to the 1842 Treaty at 
LaPointe, conducted with different Native groups, the vast majority of the land was transferred to the 
US in five treaties. These include the 1807 treaty, the 1819 Treaty of Saginaw conducted with mostly 
Chippewa peoples, the Chicago Treaty of 1821 with the Ottawa, Chippewa, and Potawatomi, the 
Washington Treaty of 1836 with Ottawa and Chippewa peoples, and finally LaPointe, at which the 
Ojibwe ceded the far northwest quadrant between Lakes Superior and Michigan that opened onto 
Wisconsin territory, which the US cut away from Michigan the same year. In 1818, shortly after 
Indiana and Illinois became states, the remainders of their territories were annexed to Michigan. From 
then until 1834 the territory was enormous, reaching as far west as the Missouri river and containing 
modern-day Iowa, Minnesota, and parts of the Dakotas (Dunbar 182). 
 
10   For more on the economic and political conditions that led to the Panic of 1837, see Sánchez Reforming 
the World, 34-41. 
 
 




11   I use the term excessive deliberately to suggest two overlapping mechanisms. First, these Indians evoke 
a sense of Native peoples as tragic-yet-fated to fade in keeping with the general narrativity of the 
Indian as an exoticized spectacle so prevalent in the popular discourses on Natives at the time. For 
more on this general representation, see Conn and Richards. However, I also mean excessive in the 
sense of parallax, suggesting a phantasmatic remainder that cannot be included in reality precisely 
because its ejection/foreclosure is constitutive of the socio-symbolic texture underpinning a given view 
of reality. For more on this mechanism, see Žižek The Parallax View 20-36, Looking Awry 89-102 and 
Event 108-35. 
 
12   Black Hawk signed the treaty with William Clark, the famous explorer and then-governor of Missouri 
territory, in May 1816, although the US had pressured other Native groups into signing treaties that 
reaffirmed various land cessions in the region the previous year. The Sauk were among the last to hold 
out, and, as Patrick Jung observes, the US built two forts in Sauk territory so as to force the issue, Fort 
Edwards in the autumn of 1815 near Warsaw, Illinois and Fort Armstrong the following spring at Rock 
Island. See Jung, 29-32. 
 
13   Much of the scholarship on Life of Black Hawk rests on this kind of framing, in which the text's work, 
whether taken as a critique of depredations or an expression of indigeneity, reads both as belated rather 
than tactical and as manifesting, not mobilizing, a supposedly axiomatic Native-American binary. 
Arnold Krupat for instance argues that Black Hawk demonstrates a mode of elegiac expression unique 
to Native American peoples. This mode represents an example of what Vizenor terms "survivance" in 
that relaying the history of his life and interweaving traditional knowledge doubles as a means of 
reconstituting and extending the life of the broader Sauk nation. However, just because the text 
emphasizes and even foregrounds certain Sauk cultural practices does not necessarily mean that, in 
Krupat's words, "the story Black Hawk sought to tell in his autobiography is foremost the story of what 
it means to be a Sauk, i.e. a national rather than a personal story, expressing a 'communitist' rather than 
an individualist identity" (527). We would expect to find traces of Sauk culture in a text relayed by a 
Sauk, questions of intention aside. More problematically, Krupat's view methodologically presupposes 
a distinctly "western" division between cultural and political fields. He writes that though "Black Hawk 
surely wanted to make known to the whites the reasons for his resistance, he would as well have 
wanted to keep his story, his People's story, alive for the Sauk nation" (Krupat 543). Are these aims 
necessarily diametric impulses? What allows them to be read as such, one can suggest, is the 
presumption that Black Hawk indeed understood the conflict as irrevocably over. However, for this to 
be the case, we have to take Black Hawk as speaking literally, and not tactically as I am arguing here, 
when he indicates his defeatedness and subordination to settler authority figures like Patterson. In 
short, ironically enough, Krupat's view mandates we take the very tropes of Indianness as fallen, 
withdrawing, and the like emerging in this very era as methodological givens. To be fair, he isn't the 
only one who situates the very stereotypes that Black Hawk mobilizes as entry points to a critique of 
settler claims to land as tools, not objects, for analysis. Laura Mielke lumps Black Hawk's text together 
with William Apess's autobiography to suggest that while differing in the particular forms of white 
depredations they outline, both texts similarly "offer living, breathing Native Americans as moral 
exemplars for a culture whose military success has not guaranteed moral progress" ("'Native to the 
Question'" 260). S.L. Pratt takes the underlying ontological Native-American binary that supposedly 
guarantees a division between "Indian" and "White" cultures so far as to offer what reads as a 
rationalization of the very violence Black Hawk sought to disclose. He asserts that when "a people who 
find meaning in a transcendent chronology come to a land, it is hard for them to gain a place at all 
since their approach to meaning is one that understands the world as a process of displacement. The 
cost of such a people's survival is the nearly inevitable destruction of places and the forms of life they 








14    For more on the development of trade and political ties with the French in the early 17th century and 
the changes in geopolitical networks from that point, including ties with the Spanish and eventually the 
US, see Jung 15-20. 
 
15   It is important to clarify that both the French and the Iroquois played roles in this emigration, and that 
upon reaching the Ohio valley, the Sauk gained not only new allies but new Native enemies as well, 
namely the Sioux, Osage, and Cherokee peoples. See Jung 12-15.  
 
16   For instance, when Black Hawk describes the encounter General Edmund Gaines at a council meeting 
in June of 1831, after returning to Saukenuk with his band following the winter hunt, as he had claimed 
he would do, he claims that he responded to the latter's advice to "'leave the country you are 
occupying'" by stating that "we had never sold our country. We never received any annuities from our 
American father! And we are determined to hold on to our village," summarizing the rationale for his 
resistance in relation to the 1804 treaty. In a footnote to this passage, Gerald Kennedy writes that the 
refrain of "we" serves to indicate that Black Hawk meant to distinguish "between his band...and the 
larger Sauk and Fox nation led by Ke-o-kuck, which had accepted annuities," adding that, Ke-o-kuck 
being present, he also "insists upon his hereditary tribal identity to assert his lineage as a leader and 
implicitly to taunt the mixed-blooded Keokuck" (Black Hawk 105, n. 68). 
 
17   This aspect of the text's genealogical dynamics recalls George Ironstack's observation of traditional 
Miami place-based conceptions of peoplehood. He writes that the Miami origin narrative demonstrates 
how they "differentiated other groups of humans: by the language they spoke and the place from which 
they came," adding that their regional neighbors were generally referred to as "'elder brothers'"; this 
place-based dynamic only came to shift gradually with the imported notion of "tribe," which ultimately 
provided the cartographic means for creating "legal entities that could negotiate away the  title to land 
and thereby create a 'legitimate' context for American settlement of Indigenous lands" (187, 192). 
 
18   For a more detailed discussion of these dynamics, see Rifkin, "Documenting." 
 
19   Despite the fact that Black Hawk had tried to open diplomatic channels and that his group had 
dwindled from 1400 to around 500 due to defection and starvation, the forces that caught up showed 
little mercy with the retreating band during the Battle of Bad Axe, which consisted mainly of a few 
Sauk warriors trying to protect women, children, and elderly as they struggled desperately to swim 
across the Mississippi to safety. Rather than merely an effect of untrained militia, such a violent 
spectacle was implicitly encouraged, as President Jackson and Secretary of War Lewis Cass believed a 
diplomatic resolution would only encourage broader Native resistance. As a measure of deterrence, and 
to reassure the region's settlers, the band in Cass's words serve an "'example...the effect of which 
[would] be lasting'" (qtd. in Jung 120).  
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 CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION: PLACING SETTLER COLONIALISM  
IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIVE SOVEREIGNTY 
 
 This dissertation project explores the ways in which narrating an anachronistic 
Indian identity, or "Indianness," facilitates and/or sustains regionally-specific forms of 
Indigenous dispossession during the removal era. Because these forms map onto much 
longer regional histories of settler colonialism, they are irreducible to a single, dyadic 
interpretation of removal politics, one consisting more or less of a homogenous project of 
racialization. Rather, specific tropes of anachronistic Indianness (the anti-familial savage, 
the primordially noble warrior, and the receding, exoticized Other) retroactively 
consolidate various juridical, political, and territorial maneuvers against Native peoples in 
different parts of the country. As the previous chapters demonstrate, these tropes in other 
words correspond with different regional struggles over Native land. Rather than 
rationalizing U.S. claims writ large, each trope instead consolidates the claims of specific 
settler actors, which may include representatives of different federal institutions, private 
citizens, or figures in state government, among others, by generating a historicity that 
forecloses the intelligibility of Indigenous claims in the respective region. The project 
therefore substitutes a regional approach to the antebellum "Indian question" grounded in 
the primacy of Native sovereignty for a chronological one organized around settler 
political history. By foregrounding the multiplicity of settler claims to Native lands 
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within each region, this approach demonstrates the contingency involved in any given 
settler claim. Taken together, the regional configurations of Indianness mapped across the 
previous chapters show that testifying to the supposed legitimacy of settler sovereignty 
over specific Native lands involves positing the historical presupposition of such 
sovereignty, namely through historicizing Indianness.  
 Foregrounding how non-Native texts retroactively displace such contingency 
through the appeal to anachronistic Indianness also creates the space to reassess the 
rhetorical means by which Indigenous activists, such as Elias Boudinot, William Apess, 
and Black Hawk, made their different positions available to a non-Native public. From 
this view, speaking and writing within the frame of Indian anachronism does not merely 
signal these voices' indebtedness to the racialist presumptions of the period; instead, in 
each case the narrativity of Indianness marks the contours of a tactical engagement with 
the supposedly axiomatic status of settler claims to space, an engagement conditioned 
through non-Natives' prior mobilization(s) of an extra-political historicity to shore up 
territorial claims, which is to say to treat Native peoples as anything but sovereign 
polities. In short, one of the project's cornerstone ideas is that, for the Native activists 
discussed above, articulating Indigenous self-determination during the removal era 
required engaging with discourses of Indianness already integral to perpetuating and 
extending different settler claims to territory. These discourses provide the condition of 
possibility for resistance to ongoing settler colonialism(s). One could argue, however, 
that such an approach winds up privileging the same non-Native sovereignty whose 
apparent uniformity that the dissertation otherwise sets out to deconstruct. Doesn't 
 298 
privileging the discursive and narrative modalities of settler colonialism in this way wind 
up paradoxically re-centering settler sovereignty, at the very least in terms of 
methodology? I will answer this objection in what follows, since it gestures to a possible 
interpretation that threatens to undermine this dissertation's central aim: to move away 
from a binary reading of antebellum dispossession that, far from critically intervening in 
the history of removal, comprises one of its legacies within both academic and 
mainstream discourses on the topic. 
 Just as Black Hawk's autobiography problematizes rather than merely 
supplements the narrative of settler expansion into the Old Northwest, as the perhaps 
tragic but nevertheless fated course of History, the regional paradigm developed in this 
dissertation less supplements contemporary studies on the removal era than it decenters 
Cherokee removal as the implied frame for conceptualizing the removal period writ large. 
The pivot away from a conceptual through-line organized around a linear representation 
of the historical period and toward the simultaneous struggles of differently situated 
Native groups emphasizes the various workings of narrativity as a juridical and political 
maneuver at the time. There is no one-size-fits-all narrativity of the removal period. 
Instead, there are instead different narrativities (or historicities) predicated on regional 
tropes of Indianness that displace particular sets of Native claims precisely insofar as they 
cast the particularity of settler claims instead as the advent of settlement/civilization over 
some version of anachronistic Indianness. The relationships between a region's history of 
settler colonialism and the specific portraits of Indian anachronism that surface in 
discourses on that region are accordingly anything but arbitrary. As the project has 
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illustrated, the (im)mutable savage emerges out of the treaty-based civilization policy at 
work in the southeast, authentic and virtuous (yet primordial) Indian character is a 
longstanding element of New England reservation politics, and the notion of inevitable, 
westerly Indian withdrawal (along with its obverse casting of organized Native resistance 
to settler depredations as anomalous and irrational violence) articulates the earliest U.S. 
claims to the Old Northwest by supplying the very sense of the territory with a future-
anterior temporality, a point at which Indians will have ceded their lands and headed 
west.  
 Insofar as these relationships bespeak regional histories irreducible to a view of 
the removal era as predicated on a single Native/American binary, within which settler 
colonialism boils down to a universal project of racialization, they also underscore the 
fact that there is no single "Indian" identity that could adequately and evenly index all 
Indigenous peoples during the removal period. But, again, doesn't this point only further 
entrench the settler state, albeit inadvertently, by representing Native groups as a 
heterogeneous population distributed along an axis of settler recognition? I would 
respond by pointing to the crucial differences between my work and that of Maureen 
Konkle. While this project in many ways builds from Konkle's work, Writing Indian 
Nations treats the removal era as manifesting, in Patrick Wolfe's terms, a particular logic 
of elimination, namely racist Anglos' denial of the Indian's modernity and, in turn, 
political sovereignty. This perspective at the very least minimizes the complexity of 
competing claims to land and sovereignty as they unfolded in different parts of the 
country. Such an approach ironically reaffirms the givenness of settler sovereignty by 
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locating, in the place of largely distinct frames of Indigenous place-making and settler 
modalities of dispossession, essentially different versions of the same underlying 
Indian/American binary, one premised moreover on a linear notion of History implicitly 
oriented to the U.S. nation-state. Presuming the givenness of historical modernity in this 
way both presupposes further embeds the centrality of U.S. claims to Native place. A 
methodology predicated on reading removal through the lens of a binary project of 
racialization cannot but wind up privileging a narrativity akin to those that worked to 
retroactively cohere different settler claims to Indigenous territory in the first place.  
 If non-Native scholars are going to privilege Native sovereignty in a manner that 
both insists that removal is ongoing, that it is still happening, and yet refuses to treat the 
state as itself reducible to a Man behind the curtain, so to speak, an approach that 
implicitly casts removal policy as the symptom of a larger, quasi-historical will-to-
colonize, then we need to emphasize and continue to interrogate the irreducibility of one 
regional history of settler colonialism to another during the removal period. We should 
recognize that while, in retrospect, removal policy appears as a coherent and indeed 
systemic project organized a ubiquitous logic of racialization, a logic that defined the 
antebellum era but is only discernible from our current position long after the fact, this 
perspective also endows the period with a sense of uniformity and reason that its 
unfolding lacked. This narrative after-image of one of the most notorious periods in 
American history foregrounds the violence of dispossession and genocide, but it also 
retroactively consolidates the primacy and privilege of the settler state by representing 
settler actors on one side and Indians writ large on the other—a binary narrativity that 
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already surfaces as a maneuver against Native peoples during the removal period. As this 
dissertation has argued, the tremendous complexity of the politics of removal remains 
one of the critical blind spots in Americanist scholarship on Native history, perhaps 
precisely because its binary configuration is both a legacy and after-image of era itself 
rather than a simple methodological confusion.  
 In other words, the homogeneity of the removal period can be understood as a 
condition of possibility, although a problematic one, for even a sympathetic approach to 
the histories of Indigenous dispossession. To illustrate the point quickly, the 
aforementioned collection Native Acts: Indian Performance, 1603 – 1832 traces the role 
of performativity as a means of Native self-determination across different historical 
epochs—but only up to the point that the Indian is removed. By contrast, Kevin 
Bruyneel's The Third Space of Sovereignty: The Postcolonial Politics of U.S.-Indigenous 
Relations traces conflicts over boundary-making and the juridical dilemmas entailed for 
Native peoples working to resist the erosion of sovereignty from within the imposition of 
settler sovereignty. However, Bruyneel's analysis begins where the removal era leaves 
off, suggesting both that a binary understanding of removal politics is indispensable to 
the logic of the third space of sovereignty, further, that the early-antebellum moment is 
the indeed the point at which a properly postcolonial relationship between the U.S. and 
Indian nations took hold. 
 As against treating the meaning of removal, then and now, as a matter of historical 
fact, I would underscore the point at which this project converges with that of Maureen 
Konkle. I wholeheartedly share Konkle's emphasis on the inadequacy of multicultural 
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liberalism as a conceptual frame for thinking about Native peoples' efforts to resist 
conditions of dispossession. Insofar as Native resistance presupposes a sovereignty 
beyond the purview of the settler state, it accordingly exceeds a model of activism 
premised on securing rights denied to oppressed or otherwise marginalized subjects 
within the body politic. As Audra Simpson puts it, Native peoples are rarely understood 
in terms of "that which they are and wish to be recognized as: nationals with sovereign 
authority over their lives and over their membership and living within their own space" 
(Mohawk 16). As I see it, the politics of Native self-determination are first and foremost 
about recognizing and working to reinforce the place-based sovereignty of Native 
peoples, above and beyond any discussion/recognition of Native culture(s). In turn, 
working to reinforce this place-based sovereignty means for me, as a non-Native scholar 
working with Native history and materials, foregrounding and deconstructing the 
narrative structures that both derive from a disavowed legacy of settler colonialism and 
constitute the basis for maneuvers against Native sovereignty in the present.  
 There is perhaps no era within the broader history of U.S. settler colonialism 
greater mystified than the removal period itself, perhaps because this era remains integral 
to the predominant postcolonial/multiculturalist approach to Native history within and 
among settler academic, government, and cultural institutions. To take one final example, 
toward the end of his book-length essay "The (Post)Colonial Construction of Indian 
Country," Eric Cheyfitz takes issue with Craig Womack's well-known call for Native 
literary separatism and intellectual sovereignty in Red on Red: Native American Literary 
Separatism. Although sympathetic toward the politics underlying Womack's position, 
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which he sees as privileging "Native traditions of resistance to certain European cultural-
political influences," Cheyfitz nonetheless warns of the tendency to slip "into an 
ahistorical and atheoretical view of Indian communities," adding that such a slip "is not 
inevitable if intellectual sovereignty is understood as political, not absolute" 
("(Post)Colonial" 105). Given the material aspect of its Creek-centric focus, Womack's 
project would seem to avoid a problematic lapse into ahistoricism.1 After all, he himself 
makes clear that while the "literary aspect of sovereignty is not the same thing as the 
political status of Native nations, the two are, nonetheless, interdependent" (Womack Red 
14). However, the crux of the matter lies with Womack's assertion that Native criticism 
be premised on a question that postcolonialism fails to consider, namely "how do Indians 
view Indians?" (Red 13). Though admitting the "justness" of an Indian literary 
nationalism, Cheyfitz doubts the possibility of a politically-minded criticism centered 
entirely on Native views of Native culture. For him, Womack's question "is inevitably 
mediated by how the settlers view the Indians, for federal Indian law is nothing but the 
Western legal view of Indians by settlers," even as this view gradually factors in both 
"how Indians view settlers" and, in turn, "how settlers view settlers" (Cheyfitz 
"(Post)Colonial" 106).  
 The basic point that any serious and ethical criticism of Native literature must 
attend to different peoples' ongoing legal and political relations with the United States is 
well taken. About the only consistent feature of a federal Indian policy over two centuries 
in the making is its wavering between moments of subversion and those of genocide. For 
some Native peoples the destructive impact of Anglo settlement goes back another two 
 304 
centuries. Put simply, both this history and Native peoples' ongoing efforts toward self-
determination are indispensable touchstones for the non-Native reception of any such 
literature. Still, one can challenge the claim that federal Indian law is "nothing but the 
Western legal view of Indians by settlers." As Cheyfitz seems to suggest, mapping the 
ways that oppressive interventions and exploitive land policies mediate sovereign Native 
peoplehood over time appears a plausible endeavor, but tracing the latter's impact on 
settler governance and society by contrast seems an infinitely more complicated task, and 
possibly an incoherent one. Why should this be the case? As Cheyfitz's own phrasing 
shows, the long and fractious history of U.S.-Native geopolitics presents U.S. Indian law, 
its associated institutions, and the citizen-subjects that ostensibly authorize both the state 
and its doctrines as altogether facets of a larger, constitutive sphere of influence 
designated by the term "the West," despite the fact that this construct at best references an 
artificial unity. In fact, Cheyfitz's phrase morphs this unity from a methodological 
necessity to a kind of trans-historical agency in its own right, while it also casts federal 
Indian law as expressing both this agency and its lineage, as the material form this view 
necessarily takes and as such a testament to its power over time.  
 Yet is federal Indian law so thoroughly reducible to a Western "view" of Indians? 
This premise yields the thesis for the present study. One effect of such a view as 
discernible in political, legal, and cultural discourses is to project retroactively just this 
kind of cohesive binary and its accompanying narrativity as the deep truth of the removal 
era. Put another way, what if the Western view of the Indian that Cheyfitz implicitly (and 
perhaps inadvertently) depicts as a causal historical principle in itself is, rather, the 
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retroactive effect of an appeal to historicity working within such laws and their associated 
discourses, an appeal that dissimulates the sheer contingency involved in any particular 
settler claim? From this view, a historicity that poses as an absolute horizon would be the 
causative element leading us to imagine an Indian/Anglo binary as the core of U.S. 
geopolitical relations with Native peoples. Rather than pointing to a political history 
silenced by the dominant culture, settler law from this angle supplies its own extra-
juridical necessity through positing both its past and its future, thereby sustaining a linear 
narrative of History that presents itself as the condition of possibility for non-Natives' 
engagement with Native sovereignty. Further, the narrativity of history that enables such 
laws to transcend their immediate ethico-political situation(s), involving specific Native 
groups, is grounded in the imagined ontology of "the Indian." Yet, as this project has 
shown, treating this identity formation as a given category in its relation to the different 
histories of Indigenous peoples and their struggles against settler colonialism 
paradoxically reinforces settler sovereignty. It does so by introducing a seemingly 
authentic split between different Native polities, on one side, and the settler sociality that 
casts territories and peoples as already (in)compatible with the multimodal calculus of 
Euramerican governmentality, on the other. Foregrounding this maneuver involves 
bracketing the received narrativity of Indian Removal and emphasizing instead the 
manner in which settler-authored discourses generate a version of this very same split in 
the context of different regional struggles in the antebellum era. To foreground the 
narrativity of this binary and its different political manifestations during this time is to 
insist on the primacy and place(s) of Native sovereignty.  
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Notes 
1     Womack also writes that his work "assumes that the political history of the Creek Nation, the 
ceremonies that form the ritual knowledge of the tribe, and the oral tradition are central to an 
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